



## What are uncertainty shocks?

Nicholas Kozeniauskas<sup>a,\*</sup>, Anna Orlik<sup>b,1</sup>, Laura Veldkamp<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Banco de Portugal, Avenida Almirante Reis 71, 1150-012 Lisbon, Portugal

<sup>b</sup> Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551, United States

<sup>c</sup> Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, Department of Finance, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, United States



### ARTICLE INFO

#### Article history:

Received 22 June 2016

Revised 25 June 2018

Accepted 27 June 2018

Available online 28 June 2018

#### JEL classification:

E32

E37

#### Keywords:

Uncertainty shocks

Disaster risk

Aggregate fluctuations

Surveys of expectations

Firm dispersion

### ABSTRACT

Many modern business cycle models use uncertainty shocks to generate aggregate fluctuations. However, uncertainty is measured in a variety of ways. Our analysis shows that the measures are not the same, either statistically or conceptually, raising the question of whether fluctuations in them are actually generated by the same phenomenon. We propose a mechanism that generates realistic micro dispersion (cross-sectional variance of firm-level outcomes), higher-order uncertainty (disagreement) and macro uncertainty (uncertainty about macro outcomes) from changes in macro volatility. If we want to consider “uncertainty shocks” as a unified phenomenon, these results show what such a shock might actually entail.

© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

## 1. Introduction

One of the primary innovations in modern business cycle research is the idea that uncertainty shocks drive aggregate fluctuations. A recent literature starting with Bloom (2009) demonstrates that uncertainty shocks can explain business cycles, financial crises and asset price fluctuations with great success (e.g., Bloom et al., 2018; Ordoñez, 2013; Pastor and Veronesi, 2012). But the measures of uncertainty are wide-ranging. Changes in the volatility of stock prices (VIX), disagreement among macro forecasters, and the cross-sectional dispersion in firms’ earnings growth, while all used as measures of uncertainty, are not the same. Comparing VIX and firm earnings growth dispersion is like comparing business cycle volatility and income growth inequality. One measures aggregate changes in the time-series and the other differences in a cross-section. Are these disparate measures really capturing a common underlying shock? If so, what is it? Uncertainty is not exogenous. People do not spontaneously become uncertain, for no good reason. One person might. But a whole economy changing its beliefs, unprompted, is collective mania. Instead, people become uncertain after observing an event that makes them question future outcomes. That raises the question: What sorts of events can make agents uncertain in a way that shows up in all these disparate measures? Uncovering the answer to this question opens the door to understanding what this uncertainty shock is and why the aggregate economy fluctuates.

\* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [nic.j.koz@nyu.edu](mailto:nic.j.koz@nyu.edu) (N. Kozeniauskas).

<sup>1</sup> The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve or the Federal Reserve System.

This paper contributes to answering these questions in the following ways. First it shows that the various measures of uncertainty are statistically distinct. While most measures of uncertainty are positively correlated after controlling for the business cycle, even the most correlated measures have correlations that are far from unity and some measures have correlations close to zero. Thus it is not obvious that these various measures of uncertainty are measuring the same shock to the economy. Using a model we show that, depending on the type of shock, different types of uncertainty can covary positively or negatively. The fact that these distinct measures are conflated in the literature is troubling because it means that there is not one uncertainty shock that explains the various aggregate outcomes linked to uncertainty. The discovery of many different shocks that explain many different outcomes is not the unified theory of fluctuations one would hope for. To unify uncertainty measures a model is used to identify a type of shock that can generate comovement in the different types of uncertainty that is consistent with the data. The model shows that changes in macroeconomic volatility are a quantitatively plausible explanation.

Section 2 starts with a statistical exploration of various uncertainty measures. These measures are organized into three categories: measures of uncertainty about macroeconomic outcomes (*macro uncertainty*); measures of the dispersion of firm outcomes (*micro dispersion*); and measures of the uncertainty that people have about what others believe (*higher-order uncertainty*). The first result is that some measures are statistically unrelated to others, except for the fact that all are countercyclical. However, the data offers some hope for resuscitating uncertainty shocks as a unified phenomenon. Statistically there is a rationale for the practice of assigning a common name to some of these time-series, cross-sectional, output, price and forecast measures: A set of measures of these three types of uncertainty and dispersion have some common fluctuations at their core. This is not just a business cycle effect. These measures comove significantly above and beyond what the cycle alone can explain.

To understand these correlations and attempt to identify what kind of shock could generate them, a model is used (Section 3). In the model agents observe events, receive some private information, update beliefs with Bayes' law, form expectations and choose economic inputs in production. In this framework the three types of uncertainty and dispersion are formally defined and solved for. The model has three possible second moment shocks that could generate fluctuations in uncertainty: changes in public signal noise, changes in private signal noise and changes in macro volatility. An increase in signal noise represents the idea that some information sources, such as news, ratings, or insights from a person's contacts might be less reliable or more open to interpretation.

Section 4 investigates the implications of the three possible shocks to the economy for the covariance of the three types of uncertainty and dispersion. The analysis shows that it is not given that the three types of uncertainty and dispersion are positively correlated. Their correlations can be negative. This shows that the different types of uncertainty are theoretically distinct. Therefore if we want to think of the various uncertainty shocks as a unified phenomenon, then there needs to be a common origin for them. The negative correlations can arise when there are shocks to signal noise. For example, when signals are noisier, they convey less information, leaving agents with more macro uncertainty. At the same time, noisier signals get less weight in agents' beliefs. Since differences in signals are the source of agents' disagreement, weighting them less reduces disagreement, which results in less dispersed firm decisions (lower micro dispersion) and less dispersed forecasts (lower higher-order uncertainty).

In contrast, macro volatility fluctuations are a reliable common cause of the disparate collection of changes referred to as uncertainty shocks. Macro volatility creates macro uncertainty by making prior macro outcomes less accurate predictors of future outcomes. They create dispersion because when agents' prior information is less accurate, they weight that prior information less and weight signals more. This change in signal weighting generates greater differences in beliefs. Prior realizations are public information: Everyone saw the same GDP yesterday. But signals are heterogeneous. While one firm may incorporate their firm's sales numbers, another will examine its competitors' prices, and yet another will purchase a forecast from one of many providers. When macro uncertainty rises and prior realizations are weighted less, these heterogeneous sources of information are weighted more, driving beliefs apart.

Divergent beliefs (forecasts) create higher-order uncertainty and micro dispersion. When forecasts differ, and the difference is based on information others did not observe, another person's forecast becomes harder to predict. This is higher-order uncertainty. Firms with divergent forecasts also choose different inputs and obtain different outputs. This is more micro dispersion. All three forms of uncertainty and their covariance can be explained in a unified framework that brings us one step closer to understanding what causes business cycle fluctuations.

While our model points to plausible sources of uncertainty measure comovement, it misses a mechanism to make uncertainty countercyclical. Of course one could assume that macro volatility rises in recessions, as many theories do. But since our goal is to uncover sources of fluctuations, it makes sense to ask why. To explain why uncertainty is countercyclical, the model needs one additional ingredient: disaster risk. Disaster risk is incorporated by allowing the TFP growth process to have non-normal innovations. Normal distributions have thin tails, which makes disasters incredibly unlikely, and are symmetric so that disasters and miracles are equally likely. This is not what the data looks like. GDP growth is negatively skewed and our extension allows the model to have this feature. Disaster risk is important for understanding uncertainty because disaster probabilities are difficult to assess, so a rise in disaster risk creates both uncertainty about aggregate outcomes (macro uncertainty) and disagreement; and this is especially so in recessions when disasters are more likely.

Section 5 explores whether our model is quantitatively plausible. The simple model presented in Section 3 generates half of the fluctuations and most of the correlations of the various uncertainty measures. Adding disaster risk makes these uncertainty measures countercyclical. It also amplifies uncertainty fluctuations. The reason is that disasters are rare and

difficult to predict. When outcomes are difficult to predict, firms disagree (higher-order uncertainty); they make different input choices and have heterogeneous outcomes (micro dispersion). With the learning and disaster risk mechanisms operating together, the model is able to generate over two thirds of the fluctuations in the various uncertainty measures. The uncertainty measures also comove appropriately with the business cycle and each other.

### 1.1. Related literature

In his seminal paper, Bloom (2009) showed that various measures of uncertainty are countercyclical and studied the ability of uncertainty shocks to explain business cycle fluctuations. Since then, many other papers have further investigated uncertainty shocks as a driving force for business cycles.<sup>2</sup> A related strand of literature studies the impact of uncertainty shocks on asset prices.<sup>3</sup> Our paper complements this literature by investigating the nature and origins of their exogenous uncertainty shocks.

A few recent papers also question the origins of uncertainty shocks. Some propose reasons for macro uncertainty to fluctuate.<sup>4</sup> Others explain why micro dispersion is countercyclical.<sup>5</sup> Ludvigson et al. (2018) use statistical projection methods to argue that output fluctuations can cause uncertainty fluctuations or the other way around, depending on the type of uncertainty. Our paper differs because it explains not just statistically, but also economically, why dispersion across firms and forecasters is connected to uncertainty about aggregate outcomes, beyond what the business cycle can explain.

Finally, the tail risk mechanism that amplifies uncertainty changes in our quantitative exercise (Section 5) is also used in Orlik and Veldkamp (2015) to explain why macro uncertainty fluctuates and in Kozlowski et al. (2017) to explain business cycle persistence. This paper takes such macro changes as given and uses tail risk to amplify micro dispersion and higher-order uncertainty covariance. The models in these other papers do not have heterogeneity in beliefs, and therefore cannot possibly address the central question of this paper: the distinction and connections between aggregate outcome uncertainty, micro dispersion and belief heterogeneity.

## 2. Uncertainty measures and uncertainty facts

This section makes two points. First, different types of uncertainty are statistically distinct—they have correlations that are far less than one—which raises the question of whether they should be treated as the same phenomenon. Second, some measures have a significant positive relationship above and beyond the business cycle, which suggests that there is a force that links them. This section starts with measurement and definitions. We discuss three types of uncertainty that have been used in the literature and introduce various measures of them. While it is well known that these measures are countercyclical, less is known about the relationship *between* the different types of uncertainty, which is our focus.

Conceptually there are three types of uncertainty that have been used in existing research. In some papers an uncertainty shock means that an aggregate variable, such as GDP, becomes less predictable.<sup>6</sup> This will be referred to as *macro uncertainty*. In other papers an uncertainty shock describes an increase in the uncertainty that firms have about their own outcomes due to changes in idiosyncratic variables. This is *micro uncertainty*.<sup>7</sup> *Higher-order uncertainty* describes the uncertainty that people have about others' beliefs, which usually arises when forecasts differ.<sup>8</sup>

To measure macro uncertainty, it would be ideal to know the variance (or confidence bounds) of peoples' beliefs about future macro outcomes. A common proxy for this is the VIX, which is a measure of the future volatility of the stock market, implied by options prices. To the extent that macro outcomes are reflected in stock prices and the assumptions underlying options pricing formulas are correct, this is a measure of the unpredictability of future aggregate outcomes, or macro uncertainty. Bloom (2009) constructs a series for macro uncertainty based on this and extends it back in time using the actual volatility of stock prices for earlier periods in which the VIX is not available. This series will be referred to as *VIX*. Full details of this measure and all of the uncertainty measures used in this paper are provided in the online appendix.<sup>9</sup> A second proxy for macro uncertainty is the average absolute error of GDP growth forecasts, labeled *forecast errors* from here on. Assuming more uncertainty is associated with more volatile future outcomes, forecast errors will be higher on average when uncertainty is higher. This measure is constructed using data on real GDP growth forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The third measure of macro uncertainty comes from Jurado et al. (2015) and will be called the

<sup>2</sup> e.g., Bloom et al. (2018), Basu and Bundick (2017), Bianchi et al. (2018), Arellano et al. (2018), Christiano et al. (2014), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Schaal (2017). Bachmann and Bayer (2013) dispute the effect of uncertainty on aggregate activity.

<sup>3</sup> e.g., Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) and Pastor and Veronesi (2012).

<sup>4</sup> In Nimark (2014), the publication of a signal conveys that the true event is far away from the mean, which increases macro uncertainty. Benhabib et al. (2016) consider endogenous information acquisition. In Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2017) less economic activity generates less data, which increases uncertainty.


<sup>5</sup> Bachmann and Moscarini (2012) argue that price dispersion rises in recessions because it is less costly for firms to experiment with their prices than Decker et al. (2016) argue that firms have more volatile outcomes in recessions because they can access fewer markets and so diversify less.

<sup>6</sup> For macro uncertainty shocks see, for example, Basu and Bundick (2017) and Bianchi et al. (2018) on business cycles, and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) and Pastor and Veronesi (2012) in the asset pricing literature.

<sup>7</sup> For micro uncertainty shocks see, for example, Arellano et al. (2018), Christiano et al. (2014), Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Schaal (2017).

<sup>8</sup> Angeletos and La'O (2013), Angeletos et al. (2018) and Benhabib et al. (2015) all use higher-order uncertainty.

<sup>9</sup> The online appendix is available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.06.004>.



**Fig. 1.** Uncertainty correlations.

*Notes:* Correlation of each measure of uncertainty with the measures of the other types of uncertainty. VIX is a measure of uncertainty for 1962Q2–2008Q2 based on the volatility (realized and implied by options prices) of the stock market from Bloom (2009). Forecast errors is the average absolute error of GDP growth forecasts from the SPF for 1968Q3–2011Q3. JLN is the macro uncertainty measure from Jurado et al. (2015) for 1960Q4–2016Q4. Sales growth is the interquartile range of sales growth for Compustat firms for 1962Q1–2009Q3. TFP shocks is the interquartile range of TFP shocks for manufacturing establishments in the Census of Manufacturers and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers for 1972–2011 (annual data). Stock returns is the interquartile range of stocks returns for public firms for 1960Q1–2010Q3. SPF forecasts is the standard deviation of real GDP growth forecasts from the SPF for 1968Q3–2011Q3. Blue Chip forecasts is the standard deviation of real GDP growth forecasts from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators dataset for 1984Q3–2016Q4. For correlations with TFP shocks the other variables are averaged over the four quarters of each year. All uncertainty series are detrended. Additional details of the data are in the online appendix.

JLN uncertainty series in reference to those authors' names. Their measure of macro uncertainty is an econometric measure based on the variance of forecasts of macro variables made using a very rich dataset.

True micro uncertainty is difficult to measure because data on firms' beliefs is rare. Dispersion of firm outcomes often proxies for micro uncertainty. Series of this kind will be referred to as measures of *micro dispersion*. Section 4 discusses how closely related micro dispersion and micro uncertainty are in the context of our model. We use three measures of micro dispersion which are constructed in Bloom et al. (2018). The first is the interquartile range of firm sales growth for Compustat firms. The second is the interquartile range of stock returns for public firms. Third is the interquartile range of manufacturing establishment TFP shocks, which is constructed using data from the Census of Manufacturers and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. These three series will be referred to as *sales growth dispersion*, *stock return dispersion* and *TFP shocks dispersion*, respectively.

To measure higher-order uncertainty two forecasting datasets are used, the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Both datasets provide information on the forecasts of macro variables made by professional forecasters. Higher-order uncertainty is computed with each dataset as the cross-sectional standard deviation of GDP growth forecasts and these series will be referred to as *SPF forecasts* and *Blue Chip forecasts*, respectively.

The first question that is investigated with the data is whether these different types of uncertainty are statistically distinct. So far the uncertainty shocks literature has focused on the fact that all types of uncertainty are countercyclical and therefore treated them as a single phenomenon. If they really are the same phenomenon then they should comove very closely. This idea is simple to test by computing the correlations between our uncertainty measures. To do this all series are detrended using a HP filter and then the correlations between each measure of uncertainty and all the measures of the other types of uncertainty are computed (e.g., take a measure of macro uncertainty and correlate it with all the measures of micro dispersion and higher-order uncertainty). This produces 42 correlations which are plotted in Fig. 1. A table of the individual correlations is provided in the online appendix. The results show that the correlations for all measures of uncertainty are far from one. The maximum correlation is 0.62, the mean is 0.32 and several correlations are close to zero. Thus despite all three types of uncertainty being countercyclical, they each fluctuate in a distinct way.

The variation in the fluctuations of the three types of uncertainty raises the question of whether these are three independent phenomena that are all countercyclical, or whether they have a tighter link. This is investigated by assessing whether there is a positive relationship between them that holds above and beyond the business cycle. Specifically, the approach is to regress each measure of uncertainty on the measures of the other types of uncertainty controlling for the real GDP growth rate:

$$u_{1t} = \alpha + \beta u_{2t} + \gamma \Delta y_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad (1)$$

where  $u_{1t}$  and  $u_{2t}$  are two measures uncertainty for period  $t$  and  $\Delta y_t$  is real GDP growth for period  $t$ . Again, the data are detrended before performing the analysis and the units are the percentage deviation from trend. Therefore  $\beta = 1$  means that

**Table 1**  
Coefficients for uncertainty regressions controlling for the business cycle.

<b>(a) Macro uncertainty</b>	<b>VIX</b>	<b>Forecast errors</b>	<b>JLN</b>
<i>Micro dispersion</i>			
Sales growth	0.33** (0.15)	0.66*** (0.21)	0.18*** (0.03)
TFP shock	0.94 (0.60)	2.27** (0.87)	0.17* (0.10)
Stock returns	0.77*** (0.10)	1.14*** (0.26)	0.23*** (0.02)
<i>Higher-order uncertainty</i>			
SPF forecasts	0.14** (0.06)	0.23* (0.14)	0.05*** (0.02)
Blue Chip forecasts	0.08 (0.10)	−0.20 (0.26)	0.12*** (0.02)
<b>(b) Micro dispersion</b>	<b>Sales growth</b>	<b>TFP shock</b>	<b>Stock returns</b>
<i>Macro uncertainty</i>			
VIX	0.08** (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.34*** (0.04)
Forecast errors	0.09*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
JLN	0.91*** (0.15)	0.46* (0.26)	1.38*** (0.14)
<i>Higher-order uncertainty</i>			
SPF forecasts	0.13*** (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)
Blue Chip forecasts	0.23*** (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)	0.14** (0.07)
<b>(c) Higher-order uncertainty</b>	<b>SPF forecasts</b>	<b>Blue Chip forecasts</b>	
<i>Macro uncertainty</i>			
VIX	0.28** (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)	
Forecast errors	0.07* (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	
JLN	1.14*** (0.35)	2.07*** (0.35)	
<i>Micro dispersion</i>			
Sales growth	0.37*** (0.13)	0.41*** (0.13)	
TFP shock	−0.42 (0.51)	0.34 (0.52)	
Stock returns	0.48*** (0.14)	0.30** (0.14)	

Notes: This table shows the value of the  $\beta$  coefficient for the regression specified in Eq. (1). Standard errors are in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance with respect to zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All uncertainty series are detrended and put in percentage deviations from trend units. See the notes to Fig. 1 for details of the series.

a 1% deviation in the right hand side uncertainty measure is associated with a 1% deviation in the left hand side uncertainty measure. In Table 1 the  $\beta$  coefficients are reported from these regressions.

The results show that most of the uncertainty measures have a positive and statistically significant relationship with each other. Aside from two series—the TFP shock measure of micro dispersion and the Blue Chip Economic Indicators measure of higher-order uncertainty—all of the series have a positive relationship with each other that's significant: for one pair of series the significance is at the 10% level, for two pairs of series it is at 5% and for all the others it is at 1%. This indicates that there is some force in the economy beyond cyclical fluctuations that links these types of uncertainty.

### 3. Model

To make sense of the facts about macro uncertainty, higher-order uncertainty, and micro dispersion, we need a model with uncertainty about some aggregate production-relevant outcome, a source of belief differences, and firms that use their beliefs to make potentially heterogeneous production decisions. To keep our message as transparent as possible, it is assumed that production is linear in labor alone. Since TFP is the key state variable, macro uncertainty comes from uncertainty about how productive current-period production will be (TFP). Belief differences arise from heterogeneous signals about that TFP. To capture the idea that some, but not all, of peoples' information comes from common sources, the TFP signals have public and private signal noise. Finally, the model needs an exogenous shock that might plausibly affect all three uncertainties. The model allows for three possibilities for this. One is a time-varying variance of TFP innovations. The

second and third are time-varying variances of public and private signal noise. This section formalizes these assumptions and describes the model's solution.

### 3.1. Environment

Time is discrete and starts in period 0. There is a unit mass of firms in the economy with each firm comprised of a representative agent who can decide how much to work. Agent  $i$ 's utility in period  $t$  depends on his output  $Q_{it}$  and the effort cost of his labor  $L_{it}$ :

$$U_{it} = Q_{it} - L_{it}^\gamma \quad (2)$$

for some  $\gamma > 1$ . Output depends on labor effort and productivity  $A_t$ :

$$Q_{it} = A_t L_{it}. \quad (3)$$

Aggregate output is  $Q_t \equiv \int Q_{it} di$  and GDP growth is  $\Delta q_t \equiv \log Q_t - \log Q_{t-1}$ .

The growth rate of productivity at time  $t$ ,  $\Delta a_t \equiv \log(A_t) - \log(A_{t-1})$ , is:

$$\Delta a_t = \alpha_0 + \sigma_t \epsilon_t. \quad (4)$$

where  $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, 1)$  and draws are independent. The key feature of this equation is that the variance of TFP growth,  $\sigma_t^2$ , can be time-varying. This will be one of the potential sources of uncertainty shocks discussed in the next section.

Agent  $i$  makes his labor choice  $L_{it}$  at the end of period  $t - 1$ . His objective is to maximize expected period  $t$  utility.<sup>10</sup> The agent makes this decision at the end of period  $t - 1$ . At this point it is assumed that the agent knows  $\sigma_t$  but  $\epsilon_t$  has not yet been realized so he does not know productivity  $A_t$ . This assumption holds if  $\sigma_t^2$  follows a GARCH process, for example, as it will later in the paper.

At the end of period  $t - 1$  each agent observes an unbiased signal about TFP growth which has both public (common) noise and private noise:

$$z_{i,t-1} = \Delta a_t + \eta_{t-1} + \psi_{i,t-1}, \quad (5)$$

where  $\eta_{t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2)$  and  $\psi_{i,t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2)$ .<sup>11</sup> All draws of the public and private noise shocks, the  $\eta_{t-1}$ 's and  $\psi_{i,t-1}$ 's, are independent of each other.<sup>12</sup> The variances of public and private signal noises are allowed to vary over time, so they are potential sources of uncertainty shocks. The information set of firm  $i$  at the end of period  $t - 1$  is  $\mathcal{I}_{i,t-1} = \{A^{t-1}, z_{i,t-1}\}$ , where  $A^{t-1} \equiv \{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{t-1}\}$ . Agents know the history of their private signals as well, but since signals are about  $X_t$  which is revealed after production at the end of each period,<sup>13</sup> past signals contain no additional relevant information.

### 3.2. Solution to the firm's problem

The first-order condition for agent  $i$ 's choice of period  $t$  labor is:

$$L_{it} = \left( \frac{E[A_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}]}{\gamma} \right)^{1/(\gamma-1)}. \quad (6)$$

In order to make his choice of labor the agent must forecast productivity. He forms a prior belief about TFP growth and then updates using his idiosyncratic signal. To form his prior belief he uses his knowledge of the mean of TFP growth in Eq. (4):  $E[\Delta a_t | A^{t-1}] = \alpha_0$ . The agent's prior belief is that  $\Delta a_t$  is normally distributed with mean  $\alpha_0$  and variance  $V[\Delta a_t | A^{t-1}] = \sigma_t^2$ .

At the end of period  $t - 1$ , the agent receives a signal with precision  $(\sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2)^{-1}$  and updates his beliefs according to Bayes' law. The updated posterior forecast of TFP growth is a weighted sum of the prior belief and the signal:

$$E[\Delta a_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}] = (1 - \omega_{t-1})\alpha_0 + \omega_{t-1}z_{i,t-1}, \quad (7)$$

where

$$\omega_{t-1} \equiv [(\sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2)(\sigma_t^{-2} + (\sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2)^{-1})]^{-1}. \quad (8)$$

<sup>10</sup> Decisions at time  $t$  have no effect on future utility so the agent is also maximizing expected discounted utility.

<sup>11</sup> These correlated signals also allow us to investigate the extreme cases of purely public and purely private signals. Pure public signals act just like a reduction in prior uncertainty. They can be created by setting private signal noise to zero  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 = 0$ . Pure private signals are a special case where public signal noise ( $\sigma_\eta$ ) is zero.

<sup>12</sup> As in Lucas (1972), there is no labor market, which means that there is not a wage which agents can use to learn about  $X_t$  or  $\Delta a_t$ . While a perfectly competitive labor market which everyone participates in could perfectly reveal  $\Delta a_t$ , there are many other labor market structures with frictions in which wages would provide no signal, or a noisy signal, about  $\Delta a_t$  (e.g., a search market in which workers and firms Nash bargain over wages). An additional noisy public signal would not provide much additional insight since the model already allows for public noise in the signals that agents receive. It would however add complexity to the model, so we close this learning channel down. Also note that if agents traded their output, prices would not provide a useful signal about TFP growth because once production has occurred, agents know TFP exactly.

<sup>13</sup> An agent that knows  $Q_{it}$  can back out  $X_t$  using the production function (3) and the productivity growth Eq. (4).

The Bayesian weight on new information  $\omega$  is also called the Kalman gain.

The posterior uncertainty, or conditional variance is common across agents because all agents receive signals with the same precision:

$$V_{t-1}[\Delta a_t] \equiv [\sigma_t^{-2} + (\sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2)^{-1}]^{-1}. \quad (9)$$

An agent's expected value of the level of TFP uses the fact that  $A_t = A_{t-1} \exp(\Delta a_t)$ :

$$E[A_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}] = A_{t-1} \exp\left(E[\Delta a_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}] + \frac{1}{2} V_{t-1}[\Delta a_t]\right). \quad (10)$$

Given this TFP forecast, the agent makes his labor choice according to Eq. (6). The labor choice dictates the period  $t$  growth rate of firm  $i$ ,  $\Delta q_{it} \equiv \log Q_{it} - \log Q_{i,t-1}$ , which is  $\Delta q_{it} = \Delta a_t + \frac{1}{\gamma-1} (\log(E[A_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}]) - \log(E[A_{t-1} | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-2}]))$ . Integrating over all firms' output delivers aggregate output:

$$Q_t = A_t \int \left(\frac{E[A_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}]}{\gamma}\right)^{1/(\gamma-1)} di. \quad (11)$$

### 3.3. Uncertainty measures in the model

This subsection derives macro, micro and higher-order uncertainty in the model, highlights the similarities and differences between them, and examines what forces make each one move.

#### 3.3.1. Macro uncertainty

For the model, macro uncertainty is defined to be the conditional variance of GDP growth forecasts, which is common for all agents:

$$\mathcal{U}_t \equiv V[\Delta q_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}] = \frac{(\gamma - 1 + \omega_{t-1})^2 \sigma_t^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 + (\gamma - 1)^2 \sigma_t^2 \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 + \omega_{t-1}^2 \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2}{(\gamma - 1)^2 (\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2)}. \quad (12)$$

If there is a prior belief about TFP with variance  $\sigma_t^2$  and a signal with variance  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2$ , then the variance of the posterior TFP belief is  $\sigma_t^2 (\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2) / (\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2)$ . You can see this form showing up in the first two terms of the numerator and the denominator. The difference between  $\mathcal{U}_t$  and the Bayesian posterior that was just discussed is that  $\mathcal{U}_t$  is the conditional variance of output, not of TFP. How TFP maps into output also depends on what other firms believe. Thus, the last term of the numerator  $\omega_{t-1}^2 \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2$  represents uncertainty about how much other firms will produce.

#### 3.3.2. Higher-order uncertainty

Higher-order uncertainty is measured with the cross-sectional variance of GDP growth forecasts:<sup>14</sup>

$$\mathcal{H}_t \equiv V\{E[\Delta q_t | \mathcal{I}_{i,t-1}]\} = \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 \omega_{t-1}^2 \left(1 + \frac{1}{(\gamma - 1) [\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 (\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2)^{-1} + 1]}\right)^2. \quad (13)$$

Higher-order uncertainty arises because there is private signal noise ( $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 > 0$ ). The larger private signal noise is, the more agents' signals differ. What also matters is how much they weight these signals in their beliefs ( $\omega_{t-1}^2$ ). If private signal noise is so large that the signal has almost no information, then  $\omega_{t-1}^2$  becomes small, and beliefs converge again. The last term in the large parentheses is the rate of transformation of belief differences in TFP to belief differences in output.

Note that higher-order uncertainty is constructed to be two-sided and symmetric. Agent  $i$ 's uncertainty about agent  $j$  is equal to  $j$ 's uncertainty about  $i$ . In general, this need not be the case. For example, in sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) or inattentiveness (Reis, 2006) theories, information sets are nested. The agent who updated more recently knows exactly what the other believes. But the agent who updated in the past is uncertain about what the better-informed agent knows. If we average across all pairs of agents, then the average uncertainty about others' expectations would be the relevant measure of higher-order uncertainty. In such a model, belief dispersion and higher-order uncertainty are not identical, but move in lock-step. The only way agents can have heterogeneous beliefs, but not have any uncertainty about what others know, is if they agree to disagree. That doesn't happen in a Bayesian setting like this.

#### 3.3.3. Micro dispersion

The measure of micro dispersion for the model is the cross-sectional variance of firm growth rates:

$$\mathcal{D}_t \equiv \int (\Delta q_{it} - \overline{\Delta q}_t)^2 di = \left(\frac{1}{\gamma - 1}\right)^2 (\omega_{t-1}^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2 + \omega_{t-2}^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-2}^2), \quad (14)$$

<sup>14</sup> See Section A of the online appendix for the derivation of the GDP growth forecast of an agent.

where  $\overline{\Delta q}_t \equiv \int \Delta q_{it} di$ .<sup>15</sup> This expression shows that micro dispersion in period  $t$  depends on the variance of private signals ( $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2$  and  $\sigma_{\psi,t-2}^2$ ), the weights that agents place on their signals in periods  $t-1$  and  $t-2$ , and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply  $1/(\gamma-1)$ . Holding these weights fixed, when private signal noise increases, firms receive more heterogeneous signals. Beliefs about TFP growth, labor choices and output therefore become more dispersed as well. When agents place more weight on their signals, it also generates more of this dispersion. More weight on the  $t-1$  signal increases dispersion in  $Q_{it}$  while more weight on the  $t-2$  signal increases dispersion in  $Q_{i,t-1}$ . Both matter for earnings growth:  $\Delta q_{it} = \log(Q_{it}) - \log(Q_{i,t-1})$ . Micro dispersion depends on  $\gamma$ , the inverse elasticity of labor supply, because less elastic labor makes labor and output less sensitive to differences in signals.

### 3.3.4. Does dispersion measure firms' uncertainty?

Micro dispersion is commonly interpreted as a measure of the uncertainty that firms have about their own economic outcomes. The uncertainty that firms have about their period  $t$  growth rates prior to receiving their signals in period  $t-1$  is

$$V[\Delta q_{it}|A^{t-1}] = \sigma_t^2 + \left(\frac{1}{\gamma-1}\right)^2 \omega_{t-1}^2 (\sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2 + \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2). \quad (15)$$

This expression tells us that firms have uncertainty about their growth rates that comes from three sources. First there is uncertainty about TFP that shows up as  $\sigma_t^2$ . A firm also has uncertainty because it doesn't know what signal it will receive. This generates two additional sources of uncertainty: public signal noise ( $\sigma_{\eta,t-1}^2$ ) and private signal noise ( $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2$ ). The relevance of these depends on the weight that firms place on their signals ( $\omega_{t-1}$ ) and how sensitive a firm's labor choice is to changes in its beliefs,  $1/(1-\gamma)$ .

Comparing the uncertainty that a firm has about its growth (15) with the dispersion of firm growth (14) highlights two differences. First, dispersion only captures uncertainty due to private differences in information. Both the volatility of TFP  $\sigma_t$  and noise in signals that are publicly observed  $\sigma_{\eta,t-1}$ , make firms uncertain about their growth. But neither generates dispersion. Micro dispersion only captures uncertainty caused by idiosyncratic differences in information:  $(\frac{1}{\gamma-1})^2 \omega_{t-1}^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2$ . Second, micro dispersion systematically overestimates this component of a firm's uncertainty:  $\mathcal{D}_t \geq (\frac{1}{\gamma-1})^2 \omega_{t-1}^2 \sigma_{\psi,t-1}^2$ . The reason is that differences in levels of output yesterday and differences today both contribute to dispersion in firm growth rates. But firms are not uncertain about what they produced yesterday. It is only differences today that matter for uncertainty. This shows up mathematically as  $\omega_{t-2} \sigma_{\psi,t-2}$  being in the expression for dispersion, but not in the expression for uncertainty. If  $\omega_{t-1} \sigma_{\psi,t-1}$  and  $\omega_{t-2} \sigma_{\psi,t-2}$  are closely correlated then changes in micro dispersion will be a good proxy for the part of uncertainty due to private information shocks. But it is possible to have dispersion, without there being any uncertainty.<sup>16</sup> Despite these issues, this paper focuses on micro dispersion, as it allows us to speak to the existing literature.

## 4. What is an uncertainty shock?

There are various, distinct measures of uncertainty. If we want to think of uncertainty as a unified concept that can explain many business cycle and financial facts, there needs to be a single shock that moves all these various measures. This section explores three plausible candidates and shows that one of them can explain the comovement of uncertainty measures in the data. In so doing, it provides a source of unification for theories based on uncertainty shocks. The three potential sources of changes in uncertainty in the model are: changes in the amount of public signal noise ( $\sigma_{\eta,t-1}$ ), changes in private signal noise ( $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}$ ), and changes in the volatility of TFP shocks ( $\sigma_t$ ).

### 4.1. Public signal noise shocks

First consider what happens to uncertainty measures when public signal noise rises. Public signal noise is sometimes referred to as "sender noise" because noise that originates with the sender affects receivers' signals all in the same way. The proofs of this and all subsequent results are in the online appendix.

**Result 1. Shocks to public signal noise can generate positive or negative covariances between any pair of the three types of uncertainty and dispersion:** Fix  $\sigma_t$  and  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}$  so that they do not vary over time.<sup>17</sup>

- (a) If (A.7) holds then  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{D}_t, \mathcal{H}_t) > 0$  and otherwise  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{D}_t, \mathcal{H}_t) \leq 0$ ;
- (b) If (A.9) holds then  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{D}_t, \mathcal{U}_t) < 0$  and otherwise  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{D}_t, \mathcal{U}_t) \geq 0$ ;
- (c) If  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}$  is sufficiently small then  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{H}_t, \mathcal{U}_t) < 0$  and if only one of conditions (A.7) and (A.9) hold then  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{H}_t, \mathcal{U}_t) > 0$ .

<sup>15</sup> The standard deviation is used rather than the IQR measure that is commonly used for the data since the standard deviation is more analytically tractable.

<sup>16</sup> If there is dispersion in firm output in period  $t-1$  but agents have perfect information in period  $t$  (which will be the case if  $\sigma_t^2 = 0$  so that  $\omega_{t-1} = 0$ ) so that they all choose the same output then there will be positive micro dispersion in period  $t$  yet firms will have no uncertainty about their growth rates:  $V[\Delta q_{it}|A^{t-1}] = 0$ .

<sup>17</sup> Conditions (A.7) and (A.9) are stipulated in the online appendix.



Public signal noise lowers micro dispersion. When public signal noise increases the signals that agents receive are less informative so they place less weight on them. This causes them to have less dispersed beliefs about TFP growth, which results in less dispersion in their labor input choices and less dispersion in their growth rates.

For higher-order uncertainty, public signal noise has two opposing effects. The direct effect comes from the same channel described above. A decrease in the dispersion of beliefs about TFP growth makes GDP growth forecasts less dispersed, which reduces higher-order uncertainty. The indirect effect arises because when agents are forecasting GDP growth, they need to forecast the labor input decisions of other agents, who produce that GDP. When public signal noise increases, the average signals of others ( $\Delta a_t + \eta_{t-1}$ ) are more volatile. Because one's own signal is useful to predict others' signals, and those signals become more important to predict, agents weight their own signals more. Greater weight on one's own signals causes GDP growth forecasts to be more dispersed and higher-order uncertainty to rise. If macro volatility is sufficiently high relative to signal noise, then the direct effect dominates because agents are mostly concerned about forecasting TFP growth, not others' signals. If macro volatility is low, others' signals are important to forecast, which makes the indirect effect stronger. Thus, public signal noise shocks can generate a positive or negative covariance between higher-order uncertainty and micro dispersion (Result 1a).

When public signal noise increases, there are also two effects on macro uncertainty. The direct effect is that less precise signals carry less information about TFP growth. This raises uncertainty about GDP growth. The indirect effect comes from agents needing to forecast the actions of others, in order to forecast their output (GDP). When public signal noise increases, agents weight their signals less in their production decisions. Since others' signals are unknown, less weight makes it easier for agents to forecast each others' decisions. This reduces uncertainty about GDP growth. Of the two opposing effects on macro uncertainty, either can dominate: If public signal noise is sufficiently high, then forecasting the actions of others will be very important. So the indirect effect will dominate and macro uncertainty will decrease. If private signal noise is sufficiently low, then all agents receive similar information, will be able to forecast each others' actions well and the direct effect will dominate. In this case macro uncertainty will increase. Thus micro dispersion and macro uncertainty can be positively or negatively correlated due to shocks to public signal noise (Result 1b).

The final part of Result 1 is about the covariance between higher-order uncertainty and macro uncertainty. These two types of uncertainty can have either a positive or negative covariance. There is a wedge between them because it is possible for uncertainty about TFP growth to increase and at the same time the dispersion of beliefs to decrease. This happens when private signal noise is low. In this case, an increase in public signal noise increases macro uncertainty because agents have more uncertainty about TFP growth. It decreases higher-order uncertainty because agents weight their signals less and have less dispersed beliefs about TFP growth.

#### 4.2. Private signal noise shocks

A change in private signal noise can also generate positive or negative covariances.

**Result 2. Shocks to private signal noise can generate positive or negative covariances between any pair of the three types of uncertainty and dispersion:** Fix  $\sigma_t$  and  $\sigma_{\eta,t-1}$  so that they do not vary over time.<sup>18</sup>

- (a) If  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}$  is sufficiently small then  $\text{cov}(U_t, \mathcal{H}_t) > 0$ ,  $\text{cov}(U_t, D_t) > 0$  and  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{H}_t, D_t) > 0$ ;
- (b) If only one of (A.11) and (A.12) holds then  $\text{cov}(U_t, \mathcal{H}_t) \leq 0$ ;
- (c) If only one of (A.10) and (A.11) holds then  $\text{cov}(U_t, D_t) \leq 0$ ;
- (d) If only one of (A.10) and (A.12) holds then  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{H}_t, D_t) \leq 0$ .

As with public noise, private signal has two competing effects on micro dispersion. There is more dispersion in the signals agents receive so if they hold the weight on their signals fixed they will have more dispersed beliefs about TFP growth, which will result in higher micro dispersion. But, because the signals are less informative agents weight them less and weight their prior beliefs more. Since agents have common prior beliefs, this decreases the dispersion in beliefs resulting in lower micro dispersion. Which of these forces is stronger depends on parameter values.

For higher-order uncertainty, these same two opposing forces are also at work. Recall from the discussion of public information shocks that when agents are forecasting GDP growth they need to forecast TFP growth as well as the actions of others. The discussion of micro dispersion tells us how an increase in private signal noise affects the dispersion of forecasts of TFP growth. For forecasts of other agents' actions the two forces also work in opposite directions. The fact that agents get signals that differ more from each other will mean that there will be greater differences in the forecasts that agents make of each others' actions. But since these signals are noisier agents will weight them less, which will bring their forecasts closer.

Private signal noise affects uncertainty about TFP growth and about the actions of others, both of which matter for macro uncertainty. The fact that agents have less precise information increases their uncertainty about TFP growth. In terms of forecasting the actions of others, agents will be more uncertain due to the fact that signals differ more across agents, but this is offset by the fact that agents are weighting their signals less.

When private signal noise is sufficiently small it is the increase in the dispersion of signals that is the dominant effect and the effects of changing signals weights are secondary. In this case all three types of uncertainty increase when private

<sup>18</sup> Conditions (A.10) to (A.12) are stipulated in the online appendix.

signal noise increases, so private signal noise shocks generate positive correlations between all three types of uncertainty and dispersion. This is part (a) of [Result 2](#). This is not necessarily the case though. There are conditions under which the uncertainty and dispersion measures are negatively correlated, as provided by parts (b)–(d) of the result. There is a wedge between macro uncertainty and micro dispersion because an increase in private signal noise increases uncertainty about TFP growth but can increase or decrease the dispersion in TFP growth forecasts. This is also the cause of the wedge between macro uncertainty and higher-order uncertainty. There is a wedge between micro dispersion and higher-order uncertainty because agents weight their signals differently when forecasting TFP growth and when forecasting the actions of others. These wedges are why the different measures of uncertainty can react in opposite ways to changes in private signal noise.

#### 4.3. Macro volatility shocks

The third possible source of uncertainty shocks is changes in the volatility of TFP growth. Unlike the other potential sources of uncertainty shocks, this source generates positively correlated fluctuations in macro uncertainty, higher-order uncertainty and micro dispersion without additional conditions.

**Result 3. Shocks to macro volatility generate positive covariances between all pairs of the three types of uncertainty and dispersion:** Fix  $\sigma_{\eta,t-1}$  and  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1}$  so that they do not vary over time. Then  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{U}_t, \mathcal{H}_t) > 0$ ,  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{U}_t, \mathcal{D}_t) > 0$  and  $\text{cov}(\mathcal{H}_t, \mathcal{D}_t) > 0$ .

When macro volatility increases agents have less precise prior information about TFP growth and they therefore weight their signals more. Since those signals are heterogeneous this causes their beliefs about TFP growth to be more dispersed, which results in more dispersed production decisions and higher micro dispersion. In terms of macro uncertainty, the less precise information about TFP growth increases macro uncertainty. Agents weighting their signals more also makes it harder for agents to forecast the actions of others', which further increases macro uncertainty. Higher-order uncertainty also increases for two reasons. First the increase in dispersion of beliefs about TFP growth that results from agents weighting their signals more increases the differences between GDP growth forecasts. These differences also increase because agents weight their signals more when forecasting the actions of others, so there is more divergence in these forecasts.

There are two points to take from this section. The first is that the different types of uncertainty and dispersion are theoretically distinct. They are not mechanically linked and nor do they naturally fluctuate together. Only one of the possible sources of uncertainty shocks necessarily generates the positive correlation between all three types of uncertainty and dispersion that is in the data. Therefore it is erroneous to treat these types of uncertainty and dispersion as a single unified phenomenon, as the existing uncertainty shocks literature has tended to. If we want to unify these various shocks then a theory that ties them together is needed. That's the second point: If we're after a common origin for the various uncertainty and dispersion shocks, then changes in macro volatility is a possible source. The next section evaluates whether macro volatility is quantitatively relevant for understanding uncertainty shocks.

### 5. Do macro volatility shocks generate enough uncertainty comovement?

To develop a quantitatively viable theory, this section enriches the model from [Section 3](#) and calibrates it to the data. The augmented, calibrated model produces uncertainty shocks that are, in many respects, quantitatively similar to the data.

#### 5.1. Quantitative model

Since the focus of this section is on assessing the quantitative potential of changes in TFP growth volatility to explain uncertainty shocks, time variation in signal noise is turned off:  $\sigma_{\psi,t-1} = \sigma_{\psi}$  and  $\sigma_{\eta,t-1} = \sigma_{\eta}$  for all  $t$ . To estimate TFP growth volatility, some stochastic structure is needed. Since GARCH is common and simple to estimate, it is assumed that  $\sigma_t^2$  follows a GARCH process:

$$\sigma_t^2 = \alpha_1 + \rho\sigma_{t-1}^2 + \phi\sigma_{t-1}^2\epsilon_{t-1}^2. \quad (16)$$


where  $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, 1)$ , with draws being independent.

The final modification to the model is that TFP growth is given a negatively skewed distribution. This captures the idea of disaster risk. Disaster risk is a useful ingredient because it amplifies the uncertainty shocks and is gets their cyclicity correct. Disaster risk can amplify uncertainty during economic downturns because disasters are more likely during these periods and they are extreme events whose exact nature is difficult to predict. This creates a lot of scope for uncertainty and disagreement.

To introduce non-normality into the model it is assumed that the economy has an underlying state  $X_t$  which is subject to a non-linear transformation to generate TFP growth. Specifically, instead of  $\Delta a_t$  being determined by [Eq. \(4\)](#),

$$\Delta a_t = c + b \exp(-X_t), \quad (17)$$

$$X_t = \alpha_0 + \sigma_t \epsilon_t, \quad (18)$$



**Fig. 2.** Change of variable function and countercyclical uncertainty.

Notes: A given amount of uncertainty about  $X$  creates more uncertainty about TFP growth when  $X$  is low than it does when  $X$  is high.

and  $\sigma_t^2$  follows Eq. (16). This is the TFP growth process from the baseline model, with an exponential transformation and a linear translation. This change of variable procedure allows our forecasters to consider a family of non-normal distributions of TFP growth and convert each one into a linear-normal filtering problem.<sup>19</sup> The structural form of the mapping in (17) is dictated by a couple of observations. First, it is a simple, computationally feasible formulation that allows us to focus our attention on conditionally skewed distributions. Note that skewness in this model is most sensitive to  $b$  because that parameter governs the curvature of the transformation (17) of the normal variable. Any function with similar curvature, such as a polynomial or sine function, would deliver a similar mechanism. Second, the historical distribution of GDP growth is negatively skewed which can be achieved by setting  $b < 0$ . Third, Orlik and Veldkamp (2015) show how a similar formulation reproduces important properties of the GDP growth forecasts in the Survey of Professional Forecasters.

The signal structure for this version of the model is:

$$z_{i,t-1} = X_t + \eta_{t-1} + \psi_{i,t-1},$$

where  $\eta_{t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2)$  and  $\psi_{i,t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_\psi^2)$ . The mechanics of learning are the same as in the baseline model, with two exceptions: (1) agents are now learning about  $X_t$  instead of  $\Delta a_t$ , and (2) once they form beliefs about  $X_t$  they transform these into beliefs about  $\Delta a_t$  with Eq. (17).

When discussing the quantitative results, the model presented in this section will be called the *disaster risk model* and the model presented in Section 3 will be called the *normal model*. The difference between these models will demonstrate the role of the skewed TFP growth distribution. There will also be results for a version of the Section 3 model in which agents have perfect information ( $\sigma_\eta = \sigma_\psi = 0$ ) about TFP growth, which will be called the *perfect information model*. The difference between this model and the normal model will demonstrate the role of imperfect information and learning in the results.

### 5.2. Why disaster risk makes uncertainty countercyclical

Disasters are more likely in bad times. The heightened risk of disasters makes bad states more uncertain times. Furthermore, disasters are hard to predict. They leave lots of scope for disagreement, dispersion of beliefs and dispersion of actions. These forces make all three uncertainty and dispersion measures countercyclical.

To formalize this argument, start with the change of variable function in Eq. (17), which introduced disaster risk. When this is calibrated the coefficient  $b$  is negative, meaning that the transformation is concave. This is driven by the fact that GDP growth is negatively skewed in the data. A concave change of variable makes extreme, low realizations of TFP growth more likely and makes very high realizations less likely. In other words, a concave transformation creates a negatively skewed variable. The concavity, and thus degree of negative skewness determines the probability of negative outlier events or, in other words, the level of disaster risk.

#### 5.2.1. Disaster risk and macro uncertainty

Fig. 2 illustrates the effect of the concave change of variable on uncertainty about TFP growth. It plots a mapping from  $X$  into TFP growth,  $\Delta a$ . The slope of this curve is a Radon–Nikodym derivative. For illustrative purposes, suppose for a moment that an agent has beliefs about  $X$  that are uniformly distributed. We can represent these beliefs by a band on the horizontal axis in Fig. 2. If that band is projected onto TFP growth (the  $\Delta a$ -space), the implied uncertainty about (width of the band for)  $\Delta a$  depends on the state  $X$ . When  $X$  is high the mapping is flat and the resulting band projected on the  $\Delta a$ -axis is

<sup>19</sup> It is also possible to allow the parameters of the model to be unknown, in which case agents need to estimate them each period. This version of the model with results is in the online appendix. Adding parameter learning to the model modestly amplifies fluctuations in uncertainty.

**Table 2**  
Parameter values for the disaster risk and normal models.

Parameter		Normal model	Disaster risk model
Disutility of labor	$\gamma$	2	2
Non-normality	$b$	n/a	-0.0767
TFP growth level (disaster risk)	$c$	n/a	0.0804
TFP growth level (normal)	$\alpha_0$	0.0034	0
Mean volatility	$\alpha_1$	2.03e-5	4.36e-4
Volatility persistence	$\rho$	0.2951	0.7419
Volatility innovation variance	$\phi$	0.1789	0.1937
Private signal noise	$\sigma_\psi$	0.0090	0.1106
Public signal noise	$\sigma_\eta$	0	0

narrow. This means that uncertainty about TFP growth and therefore GDP growth is small, so macro uncertainty is small. When  $X$  is low the opposite is true: the band projected on the  $\Delta a$  axis is wider and uncertainty is higher.

Recall that posterior beliefs about  $X$  are actually assumed to be normally distributed. According to the formula for the variance of a log-normal distribution, the variance of beliefs about TFP growth is

$$V[\Delta a_t | \mathcal{I}_{t-1}] = b^2 (\exp(V_{t-1}[X_t]) - 1) \exp(V_{t-1}[X_t] - 2E[X_t | \mathcal{I}_{t-1}]).$$

Importantly, the source of countercyclical uncertainty appears: The agent's uncertainty about  $\Delta a_t$  (conditional variance) is decreasing in his expected value of  $X_t$ .

Countercyclical uncertainty arises because, in a skewed distribution, conditional variances are not independent of means. With normally distributed prior beliefs and signals, the variance of an agent's posterior beliefs would be independent of the value of his signal. Furthermore, the cross-sectional variance of the mean posterior beliefs of agents would be independent of the state  $X_t$ . This is no longer true when there is skewness. With negative skewness, the variance of posterior beliefs is higher when the state is lower and there is a greater risk of a disaster.

### 5.2.2. Disaster risk, higher-order uncertainty and micro dispersion

To understand the role of disaster risk in generating micro and higher-order uncertainty shocks return to Fig. 2. Because of idiosyncratic signals there will be a distribution of beliefs about the state of the economy each period. For getting intuition assume that this distribution is uniform and represent it with the bands on the horizontal axis in the figure. Due to the changing slope of the change of measure function a fixed dispersion in beliefs about the state will generate greater dispersion in beliefs about TFP growth when the economy is performing worse (lower  $X$ ). This means that when the economy is doing poorly small differences in information and beliefs about the state generate far more disagreement about TFP growth than when the economy is doing well. Greater disagreement about TFP growth generates more dispersion in labor choices and firm growth rates (micro dispersion), and more dispersion in GDP growth forecasts (higher-order uncertainty). Again, the intuition here is that when the economy is doing badly it is more sensitive to shocks so agents respond more to differences in information. Thus disaster risk generates fluctuations in micro dispersion and higher-order uncertainty beyond those coming from the learning mechanism and these fluctuations are countercyclical.

### 5.3. Calibration and simulation

The normal and disaster risk models are calibrated separately, but with the same procedure, at a quarterly frequency with data for 1968Q4–2011Q4. The disutility of labor,  $\gamma$ , is calibrated externally using existing estimates. For the disaster risk model,  $\alpha_0$  can be normalized. The remaining parameters for the two models are determined using simulated method of moments. The TFP growth process is calibrated using moments of GDP growth data and the signal noises are calibrated using moments of GDP growth forecasts (from the SPF dataset). The parameter values are reported in Table 2 and the calibration moments are in Table 3. For the perfect information model the same parameter values as for the normal model are used, except signal noises are set to zero:  $\sigma_\psi = \sigma_\eta = 0$ .

To evaluate the ability of the model to generate plausible uncertainty shocks, one empirical measure of each type of uncertainty from Section 2 is used for comparison. For macro uncertainty the VIX is used, for micro dispersion it is sales growth dispersion and for higher-order uncertainty it is SPF forecasts. The model offers a direct analog to micro dispersion and higher-order uncertainty measures. But without a financial sector the VIX cannot be computed in the model, so we compute macro uncertainty in Eq. (12) and compare it with the VIX. All data are detrended in order to abstract from changes at frequencies that this paper is not attempting to explain.<sup>20</sup> The units for both the real data and the output of the model are the percentage deviation from trend. To compute model output, moments and regression coefficients are estimated in each of the 2000 simulations, using the same number of observations for each series as in the data. The results report the mean (and/or standard deviation) of each moment or coefficient. Further calibration and simulation details are in the online appendix.

<sup>20</sup> Detrending is done using a HP filter exactly as it is done in Section 2.

**Table 3**  
Calibration targets.

	Models		Data
	Normal (1)	Disaster risk (2)	(3)
<i>GDP growth</i>			
Mean <sup>†</sup>	2.72	2.71	2.71
Standard deviation <sup>†</sup>	3.68	3.76	3.42
Skewness <sup>†</sup>	0.00	−0.33	−0.32
Kurtosis <sup>†</sup>	3.61	4.68	5.08
std( $ \Delta q_t - \overline{\Delta q} $ ) <sup>†</sup>	2.30	2.48	2.41
ac( $ \Delta q_t - \overline{\Delta q} $ ) <sup>*</sup>	0.23	0.30	0.23
<i>Higher-order uncertainty</i>			
Mean <sup>†</sup>	1.50	1.45	1.54
<i>GDP growth forecasts</i>			
Average absolute error <sup>†</sup>	2.14	2.01	2.23

Notes: Calibration targets for the disaster risk model are marked with †'s. GDP growth forecasts are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The measure of higher order uncertainty is the standard deviation of GDP growth forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The period for the GDP growth data and GDP growth forecasts data is 1968Q4–2011Q4. The period for the higher-order uncertainty data is 1968Q3–2011Q3. The model samples are simulated to be the same length as the data, as described in the online appendix.

**Table 4**  
Simulation results and data counterparts.

	Models			Data
	Perfect info. (1)	Normal (2)	Disaster risk (3)	(4)
<i>(a) Macro uncertainty</i>				
Standard deviation	0	10.74	13.77	20.87
Corr. with GDP growth	0	0.00	−0.19	−0.26
<i>(b) Higher-order uncertainty</i>				
Standard deviation	0	18.49	22.69	31.13
Corr. with GDP growth	0	0.00	−0.12	−0.28
Corr. with micro uncertainty	0	0.42	0.75	0.43
Corr. with macro uncertainty	0	0.99	0.98	0.24
<i>(c) Micro dispersion</i>				
Standard deviation	0	10.29	13.83	11.58
Corr. with GDP growth	0	0.00	−0.06	−0.52
Corr. with macro uncertainty	0	0.43	0.76	0.32

Notes: The three models are described in Sections 3 and 5. The measures of macro uncertainty, micro dispersion and higher-order uncertainty for the data are the VIX, sales growth and SPF measures described in Section 2. All results are computed using the detrended series just as for the empirical analysis in Section 2. The periods for the data are: 1962Q2–2008Q2 for macro uncertainty, 1968Q3–2011Q3 for higher-order uncertainty and 1962Q1–2009Q3 for micro dispersion. The model samples are simulated so that they are analogous to the data, as described in the online appendix.

#### 5.4. Quantitative results

The model can generate shocks to uncertainty and dispersion that are quantitatively similar to the data in terms of (i) their magnitude, (ii) their correlations with each other and (iii) their correlations with the business cycle. For each model, Table 4 reports the standard deviation of each uncertainty and dispersion measure, which is a measure of the size of uncertainty shocks, and the correlation of each measure with the other measures and GDP growth.<sup>21</sup>

As a benchmark, column (1) reports moments for the perfect information model. Because signals inform agents perfectly about the aggregate state  $X_t$ , they can forecast GDP growth perfectly and there is no macro uncertainty. Since all agents have the same beliefs, there is no higher-order uncertainty and no micro dispersion.

When learning and disaster risk are added to the model (column 3), the model generates plausible shocks to uncertainty and dispersion. Macro uncertainty shocks are about 65% as large as in the data, higher-order uncertainty shocks are 70% as large and micro dispersion shocks are slightly larger than in the data. All uncertainty series are also countercyclical.

<sup>21</sup> The means of macro uncertainty and micro dispersion are omitted. The mean of macro uncertainty is 2.50 in the disaster risk model and the mean of the empirical proxy is 19.12. But a comparison between these numbers has no economic meaning because the data measure, the VIX, has units that are not comparable to the model. For the mean of micro dispersion, the problem is that size, age, industry and geography, all affect firm growth. Because the model's only source of firm heterogeneity is information, the model generates significantly less micro dispersion: 0.51 in the disaster risk model, compared to 18.59 in the data, on average. The online appendix extends the model to match average dispersion. Because this additional complexity is not essential to our main point about uncertainty covariance, it is suppressed in the main text. To compare other moments, all series are detrended, as described in Section 5. The mean of higher-order uncertainty is reported in Table 3 since it is a calibration target.

**Table 5**

Uncertainty shocks are correlated in the model, even after controlling for the business cycle.

	Macro uncertainty	Higher-order uncertainty	Micro dispersion
Macro uncertainty		1.64*** (0.05)	0.98*** (0.07)
Higher-order uncertainty	0.59*** (0.02)		0.58*** (0.045)
Micro dispersion	0.59*** (0.06)	0.97*** (0.11)	

Notes: These results are summary statistics for  $\beta$  from Eq. (1). The model is simulated 2000 times and the regressions run for each simulation. The reported coefficients are the averages across the simulations. The numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations of the coefficients across the simulations. Significance levels are computed using the fraction of simulations for which each coefficient is above zero. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-tail tests). Each series uses a simulation period that is analogous to the periods that the corresponding data series covers as described in detail in the online appendix.

cal and positively correlated with each other, with the magnitude of most of these correlations similar to their empirical counterparts.

Comparing the results in columns (2) and (3) shows the separate roles that learning and disaster risk play. Column (2) shows that learning alone generates 70–80% of the fluctuations in uncertainty and dispersion of the full model and also generates most of the positive correlations between the uncertainty and dispersion series. Adding disaster risk to the model (going from column (2) to column (3)) amplifies the uncertainty shocks and makes them countercyclical.

How much of the relationship between uncertainty and dispersion measures can the model explain, after controlling for the business cycle? To answer this question we perform the same regression analysis (Eq. (1)) on the model output as was performed on the data in Section 2. Table 5 compares regression coefficients estimated from the model to those from the data. The columns determine the left hand side variable and the rows are the right hand side variable. For example, the first number in the macro uncertainty column says that when higher-order uncertainty deviates from trend by 1 percentage point, macro uncertainty deviates by 0.59 percentage points. Taken together, the results show that the model generates a positive and significant relationship between all three types of uncertainty and dispersion, above and beyond the business cycle; just as for the data.

It appears that our mechanisms—learning and disaster risk—are more than strong enough to explain the empirical co-movement of uncertainty measures. In fact weakening the relationship between higher-order and micro dispersion, by adding more unpredictable variation in micro dispersion, might offer an even better fit to the data.

## 6. Conclusions

Fluctuations in micro uncertainty, macro uncertainty and higher-order uncertainty have been used to explain recessions, asset price drops and financial crises. While all are dubbed “uncertainty shocks,” this paper has shown that they are distinct phenomena, both empirically and theoretically. In order to unify them a theory is needed that explains how they are linked.

This paper has explored various possible theories and found that volatile macro outcomes create macro uncertainty, higher-order uncertainty and micro dispersion shocks that are correlated in a way that’s consistent with the data. The key to the mechanism is that when macro volatility is high, public information—past outcomes—becomes a less informative predictor of the future, relative to private information. This makes agents put less weight on public information, more weight on private information, and leads them to disagree more. Furthermore, when weak macro outcomes make highly uncertain disaster outcomes more likely, uncertainty of all types move in a correlated, volatile and countercyclical way. By offering a unified explanation for the origin of uncertainty shocks, our results provide insight into the nature of the shocks that drive business cycles.

## Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Ricardo Reis and an anonymous referee for their insightful comments, and to Virgiliu Midrigan, Simon Mongey, and Tom Sargent for useful discussions and suggestions. The feedback from participants at the SED meetings in Warsaw and the AEA meetings in San Francisco is also greatly appreciated.

## Supplementary material

Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:[10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.06.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.06.004).

## References

- Angeletos, G., Collard, F., Dellas, H., 2018. Quantifying confidence. *Econometrica* forthcoming.
- Angeletos, G., La'O, J., 2013. Sentiments. *Econometrica* 81 (2), 739–779.
- Arellano, C., Bai, Y., Kehoe, P., 2018. Financial frictions and fluctuations in volatility. *J. Political Economy* forthcoming.
- Bachmann, R., Bayer, C., 2013. 'Wait-and-see' business cycles? *J. Monet. Econ.* 60 (6), 704–719.
- Bachmann, R., Moscarini, G., 2012. Business Cycles and Endogenous Uncertainty. Working paper. Yale University.
- Bansal, R., Shaliastovich, I., 2010. Confidence risk and asset prices. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 100 (2), 537–541.
- Basu, S., Bundick, B., 2017. Uncertainty shocks in a model of effective demand. *Econometrica* 85 (3), 937–958.
- Benhabib, J., Liu, X., Wang, P., 2016. Endogenous information acquisition and countercyclical uncertainty. *J. Econ. Theory* 165, 601–642.
- Benhabib, J., Wang, P., Wen, Y., 2015. Sentiments and aggregate demand fluctuations. *Econometrica* 83(2), 549–585.
- Bianchi, F., Ilut, C., Schneider, M., 2018. Uncertainty shocks, asset supply and pricing over the business cycle. *Rev. Econ. Stud.* 85 (2), 810–854.
- Bloom, N., 2009. The impact of uncertainty shocks. *Econometrica* 77 (3), 623–685.
- Bloom, N., Floetotto, M., Jaimovich, N., Sapora-Eksten, I., Terry, S., 2018. Really uncertain business cycles. *Econometrica* 86 (3), 1031–1065.
- Christiano, L., Motto, R., Rostagno, M., 2014. Risk shocks. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 104 (1), 27–65.
- Decker, R., D'Erasmus, P.N., Moscoso Boedo, H., 2016. Market exposure and endogenous firm volatility over the business cycle. *Am. Econ. J.* 8 (1), 148–198.
- Fajgelbaum, P., Schaal, E., Taschereau-Dumouchel, M., 2017. Uncertainty traps. *Q. J. Econ.* 132 (4), 1641–1692.
- Gilchrist, S., Sim, J., Zakrajšek, E., 2014. Uncertainty, financial frictions, and investment dynamics. NBER. Working Paper 20038.
- Jurado, K., Ludvigson, S., Ng, S., 2015. Measuring uncertainty. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 105 (3), 1177–1216.
- Kozlowski, J., Veldkamp, L., Venkateswaran, V., 2017. The Tail that Wags the Economy: Beliefs and Persistent Stagnation. NBER. Working Paper 21719.
- Lucas, R., 1972. Expectations and the neutrality of money. *J. Econ. Theory* 4 (2), 103–124.
- Ludvigson, S., Ma, S., Ng, S., 2018. Uncertainty and business cycles: exogenous impulse or endogenous response?
- Mankiw, N.G., Reis, R., 2002. Sticky information versus sticky prices: a proposal to replace the New Keynesian Phillips curve. *Q. J. Econ.* 117 (4), 1295–1328.
- Nimark, K., 2014. Man-bites-dog business cycles. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 104 (8), 2320–2367.
- Ordoñez, G., 2013. The asymmetric effects of financial frictions. *J. Political Economy* 121 (5), 844–895.
- Orlik, A., Veldkamp, L., 2015. Understanding Uncertainty Shocks and the Role of the Black Swan. NBER. Working Paper 20445.
- Pastor, L., Veronesi, P., 2012. Uncertainty about government policy and stock prices. *J. Finance* 67 (4), 1219–1264.
- Reis, R., 2006. Inattentive producers. *Rev. Econ. Stud.* 73 (3), 793–821.
- Schaal, E., 2017. Uncertainty and unemployment. *Econometrica* 85 (6), 1675–1721.
- Van Nieuwerburgh, S., Veldkamp, L., 2006. Learning asymmetries in real business cycles. *J. Monet. Econ.* 53(4), 753–772.