Organizations & Markets

The consumer electronics industry has been flat for several years. Hopes are now being pinned on the emergence of home networks. The theory goes that if consumers were able to "internetwork": that is, connect all their gadgets—from televisions to personal computers to digital video players to phones and anything in between—they would rush out to buy new toys and devices.

We provide a new rationale for pyramidal ownership in family business groups. A pyramid allows a family to access all retained earnings of a firm it already controls to set up a new firm, and to share the new firm's nondiverted payoff with shareholders of the original firm. Our model is consistent with recent evidence of a small separation between ownership and control in some pyramids, and can differentiate between pyramids and dual-class shares, even when either method can achieve the same deviation from one share–one vote.

We analyze the relationship between conglomerates' internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking (Stein, 1997 [Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources.

This 2005 roundtable addressed stock market valuation and its implications for a number of important corporate financial management functions, including internal performance evaluation and capital budgeting. Panelists included Tom Copeland of MIT, Bennett Stewart of Stern Stewart, Trevor Harris of Morgan Stanley, Stephen O'Byrne of Shareholder Value Advisors, Justin Pettit of UBS, David Wessels of University of Pennsylvania, and Don Chew of Morgan Stanley. John Martin of Baylor University and Sheridan Titman of University of Texas at Austin moderated.

This 2005 roundtable aimed to present corporate managers and academics with a more accurate picture of how influential and sophisticated investors really think and make decisions. Panelists included Andrew Alford of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Michael Corasaniti of Pequot Capital, Steve Galbraith of Maverick Capital, Mitch Julis of Canyon Capital, Andrew Lacey of Lazard Asset Management, Michael Mauboussin of Legg Mason, Henry McVey of Morgan Stanley, and Stephen Penman of Columbia University. Trevor Harris of Morgan Stanley moderated the discussion.

Workforce diversity continues to be a key focus for organizations, driven by globalization of the U.S. economy and the desire for organizations to more accurately reflect the demographic diversity of the US population. Yet, most research on diversity in organizations has focused on the outcomes associated with workforce diversity and not on the processes that can enhance diversity in organizations.

What is the effect of liberalizing a country's broadcasting system on the level of information of its citizens? To analyze this question, we first construct a model of state monopoly broadcasting where the government selects the amount of television news coverage of different public policy outcomes, and then sets public policy and political rents. Voters vote retrospectively given the news provided. In equilibrium, the incumbent provides some news coverage, and more so to groups for which reducing policy uncertainty is more important.

The provision of choice in terms of how people use goods and services has been proposed as a vehicle of improvement of social welfare. This article highlights some of the costs and benefits of creating choice, and it discusses how much choice policy makers and other agents (e.g., employers, retailers) should ideally grant and in what form they should grant it.