Organizations & Markets

Cross-national research on social description documents that Westerners favor abstract linguistic categories (e.g., adjectives rather than verbs) more than East Asians. Whereas culture-related schemas are assumed to underlie these differences, no research has examined this directly. The present study used the cultural priming paradigm to distinguish the role of cultural schemas from alternative country-related explanations involving linguistic structures or educational experiences.

A major governance problem in closely-held corporations arising from the illiquidity of shares is the majority shareholders' expropriation of minority shareholders. As a solution, legal and finance research recommends that the main shareholder surrender some control to minority shareholders via ownership rights. We test this proposition on a large dataset of closely-held corporations. We find that shared-ownership firms report substantially larger return on assets (up to 14 percentage points) and lower expense-to-sales ratios.

This paper exploits India's rapid, comprehensive and externally imposed trade reform to establish a causal link between changes in tariffs and firm productivity. Pro-competitive forces, resulting from lower tariffs on final goods, as well as access to better inputs, due to lower input tariffs, both appear to have increased firm-level productivity, with input tariffs having a larger impact. The effect was strongest in import-competing industries and industries not subject to excessive domestic regulation.

Estimating the value of top managerial talent is a central topic of research that has attracted widespread attention from academics and practitioners. Yet, testing for the importance of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm outcomes is challenging. In this paper we test for the impact of CEOs on performance by assessing the effect of (1) CEO deaths and (2) the death of CEOs' immediate family members (spouse, parents, children, etc).

In this paper we study the determinants of business groups’ ownership structure using unique panel data on Korean chaebols. In particular, we attempt to understand how groups form over time. We find that chaebols grow vertically (that is, pyramidally) as the family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to set up and acquire firms that have low pledgeable income (e.g., low profitability) and high acquisition premia.

Organizational economics has advanced along two parallel tracks, one concerned with motivating agents with diverging objectives, the other — less developed — with coordinating agents under cognitive limits. This survey focuses on the second strand and attempts to bring the two strands together. Organizations are viewed as responses to the cognitive costs faced by their (potential) members.

The empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps (CDS).

Disparity between control and ownership rights gives rise to the risk of tunneling by the controlling shareholder. This disparity is prevalent in many emerging market economies and present in some developed countries. This paper studies whether and how the degree of control-ownership disparity in investors' home countries affects their portfolio choice in an emerging market. It combines two unique data sets on ownership and control in business groups, and investor-stock level foreign investment in Korea.