Using panel data from a large hospital system, this paper presents estimates of the productivity effects of human capital in a team production environment. Proxying nurses' general human capital by education and their unit-specific human capital by experience on the nursing unit, we find that greater amounts of both types of human capital significantly improve patient outcomes.
This study uses micro data and an overlapping generations (OLG) model to show that general equilibrium (GE) forces are critical for understanding the relationship between aggregate fertility and household savings. First, we document that parents perceive children as an important source of old-age support and that, in partial equilibrium (PE), increased fertility lowers household savings. Then, we construct an OLG model that parametrically matches the PE empirical evidence.
This paper finds statistically and economically significant out-of-sample portfolio benefits for an investor who uses models of return predictability when forming optimal portfolios. The key is that investors must incorporate an ensemble of important features into their optimal portfolio problem, including time-varying volatility, and time-varying expected returns driven by improved predictors such as measures of yield that include share repurchase and issuance in addition to cash payouts. Moreover, investors need to account for estimation risk when forming optimal portfolios.
We structurally estimate a model in which agents' information processing biases can cause predictability in firms' asset returns and investment inefficiencies. We generalize the neoclassical investment model by allowing for two biases — overconfidence and over-extrapolation of trends — that distort agents' expectations of firm productivity. Our model's predictions closely match empirical data on asset pricing and firm behavior. The estimated bias parameters are well-identified and exhibit plausible magnitudes.
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents. Our first main result is that, in the best sustainable equilibrium, distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run.
We study the optimal composition of corporate boards. Directors can be either monitoring or advisory types. Monitoring constrains the empire-building tendency of chief executive officers (CEOs). If shareholders control the board nomination process, a non-monotonic relation ensues between agency problems and board composition. To preempt CEO entrenchment, shareholders may assemble an adviser-heavy board. If a powerful CEO influences the nomination process, this may result in a more monitor-heavy board.
We use panel data to examine the prediction of Merton's intertemporal CAPM that time varying risk premiums arise from the conditional covariances of returns on assets with the return on the market. We find a positive and significant risk-return tradeoff that is driven by the time series variation in the conditional covariances, and the risk-premium on the market remains positive and significant after controlling for additional state-variables. Our estimation method allows us to estimate the risk-return tradeoff in the ICAPM using a large number of test assets.
La télévision aborde aujourd'hui sa quatrième génération. D'emblée, je voudrais insister sur le fait qu'un point de vue typiquement américain sur ce sujet n'existe pas. Non seulement parce que les États-Unis sont un grand pays avec une population hétérogène, mais aussi parce que ce dont je vais vous parler est un sujet rarement discuté, autant dans le monde universitaire que dans le monde des entreprises.