Organizations & Markets

Under standard assumptions, individuals and the government are indifferent between traditional tax-deferred retirement accounts and “front-loaded” (Roth) accounts. Adding investment fees to this benchmark, individuals are still indifferent but the government is not. We show that under weak conditions firms charge equal percent fees under both systems, yielding higher dollar fees under Traditional. We estimate that tax deferral increases demand for asset management services by $3.8 trillion, costing the government $23.4 billion in annual fees.

We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to independently and identically distributed fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally responsible regime and a fiscally irresponsible regime, with transitions occurring during crises when fiscal needs are large. Under fiscal responsibility, governments limit their spending to avoid transitioning to fiscal irresponsibility.

In this letter, we summarize our recent work on the welfare impact of recommendation algorithms and propose questions for further study. We model recommendation algorithms as an information structure, which shapes how a third party takes actions that affect the welfare of different individuals in a population. Each recommendation algorithm thus induces a welfare profile, describing the expected payoffs of different individuals when the third party takes actions following the algorithm.

Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must coordinate members’ views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar’s burgeoning labor movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both ability and personality traits that enable them to influence others, yet they earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers’ views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union’s preferred policy.

We leverage Lachmann’s insight on elite conflict to explain the politics surrounding industry regulation in contemporary America and argue that conflicts between political elites create both constraints on industry players and opportunities for them to shape regulation. The widening urban-rural polarization of American society, in particular, has made urban political elites more liberal than those in state politics. The greater the political polarization of a state,  the more local restrictions the nascent U.S.

Acquisitions can shift the market structure of a digital platform in ways that affect subsequent entries and hence the platform’s base of complementors. Synergies that complementor acquirers accrue can be entry-deterring. We develop a two-by-two typology of acquisition synergies in a multisided platform based on the two sides of a platform market (user side or complementary-technology side) and two sources of synergies (scale or scope economies).

Organizational secrecy is central to national security, politics, business, technology, healthcare, and law, but its effects are largely unknown. Keeping organizational secrets creates social divides between those who are required to keep the secret and those who are not allowed to know it. We demonstrate that keeping organizational secrets simultaneously evokes feelings of social isolation and status, which have opposing effects on employee well-being.