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ABSTRACT

We study the impact of remote work on the commercial office sector. We document large shifts in lease revenues, office occupancy, lease renewal rates, lease durations, and market rents as firms shifted to remote work in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. We show that the pandemic has had large effects on both current and expected future cash flows for office buildings. Remote work also changes the risk premium on office real estate. We revalue the stock of New York City commercial office buildings taking into account pandemic-induced cash flow and discount rate effects. We find a 45% decline in office values in 2020 and 39% in the longer-run, the latter representing a $453 billion value destruction. Higher quality office buildings were somewhat buffered against these trends due to a flight to quality, while lower quality office buildings see much more dramatic swings. These valuation changes have repercussions for local public finances and financial sector stability.

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1 Introduction

“Commuting to office work is obsolete. It is now infinitely easier, cheaper and faster to do what the nineteenth century could not do: move information, and with it office work, to where the people are. The tools to do so are already here: the telephone, two-way video, electronic mail, the fax machine, the personal computer, and so on.” — Peter F. Drucker, 1989

The Covid-19 pandemic led to drastic changes in where people work. Physical office occupancy in the major office markets of the U.S. fell from 95% at the end of February 2020 to 10% at the end of March 2020, and has remained depressed ever since, only gradually creeping back to 47% by mid-September 2022. In the intervening period, companies have learned how to effectively work from home. Many firms have announced permanent remote or hybrid work arrangements, and several have begun to shrink their physical footprint. These shifts in projected office demand have led to concerns that commercial office buildings may become a stranded asset in the wake of the disruptions resulting from remote work. Because office assets are often financed with debt which resides on banks’ balance sheets and in CMBS portfolios, large declines in value would have consequences for institutional investors and for financial stability.¹ The spatial concentration of office assets in urban central business districts also poses fiscal challenges for local governments, which rely heavily on property taxes levied on commercial offices and the adjacent retail space to provide public goods and services. A decline in office and adjacent retail real estate valuations may activate a fiscal doom loop that lowers the quality of life for residents and worsens the business environment.

In this paper, we ask what these changes in current and expected future remote work arrangements imply for the value of office buildings. To answer this challenging question, we combine new data with a new asset pricing model. A central ingredient is uncertainty

¹Investable commercial real estate assets were worth about $4.7 trillion at the end of 2019, of which office represents the largest component. They make up an important part of the portfolio allocation to “real assets” of a growing number of institutional investors (Goetzmann, Spaenjers and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021).
about future working arrangements.

To fix ideas, consider the three key forces behind the shifts in office values through the lens of a simple Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition. We can express the current value of offices \( p_t \) as the current cash flow \( d_t \), the expected present discounted value (PDV) of future cash flows, and the expected PDV of future returns:

\[
p_t = \frac{k}{1 - \rho} + d_t + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} E_t[\rho^j \Delta d_{t+1+j}] - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} E_t[\rho^j r_{t+1+j}].
\]

Taking expectations at \( t \) of the price at time \( t + 1 \), we can express the shock to office valuations in the pandemic relative to what was expected prior to the pandemic in terms of news about current and future cash flows and news about future returns:

\[
p_{t+1} - E_t[p_{t+1}] = (d_{t+1} - E_t[d_{t+1}]) + (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} \Delta d_{t+1+j} - (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} r_{t+1+j}. \tag{1}
\]

We begin by analyzing the shock to current cash flows, the first term in equation (1). Using a unique data set from CompStak, we study lease-level data for 105 office markets throughout the United States over the period from 2000 until May 2022. We document a 17.54 percentage point decrease in lease revenue between January 2020 and May 2022. This decline mostly reflects decreases in the quantity of in-force leases rather than shifts in rents on in-force leases. The quantity of newly-signed leases in our data set falls from 253.43 million square feet per year just before the pandemic to 59.32 million square feet in May 2022. Rents on in-force lease contracts fall modestly in real terms. Rents on newly-signed leases fell by 13.16% in real terms between January 2020 and December 2021 before reversing to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2021, with meaningful heterogeneity across cities.

We measure firms’ remote work plans by analyzing remote-work job postings from Ladders, to establish a negative correlation between tenants’ remote-worker hiring plans and their actual reductions in leased office space.
The effects on lease revenue are not uniform across properties. We find some evidence of a “flight to quality,” particularly in rents. Higher quality buildings, those that are built more recently and have more amenities (informally called class A+), appear to be faring better in the pandemic. Their rents on newly-signed leases do not fall or even go up, in contrast with the rest of the office stock. This is consistent with the notion that firms need to improve office quality to induce workers to return to the office given new remote options. By contrast, lower quality office stock appears to be a more substantially stranded asset, given lower demand, raising questions about whether these assets will ultimately need to be repurposed towards other uses. Because a large fraction of leases in-force in early 2020 (61.77% in the U.S., 71.59% in New York) have not yet come up for renewal in 2020 and 2021, and because vacancy rates are already at 30-year highs in several major markets (21.5% in New York in 2022.Q2), rents may not have bottomed out yet.

Second, because valuations are forward looking and reflect expectations of future cash flows and future returns, the second and third terms in equation (1), we need an asset pricing model. We build a new model adapted to the valuation of commercial real estate assets that features long lease duration, market rent risk, and supply growth risk. We model property revenues and costs, to arrive at net operating income. A property is a portfolio of long-term leases. The model aggregates to let us compute the value of (a segment of) the office market as a portfolio of office properties. There is aggregate risk in the form of business cycles. There also is uncertainty regarding the state of remote work, with stochastic transitions between a no-work from home (WFH) and a WFH state. Rent growth, supply growth, lease renewals, new lease signings, and costs vary across states.

We calibrate the model to New York City’s office market. It matches market rent, supply, and vacancy dynamics in the data. This includes the sharp increase in office vacancy rates between 2020 and 2022. The model’s stochastic discount factor (SDF) is chosen to match the observed risk-free interest rate, the equity risk premium in the stock market (and its fluctuation across recessions and expansions), and the returns on a new WFH risk factor we create. The WFH risk factor goes long in publicly-listed companies which support remote
work practices (i.e., Zoom) and goes short publicly-listed companies which are reliant on physical presence (i.e., cruise lines).

A key parameter that affects the change in office valuations due to remote work is the persistence of remote/hybrid work practices. We back out this parameter from the (unlevered) observed stock return on NYC-centric office REITs between January and December 2020. Since REITs predominantly invest in A+ office product, we do so for a separate calibration to the A+ segment of the NYC office market which relies on CompStak data. The model matches the observed office return for an annual persistence parameter of 0.8176, indicating that office REIT investors believe remote-work practices to be long-lasting.

With this parameter in hand, we return to the full NYC office market calibration. We obtain a 44.80% reduction in the value of the entire NYC office stock between the end of 2019 and the end of 2020. Simulating the model forward for ten years, we characterize the mean value of the office stock and—just as importantly—the uncertainty around this valuation, which depends on the sequence of shocks that hits the economy. Along the average path, office occupancy stabilizes and the economy returns to the no-WFH state with some probability. These mean-reversion forces push office valuations towards an average value in 2029 is about 39.18% below 2019 values. Along paths where the economy remains in the WFH state for ten years, office values in 2029 are 59.86% below their 2019 values. Hence, there is substantial uncertainty about future office values, WFH risk, that our approach quantifies.

What do these numbers imply for the value of the office stock? For NYC, we observe $18.38 billion in lease revenue in the CompStak data and the ratio of office value to lease revenue is 6.02 based on our model. Hence, the value of the NYC office properties in our dataset is $110.64 billion. The short-term value reduction of 44.80% amounts to $49.57 billion, while the longer-term reduction of 39.18% amounts to $49.57 billion. Extrapolating to all properties in the U.S. in our dataset, the $68.32 billion annual leasing revenue results in a $411.31 billion office value before the pandemic using the same 6.02 value-to-lease revenue ratio. We estimate that pandemic-related disruptions around remote work have lowered the value of office buildings observed in our dataset by $184.27 billion in the short run (44.80%)
and by $161.15 billion in the long-run (39.18%). These estimates understate the value de-
struction of the overall U.S. office stock since our CompStak data do not cover the universe
of commercial leases. We underestimate lease revenues by a factor of 2.81. The total de-
cline in commercial office valuation might be, as a consequence, around $518.71 billion in
the short-run and $453.64 billion in the long-run.

**Related Literature**  Our work relates to three literatures. One strain of research has focused
on identifying disruptive technological shocks to asset prices. A specific concern in this lit-
erature has been the problem of stranded assets: whether innovation or novel risks such
as climate change have the potential to transform existing assets into liabilities, with conse-
quences for the creative destruction of economic growth (Gârleanu, Kogan and Panageas,
2012; Kogan and Papanikolaou, 2014, 2019; Barnett, Brock and Hansen, 2020; Pástor, Stam-
baugh and Taylor, 2022). We contribute to this literature by documenting a novel form of
disruptive technology shock in the form of remote work, proposes a work-from-home risk
factor, and highlight its consequences for urban commercial assets.

We also relate closely to the literature on the impact of remote work on real estate. Rosen-
thal, Strange and Urrego (2021) documents a decline in the commercial rent gradient in
the city center and transit cities as compared to car-oriented cities with COVID-19. Bartik,
Cullen, Glaeser, Luca and Stanton (2020) and Barrero, Bloom and Davis (2021) survey data
to assess the prevalence of remote work, and investigate reasons why working from home
is expected to last. Hoesli and Malle (2021) analyze the effect of COVID-19 on commercial
real estate in the European markets. Gupta, Mittal, Peeters and Nieuwerburgh (2021) stud-
ies the impact of work from home on residential real estate prices in urban and suburban
areas of top 30 MSAs. Cohen, Friedt and Lautier (2020) shows changes in real estate prices
in New York City due to COVID-19. Brueckner, Kahn and Lin (2021), Delventhal, Kwon
and Parkhomenko (2021), Ramani and Bloom (2021), Mondragon and Wieland (2022), and

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\(^2\)We have 1909.42 million square feet of active leases in our dataset in February 2020, just prior to the onset of
the pandemic. According to Cushman & Wakefield, the U.S office inventory at the end of 2019 was 5,375
million square feet. The ratio of these two numbers is 2.81.
Li and Su (2021) study the impact of working from home on residential location and house prices. This paper uses micro data on office leases to document changes in commercial real estate markets with a rise in remote work, and uses these data as inputs in a new valuation model.

Finally, our work relates to literature examining commercial real estate as an asset class. Cvijanović, Milcheva and van de Minne (2021) studies market segmentation by investor characteristics in commercial real estate. Geltner (1993) assesses valuation given existing appraised values. A key contribution of our paper to this literature lies in developing a tractable, yet rich bottom-up model of commercial building valuation. The valuation model has broad applicability to study pricing of publicly- and privately-traded assets in different contexts.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews changes in the office leasing market during the pandemic, highlighting the contemporaneous losses to lease revenue. Section 3 estimates the valuation of office buildings in the context of a structural model, and 4 highlights the implications for office valuation. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A estimates changes to future expected returns in the context of an asset pricing model incorporating work-from-home risk. Appendix B describes our REIT financial data in more detail. Appendix C provides model derivations. Appendix D outlines the calibration algorithm. Appendix E reports additional results from the model.

2 The Office Market During the Pandemic

2.1 Data

In comparison to other real estate markets, such as residential real estate, the market for commercial office buildings is opaque. We combine cash flow and pricing data from both public and private markets in order to make progress on understanding the valuation of the entire office sector in light of disruptions introduced by the shift to remote work.
Our main data set is CompStak, a data platform where commercial real estate brokers exchange leasing information. The data set contains lease-level transaction data for a large sample of offices leases in the U.S. for the period January 2000–June 2022. Data coverage improves in the first part of the sample and stabilizes around 2015.

Our data contain information on the lease, the building, and the tenant. Lease characteristics include: the execution date, lease commencement date, lease expiration date, the starting rent, the rent schedule, free rent period, tenant improvements, the size (in square feet) of the lease, floor(s) of the building, lease type (new lease, extension, expansion), and other lease options. Building characteristics include: building location, building class (A, B, or C), building age, sub-market, market. Tenant characteristics include: tenant name, tenant industry (SIC and NAICS code), tenant employees, and tenant ticker (if publicly traded). We use this data to study the evolution of the lease market over the course of the pandemic, in terms of quantities, prices, and contract features.

In public markets, we obtain the list of office REITS as the constituents of the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust (NAREIT) office index for the period 2019–2021. Using this list of REITs, we develop a novel data set of annual REIT financials from the 10-K filings with the SEC. We hand-collect lease revenue including tenant reimbursements, total revenue, funds from operation (FFO), net rentable square feet, and occupancy rate.

Finally, we use job postings data drawn from Ladders, an online job search service site. The platform focuses on job positions paying in excess of $100,000 a year, and so has high coverage of many remote working positions more commonly represented in high-wage professions. We use this service to track the fraction of job postings which mention fully remote terms at the firm level. This allows us to measure remote working plans by office tenants and connect them to their leasing decisions.

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3The constituent list can be found here: https://www.reit.com/data-research/reit-indexes/monthly-index-constituents A list of REITs we focus on can be found in Appendix Table 7.
2.2 Shock to Leasing Revenue

Figure 1 highlights the first component of the valuation shock: the reduction in current leasing revenue. We compute the total annual leasing revenue on all in-force leases each month, excluding subleases to avoid double-counting of revenue. The total value of annualized leasing revenue exceeded $65.37 billion prior to the pandemic in January 2020 (all numbers expressed in December 2021 dollars). Total leasing revenue then experienced a substantial decline, falling 17.54% by June 2022 to about $53.90 billion (Panel A). This decline is substantial taking into account the long-term nature of commercial leases. It indicates substantial shifts in leasing activity among those tenants in a position to make a choice about their space decisions.

We decompose this decline in total leasing revenue into its two underlying components: changes in average rents on in-force leases (Panel B) and changes in quantities (Panel C). The average rent is again expressed in real 2021 dollars.

While we observe contractual pricing terms in the CompStak data, lease terms require some discussion. We focus on net effective rents (NER), which augment the standard contract rent schedule (a rent for each month over the course of the lease) with additional provisions including rent concessions (free rent) as well as tenant improvements (work paid for by the landlord). The resulting NER reflects the effective rent earned per month by the landlord, and is the most relevant object in understanding changing market rent dynamics. Annualized net effective rents on in-force leases fell in real terms throughout the pandemic. Most leases that are in-force during the pandemic were signed before the pandemic and have had built-in nominal rent escalation clauses. However, the scheduled rent increases were not large enough to keep pace with inflation, leading to a modest real NER drop on active leases of 5.75%. We also show below that net effective rents on new leases signed during the pandemic fell substantially below pre-Covid rent levels in the first year of the pandemic.

In addition, the quantity of in-force leases (in square feet) also fell dramatically during the pandemic (Panel C). The decline is 11.79% between January 2020 and May 2022. This
Figure 1: Current Office Lease Revenues

Panel A: Total Lease Revenue on In-force Contracts

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Annualized Leasing Revenue (in 2021 Dec $)

Panel B: Average Rent on In-force Contracts

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Net Effective Rent

Panel C: Quantity of In-force Contracts

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Active SQFT
decline reflects both difficulties in filling vacant space with new tenants and lack of lease renewals (or partial renewals) by existing tenants whose lease is up for renewal. This suggests that understanding the quantity dimension is of utmost importance when it comes to understanding shocks to pandemic cash flows.

We also observe that this decrease in current lease revenue is felt most strongly for lower than for higher quality office space. To measure high quality buildings, we define “A+” properties by isolating leases that are in the top ten percent of net effective rents in each quarter and sub-market among all properties that are ranked as Class A by CompStak. We categorize a building that has such a lease as A+ and assume that the A+ status remains for ten years, unless another top-10% lease is signed in that building at which point the 10-year clock resets. The remaining buildings (“Other”) are classes “A-” (A without A+), B, and C. The right panels of Figure 1 separate out the two groups, normalizing the statistics for each group at 100 in January of 2020. We find that rent increases are stronger for Class A+ buildings after the pandemic (Panel B), and the decline in active leases is smaller (Panel C). The combination of both of those forces means that total annualized leasing revenue sees less of a decline in Class A+ buildings (Panel A). Concretely, leasing revenues fall by 15.21% for A+ versus by 18.49% for the rest of the office universe.

We observe even stronger evidence for differing trends across office space by quality in Figure 2, which focuses on New York City (NYC) and Texas, as representative examples of both major and non-major commercial real estate markets. Panels A and B display changes in net effective rents per sf on newly-signed leases for properties. The left panels define A+ properties as before. The right panels use an alternative definition based on building age: younger buildings are those constructed in or after 2010. Properties defined as A+ sustain rent levels much better in both New York and Texas compared to other properties. Younger buildings even experience sizable rent increases, compared to substantial rent decreases for other properties. This divergence suggests a “flight to quality” in office demand in these markets.
Figure 2: Changes in Office Rents and Occupancy

Panel A: Net Effective Rent for A+ and Young vs. Others in NYC

Panel B: Net Effective Rent for A+ and Young vs. Others in Texas

Panel C: Occupancy Rates for A+ and Young vs. Others in New York City

Panel D: Occupancy Rates for A+ and Young vs. Others in Texas
2.3 Physical Occupancy, Lease Expiration, and Contractual Vacancy

We continue with a descriptive summary of office market dynamics through the pandemic to illustrate the extraordinary shock experienced in this market. In Figure 3 we highlight the key shift we focus on our paper: the sudden drop in physical office presence for white-collar workers. Physical office occupancy is measured from turnstile data provided by Kastle.\footnote{The Kastle data cover more than 2,600 buildings in 138 cities.}

Over the course of the pandemic, about 70% of college-educated workers did some or all of their work from home. In the initial wave of the pandemic, physical office occupancy rates fell to just 20% among the top-10 largest office markets (10% in NYC). Average occupancy recovered to about 30% (20%) by the end of 2020. It saw several more dips as the pandemic intensified in early 2021. The recovery continued in the second half of 2021 to about 40% (35%), before falling sharply due to the rise of the Omicron variant at the end of 2021. The latest data as of mid-September 2022 show a 47.5% occupancy rate among the largest 10 office markets (46.6% in NYC). With two years of remote work experience, many employers and employees have formed new habits and expectations. Employees have come to like remote work and report being more productive. Employers have upwardly revised their own longer-run expectations on average employee days in the office (Barrero et al., 2021), and have begun to adjust their demand for office space as shown in more detail below.

These large drops in physical occupancy did not translate into large immediate drops in commercial office cash flows, as shown above. The reason for the delayed and gradual reaction is the staggered nature of commercial leases, highlighted in Figure 4. Because most commercial leases are long-term, and not up for immediate renewal, only a fraction of office tenants have had to make active choices about their future office demand so far. Of all in-force leases as of the end of December 2019, only 38.23% came up for renewal in 2020 and 2021 combined. Nearly all of the tenants not up for renewal have continued to make rent payments, despite their lack of physical occupancy. When more leases come up for renewal in the future, the office demand of tenants who have made limited use of office space during
the pandemic remains highly uncertain and is a crucial determinant of office valuation.

Despite the modest share of tenants that have seen lease expirations so far, we already observe drastically higher vacancy rates reflecting lease exits among that sample. The office vacancy rate in Manhattan, the country’s largest office market, was at a 30-year high of 21.5% in the second quarter of 2022 (Cushman & Wakefield), as shown in Figure 5. Panels C and D of Figure 2 plot occupancy rates for NYC and Texas using our CompStak data, scaled to 100 in January 2020. The left panels show that occupancy rates fell for both A+ and lower-quality buildings. The right panels shows that younger buildings, those built after 2010 or after 2015, saw substantially stronger occupancy during the pandemic than older buildings.
2.4 Leasing Quantities and Prices

Pandemic Impact on Lease Quantities

We next turn to examine the consequences of pandemic-associated shifts in office demand on the number of new leases signed. To do so, we aggregate the total number of new commercial office leases signed, expressed in square feet, in the CompStak data. We also break down this total into major and non-major markets.\(^5\) We observe a dramatic decrease in the quantity of new leases signed, sometimes called absorption in the industry, across both sets of markets in Figure 6. The volume of newly signed leases fell from 253.43 million sf per year in the six months before the pandemic to 59.32 million sf per year over the most recent six months. This indicates a massive drop in office demand from tenants who are actively making space decisions.

\(^5\)The major office markets are: New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Houston, Dallas, Austin, Nashville, Chicago, Atlanta, Miami, Washington D.C., Denver, Los Angeles, Bay Area, and San Francisco.
Figure 6: New Leases Signed

Total Sq Footage of Leases Signed annually (6M MA, in Millions)

Execution Date
50
100
150
200
250

Total Sq Footage of Leases Signed annually (6M MA, in Millions)

Major Markets
Non-Major Markets

Execution Date
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Pandemic Impact on Lease Duration

Even when tenants do renew leases, they may not do so under the same set of terms. Figure 7 shows that the share of new leases signed that are less than three years in duration increased substantially during the pandemic, to account for almost half of our sample, while the share of leases with a duration more than seven years decreased meaningfully. The shortening of lease duration suggests important shifts in the commercial office market, even conditional on lease renewal. As a result, the coming years 2023–2025 will feature even larger than expected lease expiration from two channels: the pre-scheduled expiration of long-term leases signed before the pandemic, as well as the expiration of short-term leases signed during the pandemic.

Pandemic Impact on Rents

We next explore the dynamics of net effective rents on new leases. We compute the square-foot weighted average NER and again express the rent in 2021 dollars. Figure 8 shows large changes in real NERs on new leases signed over the course of the pandemic. Panel A is for all markets and Panel B is for New York City. We provide both a longer-term perspective in the
top row and zoom in on the post-2018 period in the bottom row of each panel. Nationally, the NER fell by 13.16% in 2020. Starting in January 2021, the NER on newly-signed leases experiences a sharp reversal with the NER ending up back at its pre-pandemic level at the end of our sample.

The national average NER dynamics could reflect composition effects, either in terms of where new leases are being signed or in terms of the types of tenants signing new leases. To control for such selection effects, we remove tenant-industry and geographical fixed effects (state or major/non-major market). Once fixed effects removed (solid line), both the decline in NER in 2020 and the rebound in 2021 become weaker. Much of the recent rebound in NER in the raw data turns out to be a spatial composition effect.

In NYC, the NER decline on new leases in 2020 is sharper at 15.94%, and the rebound in 2021 and 2022.H1 much weaker. The measurement in NYC is not sensitive to the removal of tenant and sub-market fixed effects.

The right panels break down the market-wide NER dynamics by quality segment: A+, A- (all other class A), and B + C. We focus on the solid lines, which remove fixed effects. Nationally, A+ rents on new leases show resilience, rising modestly between January 2020 and June 2022. Lower-quality office rents, by contrast, see a much steeper decline over the pandemic. In NYC, A+ rents on new leases show stronger declines in 2020, but rebound more sharply in 2021 compared to other market segments. Rents on lower-quality office buildings fall without much of a rebound in 2021.

2.5 Connecting Remote Work and Office Demand

Office demand was greatly impacted over the course of the coronavirus pandemic due to the health risks of in-person activity. Businesses invested in remote-working technologies, and both firms and employees become accustomed to new practices of working from home. To the extent that these reflect durable shifts in worker preference and are accommodated by firms, we expect to see ongoing shocks to office demand as a consequence.
Figure 8: Net Effective Rent During Pandemic

Panel A: National

Panel B: NYC

Source: CompStak. All FE includes state, major/non-major market, industry and renewal FEs.
In order to connect the changes in office demand to shifts in remote work specifically over the course of the pandemic, we use job posting data from Ladders which allow us to measure the fraction of a firm’s job listings that are for fully-remote positions. We then compare the fraction of job listings that are remote with the change in office demand by that same firm. The change in office demand is measured as the percentage change in active lease space (in square feet) normalized by employment growth relative to January 2010. Tenants will have a more negative change in office demand if they do not renew leases that come up for renewal during the pandemic, if they renew and take less space, or if they do not expand space in proportion to their total number of employee. We are able to merge job postings and tenant data for 135 large tenants.

Table 1 reports the results of a regression of the change in office demand on the fraction of remote-job postings, measured over various periods ranging from the last 3 to the last 24 months (relative to the time of data collection in February 2022). We find a significantly negative relationship at all horizons. Our results suggest that firms that have greater remote demand in job listings are less likely to demand office space. A 10% point increase in the share of remote job postings lowers office demand by 3.9–4.9% points. This is consistent with the idea that durable shifts in remote work are driving changing demand for office space.

The Ladders data contains a flag indicating whether the position is remote or not.
Table 1: Remote Listings and Office Demand

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>0.030</td>
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</table>

* t statistics in parentheses.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Note: The dependent variable, Δ Space, is constructed from CompStak and defined as the square feet (SQFT) of leases executed post-pandemic minus the positive part of the difference between SQFT of leases expired post-pandemic and SQFT of leases commenced post-pandemic, and normalized by pre-pandemic active SQFT. The independent variables measure the ratio of remote job postings for a specific tenant within a time window since we downloaded the data snapshot from Ladders in Feb 2022. More specifically, we look at Dec 2021 to Feb 2022, Jan 2021 to Feb 2022 and Jan 2020 to Feb 2022 and check the ratio of tenants’ remote jobs over their total job postings.
3 Office Valuation Model

How do changes in remote work and the accompanying changes in office rent revenues affect the value of office buildings? To answer this important question, we turn to a structural valuation model. Like in any valuation, we focus on cash flows and discount rates. Conceptually, the value of a building (or portfolio of buildings or the market overall) is the expected present discounted value of rent revenues \( \text{Rev}_{t+j} \) minus expenditures \( \text{Cost}_{t+j} \):

\[
V_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \left( \text{Rev}_{t+j} - \text{Cost}_{t+j} \right) \right] = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \text{Rev}_{t+j} \right] - E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \text{Cost}_{t+j} \right] = V_t^R - V_t^C \tag{2}
\]

where \( M_{t,t+j} \) is the cumulative stochastic discount factor (SDF) between \( t \) and \( t+j \). \( V_t \) is an end-of-period (ex-dividend) price. By value additivity, the value of the building is the difference between the value of the (positive) rents minus the value of the (positive) costs. This gets around the issue that the difference between revenues and costs (before-tax net cash flow) can be negative.

Several real-world complications arise regarding a property’s cash flows which make this valuation more difficult than the valuation of, say, a stock’s dividend stream. Each building is a portfolio of leases with different lease terms and maturity dates. Physically identical buildings therefore have different valuations as a result of different lease structures in place. The leases are finite, but there is additional rental revenue after the leases mature. After some initial vacancy and some initial tenant improvements and concessions (e.g., free rent) the space will be released at the market rent. Furthermore, the building may not be fully leased, in which case vacancy creates cash flow shortfalls. Hence, the key sources of risk are vacancy risk and market rental risk. On the cost side, the operating expenses including the reserve account to provision for regular capital expenditure or maintenance. A part of the costs is fixed, while another part is variable (with occupancy). Costs also include leasing commissions, which are different for new leases and lease renewals. Finally, there is the risk
of supply growth.

The model we propose includes most of these real world features in a tractable way. It can be used to value an individual building, or a (sub-)market, which is a portfolio of buildings. The full derivation of the model is in Appendix C. This model should be useful for valuing income-generating properties in any sector or location. Section 3.3 describes the calibration of the model, which will focus on the office market in New York City.

3.1 Modeling Revenues

The central challenge in modeling leases is incorporating the process of expiration and re-lease renewal, at potentially different lease rates. This is important because commercial leases are long-term in nature, but much shorter in duration than the expected life of the building. In our model, leases comes due in the current period with probability $\chi$. Under the law of large numbers, $\chi$ is also the share of all leases coming due in a given period in that building/market. The random arrival of lease expiration absolves us from having to keep track of the history of past lease executions. Under this assumption, we only need two state variables to describe the evolution of rental revenues in a building/market: $\hat{Q}_t^O$ and $\hat{R}_t^O$.

Let $Q_t^O$ be the occupied space (in square feet) in a building/market at the end of period $t$ and $Q_t^V$ be the vacant space in a building/market at the end of period $t$. If $Q_t$ is the total size of the building/market, then $Q_t^V = Q_t - Q_t^O$. The law of motion for occupied space in a building/market is:

$$Q_{t+1}^O = \min \left\{ Q_t^O (1 - \chi) + Q_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O (z') + (Q_t - Q_t^O) s_{t+1}^V (z'), Q_t + 1 \right\}.$$ 

The first term denotes the space that was occupied at the end of last period which is not up for renewal. The second term denotes the space that was up for renewal and is renewed for the same or for less space. Here, $0 \leq s_{t+1}^O (z') \leq 1$ is the share of office space that was up for renewal which is being renewed in period $t + 1$. This is a stochastic process whose realized value depends on the state of the world $z'$ in period $t + 1$. It combines the extensive margin of
renewal (the share of space that gets renewed versus not-renewed) and the intensive margin of renewal (the share of space in sf that is renewed conditional on renewal). The third term denotes space that was vacant at the end of last period and is being newly rented. The stochastic process \(0 \leq s_{t+1}^V(z')\) is the share of office space that was vacant that is being newly rented out in period \(t + 1\) if period \(t + 1\) is in state \(z'\). This term includes the part of lease expansions that exceeds the original space (renewals for more space). This share is not bounded from above by 1, to allow for growth in a building/market due to changes in the supply. The minimum operator guarantees that space occupancy in a building/market is weakly below available supply. It will not be binding in our calibration.

The growth in available space in a building/market is a stochastic process which depends on the regime the model is in:

\[
\frac{Q_{t+1}}{Q_t} - 1 = \eta_{t+1}(z').
\]

Growth reflects new construction (renovation of a building that adds floorspace or new construction in a market) net of depreciation.

We define the scaled state variable \(\hat{Q}_t^O\):

\[
\hat{Q}_t^O = \frac{Q_t^O}{Q_t}
\]

with the law of motion:

\[
\hat{Q}_{t+1}^O(\hat{Q}_t^O, z') = \min \left\{ \hat{Q}_t^O(1 - \chi) + \hat{Q}_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O(z') + (1 - \hat{Q}_t^O)s_{t+1}^V(z'), 1 \right\}
\]

The rent revenue in a building/market in period \(t + 1\) takes the following form:

\[
Rev_{t+1} = Q_t^O(1 - \chi)R_t^O + \left[ Q_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O(z') + (\hat{Q}_t^O - Q_t^O)s_{t+1}^V(z') \right] R_{t+1}^m
\]

in which \(R_t^O\) is the average net effective rent per square foot on existing leases and \(R_{t+1}^m\)
is the market’s net effective rent (NER) per square foot on newly executed leases. The net effective rent incorporates concessions (free rent) and tenant improvements. We assume that all new leases are signed at the market NER. The rent on existing leases is a geometrically-decaying weighted average of all past market rents, where the weights capture the shares of outstanding leases signed in each of the prior periods:

\[ R_t^O = \chi \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1 - \chi)^k R_{t-k}^m \]

The law of motion for this second state variable is given by:

\[ R_{t+1}^O = (1 - \chi) R_t^O + \chi R_{t+1}^m \]

We define the state variable \( \hat{R}_t^O \):

\[ \hat{R}_t^O = \frac{R_t^O}{R_t^m} \]

The growth rate of the market’s NER per square foot is a stochastic process: it’s value depends on the aggregate state realization \( z' \) in period \( t + 1 \):

\[ \frac{R_{t+1}^m}{R_t^m} - 1 = \epsilon_{t+1}(z') \]

The law of motion for the scaled state variable becomes:

\[ \hat{R}_{t+1}^O(\hat{R}_t^O, z') = \frac{1 - \chi}{1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z')} \hat{R}_t^O + \chi \] (4)

We can now rewrite rent revenue as a function of the scaled state variables. The rent revenue in a building/market in period \( t + 1 \) takes the following form:

\[ Rev_{t+1} = \bar{Q}_t R_t^m \left\{ (1 - \chi) \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{R}_t^O + \left[ \hat{Q}_t^O \chi s^O(z') + (1 - \hat{Q}_t^O) s^V(z') \right] (1 + \epsilon(z')) \right\} \]

Define potential rent as the rent revenue based on full occupancy at the prevailing market
rent: $\bar{Q}_t R^n_t$. Denote the rent revenue scaled by last period’s potential rent with a hat:

$$
\hat{\text{Rev}}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z') = \frac{\text{Rev}_{t+1}}{\bar{Q}_t R^n_t} = (1 - \chi)\hat{Q}^O_t \hat{R}^O_t + \left(\hat{Q}^O_t \chi s^O(z') + (1 - \hat{Q}^O_t) s^V(z')\right) (1 + \epsilon(z'))
$$

Recall the expected PDV of lease revenues $V^R_t$:

$$
V^R_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \text{Rev}_{t+j} \right]
$$

Scale this price by potential rent to obtain a price-dividend ratio:

$$
\hat{V}^R_t = \frac{V^R_t}{\bar{Q}_t R^n_t}
$$

The price-dividend ratio of the lease revenue claim solves the Bellman equation:

$$
\hat{V}^R_t(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z) = \sum_{z'} \pi(z'|z) M(z'|z) \left\{ \hat{\text{Rev}}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z') + (1 + \eta(z'))(1 + \epsilon(z'))\hat{V}^R_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_{t+1}, \hat{R}^O_{t+1}, z') \right\}
$$

subject to the laws of motion for the scaled state variables (3) and (4).

### 3.2 Modeling Costs

On the cost side, there are three types of costs: operating expenditures, capital expenditures, and leasing commissions. Note that tenant improvements and concessions (free rent) are already reflected on the revenue side since we consider net effective rent as our rent concept.

We fold the per-period equivalent of capital expenditures into the operating expenses, a common practice (the capital reserve account). These per-period capital expenditures are independent of building occupancy. Other operating costs that are independent of occupancy are: property insurance, property taxes, and the fixed part of utilities and maintenance. We refer to these combined fixed costs per square foot as $C^\text{fix}_t$. The presence of fixed costs acts
as operational leverage to the asset.

Utilities and maintenance also contain a variable component that depends on building occupancy. Variable costs per square foot are denoted as $C_{i, var}^t$.

Leasing commissions (or broker fees) capture costs associated with bringing in new tenants. When a lease expires, leasing commissions are higher for new leases than for renewals: $LC^N > LC^R$. Commissions are variable costs, proportional to the first-year rental revenue from the lease.

Building costs are:

$$Cost_{t+1} = C_{t+1}^{fix} (z') \bar{Q} + Q_{t}^O C_{t+1}^{var} (z') + \left[ Q_{t}^O s t+1 (z') LC_{t+1}^R (z') + (\bar{Q}_t - Q_{t}^O) s t+1 (z') LC_{t+1}^N (z') \right] \bar{R}_t^{m}$$

We scale costs by lagged potential rent:

$$\bar{Cost}_{t+1} = \frac{Cost_{t+1}}{\bar{Q}_t \bar{R}_t^{m}}$$

$$= c_{t+1}^{fix} (z') + \hat{Q}_{t}^O c_{t+1}^{var} (z') + \left[ \hat{Q}_{t}^O \chi s_t+1 (z') LC_{t+1}^R (z') + (1 - \hat{Q}_{t}^O) s_t+1 (z') LC_{t+1}^N (z') \right] (1 + \epsilon (z'))$$

where cost per square foot to market rent per square foot ratios are defined as:

$$c_{t+1}^{fix} (z') = \frac{C_{t+1}^{fix} (z')}{\bar{R}_t^{m}}$$

and

$$c_{t+1}^{var} (z') = \frac{C_{t+1}^{var} (z')}{\bar{R}_t^{m}}.$$

Note that $\bar{Cost}_{t+1}$ only depends on $\hat{Q}_{t}^O$ and on $z'$, not on $\bar{R}_t^O$.

Recall the expected PDV of costs $V_t^C$:

$$V_t^C = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t+j} Cost_{t+j} \right].$$

We scale this price by potential rent to obtain a price-dividend ratio:

$$\hat{V}_t^C = \frac{V_t^C}{\bar{Q}_t \bar{R}_t^{m}}.$$
The price-dividend ratio of the building cost claim solves the Bellman equation:

\[
\hat{V}_t^C (\hat{Q}_t^O, z) = \sum_{z'} \pi(z' | z) M(z' | z) \left\{ \text{Cost}_{t+1} (\hat{Q}_t^O, z') + (1 + \eta(z')) (1 + \epsilon(z')) \hat{V}_{t+1}^C (\hat{Q}_{t+1}^O, z') \right\}
\]

subject to the law of motion for the scaled state variable in (3).

Bellman equations (5) and (6) have closed-form solutions spelled out in Appendix C.

3.3 Calibration

Since we are interested in understanding how the value of office is affected by remote work, we want to calibrate the model to the entire stock of office. While risk and return are likely to vary across space, we focus here on New York City: America’s largest office market. One key parameter will be identified from the A+ segment of the NYC office market, so we also need a calibration for that segment of the NYC office market.

3.3.1 States and State Transition Probabilities

The state variable \( z \) follows a Markov Chain which can take on four values: expansion (E), recession (R), WFH expansion (WFH-E), WFH recession (WFH-R). Here, WFH stands for a world where a lot of work is done remotely or in hybrid format. Before 2020, the world was oscillating between the E and R states.\(^7\)

The model is calibrated at an annual frequency. We decompose the \( 4 \times 4 \) annual state transition probability matrix as the Kronecker product of two \( 2 \times 2 \) transition probabilities. The first matrix governs the dynamics between expansions and recessions. The second one governs the dynamics between no-WFH and WFH states. These two components are assumed to be independent:

\[
\pi(z' | z) = \pi^{BC}(z' | z) \otimes \pi^{WFH}(z' | z).
\]

\(^7\)We can think of the two non-WFH states as states where there was a small amount of remote work. American Time Use Survey data for 2017 put the fraction of remote work at around 5%.
We calibrate expansions and recessions to the observed frequency of NBER recessions in the 1926–2019 data, and the average length of a recession. Recessions are shorter-lived than expansions. This pins down the $2 \times 2$ matrix $\pi^{BC}(z'|z)$.

$$
\pi^{BC} = \begin{bmatrix}
E & R \\
0.877 & 0.123 \\
R & 0.581 0.419
\end{bmatrix}
$$

The WFH transition matrix is a key object in our valuation exercise. The no-WFH state captures an environment in which remote work is rare, while the WFH state captures an environment in which remote work is common. We set the probability of entering in the WFH state from the no-WFH state equal to $q = 5\%$, to capture the idea that a transition to mass adoption of remote work was unlikely before 2020. The second parameter is the probability of remaining in the WFH state conditional on having entered it, which we label $p$. The latter governs the persistence of remote work, and it is a key parameter of interest in the paper. We will infer the value of $p$ from the observed change in class-A+ office valuations at the onset of Covid, as measured from office REIT data, and perform robustness with respect to this parameter. As explained in detail below, this calibration delivers $p = 0.8176$. These two parameters pin down $\pi^{WFH}(z'|z)$:

$$
\pi^{WFH} = \begin{bmatrix}
\text{No WFH} & \text{WFH} \\
1 - q & q \\
1 - p & p
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
\text{No WFH} & \text{WFH} \\
0.95 & 0.05 \\
0.1824 & 0.8176
\end{bmatrix}
$$

### 3.3.2 State Prices

The one-period SDF takes the form $M(z'|z)$. We decompose this SDF into a pre-WFH SDF and a WFH shifter:

$$
M(z'|z) = M^{BC}(z'|z) \otimes M^{WFH}(z'|z).
$$

We choose $M^{BC}(z'|z)$ to match the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium in both expansions and recessions. First, we match the risk-free rate, conditional on being in a given
state:

\[ R_i^f(z) = \left( \sum_{z'} \pi^{BC}(z'|z) M^{BC}(z'|z) \right)^{-1}. \]

We average the observed 3-month T-bill rate (in excess of inflation) in expansions and recessions using pre-2020 data. Second, we match the average return on equity conditional on each pair \((z, z')\). That is, we want the conditional Euler equations for the aggregate stock market return \(\text{Ret}^{mkt}\) be satisfied for each state \(z = E, R)\):

\[ 1 = \left( \sum_{z'} \pi^{BC}(z'|z) M^{BC}(z'|z) \text{Ret}^{mkt}(z'|z) \right) \]

Combined, the equations for the risk-free rate and the equity return provide four equations in four unknowns, and hence pin down \(M^{BC}(z'|z)\):

\[
M^{BC} = \begin{bmatrix}
E & R \\
0.761 & 2.639 \\
0.262 & 1.917
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The model matches the observed long-term average real risk-free rate of 1.5%. It implies a higher real risk-free rate in recessions than in expansions. The model also matches the historical average equity return of 9.5%. The equity risk premium is 8.0% unconditionally, and substantially higher in recessions (13.8%) than in expansions (6.9%).

The SDF component \(M^{WFH}(z'|z)\) governs how the risk associated with working from home is priced. It is chosen to price the returns on a portfolio of stocks that goes long companies that benefit from remote work and short companies that are exposed to remote work. We exclude real estate stocks from the portfolio on purpose. Appendix A.2 contains the details of the WFH factor construction. We call this portfolio the WFH equity factor.

We use data from the period January 2015–January 2020 to measure the conditional expected return \(\text{Ret}^{wfh}(z' = \text{no WFH}|z = \text{No WFH})\). The WFH equity factor is exposed to stock and bond market risk, as captured by the first two terms below, as well as to WFH
risk, as captured by the last term:

\[ \text{Ret}^{\text{WFH}}(z' = \text{No WFH}|z = \text{No WFH}) = \beta^{\text{mkt}} \lambda^{\text{mkt}} + \beta^{\text{bond}} \lambda^{\text{bond}} + \lambda^{\text{WFH}}. \]

We estimate the (conditional) stock and bond betas in the January 2015–January 2020 period. Appendices A.4 and A.5 show how we pin down the (conditional) market prices of risk for the WFH equity risk factor, and for the stock and bond risk factors, respectively. Given our value of \( \lambda^{\text{WFH}} = -7.0\% \), we find \( \text{Ret}^{\text{WFH}}(z' = \text{no WFH}|z = \text{No WFH}) = -6.42\% \).

We use the data from January 2020 to December 2020 to measure the conditional expected return \( \text{Ret}^{\text{WFH}}(z' = \text{WFH}|z = \text{No WFH}) \). Since we only observe one such transition in our sample, we are forced to take this simpler approach. This results in \( \text{Ret}^{\text{WFH}}(z' = \text{WFH}|z = \text{No WFH}) = 30.84\% \).

Given that we have no data on the transition from the WFH to the no-WFH state and only 1.5 observations on the return conditional on remaining in the WFH state, we opt to assume instead that the second row of \( M^{\text{WFH}} \), conditional on \( z = \text{No WFH} \), is equal to the first row, conditional on \( z = \text{No WFH} \).

We normalize the SDF entry \( M^{\text{WFH}}(\text{No WFH}|\text{No WFH}) = 1 \). This then leaves us with one equation in one unknown. We set \( M^{\text{WFH}}(\text{WFH}|\text{No WFH}) \) to price the WFH equity risk factor return correctly for \( z = \text{No WFH} \):

\[
1 = \left( \sum_{z'} \pi^{\text{WFH}}(z'|z) M^{\text{WFH}}(z'|z) \text{Ret}^{\text{WFH}}(z'|z) \right).
\]

Finally, since we want the risk-free rate to be fully determined by \( M^{\text{BC}}(z'|z) \) and unaffected by \( M^{\text{WFH}} \), we scale each row of \( M^{\text{WFH,unscaled}} \) such that \( E[M^{\text{WFH}}|z] \) is equal to 1 for each state \( z \):

\[
M^{\text{WFH,unscaled}} = \begin{bmatrix}
\text{No WFH} & 1 & 1.696 \\
\text{WFH} & 1 & 1.696
\end{bmatrix}, \quad M^{\text{WFH}} = \begin{bmatrix}
\text{No WFH} & 0.966 & 1.639 \\
\text{WFH} & 0.627 & 1.080
\end{bmatrix}
\]
The model considers the WFH state (second column) to be a worse state of the world—with a higher market price of risk—as the no-WFH state (first column). Assets such as offices, that have lower returns in that state of the world, are therefore riskier.

In sum, the asset pricing model pins down the risk-free rate and contains two priced aggregate risk factors: an equity market factor and a remote work factor.

3.3.3 Office Cash Flows for All NYC

Since we are interested in valuing the entire commercial office stock in New York City (the market), our main calibration is for the entire office stock. Below, we also consider a second calibration to the A+ segment. The calibration algorithm is detailed in Appendix D.

We set the lease expiration parameter at $\chi = 0.1351$. This delivers a lease duration of 7.40 years, matching the CompStak average office lease term in the New York City data. Table 2 lists the remaining parameters, which vary by state.

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
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<th>WFH-R</th>
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<td>0.0544</td>
<td>-0.1251</td>
<td>0.0334</td>
<td>-0.1699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply growth</td>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>-0.0152</td>
<td>-0.0158</td>
<td>-0.0407</td>
<td>-0.0413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease renewal share</td>
<td>$s^O$</td>
<td>0.8259</td>
<td>0.2897</td>
<td>0.2748</td>
<td>0.0964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New leasing share</td>
<td>$s^V$</td>
<td>0.1838</td>
<td>0.3350</td>
<td>0.0612</td>
<td>0.1115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed cost/rent ratio</td>
<td>$c^{fix}$</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable cost/rent ratio</td>
<td>$c^{var}$</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leasing commission new</td>
<td>$LC^N$</td>
<td>0.3000</td>
<td>0.3000</td>
<td>0.2400</td>
<td>0.2400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leasing commission renewals</td>
<td>$LC^R$</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
<td>0.1200</td>
<td>0.1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Market NER growth $\epsilon$ in expansions and recessions comes from the January 2000 to December 2019 CompStak data.\(^8\) NER is strongly pro-cyclical. Market NER growth in the remote work state comes from the January 2020 to May 2022 CompStak data. Market NER

\(^8\)Since NBER business cycles in this period (and before) are shorter than commercial real estate (CRE) leasing cycles, we use the latter to determine the values for annual NER growth in expansions and recessions. Strict adherence to NBER dates would result in office NER growth that is far too similar across expansions and recessions, and make the large fluctuations in rent growth observed in the data highly unlikely events from the perspective of the model.
Suppose growth was -16.99% from December 2019 to December 2020 (a WFH-R episode), and +3.34% per year from January 2021 to May 2022 (two WFH-E years).

Supply growth $\eta(z)$ incorporates new construction net of depreciation and reductions in office space due to conversion to alternative use. The values for supply growth for expansion and recession periods are calculated from CompStak based on the year of construction of all office buildings. New construction is 1.18% in expansions and 1.12% in recessions. We subtract a 2.70% depreciation rate, a realistic number for office property, from the new construction numbers to arrive at the net supply growth $\eta$ reported in the table.\(^9\) Supply growth is acyclical because of the long construction lags for office properties.

The values for supply growth in WFH-R and WFH-E periods are calculated by downscaling E and R supply growth by a fixed amount $\Delta \eta$. The value for $\Delta \eta$ is set such that the model has long-run growth in potential gross rent of zero, given all other parameters. This keeps the model stationary. The calibration has the intuitive feature that supply growth is much lower in the remote work states compared to the no-WFH states, capturing the response of developers to the reduced demand for office as well as conversion of office to alternative uses such as housing.

The parameters $s^O(E), s^O(R), s^V(E), s^V(R)$ govern office demand across the business cycle in the non-WFH states. We pin down these four parameters to match four moments of the NYC contractual vacancy rate over the period 1987.Q1-2019.Q4, plotted in Figure 5. Those moments are the mean, the standard deviation, the maximum, and the minimum. The resulting lease renewal share for existing leases that are up for renewal, $s^O$, is strongly pro-cyclical. The new leasing share for vacant space, $s^V$, is counter-cyclical, simply because there is much less vacant space available for lease in expansions. This calibration ensures that our model matches both the average vacancy rate of NYC office as well as the amplitude of the leasing cycle, which reflects cyclical tenant demand for office.

The parameters $s^O$ and $s^V$ in the WFH states are assumed to be proportional to their

\(^9\)Our depreciation estimate corresponds closely to the 39 years of allowable depreciation expense for non-residential commercial real estate assets.
no-WFH counterparts:

\[ s^i_{z, \text{wf}} = \delta \cdot s^i_{z}, \quad z = E, R, \quad i = O, V. \]  

(7)

We estimate \( \delta \) to as to best fit the dynamics of the office occupancy rate over the nine quarters from 2020.Q1-2022.Q1. Appendix D explains the details. The resulting value is \( \delta = 0.3328 \), which indicates a large downward shift in office demand in the WFH state. This shift is consistent with the evidence on the large decline in new leasing activity, documented in Figure 6. It allows the model to match the large rise in vacancy rates observed in the data between 2020.Q1 and 2022.Q1.

The fixed costs and variable costs are assumed to be acyclical, making net operating income (revenue minus cost) more cyclical than revenues. Leasing commissions are also acyclical, and around 4.3% per year on leases that last an average of 7 years, for a total commission of 30% on a new lease. Leasing commissions on renewals of existing leases are set half as large as commissions on new leases. Leasing commissions are assumed to go down by 20% in the WFH state to reflect additional competition for brokerage business in a world where office demand is weak.

3.3.4 Office Cash Flows for A+ Properties in NYC

Next, we calibrate the model to A+ buildings of New York City. We use the leases on the subset of A+ buildings to get parameter estimates for the A+ NYC office sector. The calibration approach parallels that for NYC All, and is detailed in Appendix D. \( \chi \) is set to be 0.1351 to match the slightly higher average lease duration of 8.20 years of A+ leases in NYC. Table 3 lists the remaining parameter estimates for the A+ universe. The cost parameters are assumed to be the same as for the market as a whole.
### Table 3: Calibration for NYC A+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>WFH-E</th>
<th>WFH-R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market NER growth</td>
<td>( \epsilon )</td>
<td>0.0482</td>
<td>-0.1212</td>
<td>0.0272</td>
<td>-0.0472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply growth</td>
<td>( \eta )</td>
<td>-0.0155</td>
<td>-0.0081</td>
<td>-0.0410</td>
<td>-0.0336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease renewal share</td>
<td>( s^O )</td>
<td>0.8432</td>
<td>0.5668</td>
<td>0.5361</td>
<td>0.3604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New leasing share</td>
<td>( s^V )</td>
<td>0.1160</td>
<td>0.1893</td>
<td>0.0738</td>
<td>0.1204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4 Identifying the Persistence of Work From Home

A key parameter in the calibration is \( p \), which governs the persistence of remote work. We identify this parameter as follows. We assume that the economy transitioned from the no-WFH expansion state (the E state) in 2019 to the WFH state and a recession (the WFH-R state) in 2020. We compute the model-implied return on the NYC A+ office market in this transition, using the A+ calibration described above:

\[
\left( \frac{\hat{V}^{A+}(\hat{Q}_t^O, \hat{R}_t^O, WFHR)}{\hat{V}^{A+}(\hat{Q}_{19}^O, \hat{R}_{19}^O, E)} \right) \left( \frac{\hat{Q}_t^O R_t^m}{\hat{Q}_{19}^O R_{19}^m} \right) + \left( \frac{\hat{NOI}^{A+}(\hat{Q}_t^O, \hat{R}_t^O, WFHR)}{\hat{V}^{A+}(\hat{Q}_{19}^O, \hat{R}_{19}^O, E)} \right) = (1 - 22.75\%).
\]

Figure 9 plots this model-implied realized return on A+ office in this transition, the left-hand side of the equation above, for a range of values of \( p \).\(^{10}\) Since the office return in this transition varies strongly with \( p \), this moment is well-suited to identify this parameter.

In order to pick the relevant point on this curve, we turn to the REIT data. REITS invest in class A+ office properties. The three NYC-centric office REITs, (SL Green, Vornado, and Empire State Realty Trust), experienced a value-weighted return of -36.16% between December 2019 and December 2020. After unlevering this equity return, the asset return was -22.75%.\(^{11}\) The model matches this decline for a value of \( p = 0.8176 \). With this key parameter identified, we can return to the calibration for the full NYC office market and calculate the change in its value due to remote work.

---

\(^{10}\)As the equation shows, this return depends also on the state pair \((\hat{Q}_t^O, \hat{R}_t^O)\) for 2019 and 2020, respectively. We obtain these by feeding in the sequence of annual aggregate shocks (expansions and recessions) from 1926 to 2019 obtained from the NBER recession chronology into the laws of motion of the states under the A+ calibration, which gives the 2019 values. For the 2020 values, we apply the law of motion for the state variables once more, assuming that the state transitioned from E to WFH-R.

\(^{11}\)Unlevering is done based on leverage ratio and cost of debt data from NAREIT.
4 Main Results

4.1 Key Model Outcomes

Table 4 presents the model solution for the “All NYC” office calibration. The model delivers a reasonable unconditional average cap rate of 7.74% for the overall NYC office market. The cap rate is 9.73% in recessions and 7.45% in expansions. In the data, the average hedonic-adjusted cap rate from Real Capital Analytics for Manhattan Office of 5.3% for 2001–19.\footnote{Cap rates were higher before 2001. Since our model’s steady state pertains to a longer period than 2001–19, the slightly higher average is a good feature. Also, our data pertains to more than Manhattan. Cap rates are higher in the other boroughs than in Manhattan. RCA has no office cap rates for the outer boroughs. Finally, our cap rate pertains to the entire office stock and removes depreciation, which lowers the growth rate and increases the cap rate by 2.7% points. The model-implied cap rate on a building where cash-flow growth is not reduced by depreciation is therefore 5.0%.} The RCA data also indicate higher cap rates in recessions (6.0% in 2001, 2008, 2009) than in expansions (5.2% for 2002–2007 and 2010–2019).

In a Gordon Growth Model with constant expected NOI growth rate $g$ and a constant discount rate $r$, the cap rate $c = r - g$. Our Markov Chain model features time-varying expected growth and time-varying expected office returns, so this relationship does not hold.
It is nevertheless useful to look at the two components of the cap rate. The model implies an expected return on NYC office of 7.70% and an office risk premium of 6.21%. This is naturally lower than the equity risk premium of 8.06% since an unlevered office property is less risky that the aggregate stock market (which is a levered investment). The office risk premium is substantially higher in recessions (10.16%) than in expansions (5.19%).

Table 4: Model Solution for NYC All Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Uncond</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>WFHE</th>
<th>WFHR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R_f$</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>0.0084</td>
<td>0.0467</td>
<td>0.0084</td>
<td>0.0467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity $E[\text{Ret}] - 1$</td>
<td>0.0955</td>
<td>0.0773</td>
<td>0.1846</td>
<td>0.0746</td>
<td>0.1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity RP = $E[\text{Ret}] - 1 - R_f$</td>
<td>0.0806</td>
<td>0.0690</td>
<td>0.1379</td>
<td>0.0662</td>
<td>0.1348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap rate</td>
<td>0.0774</td>
<td>0.0745</td>
<td>0.0973</td>
<td>0.0676</td>
<td>0.0999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office $E[\text{Ret}] - 1$</td>
<td>0.0770</td>
<td>0.0603</td>
<td>0.1484</td>
<td>0.0684</td>
<td>0.1455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office RP = $E[\text{Ret}] - 1 - R_f$</td>
<td>0.0621</td>
<td>0.0519</td>
<td>0.1016</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>0.0987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{E}_{g_t}$</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>-0.0186</td>
<td>0.1256</td>
<td>-0.0565</td>
<td>0.1102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy rate = $1 - \hat{Q}^O$</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
<td>0.1053</td>
<td>0.1600</td>
<td>0.2768</td>
<td>0.2865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\text{Rev}}$</td>
<td>0.7876</td>
<td>0.7995</td>
<td>0.9067</td>
<td>0.6479</td>
<td>0.8087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\text{Cost}}$</td>
<td>0.4138</td>
<td>0.4259</td>
<td>0.4141</td>
<td>0.3777</td>
<td>0.3755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\text{NOI}} = \hat{\text{Rev}} - \hat{\text{Cost}}$</td>
<td>0.3738</td>
<td>0.3735</td>
<td>0.4926</td>
<td>0.2702</td>
<td>0.4331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\nu}^R$</td>
<td>8.4713</td>
<td>8.9948</td>
<td>8.1383</td>
<td>7.1768</td>
<td>6.7796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\nu}^C$</td>
<td>3.7269</td>
<td>4.0427</td>
<td>3.1483</td>
<td>3.2731</td>
<td>2.5389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\nu} = \hat{\nu}^R - \hat{\nu}^C$</td>
<td>4.7444</td>
<td>4.9521</td>
<td>4.9901</td>
<td>3.9037</td>
<td>4.2407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expected NOI growth is close to zero (-0.07% per year) unconditionally. This number is in real terms and already incorporates that the office stock depreciates at 2.70% per year (so it is 2.63% before depreciation). Expected cash flow growth is higher in recessions than in expansions since recession states imply a high likelihood of transitioning to a better economic state going forward. The opposite is true of realized NOI growth rates in a transition from expansions to recessions, which are negative in the model (not reported).

The next part of the table shows that vacancy rates are 15% on average, higher in recessions than expansions by 5.47% points, and much higher conditional on being (and remaining) in the remote work states, around 27.9%.

The last part of the table shows the value of the building, scaled by potential rent, and
broken down into the PDV of revenues minus PDV of costs. The typical NYC office trades for a multiple of 4.74 times potential gross rent unconditionally according to our calibration. The average valuation ratio of office properties in the no-WFH expansion state of 4.95 is 16.78% higher than the value of 4.24 in the WFH-R state.

Figure 10 shows the valuation ratio for office \( \hat{V} \) conditional on expansion, recession, WFH-expansion and WFH-recession for NYC. The x-axis plots the grid for \( \hat{Q}^O \) and the y-axis shows the grid for \( \hat{R}^O \). Office valuation ratios are increasing in both occupancy \( \hat{Q}^O \) and rent premium \( \hat{R}^O \).

4.2 The Effect of WFH on Office Values

4.2.1 Entire Office Stock

To assess the effect of remote work on office values, we let the economy undergo the same transition as the one we considered for A+ office when calibrating the parameter \( \mathbf{p} \), namely from an expansion in the no-WFH state in 2019 to a WFH-R state in 2020. We feed in the observed history of expansions and recessions from 1926-2019 to arrive at the value for the endogenous state variables \( (\hat{Q}_{19}^O, \hat{R}_{19}^O) \) using the laws of motion for the states (3) and (4) under the “NYC All” calibration. The model captures the decade-long expansion before the Covid-19 pandemic. We then apply the law of motion once more to obtain \( (\hat{Q}_{20}^O, \hat{R}_{20}^O) \) assuming the economy transitioned from E to WFH-R between 2019 and 2020.

The realized growth rate of potential gross rent in this transition is -20.42% in the model. The change in the scaled valuation ratio is -30.63%. Therefore, the overall value of the NYC office stock in this transition falls by 44.80%:

\[
\left( \frac{\hat{V}(\hat{Q}_{20}^O, \hat{R}_{20}^O, WFHR)}{V(\hat{Q}_{19}^O, \hat{R}_{19}^O, E)} \right) \left( \frac{\bar{Q}_{20} R_{20}^m}{\bar{Q}_{19} R_{19}^m} \right) = (1 - 30.63\%) \cdot (1 - 20.42\%) = (1 - 44.80\%)
\]

Put differently, if the entire office stock of NYC had been publicly listed, its value would have fallen by 44.80% in 2020. This same decline was 27.13% for the A+ office sector, illustrating
the relative safety of A+ office.

To understand the longer-run consequences of remote work, we conduct the following simulation exercise. In the first period of the transition, from 2019 to 2020, the economy goes from the E to the WFH-R state. In the second year, from 2020 to 2021, the economy transitions from WFH-R to WFH-E. After 2021 (from 2022 onward), we let the economy evolve stochastically according to its laws of motion governed by $\pi$. Since there are many
possible paths for the evolution of the state, Figures 11 and 12 show fan charts where darker blue colors indicate more likely future paths for the economy. The solid line indicates the mean path. The red line plots the average path conditional on the economy remaining in the WFH state every year until 2029. The probability of this event occurring is 20.0% according to the model.

Figure 11: Key Moments Distributions, Normalized to 100 in Dec 2019

Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the valuation ratio \( \hat{V} \) for a transition from expansion in 2019 to WFH-R in 2020 and WFH-E in 2021. From 2022 onward, the state evolves stochastically. The shaded areas show percentiles of the distribution of simulated paths, with the darkest color indicating the 40–60 percentile range, and the lightest color the 10–90 percentile range.

The top left panel of Figure 11 shows the occupancy rate dynamics from the model simulation. The model captures a substantial decline in occupancy from a high value of 95.08% in 2019 to an average value of 80% in 2022. Hence the model essentially matches the observed vacancy rate, which was 21.5% in 2022.Q2. Since long-term leases continue to roll off and renew at low rates as long as the economy is in the WFH state, the decline in occupancy is protracted. Should the economy remain in the WFH state until 2029, occupancy would
eventually fall below 65% even after accounting for the supply response.\textsuperscript{13}

Lease revenues, in the top right panel, reflect the protracted decline in occupancy and the gradual repricing of existing leases at lower market rents. The model predicts a decline in actual lease revenues \((Q^O R^O)\) of -17.5\% between 2019 and 2021, which matches the observed decline in in-force lease revenues in the Compstak data for New York City of -17.5\% between December 2019 and May 2022. Lease revenues are down 28.47\% by 2029 along the average path. Total lease revenue falls by much more for the red line, reflecting additionally the faster reduction in the overall quantity of office floor space.

The bottom left panel shows that NOI falls by less than revenues since costs also decline in occupancy. The bottom right panel shows that office cap rates were below 5.76\% in 2019 in the model, after a decade-long expansion that increased occupancy and rents. Cap rates then increase in 2020, fall back in 2021 as the economy shifts from recession to expansion, and then gradually stabilize toward their unconditional mean of 7.74\%.

The combination of declining cash flows and rising cap rates results in a substantial change in the value of office \(V_t\), shown in Figure 12. The graph illustrates a mean path that sees no recovery. Remote work is a near-permanent shock. Ten years after the transition, office values remain at levels that are 39.18\% below the valuation in 2019. Along some sample paths, the economy returns to the no-WFH state and sees increases in occupancy rates \((\hat{Q}^O)\), rent revenues, and NOI. Along other sample paths, the economy remains in the WFH state (WFH-E or WFH-R) for a long period, and office valuations continue to fall. For example, conditioning on remaining in the WFH state for at least 10 years (red line), office valuation are 59.86\% lower in 2029 than in 2019.

A second key message from the paper is that there is substantial uncertainty around the mean path. This uncertainty is driven both by the future state of the economy, the medium-frequency fluctuations between recession and expansion, as well as by the lower-frequency uncertainty about the future evolution of remote work. Office valuations are subject to WFH

\textsuperscript{13}Recall that supply growth in the WFH state is 2.55\% points lower per year in the WFH than in the no-WFH states. This captures reduced construction as well as conversion of office to alternative use.
Figure 12: Office Valuation Distribution for NYC, Normalized to 100 in Dec 2019

Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the office value $V$ for a transition from expansion in 2019 to WFH-R in 2020 and WFH-E in 2021. From 2022 onward, the state evolves stochastically. The shaded areas show percentiles of the distribution of simulated paths, with the darkest color indicating the 40–60 percentile range, and the lightest color the 10–90 percentile range.

4.2.2 Flight To Quality

The previous results referred to the entire NYC office stock. We now redo the simulations for the A+ segment, which has its own cash-flow parameters. We define the A+ as in Section 2.14 The results for cap rates, valuation ratios, and vacancy rates in the A+ office segment are reported in Appendix E. They show lower cap rates and lower expected returns in the A+ segment, consistent with the lower risk of this segment.

Figure 13 revisits the transition graph for office values. It shows substantially smaller value reductions both in the short and in the long-run. The mean path has office values down by 20.67% in 2029 compared to 2019. In the scenario where the economy remains in the WFH state until at least 2029, the decline in A+ office values is 35.28%. The better performance is due to the stronger rent growth for A+ in the WFH states, and a lower risk premium for A+ office especially in the WFH state. On the flip side, the performance of the complement of A+, A-/B/C-class office is strictly worse than the overall market. Its initial

14Buildings which contain an expensive lease—defined as higher than the 90th percentile NER for the quarter and submarket—enter the A+ segment, and remain there for ten years.
value decline is -68.98% compared to -44.80% for all office.

Figure 13: Office Valuation Distribution for NYC A+, Normalized to 100 in Dec 2019

Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the A+ office value $V$ for a transition from expansion in 2019 to WFH-R in 2020 and WFH-E in 2021. From 2022 onward, the state evolves stochastically. The shaded areas show percentiles of the distribution of simulated paths, with the darkest color indicating the 40–60 percentile range, and the lightest color the 10–90 percentile range.

4.2.3 Term Structure of Valuations

We can decompose the (change in) office value into the contribution from each of the future cash flows. Appendix C.4 explains the procedure. Figure 14 plots the share of the total value of office that comes from each of the first 20 years of cash flows. The lines are downward sloping as cash flows in the near term are more valuable than cash flows farther in the future due to discounting. Each line refers to a different current state for the economy. Interestingly, in expansions (such as 2019) the contribution of the nearest-term cash flows is much smaller than in the WFH-R state (such as 2020). For the share of short-term in total cash flows to rise (in present-value) between 2019 and 2020, the value of the cash flows in the farther future must falls by more than in the near future. This occurs because rents (and NOI) in the short-term are largely locked in given the long-term nature of leases. Investors would be willing to pay a premium for buildings that have a lot of long-term pre-pandemic leases in place.

This pattern is unusual, compared to the equity markets, where van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2012) find that the share of short-maturity equity cash flows falls in the mild
recession of 2001, indicating an expected rebound in the near term, and stays flat in the deep recession of 2008, indicating a near-permanent shock to cash flows. Our results therefore suggest that the locked-in nature of commercial leases results in a different term structure of cash flow shocks in commercial real estate compared to other asset classes. In turn, this suggests that the shock to commercial office as a result of remote work may play out over an extended horizon.

Figure 14: Decomposing Office Values by Horizon

![Figure 14: Decomposing Office Values by Horizon](image)

4.2.4 Robustness to Persistence of Remote Work

To assess how sensitive our headline value reduction number is, we explore alternative values for the key parameter $p$. Figure 15 plots the difference in office values ($V$) between the model with no remote work in December 2019 and the model with remote work in December 2020. The vertical dashed line indicates our benchmark model with $p = 0.8176$, which produces a 44.80% valuation decline in the transition. This same decline is around 30.31% for a value of $p$ that is half as large as our benchmark.
5 Conclusion and Discussion

The real estate sector provides a unique vantage point to study the large social shifts in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. We estimate a 44.80% decline in the value of New York City’s office stock at the outset of the pandemic. We estimate that remote work is likely to persist and result in long-run office valuations that are 39.18% below pre-pandemic levels. Our novel commercial real estate valuation model is suitable for calibration to office markets in other locations and other commercial real estate sectors.

These valuation changes are large, but since about 80% of the office stock is privately-held and private transactions have been few and far between (and represent a heavily selected sample) it has been difficult to directly observe the valuation changes in the market place. One exception is office REIT stocks, whose (unlevered) valuations the model matches both in 2020 and in 2022. Other market indicators that have turned bearish are short interest (as a share of equity float) in office REIT stocks and the prices of CMBX tranches rated BBB−. Specifically, tranches in more recent CMBX vintages, which have a larger share of office collateral than earlier vintages, have experienced larger price declines.

Our results have important implications for future work practices. Firms and employees have invested considerably to advance remote work possibilities. This has enabled ma-
or changes in the locations where individuals work and live. Real estate markets provide important financial signals which can help assess how society perceives the net benefit of remote work.

Trends in office occupancy have prompted discussion on the merits of conversion of office, either from A-/B/C to A+ office or to alternative use such as multi-family. The former conversion could make sense in light of the flight to quality and the likely dearth of new office construction for years to come. The latter conversion makes sense in light of the lack of affordable housing in large cities, but often runs into issues relating to the structural feasibility, zoning restrictions, and return on investment. Older buildings tend to be more amenable to apartment conversion. Whether and how these conversions take place will have an important impact on urban design. Given the negative externalities associated with office vacancy, there may be a role for local governments to subsidize the conversion.

Finally, the decline in office values and the surrounding CBD retail properties, whose lease revenues have been hit at least as hard as office, has important implications for local public finances. For example, the share of real estate taxes in NYC’s budget was 53% in 2020, 24% of which comes from office and retail property taxes. Given budget balance requirements, the fiscal hole left by declining CBD office and retail tax revenues would need to be plugged by raising tax rates or cutting government spending. Both would affect the attractiveness of the city as a place of residence and work. These dynamics risk activating a fiscal doom loop. With more people being able to separate the location of work and home, the migration elasticity to local tax rates and amenities may be larger than in the past. Future research should explore these implications and study the role for federal fiscal policy.

\[\text{15} \text{ An additional 3\% of tax revenue comes from a tax on real estate tenants.}\]
References


A Asset Pricing Model to Infer Expected Returns

We consider a simple asset pricing model that can help explain office valuations and how WFH has impacted them. Conceptually, WFH has affected current building cash flow levels, expectations of future cash flow growth rates, and discount rates. The previous sections discussed the impact on current cash flows and on expected future rent growth. In this section, we develop a simple model to help understand how expected returns (risk premia) were affected during this period.

A.1 Model for Expected Returns

We propose the following model for the expected log return on office REITs:

\[ x_t \equiv \mathbb{E}_t[r_{t+1}^o] = r_t^f + \beta_t^m \lambda^m + \beta_t^b \lambda^b + \beta_t^{wfh} \lambda^{wfh} \]  

Office REITs are exposed to three sources of risk: aggregate stock market risk, aggregate bond market risk, and the systematic risk associated with remote work. In addition, their expected returns reflect the evolution of short-term nominal bond yields \( r_t^f \). To capture the changes in the underlying risk structure during the pandemic, we allow the exposures of office REITs to vary over time.

A.2 Constructing a WFH Risk Factor

We form a portfolio (Working from Home Index) that goes long stocks that benefit from remote work and short stocks that suffer from the move to working-from-home. Our benchmark WFH factor goes long stocks in the technology sector, health care sector, and pharmaceutical companies developing vaccine candidates and short stocks in the transportation sector, entertainment sector, and hotel sector. The WFH index composition can be found in table 5. Several variations on the factor construction, such as excluding entertainment stocks or just going long technology stocks and short transportation stocks, give similar results.
The Working from Home Risk Factor is a monthly rebalanced, Long-Short market capitalization weighted basket of stocks. On the last working day $r$ of each month, which we call the rebalance day, each stock $i$ in the long leg is assigned weight $w_{i,l,r}$ and each stock $j$ in the short leg is assigned weight $w_{j,s,r}$

$$w_{i,l,r} = \frac{M_{i,r-1}}{\sum_{k \in c_{l,r}} M_{k,r-1}}; w_{j,s,r} = \frac{M_{j,r-1}}{\sum_{k \in c_{s,r}} M_{k,r-1}}$$

Where $M_{k,r-1}$ is the Market Capitalization of Stock $k$ on day $r-1$, the working day immediately preceding rebalance day $r$. $c_{l,r}$ and $c_{s,r}$ are the constituents in long and short legs respectively for rebalance date $r$. Further, we impose a weight cap of 10% on each stock in the long leg and a weight cap of 20% on each stock in the short leg. The remaining weight are redistributed among remaining stocks of that leg in the same proportion above, i.e. proportional to their market capitalization. Such that:

$$\sum_{k \in c_{l,r}} w_{k,l,r} = 1; \sum_{k \in c_{s,r}} w_{k,s,r} = 1$$

Once weights are assigned, daily returns of the long and short leg are calculated as follows:

$$R_{l,t} = \sum_{k \in c_{l,t}} w_{k,l,r} \left( \frac{P_{k,t}}{P_{k,t-1}} - 1 \right)$$

$$R_{s,t} = \sum_{k \in c_{s,t}} w_{k,s,r} \left( \frac{P_{k,t}}{P_{k,t-1}} - 1 \right)$$

Where $R_{l,t}$ and $R_{s,t}$ are the returns of the long and short legs of the Index and $P_{k,t}$ is the price of stock $i$ on day $t$. $w_{k,x,r_t}$ is the weight of stock $k$ in leg $x$ on date $t$, if $t$ is a rebalance date and the weight of stock $k$ in leg $x$ on the rebalance date immediately preceding date $t$ otherwise.

The daily return $R_t$ on the working from Index on date $t$ is then given by:

$$R_t = R_{l,t} - R_{s,t}$$
The level of the Working from home index on date $t$, $WFH_t$ is then given by:

$$WFH_t = WFH_{t-1}(1 + R_t); WFH_0 = 100$$

We start the WFH time series in 2015 since the composition of the WFH index is relatively stable after that date. Prior to 2015, many of the companies in the long or short leg were not trading yet, such as Zoom. Several perturbations on the WFH index construction deliver similar results. Figure 16 plots the WFH index constructed from weekly and monthly returns. Below we use the monthly return series. The figure cumulates the WFH index returns starting from 100 at the start of 2015.

**Figure 16: Working From Home Risk Factor**

Before the pandemic, the WFH factor has modestly positive returns. It then spikes up 50% when the pandemic hits and large parts of the economy transition to remote work. Companies supporting remote work practices (Zoom, Peloton, etc.) flourish, while companies that require travel of physical proximity sell off (cruise lines, hotels, etc.). The WFH factor spikes up when the pandemic intensifies. It drops sharply when there is news about the development of a vaccine such as in November 2020 and at the start of 2021. Naturally, the average realized return of the WFH factor during the pandemic is strongly positive.
Table 5: Composition of WFH Index

Panel A: Long Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ticker</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leg</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PFE</td>
<td>Pfizer Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Vaccine Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRNA</td>
<td>Moderna Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Vaccine Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNTX</td>
<td>Biontech Se</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Vaccine Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNJ</td>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Vaccine Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZN</td>
<td>AstraZeneca Plc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Vaccine Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVAX</td>
<td>Novavax Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Vaccine Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGN</td>
<td>Regeneron Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Healthcare/Biopharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GILD</td>
<td>Gilead Sciences Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Healthcare/Biopharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRNE</td>
<td>Sorrento Therapeutics Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Healthcare/Biopharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMGN</td>
<td>Amgen Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Healthcare/Biopharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFLX</td>
<td>Netflix Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOOGL</td>
<td>Alphabet Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB</td>
<td>Meta Platforms Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMZN</td>
<td>Amazon.Com Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSFT</td>
<td>Microsoft Corp</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTXS</td>
<td>Citrix Systems Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRGS</td>
<td>Progress Software Corp</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAM</td>
<td>Atlassian Corporation Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTNX</td>
<td>Nutanix Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZM</td>
<td>Zoom Video Communications</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VZ</td>
<td>Verizon Communications Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATVI</td>
<td>Activision Blizzard Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTDOF</td>
<td>Nintendo Ltd</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Electronic Arts Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCO</td>
<td>Cisco Systems Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTCH</td>
<td>Match Group Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGHT</td>
<td>8X8 Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
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<td>VG</td>
<td>Vg Corp</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
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<td>PANW</td>
<td>Palo Alto Networks Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTON</td>
<td>Peloton Interactive Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Virtual Healthcare</td>
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<td>TDOC</td>
<td>Teladoc Health Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Virtual Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMW</td>
<td>Vmware Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cloud Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSG</td>
<td>Inseeog Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cloud Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZS</td>
<td>Zscalar Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cloud Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBX</td>
<td>Dropbox</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cloud Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTAP</td>
<td>Netapp Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cloud Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKTA</td>
<td>Okta Corp</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTNT</td>
<td>Fortinet Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCU</td>
<td>Docusign</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Online Document Mgmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOX</td>
<td>Box Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Online Document Mgmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPLD</td>
<td>Upland Software Inc</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Online Document Mgmt</td>
</tr>
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Panel B: Short Positions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ticker</th>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAL</td>
<td>Delta Air Lines Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAL</td>
<td>United Airlines Holdings Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAL</td>
<td>American Airlines Group Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUV</td>
<td>Southwest Airlines Co</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Carnival Corp</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLH</td>
<td>Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNP</td>
<td>Union Pacific Corp</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLT</td>
<td>Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Hotels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>Marriott International</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Hotels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hyatt Hotels Corp</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Hotels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHG</td>
<td>Intercontinental Hotels</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Hotels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX</td>
<td>Six Flags Entertainment Corp</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>Eventbrite Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYV</td>
<td>Live Nation Entertainment In</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYNN</td>
<td>Wynn Resorts Ltd</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVS</td>
<td>Las Vegas Sands Corp</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZR</td>
<td>Caesars Entertainment Inc</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.3 WFH Risk Exposure

To show that WFH risk emerged in full force during the pandemic, we estimate time-varying betas from 36-month rolling-window regressions for monthly office REIT excess returns:

\[
\frac{r_{o_{t+1}} - r_{f_t}}{1} = \alpha + \beta^m_t (r^m_{t+1} - r^f_t) + \beta^b_t (r^b_{t+1} - r^f_t) + \beta^{wfh}_t r^{wfh}_{t+1} + e_{t+1}
\]  

Figure 17 shows the estimated betas for office REITS. The patterns in the stock and bond betas of office REITS in the three-factor model (blue line) are similar to those in the two-factor model without the WFH factor (orange line) before the pandemic. However, omission of the WFH factor leads one to overstate the stock market beta during the pandemic (top left panel). The reverse is true for the bond beta in the top right panel.

The WFH beta in the bottom left panel is close to zero prior to the pandemic in February 2020, an exposure estimated over the 36-month window from March 2018 until February 2020. The \( \beta^{wfh} \) for Office REITS then starts a precipitous decline to around -0.5. It remains strongly negative until the end of our sample in December 2021, ending up at -0.3 in Decem-
ber 2021. The bottom-right panel shows that the $R^2$ improves during the pandemic thanks to the inclusion of the WFH factor.

Figure 17: Risk Exposures of Office REITs During Covid with WFH

![Market Returns](image)

![Bond Returns](image)

![Working From Home Index](image)

![R-squared](image)

A.4 WFH Risk Price

We estimate the market prices of risk on the WFH factor, $\lambda^{wfh}$, using the cross-section of 22 individual office REIT returns. We use a two-stage Fama-MacBeth procedure. In the first time-series stage, we estimate 36-month rolling-window regressions of each REIT’s return on the three factor returns; i.e., we estimate equation (9) for each REIT separately. In the second cross-sectional step, we regress the realized return each month on the betas for that month. The market price of risk estimates are the average of the monthly slope estimates of the second step. We use only the months prior to the onset of the pandemic (January 2015-January 2020) when computing this average. Since the WFH index saw unusually high
realizations during the pandemic, inclusion of the pandemic months would lead one to confuse realized with expected returns, while in fact the two are negatively correlated. We obtain \( \hat{\lambda}_{\text{WFH}} = -7.0\% \) annualized (t-stat is -0.52 but the sample is short to reliably estimate this coefficient).\(^{16}\)

The negative market price of risk for WFH risk means that states of the world where the WFH risk factor was large and positive are bad states of the world. This is intuitive, as those are periods where the pandemic flared up. Conversely, negative returns to WFH, such as Nov 8, 2020 when the vaccine discovery news first broke, are good states of the world.

### A.5 Expected Returns

For the risk prices on stocks and bond, we use the sample average of the estimated risk premia in the post-1994 period: \( \lambda^m = 7.81\% \) and \( \lambda^b = 2.91\% \). For the WFH risk price, we use \( \lambda_{\text{WFH}} = -7.0\% \), estimated above. We combine the three time-varying betas from Figure 17 with the market price of risk estimates to form the expected return on office REITS as per equation (8). Figure 18 plots the resulting expected return. While the contribution from stocks and bond market risk shrinks over the course of the pandemic, by virtue of the declining stock and bond betas, the contribution from the WFH risk exposure in purple is substantial. WFH risk contributes about 2-3% points to the expected return on office during the pandemic.

The expected return on office REITs shrinks from 12.86% pre-pandemic (January 2015-December 2019) to 10.79% during the pandemic (January 2020-December 2021), a decline of 207 basis points. In December 2021, the expected return climbs back up to 11.7%.

\(^{16}\)Repeating the exercise with weekly instead of monthly return data and the 52-week rolling window betas, we obtain \( \hat{\lambda}_{\text{WFH}} = -10.2\% \) (t-stat is -0.84).
Figure 18: Expected Return of Office REITs During Covid
B REIT Financial Data

B.1 Evidence from REIT Financials

Having observed granular lease revenue from CompStak data, we now turn to office REIT financials to measure the pass-through of lower rent revenues into lower net cash flows.

Figure 19 plots the density of operating costs divided by lease revenue in the left panel, and against the occupancy rates in the right panel, pooling all office REITs and years. The full list of office REITs is in Appendix Table 7. The median ratio of operating costs to lease revenue ratio is 0.313, with substantial dispersion around the median. The right panel shows that a higher occupancy rate is associated with a lower operating costs to lease revenue ratio. This is indicative of the fact that some operating expenses are fixed in nature, and can be amortized over a larger tenant base as occupancy rises.

![Figure 19: Office REITs Property Operating Costs/Lease Revenue](image)

Next, we study the pass-through of lease revenues to cash flows. In the time-series, Figure 20 plots lease revenue and lease revenue minus operating costs over time, aggregated across all office REITs. The numbers are deflated by CPI and expressed in 2021 USD. The figure suggest that operating costs are roughly proportional to lease revenues.

Table 6 shows the pass-through from lease revenue of office REITs to different measures.
of net cash flows, considering years from 2000–2020. Column (2) indicates that an additional $1 in lease revenue per sqft translates into $0.61 of lease revenue minus costs. When we consider REIT and year fixed effects in Column (4), we obtain a pass-through of $0.54.

Table 6: Pass-Through From Lease Revenue to Net Cash Flows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) FFO /sqft</th>
<th>(2) LR-C /sqft</th>
<th>(3) FFO /sqft</th>
<th>(4) LR-C /sqft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lease Revenue /sqft</td>
<td>0.328***</td>
<td>0.612***</td>
<td>0.390***</td>
<td>0.538***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9.75)</td>
<td>(36.47)</td>
<td>(4.48)</td>
<td>(23.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.510***</td>
<td>1.483***</td>
<td>1.483</td>
<td>3.714***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.95)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(5.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REIT FE ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓
Observations 148 171 148 171
R squared 0.394 0.887 0.659 0.979

$t$ statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Assuming that REIT landlords have representative pass-through from lease revenue to net cash flow, the $4 billion reduction in lease revenues observed for the CompStak sample during the pandemic translates into a $2.16 billion reduction in net cash flow. The propor-
tionality of operating expenditures and lease revenue suggests that a 7.0% decline in lease revenue generates an equal 7.0% decline in net cash flow.

Figure 21 shows the realized dividend growth rate, extracted from the NAREIT cum- and ex-dividend returns on their REIT office index. It plots the year-over-year log change in the realized dividend paid out in the current and past 11 months. Dividend growth was 3.5% in December 2019, i.e., the total dividends paid during 2019 were 3.5% points higher than total dividends paid during 2018. In December 2020, dividend growth had fallen to -0.7%. That is, full-year 2020 dividends were 0.7% lower than full-year 2019 dividends. In December 2021, FY dividends were 3.8% points lower than a year before. The 4.5% point cumulative drop in the level of dividends over the course of the pandemic is similar to the 5.5% decline in lease revenues for A+ office measured in the CompStak data (Figure 1).

Figure 21: Realized Dividend Growth of Office REITs During Covid

B.2 Description of REIT Financial Data

We collect annual financial data of REITs from 10-K financial statements filed to the SEC. We notice several discrepancies in the same year statistic filed by the REITs across 10-Ks. Further, the reporting patterns are different across REITs, and over time for the same REIT. Below, we describe the methodology we undertake to make the data consistent.
We collect the statistic for a particular REIT-year from the 10-K filed by the REIT in that particular year. For instance, CXP reports total revenue for 2008 as different numbers in the 10-Ks filed for financial years 2008 and 2009, and no amendment is filed for such a discrepancy. We take the 2008 total revenue from the 10-K for financial year 2008. A similar practice is followed for all statistics and REITs.

*Total lease revenue* consists of rental income and tenant reimbursements. Often times, rental income is referred to as base rent or rent income. Other income is not considered in the calculations for total lease revenue. *Total revenue* includes other income.

*Funds from Operations* or cash available for distribution is attributable to common stockholders and non-controlling interests. *Net income* adjusts for other income (expense) such as interest income (expense), IPO litigation expense, gain (loss) from derivative financial instruments. It also considers operating expenses include property operating expenses, gound rent expenses, real estate taxes, depreciation and amortization etc. *Operating property expenses* only includes expenses associated with renting and maintaining the properties, such as repair and maintenance costs, payroll costs, utility costs and professional fees.

We also obtain *net rentable square feet* and *occupancy rate* from the REIT 10-K reports. In case, we have both occupancy rates and leasing rates, we consider occupancy rates, as that corresponds to the revenue currently being generated by the properties. Note that % Occupied \( \leq \) % Leased. In most cases,

\[
\text{Leased SqFt} = \text{Net Rentable SqFt} \times \text{Occupancy Rate}
\]

Many office REITs hold properties across sectors: office, retail, industrial etc. We consider rentable area and occupancy rates of the office sector properties, if available separately by sector. Boston Properties, Inc. (BXP) includes office sector plus office/technical sector properties. We also focus on properties in the U.S. by geography. If we don’t have these statistics by geography and sector, we use the REIT level statistics. Additionally, we only consider the properties in the operating portfolio of the REIT, which excludes the redevelopment and
construction properties. This is commensurate with considering the properties generating revenue in the corresponding financial year.

Table 7: List of Office REITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office REIT</th>
<th>Ticker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc.</td>
<td>ARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandywine Realty Trust</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Properties, Inc.</td>
<td>BXP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIM Commercial Trust Corp</td>
<td>CMCT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cousins Properties</td>
<td>CUZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbia Property Trust Inc.</td>
<td>CXP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly Government Properties</td>
<td>DEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Commonwealth</td>
<td>EQC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empire State Realty Trust</td>
<td>ESRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Street Properties Corp.</td>
<td>FSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PGRE</td>
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<td>Vornado Realty Trust</td>
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<td>Douglas Emmett, Inc.</td>
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<td>City Office REIT, Inc.</td>
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<td>New York City REIT, Inc.</td>
<td>NYC</td>
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C Model Derivation

This section contains the full derivation of the model in Section 3. The goal is to solve the following equation:

\[ V_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} (Rev_{t+j} - Cost_{t+j}) \right] = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} Rev_{t+j} \right] - E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} Cost_{t+j} \right] = V_t^R - V_t^C \]

First, we solve the revenue side, i.e., for \( V_t^R \).

C.1 Revenue.

Reproducing the equation for the law of motion for occupied space, \( Q_{t+1}^O \) below:

\[ Q_{t+1}^O(Q_t^O, z') = \min \{ Q_t^O(1 - \chi) + Q_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O(z') + (\bar{Q}_t - Q_t^O)s_{t+1}^V(z'), \bar{Q}_{t+1} \} \]

From the stochastic process of the growth of the total space in the building we get:

\[ \frac{\bar{Q}_{t+1}}{\bar{Q}} - 1 = \eta_{t+1}(z') \Rightarrow \bar{Q}_{t+1} = \bar{Q}_t(1 + \eta_{t+1}(z')) \]

and the scaled state variable \( \hat{Q}_t^O \), we can be rearranged as

\[ \hat{Q}_t^O = \frac{Q_t^O}{\bar{Q}_t} \Rightarrow Q_t^O = \hat{Q}_t^O \bar{Q}_t \]

To convert \( Q_{t+1}^O(Q_t^O, z') \) as a function of scaled variables, \( Q_{t+1}^O(\hat{Q}_t, z') \), we substitute equations for \( \bar{Q}_{t+1} \) and \( Q_t^O \),

\[ \hat{Q}_{t+1}^O = \min \{ \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q}_t(1 - \chi) + \hat{Q}_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O(z') + (\hat{Q}_t - \hat{Q}_t^O) s_{t+1}^V(z'), \hat{Q}_{t+1}^O(1 + \eta_{t+1}(z')) \} \]

\[ \hat{Q}_{t+1}^O = \min \{ \frac{\hat{Q}_t^O(1 - \chi) + \hat{Q}_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O(z') + (1 - \hat{Q}_t^O) s_{t+1}^V(z')}{1 + \eta_{t+1}(z')}, 1 \} \]
Next, the rent revenue in the building/ market in period $t + 1$ is,

$$\text{Rev}_{t+1}(Q^O_t, R^O_t, z') = Q^O_t (1 - \chi) R^O_t + \left[ Q^O_t \chi s^O_t(z') + (Q_t - Q^O_t) s^V_{t+1}(z') \right] R^m_{t+1}$$

$R^O_t$ is the average net effective rent per sqft on existing leases, and $R^m_{t+1}$ is the market net effective rent per sqft on newly executed leases. $R^O_t$ is a geometrically-decaying weighted average of all past market rents,

$$R^O_t = \chi \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1 - \chi)^k R^m_{t-k}$$

Similarly, we can write $R^O_{t+1}$ as,

$$R^O_{t+1} = \chi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1 - \chi)^k R^m_{t+1-k}$$

$$R^O_{t+1} = \chi R^m_{t+1} + \chi (1 - \chi) R^m_t + \chi (1 - \chi)^2 R^m_{t-1} + \chi (1 - \chi)^3 R^m_{t-2} + \cdots$$

$$R^O_{t+1} = \chi R^m_{t+1} + (1 - \chi) \left[ \chi R^m_t + \chi (1 - \chi) R^m_{t-1} + \chi (1 - \chi)^2 R^m_{t-2} + \cdots \right]$$

$$R^O_{t+1} = (1 - \chi) R^O_t + \chi R^m_{t+1}$$

The growth rate of the market’s NER per sqft is a stochastic process, which follows the following law of motion,

$$\frac{R^m_{t+1}}{R^m_t} - 1 = \epsilon_{t+1}(z') \quad \Rightarrow \quad R^m_{t+1} = R^m_t (1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z'))$$

Let’s define the state variable $\hat{R}^O_t$ as,

$$\hat{R}^O_t = \frac{R^O_t}{R^m_t}$$
We want to find the law of motion for the scaled state variable $\hat{R}^O_{t+1}$:

\[
\hat{R}^O_{t+1} = \frac{R^O_{t+1}}{R^m_{t+1}}
\]

\[
\hat{R}^O_{t+1} = \frac{(1 - \chi)R^O_t + \chi R^m_{t+1}}{R^m_{t+1}}
\]

\[
\hat{R}^O_{t+1} = \frac{(1 - \chi)R^O_t}{R^m_{t+1}} + \chi
\]

\[
\hat{R}^O_{t+1} = \frac{(1 - \chi)\hat{R}^O_t R^m_t}{R^m_{t+1}} + \chi
\]

\[
\hat{R}^O_{t+1} = \frac{(1 - \chi)\hat{R}^O_t}{1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z')} + \chi
\]

Let’s define scaled revenues as

\[
\hat{Rev}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z') = \frac{Rev_{t+1}}{Q^m_t}
\]

Rewriting the equation for $Rev_{t+1}(Q^O_t, R^O_t, z')$ in terms of $R_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z')$:

\[
Rev_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z') = \hat{Q}^O_t \hat{Q}_t (1 - \chi)\hat{R}^O_t R^m_t + \left[\hat{Q}^O_t \hat{Q}_t \chi s^O_{t+1}(z') + (\hat{Q}_t - \hat{Q}^O_t \hat{Q}_t) s^V_{t+1}(z')\right] R^m_t (1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z'))
\]

\[
Rev_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z') = \hat{Q}^O_t R^m_t \left[\hat{Q}^O_t (1 - \chi)\hat{R}^O_t + \left[\hat{Q}^O_t \chi s^O_{t+1}(z') + (1 - \hat{Q}^O_t) s^V_{t+1}(z')\right] (1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z'))\right]
\]

Scaled Revenue $\hat{Rev}_{t+1}$ can be written as

\[
\hat{Rev}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}^O_t, \hat{R}^O_t, z') = \hat{Q}^O_t (1 - \chi)\hat{R}^O_t + \left[\hat{Q}^O_t \chi s^O_{t+1}(z') + (1 - \hat{Q}^O_t) s^V_{t+1}(z')\right] (1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z'))
\]

The Expected PDV of Revenues is written as

\[
V^R_t = E_t \left[\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t+j} Rev_{t+j}\right]
\]

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The scaled version is:

\[ \hat{V}_t^R = \frac{V_t^R}{\hat{Q}_t R_t^m} \]

which solves the following Bellman equation:

\[ \hat{V}_t^R (\hat{Q}_t^O, \hat{R}_t^O, z) = \sum_{z'} \pi(z'|z) M(z'|z) \left[ \hat{\text{Rev}}_{t+1} (\hat{Q}_t^O, \hat{R}_t^O, z') + (1 + \eta(z'))(1 + \epsilon(z')) \hat{V}_{t+1}^R (\hat{Q}_{t+1}^O, \hat{R}_{t+1}^O, z') \right] \]

Finally, we get \( V_t^R \) by

\[ V_t^R = \hat{V}_t^R (\hat{Q}_t^O, \hat{R}_t^O, z) \overline{R}_t^m \]

### C.2 Costs

The building costs are written as:

\[ \text{Cost}_{t+1} = C_{t+1}^{\text{fix}} (z') \overline{Q} + Q_t^O C_{t+1}^{\text{var}} (z') + \left[ Q_t^O \chi s_{t+1}^O (z') LC_t^R (z') + (\overline{Q} - Q_t^O) s_{t+1}^V (z') LC_t^N (z') \right] R_{t+1}^m \]

Substituting for \( R_{t+1}^m \) and \( Q_t^O \), we get,

\[ \text{Cost}_{t+1} = C_{t+1}^{\text{fix}} (z') \overline{Q} + \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q} C_{t+1}^{\text{var}} (z') + \left[ \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q} \chi s_{t+1}^O (z') LC_t^R (z') + (\hat{Q} - \hat{Q}_t^O) s_{t+1}^V (z') LC_t^N (z') \right] R_{t+1}^m (1 + \epsilon_{t+1}(z')) \]

Defining scaled costs as:

\[ \hat{\text{Cost}}_{t+1}^O (\hat{Q}_t^O, z') = C_{t+1}^{\text{fix}} (z') + \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q} C_{t+1}^{\text{var}} (z') + \left[ \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q} \chi s_{t+1}^O (z') LC_t^R (z') + (1 - \hat{Q}_t^O) s_{t+1}^V (z') LC_t^N (z') \right] (1 + \epsilon(z')), \]

\[ \hat{\text{Cost}}_{t+1}^O (\hat{Q}_t^O, z') = C_{t+1}^{\text{fix}} (z') + \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q} C_{t+1}^{\text{var}} (z') + \left[ \hat{Q}_t^O \hat{Q} \chi s_{t+1}^O (z') LC_t^R (z') + (1 - \hat{Q}_t^O) s_{t+1}^V (z') LC_t^N (z') \right] (1 + \epsilon(z')), \]
where
\[ c_{t+1}^{\text{fix}}(z') = \frac{C_{t+1}^{\text{fix}}(z')}{R_t^m} \quad c_{t+1}^{\text{var}}(z') = \frac{C_{t+1}^{\text{var}}(z')}{R_t^m} \]

The Expected PDV of Costs is written as:
\[ V_t^C = E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \text{Cost}_{t+j} \right] \]

The scaled version is:
\[ \hat{V}_t^C = \frac{V_t^C}{Q_t R_t^m} \]

which solves the Bellman equation
\[ \hat{V}_t^C (\hat{Q}_t^O, z) = \sum_{z'} \pi(z'|z) M(z'|z) \left\{ \hat{\text{Cost}}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}_t^O, z') + (1 + \eta(z')(1 + \epsilon(z'))) \hat{V}_{t+1}^C (\hat{Q}_{t+1}^O, z') \right\} \]

Finally, we get \( V_t^C \) by
\[ V_t^C = \hat{V}_t^C (\hat{Q}_t^O, z) Q_t R_t^m \]

### C.3 Closed-form solutions

First, we define matrix notations for parameters:
\[ \mathbb{1}_{4\times1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1, 1, 1, 1 \end{bmatrix}' \]
\[ E_{4\times4} = \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_{4\times1}, \epsilon_{4\times1}, \epsilon_{4\times1}, \epsilon_{4\times1} \end{bmatrix}' \]
\[ H_{4\times4} = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_{4\times1}, \eta_{4\times1}, \eta_{4\times1}, \eta_{4\times1} \end{bmatrix}' \]
\[ S_{4\times4}^O = \begin{bmatrix} s_{4\times1}^O, s_{4\times1}^O, s_{4\times1}^O, s_{4\times1}^O \end{bmatrix}' \]
\[ S_{4 \times 4}^{V} = \left[ s_{4 \times 1}^{V}, s_{4 \times 1}^{V}, s_{4 \times 1}^{V}, s_{4 \times 1}^{V} \right] \]

### C.3.1 Cost Valuation

We first shorthand the expression of \( \hat{\text{Cost}}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}_{t}^{O}, z') \), which is a linear function w.r.t. \( \hat{Q}_{t}^{O} \), as:

\[
\hat{\text{Cost}}_{t+1}(\hat{Q}_{t}^{O}, z') = a(z') + b(z') \cdot \hat{Q}_{t}^{O}
\]

where

\[
a(z') = c_{t+1}^{\text{fix}}(z') + (1 + \epsilon(z')) \cdot s_{t+1}^{V}(z') \cdot LC_{t+1}^{N}(z'),
\]

\[
b(z') = c_{t+1}^{\text{var}}(z') + (1 + \epsilon(z')) \cdot \left[ \chi s_{t+1}^{O}(z') \cdot LC_{t+1}^{R}(z') - s_{t+1}^{V}(z') \cdot LC_{t+1}^{N}(z') \right]
\]

Then, we take the derivative (w.r.t. \( \hat{Q}_{t}^{O} \)) of cost valuation Bellman equation:

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{V}_{t}^{C}}{\partial \hat{Q}_{t}^{O}}(\hat{Q}_{t}^{O}, z) = \sum_{z'} \pi(z'|z) M(z'|z) \left\{ b(z') + (1 + \eta(z'))(1 + \epsilon(z')) \frac{\partial \hat{V}_{t+1}^{C}}{\partial \hat{Q}_{t+1}^{O}}(\hat{Q}_{t+1}^{O}, z') \right\}
\]

\[
= \sum_{z'} \pi(z'|z) M(z'|z) \left\{ b(z') + (1 + \epsilon(z'))(1 - \chi + \chi s_{t+1}^{O}(z') - s_{t+1}^{V}(z')) \frac{\partial \hat{V}_{t+1}^{C}}{\partial \hat{Q}_{t+1}^{O}}(\hat{Q}_{t+1}^{O}, z') \right\}
\]

Notice that the instantaneous reward term, \( b(z') \), is independent to \( \hat{Q}_{t}^{O} \). Thus, \( \frac{\partial \hat{V}_{t}^{C}}{\partial \hat{Q}_{t}^{O}}(\hat{Q}_{t}^{O}, z) \) is only a function of \( z \) by checking the valuation in an infinite sum form:

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{V}_{t}^{C}}{\partial \hat{Q}_{t}^{O}}(\hat{Q}_{t}^{O}, z) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} E_{t} \left[ M(z_{t+\tau}|z) \cdot b(z_{t+\tau}) \right],
\]

Thus, by taking integral of \( \hat{Q}_{t}^{O} \), we can conclude that \( \hat{V}_{t}^{C} \) is a linear function w.r.t. \( \hat{Q}_{t}^{O} \):

\[
\hat{V}_{4 \times 1}^{C} = a_{4 \times 1}^{C}(z) + b_{4 \times 1}^{C}(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_{t}^{O}
\]
\[ b_{4 \times 1}^C(z_{4 \times 1}) = \left( I - \pi_{4 \times 4} \circ M_{4 \times 4} \circ (1 + E_{4 \times 4}) \circ \left( 1 - \chi + \chi S_{4 \times 4}^O - S_{4 \times 4}^V \right) \right)^{-1} \cdot \]
\[ (\pi_{4 \times 4} \circ M_{4 \times 4})_{4 \times 4} \cdot \left( c_{4 \times 1}^{\text{var}} + (1 + E_{4 \times 1}) \circ \left( \chi S_{4 \times 1}^O \circ LC_{4 \times 1}^R - s_{4 \times 1}^V \circ LC_{4 \times 1}^N \right) \right)_{4 \times 1} \]

Then, we look back the original valuation function of cost, and equation becomes a linear equation for the only unknown, \( a^C \), and we solve it using the inverse method:

\[ a_{4 \times 1}^C(z_{4 \times 1}) = \left( I - \pi_{4 \times 4} \circ M_{4 \times 4} \circ (1 + E_{4 \times 4}) \circ (1 + H_{4 \times 4}) \right)^{-1}_{4 \times 4} \cdot \]
\[ (\pi_{4 \times 4} \circ M_{4 \times 4})_{4 \times 4} \cdot \left( c_{4 \times 1}^{\text{fix}} + (1 + E_{4 \times 1}) \circ \left( s_{4 \times 1}^V \circ LC_{4 \times 1}^N + b_{4 \times 1}^C \circ s_{4 \times 1}^V \right) \right)_{4 \times 1} \]

### C.3.2 Revenue Valuation

The revenue valuation problem is very similar to the cost valuation problem, but now the valuation function depends on both \( \hat{Q}_t^O \) and \( \hat{R}_t^O \). So we first look at the Bellman equation for \( \frac{\partial^2 \hat{V}_t^R}{\partial \hat{Q}_t^O \partial \hat{R}_t^O} \) and find it’s independent to \( \hat{Q}_t^O \) or \( \hat{R}_t^O \):

\[ \frac{\partial^2 \hat{V}_t^R}{\partial \hat{Q}_t^O \partial \hat{R}_t^O} = d^R(z) \tag{10} \]

where

\[ d^R_{4 \times 1}(z_{4 \times 1}) = \left( I - \pi_{4 \times 4} \circ M_{4 \times 4} \circ (1 - \chi) \circ \left( 1 - \chi + \chi S_{4 \times 4}^O - S_{4 \times 4}^V \right) \right)^{-1} \cdot \]
\[ (\pi_{4 \times 4} \circ M_{4 \times 4})_{4 \times 4} \cdot (1 - \chi \cdot 1_{4 \times 1})_{4 \times 1} \]

Next, we integrate equation (10) by \( \hat{Q}_t^O \):

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{V}_t^R}{\partial \hat{R}_t^O} = c^R(\hat{R}_t^O, z) + d^R(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_t^O \]

---

\(^{17}\) We use \( \circ \) to represent element-wise multiplication for metrics, and \( \cdot \) for matrix dot product.
Notice that the instantaneous reward term for the Bellman equation for $\frac{\partial V_R}{\partial \hat{R}_l^O}$ is independent to $\hat{R}_l^O$:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\text{Rev}}_{l+1}}{\partial \hat{R}_l^O} = (1 - \chi) \cdot \hat{Q}_l^O$$

(11)

Thus, we can conclude:

$$c^R(\hat{R}_l^O, z) = c^R(z),$$

and we can solve $c^R(z)$ in this linear system:

$$c^R_{4x1}(z_{4x1}) = (I - \pi_{4x4} \circ M_{4x4} \circ (1 + H_{4x4}) \circ (1 - \chi))^{-1} \cdot (\pi_{4x4} \circ M_{4x4})_{4x4} \cdot ((1 - \chi) \circ s_{4x1} \circ d_{4x1})_{4x1}$$

Following the same logic, by taking integral w.r.t. $\hat{R}_l^O$ in equation (10) and check the independence of instantaneous reward:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{V}_l^R}{\partial \hat{Q}_l^O} = b^R(z) + d^R(z) \cdot \hat{R}_l^O$$

(12)

where

$$b^R_{4x1}(z_{4x1}) = (I - \pi_{4x4} \circ M_{4x4} \circ (1 + E_{4x4}) \circ (1 - \chi + \chi S_{4x4}^O - S_{4x4}^V))^{-1} \cdot (\pi_{4x4} \circ M_{4x4})_{4x4} \cdot ((1 - \chi + \chi S_{4x4}^O - S_{4x4}^V) \circ (1 + \chi d_{4x1}^R) + (1 - \chi) \chi d_{4x1}^R)_{4x1}$$

Then, we integrate equation (11) w.r.t. $\hat{R}_l^O$ and equation (12) w.r.t. $\hat{Q}_l^O$, we get:

$$\hat{V}_l^R = a_R(\hat{R}_l^O, z) + c(z) \cdot \hat{R}_l^O + d(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_l^O \cdot \hat{R}_l^O$$

$$= a_Q(\hat{Q}_l^O, z) + b(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_l^O + d(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_l^O \cdot \hat{R}_l^O$$

By comparing terms, we can conclude that

$$\hat{V}_l^R = a^R(z) + b^R(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_l^O + c^R(z) \cdot \hat{R}_l^O + d^R(z) \cdot \hat{Q}_l^O \cdot \hat{R}_l^O$$

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and solve the intercept term in the linear system:

\[ a_{4x1}^R(z_{4x1}) = (I - \pi_{4x4} \circ M_{4x4} \circ (1 + E_{4x4}) \circ (1 + H_{4x4}))^{-1} \cdot \]

\[ (\pi_{4x4} \circ M_{4x4})_{4x4} \cdot \left( (1 + \epsilon_{4x1}) \circ \left( s_{4x1}^V \circ (1 + b_{4x1}^R + \chi d_{4x1}^R) + \chi (1 + \eta_{4x1}) \circ e_{4x1}^R \right) \right)_{4x1} \]

### C.4 Strip Decomposition

The price of a property is the expected PDV of its future cash-flows. By value additivity, this is also the sum of prices of each cash-flow strip:

\[ V_t = V_t^{(1)} + V_t^{(2)} + \cdots = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} V_t^{(j)} = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} V_t^{R,(j)} - \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} V_t^{C,(j)} \]

The last equality expresses the price of each NOI strip as the difference between the corresponding revenue strip and cost strip, again using value additivity.

The revenue strips can be priced recursively:

\[ V_t^{R,(j)} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ M_{t,t+j} V_{t+1}^{R,(j-1)} \right] \]

starting from

\[ V_t^{R,(1)} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ M_{t,t+1} Rev_{t+1} \right] \]

Scaling by potential gross revenue

\[ \tilde{V}_t^{R,(j)} = \frac{V_t^{R,(j)}}{\tilde{Q}_t R_t^m} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ M_{t,t+j} \tilde{V}_{t+1}^{R,(j-1)} (1 + \epsilon_{t+1})(1 + \eta_{t+1}) \right] \]

starting from

\[ \tilde{V}_t^{R,(1)} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ M_{t,t+1} \tilde{Rev}_{t+1} \right] \]

since

\[ \frac{\tilde{Q}_{t+1} R_{t+1}^m}{\tilde{Q}_t R_t^m} = (1 + \epsilon_{t+1})(1 + \eta_{t+1}) \]
There is a closed-form expression for each $\hat{V}^{R,(j)}_t$ that can be established using the same procedure we used above to obtain the closed-form solution for the entire claim’s scaled valuation ratio $\hat{V}^{R}_t$:

$$\hat{V}^{R,(j)}_t = a^{R,(j)}(z) + b^{R,(j)}(z) \cdot \hat{Q}^O_t + c^{R,(j)}(z) \cdot \hat{R}^O_t + d^{R,(j)}(z) \cdot \hat{Q}^O_t \cdot \hat{R}^O_t,$$

for suitably-defined coefficients $a^{R,(j)}(z)$, $b^{R,(j)}(z)$, $c^{R,(j)}(z)$, and $d^{R,(j)}(z)$.

The logic is similar for the scaled price of the cost strips.

$$\hat{V}^{C,(j)}_t = a^{C,(j)}(z) + b^{C,(j)}(z) \cdot \hat{Q}^O_t,$$

for suitably-defined coefficients $a^{C,(j)}(z)$ and $b^{C,(j)}(z)$.

## D Calibration Algorithm

The following describes the steps in the calibration algorithm for the universe of NYC office buildings (NYC All) and the subset of A+ buildings (NYC A+). We set the depreciation to 2.7% in both calibrations, a realistic annual depreciation rate for commercial office. The calibration for NYC All takes the persistence parameter of the WFH state, $p$, as given. This parameter is pinned down from the A+ calibration. Conversely, the calibration for NYC A+ takes the parameter $\Delta \eta$ as given. This parameter is pinned down from the NYC All calibration. Hence, the two calibrations are interdependent; they solve a fixed-point problem.

### D.1 NYC All, given $p$

1. Keep only office buildings and exclude subleases in the Compstak data set of leases for NYC.

2. Calculate the average leasing term for all leases in NYC. Set $\chi$ equal to the reciprocal.

3. Estimate $\varepsilon$ from data:
(a) To estimate $\epsilon(E)$ and $\epsilon(R)$, first calculate sf-weighted NER for each month, and take the 6-month moving average. Use data from January 2000 (start of CompStak) until December 2019.

(b) If more than 6 months of the 1-year window falls in recession, then it’s considered recession; otherwise it’s considered expansion. Use the leasing cycle definition instead of the business cycle.

(c) Compute the annual growth rate of the 6M MA NER, and average separately for expansions and recessions.

(d) Estimate $\epsilon(WFHR)$ as the realized NER growth between December 2019 and December 2020, and $\epsilon(WFHE)$ and annualized realized rent growth between December 2020 and May 2022.

(e) Since the values for $\epsilon(E)$ and $\epsilon(R)$ are determined based on the leasing cycle rather than the business cycle, adjust all four $\epsilon(z)$ parameters by a constant so that the unconditional average NER growth in the model, which uses the Markov chain $\pi(z'|z)$ estimated on the business cycle, equals the sample average NER growth.

4. Estimate $\eta(E)$ and $\eta(R)$ from data:

   (a) Compute the growth rate in floor space in year $t$ as the newly constructed office square feet in year $t$ relative to the total square feet of office space built before year $t$ for each year from 1970–2019. This uses the full history of construction years in our CompStak dataset.

   (b) Year $t$ is a recession when more than 6 months of that year is in recession.

   (c) Average the construction growth rate across expansions and recessions.

   (d) Subtract the rate of depreciation to arrive at $\eta(E)$ and $\eta(R)$

5. Set $\eta(WFHE) = \eta(E) + \Delta \eta$ and $\eta(WFHR) = \eta(R) + \Delta \eta$. Find the $\Delta \eta$ such that the
long-run growth rate of potential rent in the NYC All is zero:

\[\sum_z \pi(z)(1 + \epsilon(z))(1 + \eta(z)) = 1,\]

where \(\pi(z)\) is the \(4 \times 1\) ergodic distribution of the \(4 \times 4\) Markov Chain \(\pi(z'|z)\).

6. Estimate the four parameters \(\{s^O(E), s^O(R), s^V(E), s^V(R)\}\) to match the following four moments in quarterly Manhattan office occupancy rate data for from 1987.Q1 to 2020.Q1:

(a) mean (empirical mean)
(b) std (empirical std)
(c) minimum (empirical min - 0.5%)
(d) maximum (empirical max + 0.5%)

7. Assume that the four parameters \(\{s^O(WFHE), s^O(WFHR), s^V(WFHE), s^V(WFHR)\}\) are shifted by a common factor \(\delta\) relative to their no-WFH counterparts: \(s^{\{V,O\}}(WFH) = \delta \cdot s^{\{V,O\}}(no-WFH)\). Estimate the parameter \(\delta\) to best fit the dynamics of the office occupancy rate in the nine quarters from 2020.Q2–2022.Q2. These dynamics are given by the model:

\[\hat{Q}_{t+1}^O(\hat{Q}_t^O, z') = \frac{s^V_{t+1}(z')}{1 + \eta_{t+1}(z')} + \hat{Q}_t^O \cdot \frac{1 - \chi + \chi s^O_{t+1}(z') - s^V_{t+1}(z')}{1 + \eta_{t+1}(z')}\]

Simulate the law of motion for occupancy from 1930 until 2019, under the observed sequence of expansions and recessions, to arrive at the initial condition for \(\hat{Q}^O\) in 2020.Q1. Then simulate the occupancy process forward for the next 9 quarters assuming that the first four quarters are WFHR observations and the last 5 are WFHE. Find the \(\delta\) that minimizes the distance between the model and the data.

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D.2 NYC A+, given $\Delta \eta$

The calibration for the A+ office cash flows is based on the subset of leases in A+ buildings. It follows the same steps as outlined above for NYC All, with the following modifications:

3.(d) The observed value for $\epsilon(WFHE)$ in step 3(d) is implausible.\(^{18}\) We set $\epsilon(WFHE, A+) = \epsilon(WFHE, All) - \epsilon(E, All) + \epsilon(E, A+).$ This preserves the features that A+ market rent growth is less cyclical than All rent growth and that A+ market rent growth in WHE is lower than in E.

5. The NYC A+ calibration takes $\Delta \eta$ from the NYC All calibration

6. We use data from NAREIT on office sector occupancy from 2000.Q1 to 2020.Q1 to calibrate $\{s^O(E), s^O(R), s^V(E), s^V(R)\}$. We target a minimum occupancy rate equal to the empirical minimum - 6.5% because the A+ occupancy data is missing the 1990s, the worst historical period for office occupancy.

8. Given all other parameters, find $p$ to match the observed realized return on NYC-centric office REITS between December 31, 2019 and December 31, 2020, after adjusting for leverage. See the discussion in Section 3.4.

E Results for NYC A+ Market

Appendix Table 8 shows the model solution for the A+ calibration. The model delivers a lower cap rate for A+ NYC office, due to the lower riskiness of A+ cash flows. Class A+ has lower vacancy levels than the market as a whole, on average as well as in the WFH states. Appendix Figure 22 shows the valuation ratio $\hat{V}$ in each state as a function of occupancy and rent state variables.

\(^{18}\)This is not surprising. The data are based on one realization from a transition from WFH-R to WFH-E, which may not be a good measure of the average rent growth conditional on being in WFH-E.
Table 8: Model Solution for NYC All Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Uncond</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>WFHE</th>
<th>WFHR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cap rate</td>
<td>0.0656</td>
<td>0.0623</td>
<td>0.0828</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>0.0748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office $E[\text{Ret}] - 1$</td>
<td>0.0645</td>
<td>0.0516</td>
<td>0.1346</td>
<td>0.0459</td>
<td>0.1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office RP = $E[\text{Ret}] - 1 - R_f$</td>
<td>0.0496</td>
<td>0.0432</td>
<td>0.0879</td>
<td>0.0375</td>
<td>0.0716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E[g_t]$</td>
<td>-0.0024</td>
<td>-0.0179</td>
<td>0.0989</td>
<td>-0.0289</td>
<td>0.0213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy rate $= 1 - \hat{Q}^O$</td>
<td>0.0983</td>
<td>0.0819</td>
<td>0.1220</td>
<td>0.1278</td>
<td>0.1553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\text{Rev}}$</td>
<td>0.8228</td>
<td>0.8158</td>
<td>0.9340</td>
<td>0.7658</td>
<td>0.8069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\text{Cost}}$</td>
<td>0.4228</td>
<td>0.4279</td>
<td>0.4183</td>
<td>0.4114</td>
<td>0.4050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOI $= \hat{\text{Rev}} - \hat{\text{Cost}}$</td>
<td>0.3994</td>
<td>0.3874</td>
<td>0.5151</td>
<td>0.3539</td>
<td>0.4013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\nu}^R$</td>
<td>10.7146</td>
<td>11.0337</td>
<td>10.0413</td>
<td>10.3574</td>
<td>9.3590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\nu}^C$</td>
<td>4.7105</td>
<td>4.9033</td>
<td>3.9135</td>
<td>4.7601</td>
<td>4.0601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{\nu} = \hat{\nu}^R - \hat{\nu}^C$</td>
<td>6.0041</td>
<td>6.1304</td>
<td>6.1278</td>
<td>5.5973</td>
<td>5.2988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 22: $\hat{V}$ for NYC A+ Market by States