Macroeconomics

The Chinese earnings yield differential relative to the U.S. switches from negative to positive around 2009, with the aggregate variation masking substantial cross-sector variation. Changes in sectoral composition and (changing) growth expectations are not important determinants of the variation in China-U.S. valuation differentials. Instead, changes in ownership structure, and most importantly cross-sectional and temporal variation in financial openness, are the key contributors.

Along with its interrelated companion volume, The Content, Impact, and Regulation of Streaming Video, this book covers the next generation of TV—streaming online video, with details about its present and a broad perspective on the future. It reviews the new technical elements that are emerging, both in hardware and software, their long-term trend, and the implications. It discusses the emerging ‘media cloud’ of video and infrastructure platforms, and the organizational form of such TV.

Economic theory suggests that leaders may play key roles in enabling social movements to overcome collective action problems through a variety of distinct mechanisms. Empirical tests of these theories outside the lab are scarce due to both measurement and identification challenges. We conduct multiple field experiments to test theories of leadership in the context of Myanmar's burgeoning labor union movement. We collaborate with a confederation of labor unions as it mobilizes garment workers in the run-up to a national minimum wage negotiation. We present three sets of results.

We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk-averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk-averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante.

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive-form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extenstive-form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive-form with some information structure.

Since 1980, economic growth in the U.S. has been fastest in its largest cities. We show that a group of skill- and information-intensive service industries are responsible for all of this new urban bias in recent growth. We then propose a simple explanation centered around the interaction of three factors: the disproportionate reliance of these services on information and communication technology (ICT), the precipitous price decline for ICT capital since 1980, and the preexisting comparative advantage of cities in skilled services.

A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased toward higher actions. She can verify the agent's information and specify his permissible actions. We show that if the verification cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent either chooses an action below a threshold or requests verification and the efficient action above the threshold. For higher costs, however, the principal may require verification only for intermediate actions, dividing the delegation set.

We study the nature of firm pay dynamics using matched employer-employee and firm financials data from Sweden. To this end, we propose and estimate a statistical model that extends the seminal framework by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999b) to account for idiosyncratically time-varying firm pay policies. We validate the model by showing that firm-year pay estimates are systematically related to measures of firm performance.