Asset Management

Many corporate executives view private equity as a last resort, as expensive capital that should be tapped only by companies that don't have access to presumably cheaper public equity. The reality of private equity, however, is more complex, and potentially quite rewarding, for both shareholders and management. This paper surveys some of the academic work on the costs and benefits of public vs. private equity, contrasting the private equity investment process with its public counterpart and exploring how such a process may add value.

We show that the accrual anomaly documented by Sloan (1996) [Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71: 289–315] is concentrated in firms with high idiosyncratic stock return volatility making it risky for risk-averse arbitrageurs to take positions in stocks with extreme accruals. Moreover, the accrual anomaly is found in low-price and low-volume stocks, suggesting that transaction costs impose further barriers to exploiting accrual mispricing.

Focusing on asset returns governed by a factor structure, the APT is a one-period model, in which preclusion of arbitrage over static portfolios of these assets leads to a linear relation between the expected return and its covariance with the factors. The APT, however, does not preclude arbitrage over dynamic portfolios. Consequently, applying the model to evaluate managed portfolios is contradictory to the no-arbitrage spirit of the model.

This paper examines inventory management from an incentive perspective. We show that when a manager has private information about future attainable revenues, the residual income performance measure based on historical cost can achieve optimal (second-best) incentives with regard to managerial effort as well as production and sales decisions. The LIFO (last-in—first-out) inventory flow rule is shown to be preferable to the FIFO (first-in—first-out) rule for the purpose of aligning incentives.

This paper lays out a comprehensive solution to the problem of accounting for claims based the performance of a firm's stock price. The accounting covers employee stock options, stock appreciation rights, put and call options, convertible debt and preferred stock, warrants, and other hybrid securities. This issue has vexed the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) who have approached the problem on a piecemeal basis, leading to inconsistent treatments of claims that in substance are very similar.

We develop a general equilibrium model of a production economy which has a risky production technology as well as a growth option to expand the scale of the productive sector of the economy. We show that when confronted with growth options, the representative consumer may sharply alter consumption rates to improve the likelihood of investment. This reduction in consumption is accompanied by an erosion of the option value of waiting to invest, leading to investment near the zero NPV threshold.

Bayesian learning implies decreasing weights on prior beliefs and increasing weights on the accuracy of the analyst?s past forecast record, as the number of forecast errors comprising her forecast record (its length) increases. Consistent with this model of investor learning, empirical tests show that investors? reactions to forecast news are increasing in the product of the accuracy and length of analysts? forecast records. Moreover, the Bayesian learning predicted by our model is more descriptive of investor reactions than is a static model which predicts that investors?

We survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine the factors that drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions. We find that managers would rather take economic actions that could have negative long-term consequences than make within-GAAP accounting choices to manage earnings. A surprising 78% of our sample admits to sacrificing long-term value to smooth earnings. Managers also work to maintain predictability in earnings and financial disclosures.