Asset Management

In 3 studies, participants made choices between hypothetical financial, environmental, and health gains and losses that took effect either immediately or with a delay of 1 or 10 years. In all 3 domains, choices indicated that gains were discounted more than losses. There were no significant differences in the discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes, but health gains were discounted more and health losses were discounted less than gains or losses in the other 2 domains.

Accounting is often criticized for omitting intangible assets from the balance sheet. With value in firms of today flowing less from tangibles assets and more from so-called intangibles—brands, distribution systems, supply chains, "knowledge capital," "organization capital"—accounting is seen as remiss, with high price-to-book ratios as evidence. The remedy often proposed involves booking these intangible assets to the balance sheet.

How public pension plan assets should be invested is an important but unsettled question. Some observers endorse the standard practice of investing heavily in higher yielding but riskier equities, reasoning that the higher average returns will reduce future required tax receipts and also help to reduce underfunding over time. Others advocate a more conservative approach that reduces the volatility of funding levels and the likelihood of severe shortfalls during economic downturns when government resources are already constrained.

Heterogeneity is ubiquitous in firm-level and sectoral data. Equilibrium models, however, typically assume a representative firm, as in Andrew B. Abel and Olivier J. Blanchard (1983). The representative firm paradigm leaves no role for the distribution of capital. We model capital reallocation in a general equilibrium model with two sectors. Capital adjustment costs capture illiquidity in our model, similar to Hirofumi Uzawa's (1969) capital installation technology.

This monograph focuses on the use of incomplete contracting models to study transfer pricing. Intrafirm pricing mechanisms affect division managers' incentives to trade intermediate products and to undertake relationship-specific investments so as to increase the gains from trade. Letting managers negotiate over the transaction is known to cause holdup (underinvestment) problems. Yet, in the absence of external markets, negotiations frequently outperform cost-based mechanisms, because negotiations aggregate cost and revenue information more efficiently into prices.

Affine jump-diffusion (AJD) processes constitute a large and widely used class of continuous-time asset pricing models that balance tractability and flexibility in matching market data. The prices of e.g., bonds, options, and other assets in AJD models are given by extended pricing transforms that have an exponential-affine form; these transforms have been characterized in great generality by Duffie et al. [2000. Transform analysis and asset pricing for affine jump-diffusions. Econometrica 68, 1343–1376].

We propose a new three-pronged plan to address the recent harmful flood of foreclosures. Our plan would address the major barriers that inhibit the ability of third-party servicers to modify mortgages the way portfolio lenders are now doing with greater success. The plan provides greater compensation for servicers to perform their duties, removes legal constraints that inhibit modification, and addresses critical second liens that often get in the way of effective mortgage modifications.

Several recent papers assume that private information (PIN), proposed by Easley et al. [2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 218–2221; 2004. Factoring information into returns. Working Paper, Cornell University], is a determinant of stock returns. We replicate Easley et al. (2002) and show that while PIN does predict future returns in the sample they analyze, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications and time periods.

Portfolio credit derivatives are contracts that are tied to an underlying portfolio of defaultable reference assets and have payoffs that depend on the default times of these assets. The hedging of credit derivatives involves the calculation of the sensitivity of the contract value with respect to changes in the credit spreads of the underlying assets, or, more generally, with respect to parameters of the default-time distributions. We derive and analyze Monte Carlo estimators of these sensitivities.