This is Why I Leave: Race and Voluntary Departure

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Abstract

Although there have been numerous studies on voluntary departure—i.e., quit behavior—the way race influences voluntary departure is not yet settled. Some studies suggest racial minorities are more apt to voluntarily depart than non-minority employees due to discrimination in the workplace. Other studies suggest racial minorities are more apt to stay due to discrimination in the labor market. In this study, going beyond existing theories concerning localized experiences of discrimination that have led to differing predictions in the literature, I develop a structural theory on voluntary departure. The theoretical framework focuses on how resources affect conditions of departure may lead to differences in voluntary departure by race. This structural theory is then tested using a nationally representative cohort sample of over 8,000 individuals who have secured jobs over a 22-year period in the U.S. Finding evidence that corroborates the theory, I close with a discussion on how this study advances an understanding of race, inequality and labor market mobility.

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INTRODUCTION

Labor market mobility—movement into and out of jobs and workplaces—has important economic consequences (White, 1970; Granovetter, 1981), including on earnings (Brett and Stroh, 1997; Lam and Dreher, 2004; Quintana-Garcia and Elvira, 2017) and job security (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 2001; Kalleberg and Mouw, 2018). For racial minorities and Blacks in particular, departure from the workplace may have outsized impacts. Studies find that "loading up" on longer-term experience with a single employer is one way—and some scholars have argued a largely solitary pathway—for Black employees to experience promotions and sustain upward mobility in workplaces, or what is known as the "particularistic mobility" thesis (Baldi and McBrier, 1997; Elliott and Smith, 2004; see Wilson, 2020 for a recent summary). For this reason, mobility events such as voluntary departure from organizations are viewed as a factor underlying economic differences by race (Holzer and Neumark, 2000; Pager and Quillian, 2005).

Despite the importance of voluntary departure, the relationship between race and voluntary departure with respect to members of groups electively leaving jobs is not yet clear. In the organizational inequality literature, racial minorities are argued to voluntarily quit their jobs more than White employees (Castilla, 2008; Elvira and Town, 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson, 2005) due to workplace discrimination (Baldi and McBrier, 1997; Smith, 2002; Elliott and Smith, 2004; Wilson, 2020). Meanwhile, the labor market inequality literature suggests White employees are more likely to leave than Black employees due to the discrimination the latter faces in the labor market (Bertrand and Mullinathan, 2004; Becker, 2010; Fryer, Pager and Spenkuch, 2013; Gaddis, 2015). Both literatures focus on discrimination that emanates from the local context and varies where attention is directed. While important, attention to local instances of discrimination—whether in workplaces or labor markets—leaves unanswered questions about how race might operate beyond these local contexts to influence organizational behavior.

Given this, the primary aim of this study is to develop and test a structural perspective of voluntary departure that goes beyond localized experiences of discrimination (e.g., racial animus or prejudice). Due to historic path dependencies affecting institutions and structures in society, scholars have argued that discrimination may be more systematic than any one set of local contexts—i.e., an employee's workplace or labor market—can explain. Researchers have, therefore, argued for a structural perspective on race (Feagin and Eckberg 1980; Massey, Rothwell and Domina, 2000; Ray, 2019), wherein race is viewed as a resource-based position within a society. Within a structural perspective race, is structure. It places some racial groups closer to societal resources and other racial groups further away from them (Blumer 1958; Bonilla-Silva, 2016; Ray, 2019; Emirbayer and Desmond, 2015).

Building on this view I ask the question, how does race influence the conditions—i.e., the resources and employment outcomes—under which workers voluntarily depart jobs? To date, research on turnover has largely focused on voluntary departure in isolation, and asked whether employees elect to stay or leave organizations. Yet for the interest of inequality scholars, as important as understanding whether an employee voluntarily departs is knowledge regarding under *what conditions* an employee departs. Individuals might depart because they have resources available that might lead to better opportunities. Or individuals may depart because they have resource deficits that lead to less favorable outcomes. In this study, the theoretical advance I aim to make is to develop and test a framework that explains how race patterns the conditions—i.e., the resources and future employment conditions—under which individuals quit.

I argue that for members of racial groups at the upper end of the racial hierarchy who are in closer proximity to resources, voluntary departure from organizations occurs as a result of resource availability. For racial groups at the lower end of the racial hierarchy who are more distant from resources, I argue voluntary departure from organizations occurs due to resource deprivation (e.g., a

lack of health or transportation). I map these structural positions onto the two racial groups that empirical studies suggest are the furthest apart in societal resources in the United States—i.e., Blacks and Whites—to test my arguments. Using detailed data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort (NLSY97 Cohort), I find that different resource and employment conditions exist surrounding voluntary departure for Black and White workers. I also find differences in the conditions that exist for voluntary departure across other races and ethnicities.

VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE FROM ORGANIZATIONS

Existing Research

Voluntary departure is defined as an employee electing to end an employer-employee relationship rather than by an employer through a firing, a layoff or a dismissal. Voluntary departure has long been of interest to organizational researchers because it is seen as an inefficient and avoidable cost for organizations (Trevor, 2001; Nyberg, 2010; Cappelli and Keller, 2014). It is also common in the United States. In recent decades, except in times of sharp economic downturns such as the Great Recession of 2009 and the economic downturn of 2020 due to COVID, voluntary departures have made up the majority of employer-employee separations (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008-2020). The elective termination of the employment relationship by employees has studied by numerous scholars, including those in organizational theory, sociology, economics, industrial psychology, and organizational behavior. In a recent review Lee and colleagues noted more than 2,000 studies have been published on why people voluntarily depart—a.k.a. "quit" over the last hundred years (Lee et al., 2017).

An important question for scholars remains, what is the influence of employees' demographic characteristics on their quit propensity? While studies of gender and voluntary departure have found clear patterns for women and men (Light and Ureta, 1992; Sicherman, 1996; Hom, Roberson and Ellis, 2008; Gayle, Golan and Miller, 2012), empirical patterns pertaining to race have been more

equivocal. In labor market studies, scholars argue and have found some empirical support for the argument that racial minorities voluntarily quit their jobs less than Whites (Black, 1995; Whatley and Sedo, 1998; Oettinger, Altonji, and Blank, 1999; Fryer, Pager and Spenkuch, 2013). Researchers argue this is due to discrimination in the labor market (Oettinger, 1996; Altonji and Blank, 1999; Ghiselli, La Lopa, and Bai, 2001; Bertrand and Mullinathan, 2004; Kang et al., 2016). In the literature on intraorganizational inequality, scholars have argued and have found evidence in the opposite direction. Specifically, some studies suggest that racial minorities are more likely to voluntarily depart than Whites due to workplace discrimination and bias (Castilla, 2008; Elvira and Town, 2001; Sørensen, 2004; McGinn and Milkman, 2013).

As significant as these studies have been, from the perspective of inequality scholars, it is of interest not only whether an employee leaves or stays, but the conditions under which employees depart. By conditions, I refer to the employment state that individuals are in after departure. Studies of voluntary departure indicate that some individuals leave their current jobs without alternative jobs lined up (Lee and Mitchell, 1994; Maertz and Campion, 1998; Hom, Roberson and Ellis, 2008). Principally, individuals may depart to take new jobs, but they may also quit and exit the workforce for a temporary period. Prior studies suggest the latter might occur, for example, due to various economic stressors and unplanned events (Lee and Mitchell, 1994; Maertz and Campion, 2004). Understanding the conditions under which individuals depart and whether these vary by race is the purpose of this study herein.

A General Model on Voluntary Departure

Before turning to the effect of race to make progress on the conditions under which departure occurs, I begin with a general model on the relationship between resources and departure. I refer to resources as "sources of supply or support" that include material, social, and physical assets that can

be used by actors to increase their opportunities. Examples of resources include those that provide stability—such as housing and transportation—that allow individuals to maintain jobs, as well as non-material resources such as social networks that might help individuals find jobs.

I show the relationship between resources and voluntary departure in Figure 1. Overall, I expect resources to have a U-shaped relationship with the voluntary departure of employees. The model assumes that when employees depart they may enter into either one of two states: (1) they might take time out of the workforce after quitting or (2) they may quit to enter into a new employment contract with another employer.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

I expect there is more voluntary departure at either end of the resource spectrum than in the middle. To explain why, I begin with the left-hand side where resources are low. Here, I expect individuals to be more apt to leave jobs voluntarily than they are in the mid-range. At this location, a lack of resources and constraints might lead to the inability to keep a position at an employer (e.g., a lack of transportation) compared to a mid-range resource position. This suggests that although those with low resources might arguably have much to gain from working for an employer, those with lower levels of resources are expected to voluntarily quit their jobs more than those with higher resources (in the mid-range).

Turning to the right-hand side where resources are high, here I also expect individuals to be more apt to leave jobs than they are in the mid-range. In this position, however, individuals leave for entirely different reasons than they do at the low-resource end: They leave for reasons that are enabled by resources (e.g., to start their own business or to take a better job at a different employer). Resource enabled departure occurs here to a greater extent than it does in the middle because individuals have greater opportunities. Having provided this overall model for the relationship between resources and voluntary turnover, I build upon this frame. I use it to understand how race might pattern elective departure from organizations. I then make predictions about conditions of voluntary departure, or about resources and future employment, by race.

RACE AND VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE

I turn to the question, how does race influence the conditions under which individuals depart from organizations? In existing theory on voluntary departure, discriminatory behavior on the part of those in positions of authority is a primary explanatory force behind minority employees staying (due to discrimination in the labor market) or leaving (due to discrimination in the workplace) compared to White employees. Yet, researchers suggest that "something other than individual-level actors may discriminate" (Small and Pager 2020: 52) to influence inequality. Scholars on race have asked researchers, while acknowledging that direct instantiations of discrimination may exist, to also consider how structural (positional) aspects of race may affect labor market mobility (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015; Ray 2019; Small and Pager 2020).

I do so here by beginning with a definition of race. Race is defined as a "symbolic category based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed according to specific social and historical context" (Emirbayer and Desmond, 2015:43). Race is imbued with cultural expectations, meanings, and values such that race is "real in its consequences" (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). This definition of race construes it not as emanating from individuals as a part of their identity, though individuals may categorize themselves based on race or be categorized as such by others (Tajfel and Turner, 1979); rather, in the definition used here, race does not rely on self-categorization for race to be real. It is consequential not (only) because of one's interpersonal engagement with race (e.g., self-identity,

racial pride/animus) but because race situates groups into hierarchical positions vis-à-vis resources (DiTomas, 2013; Ray, 2019).

In the United States, race has historically situated groups within varying proximities to resources, but by all accounts, race continues to do so contemporaneously. Scholars have found that race affects one's proximity to resources spanning health, material resources such as housing transportation, as well as cultural and social resources (for an overview of the literature, see Table A1 in the appendix). Racial proximity to resources may emerge from historical laws (e.g., segregation in housing and schools) and other factors. For example, the devaluation of housing in Black neighborhoods (redlining) over a century not only affects historical differences in resource access. Redlining has also been linked to contemporaneous intergenerational wealth, housing, and health (Rothstein, 2017).

From a structural perspective, resources are what give race meaning: a proximity to resources based on one's phenotype is race. In line with this, studies find individuals categorize other people as Black or White (or mixed/other race) based on a person's resources, and that this occurs outside of a person's self-identification with a racial category (Penner and Saperstein, 2008). In fact, researchers find the same person might be categorized by others as Black and then as White over time (or an alternative such as 'mixed race') as their resources improve (Saperstein and Penner, 2012).

Resource advantages and disparities related to race can be mistaken for social class, but scholars theorize race and class as distinct (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Emirbayer and Desmond, 2015). Anecdotally, there are incidents that demonstrate that race and class are not the same. One anecdote is the infamous time Henry Louis Gates Jr., a renowned Harvard professor who is Black, was arrested in his own home in Cambridge, Massachusetts, after a neighbor called the police. Gates was suspected of burglarizing his own home when he forcefully opened a door because he did not have his keys. Why did the neighbors call the police? They explained that Dr. Gates did not look like a person who

was expected to live there. More systematically, several studies now document that racial disparities in resources endure and, in some instances, increase at higher social class levels, rather than decrease (Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson, 2005; Western and Pettit, 2005). For instance, studies find health disparities by race become heightened at higher class levels, not lessened (Whitson et al., 2011; Assari, 2018; Stainback, Jason, and Walter, 2018), and other studies suggest how financial resources are patterned by race outside of class (Wilson and Rodgers, 2016; Small, Torres, and Wang, 2021).

Resource Disadvantaged Departure

I now theorize about how race affects the likelihood of leaving jobs. I begin with the left-hand side of Figure 1, wherein departure occurs when individuals leave due to a lack of resources, relative to individuals in the mid-range. I expect Black employees to be more apt to voluntarily depart than White employees due to a lack of resources.

A primary reason for this expectation is the resources required to perform jobs, including with respect to an ideal worker norm. Prior research suggests that organizations expect employees to conform to ideal worker norms across various types of jobs (Coser, 1974; Williams, 2001; Whyte, 2013 [1956]). The ideal worker is unencumbered in their work performance, is in pristine health, shows up on time, and is physically and mentally available to execute a job, regardless of what is occurring in their personal lives (Michel, 2011; Kessler et al., 2011; Pfeffer, 2018). This idealized worker concept originated for scholars in studies of white-collar work (Davies and Frink, 2014). However, this normative expectation extends to manual labor and service jobs, including in industries such as retail, transportation, and food service (Kalleberg, 2001; Cameron, Thomason, and Conzon, 2021). Low-wage workers are expected to be available "at any time and on any day" (Cameron et al., 2021: 1821). In lower paying jobs workers experience a lack of schedule control from week to week,

and even day to day, but managers expect workers to be available to perform nonetheless (Lambert, 2008; Schneider and Harkett, 2019).

There has been important research on how idealized worker norms affect voluntary departure across gender (e.g., Martin, 2004; Acker, 2006; Padavic, Ely, and Reid, 2020), but the resources required to be available to conform to this ideal may also be patterned by race (see discussion in Byron and Roscigno, 2019: 152–157). A growing literature on racialized organizations (Ray, 2019) views organizational rules, processes, and routines as situating Whites individuals closer to material and social resources in workplaces than racial minorities. Whites and racial minorities might differ in actual proximity to resources in ways that affect adherence to the ideal worker norm. Additionally, not adhering to the ideal worker norm might also have differing impacts, meaning there may be different sanctions enacted against those who violate the ideal worker norm whether they are White or a racial minority.

Existing disadvantages emanating from a lack of resources might lead workers to voluntarily depart rather than continue to work for an employer. Some studies suggest workers might voluntarily leave rather than violate this norm. For instance, Wynn and Rao (2020) studied a consulting firm and found that when individuals face difficulty in their external circumstances, rather than asking the employer to accommodate them, employees voluntarily quit. They viewed doing so as an exercise of their own agency (see also Pugh, 2015; Moen et al., 2013). Additionally, organizations may "counsel" their employees that it is better to voluntarily separate than continue to work (Darr and Johns, 2008; Johns, 2010). This might benefit employers if it reduces the risk of legal retaliation and workers depart amicably "on their own terms" (Rasnic, 1995; Autor, 2003).

For all these reasons there may be differences in voluntary departure by race. Resource disparities such as those stemming from a lack of material, social, and physical resources may affect the likelihood of staying on a job compared to quitting a job. I expect the following.

H1. Race influences the odds of voluntarily leaving jobs due to resource (dis)advantages. Black workers have increased odds of leaving jobs due to a lack of resources (e.g., in health, transportation, and other factors) versus staying in their current jobs, relative to White workers.

Continuing with these arguments and staying on the left-hand side of Figure 1, I consider other aspects of departing—i.e., namely future employment conditions at the time of quitting. I expect that Black workers are more apt than White workers to depart organizations to search for jobs without already having jobs lined up. If this is the case, it may have important consequences. Studies indicate that even short employment gaps on resumes can signal that a job-seeker is of poor quality (Fuller, 2008; Erickson and Rooth, 2014; Pedulla, 2018). Further, employment gaps might also indicate to employers that a prospective employee lacks commitment to working (Galperin et al., 2020; Weisshaar, 2018). Yet, studies suggest if an employee is dissatisfied with their current work conditions, opting out of one's current employment might facilitate more time to look for work. Several studies indicate that finding a job can be time-intensive (see Bartik and Stuart, 2021, for a review). It may be that if workers desire to move elsewhere, they must quit in order to locate other employment.

For these resource-related reasons, there are likely differences in the propensity to leave without jobs that are patterned by race. Succinctly, resources are required to find new jobs and these resources are differently available across race. Job search often requires searching online and there is a "digital divide" that exists across racial minorities and Whites.¹ To the degree that Black individuals are less apt to have reliable ways to search for jobs after work, they may be more apt to quit in order to look for new work. Additionally, resources like social networks have long been known to differ across Black and White job-seekers (Kmec, 2007). Evidence indicates the latter have more useful networks for locating employment (Smith, 2005; Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006; Damaske,

¹ Fairlie (2004) finds a digital divide by race, wherein income (often used as a proxy for social class) differences explain only 10 to 30 percent of the gap in the United States,

2009; Fernandez and Greenberg, 2013; Pager and Pedulla, 2015). As a result, the length of time and intensity required to find jobs may be higher for Black workers than White workers. I make the following prediction.

H2. Black workers have increased odds of voluntarily leaving their current job to look for a new job compared to staying at their current job relative to White workers.

Resource Enabled Departure

Further, I also consider how the availability of resources might also influence voluntary departure. Turning to the right-hand side of Figure 1, there are reasons to expect that when individuals have high levels of resources, they might also decide to quit. In theorizing this, a boundary condition is that I exclude in my theorizing rare events that lead to an influx of resources. These might cause a drastic change in life circumstances (e.g., winning a lottery) that prompt rare behaviors (e.g., permanent exit from the workforce). My focus is on how race patterns the conditions under which employees leave to pursue opportunities.

There are reasons individuals quit that require resources, such as quitting to return to school or starting a new business. Going back to school after working for a period is common in the United States (National Center for Education Statistics, 2006), and this behavior may be patterned by race. Studies indicate that in the United States there is not a well-defined transition between school and work (Park and Sandefur, 2003), and White individuals may be more apt to be able to return to school (Dougal et al., 2019). In terms of starting a new business, researchers have also consistently found racial effects whereby racial minorities are disadvantaged (Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman, 2003; Pager and Shephard, 2007; Chatterji and Seamans, 2012). Further, minorities might anticipate discrimination in capital markets in ways that affect their quit behavior. A study by Fairlie et al. (2022) suggests that Black entrepreneurs expect to be denied credit and, because of this are more likely to forgo asking for loans. I expect the following.

H3. White workers have increased odds of leaving jobs for reasons that require resources (e.g., schooling) versus staying in their current jobs relative to Black workers.

Finally, there are reasons the presence (rather than absence) of resources lead to greater voluntary departure due to subsequent employment. As already intimated, locating new employment while currently working is driven by resources such as physical resources (good health), material resources (computers, internet access), and social resources (such as social ties). Given this, higher levels of resources may lead to a greater likelihood of employment. This suggests the following prediction.

H4. White workers have increased odds of leaving jobs to take new jobs versus staying at jobs compared to Black workers.

ADDITIONAL RACES AND ETHNICITIES AND VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE

The aforementioned hypotheses make predictions regarding Black and White employees because these are the racial groups that have been widely found to have the largest differences in resource disparities in the United States (refer to Table A1). However, I do not ignore other races and ethnicities in my examination. Existing studies indicate there may be differences in turnover across other racial and ethnic groups compared to Whites (Zatzick et al., 2003; McGinn and Milkman, 2013; Sabat et al., 2021). Scholars suggest that a racial hierarchy exists in society that includes a multiplexity of racial groups (Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Hispanics may face resource disparities similar to Blacks (Avery, McKay, and Wilson, 2008; Pager and Quillian, 2005), although these resource disadvantages might not be identical (see Chetty et al., 2020). Asian individuals might also experience disadvantages compared to White individuals (Cheng, 1997; Kim, 2007; Ely, Padavic, and Thomas, 2012). I examine these groups' voluntary departure in models.

Beyond examining races and ethnicities in the models, I also include an examination of gender. However, I leave theoretical tests about the intersection of gender and race largely to future research for a few reasons. In studies upon which the present research builds, theorists focus on the influence of a racial-ethnic hierarchy and its effects on behaviors and outcomes. Race is a primary focus prior to turning to questions about gender. Particularly relevant here, compared to the well-established findings about gender and voluntary departure, race is less understood. That said, I do point out any interactional effects across race by gender when they occur after running the main models.

RESEARCH METHODS

The data used for this study is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) data, a publicly available dataset prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data comprises 8,984 men and women born from 1980 through 1984, living in the United States on December 31, 1996. On this basis, the NLSY yields a cohort of individuals starting from their early adolescent stage, through the time they are 35–39 years of age (through 2019). The data consists of a nationally representative sample of 6,748 youths in a cross-sectional sample, and an oversample of 2,236 non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics. The sample is based on 75,291 household units of which there were 9,907 eligible members of whom 90.7% responded affirmatively and were included in the study.²

The NLSY is administered via a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI). The interviewers enter answers (or allows respondents to enter answers directly on sensitive topics), and selects the next question based on a respondent's answers. These computer-assisted aspects permit a comprehensive record to be kept about labor markets and employment responses. For example, if a respondent were surveyed about a job in 2011 that they held, they would be asked about that job in 2013. In the NLSY, respondents provided details on all jobs that they had held between survey interviews and jobs they currently held. The unit of analysis in the study is the job-respondent level.

 $^{^{2}}$ The final respondent sample in this study is comprised of 8,699 individuals that had demographic information and had worked at least one job.

Variables

Voluntary Departure. The voluntary departure measures are constructed from the question, "Which of the reasons best describes why you left [employer's name]?" If a respondent indicated (either from a prior survey year or during the present survey yet) that they once held a job and no longer did when interviews were conducted in person, they were presented with choices that indicated the reasons why they might have left (i.e., "Which of the reasons on this card <u>best</u> describes why you left your employer?" [note: bolded emphasis is provided by this author]). The full set of choices from which a respondent could choose was nearly identical, though not completely, from survey year to survey year (see Table A2 in the appendix).

Consistent with prior research including studies using NLSY data sets (Sicherman, 1996; Trevor, 2001; Lee et al., 2008), if any of these reasons were listed, departure was categorized as involuntary: (1) layoff (2) company, office, workplace, or plant closed (3) end of temporary or seasonal job (4) discharged or fired and (5) program/project/job ended; for a given job-week the measure was coded as 1, or else 0, if the respondent did not involuntarily depart in that week. This variable was coded and analyses of involuntary turnover are shown in the appendix.

Voluntary departure included all other reasons not directly related to an employer terminating the employer-employee relationship. Voluntary departure included quitting for aspects like "working conditions" as well as the reasons included in the dependent variables to test hypotheses, such as a respondent quitting in order "to return to school" or due to "no transportation/transportation problems." I began by creating one overall, voluntary departure variable, which is coded 1, if a respondent indicated that they left for any reasons outside of involuntary departure in a week, or else 0, if they did not voluntarily depart in a week. While the purposes of the study are not to compare the differences in overall turnover by race, I provide the models of voluntary departure to provide a baseline comparison to existing research.

To test H1-H4, respondents answers were categorized accordingly. To test H1, a *resource disadvantaged departure* variable was created, and the variable equals 1 if the respondent left due to medical reasons, family reasons or due to transportation issues in a given week, else 0. The variable *left to look for a new job* in a given week equals 1 one if this occurred, else 0 for a test of H2. The variable for *resource enabled departure* was created and equals 1, if the respondent left to return to school or start a new business or else 0 for a test of H3. Finally, the variable *left to take a new job* in a given week is coded as 1 if that occurred, or else 0 for a test of H4.

Independent Variables. The main independent variable is the race of the respondent. The race of the respondent is measured in Round 1 of the NLSY, after the prescreener. The prescreener occurred so that the NLSY interviewer could determine whether the household qualified for the study (i.e., if one or more members of the household were in the appropriate age range.) There were 75,291 housing units originally surveyed, and it was determined that there were 9,907 eligible respondents. The race variable was completed by the household member who was 18 years of age or older. The interviewer was NOT the one indicating the race, ethnicity, or gender but recording the information provided by the respondent. The variables *Black* and *White* are binary and equal 1; this was the indicated race during Round 1 of the NLSY or else 0.³ The other demographic variables for race and ethnicity are Asian, Hispanic, and Other Minority. In the models either *Black* (in tests of H3–H4) or *White* (in tests of H1–H2) is the omitted category.

Control Variables. Several control variables are included to account for individual-level characteristics, job characteristics, and employer characteristics of the jobs held.

Gender. There is a *female* variable included in the models that is coded as 1 if the NLSY survey indicated the person as such, or else 0 if the survey indicates they are male.

³ The category *Black* is coded as such through indications of race OR ethnicity. For example, if a respondent indicated they are Black Hispanic the variable would be coded as *Black* =1.

Age. An *age* variable is included and measured as the age of the respondent when they were interviewed about the job. It is calculated based on the birth year.

Marriage. The dichotomous variable *married* is also included as a control, and it is equal to 1, if the respondent was married before they held the job or else 0. The variable was imputed when possible, when it was missing for a given job year.⁴

Education. Variables are included for the highest level of education that was attained by a respondent at the time when a job was held. The categories are as follows: *no high school degree*, *high school degree*, *GED*, *associate's degree*, *bachelor's degree*, *master's degree*, *PhD*, and *professional degree*.⁵

Number of years worked. I include a continuous variable for prior work experience, measured as the number of years worked prior to the interview date about a job. Since prior experience has the granularity of weeks worked in prior jobs, this is a continuous measure (e.g., 72 weeks is 72/52=1.38 years).

Previously laid off. Given the propensity respondents might have to voluntarily depart rather than be fired based on experiencing this in the past (Davis et al., 2015), I create a dichotomous variable that captures whether a respondent had been fired or laid off before a given job (1=yes, or 0=no).

Part time. To account for heterogeneity with respect to the job, *part time* is a variable that equals 1 if the job is such, or else 0. This variable was coded as equal to 1, if the number of hours worked per week was < 35 hours.

⁴ There is a high level of missingness for the marital status variables across survey years. The most reliable measure of marital status is an indication of whether or not a respondent has ever been married, and it is imputed when the data is missing. To do so, I used the fact that a respondent being never married in a survey year implies they had the same status in previous survey years. Further, I used the fact that being divorced, widowed, or separated means that one has been married before.

⁵ For missing values on education, I imputed values in two ways: A respondent having no degree in a survey year implies the same in previous survey years and was updated as such. Also, a "missing highest degree" indicator in a survey year between two non-missing highest degrees that are the same implies the same degree for the missing cases. For instance, if a respondent's highest degree is a bachelor's in 2002 and 2006, this implies the highest degree in years 2003, 2004 and 2005 is also a bachelor's. In the models, the missing category is *no high school degree*.

Hourly pay. To account for the relationship that quitting has with pay, a measure of the pay they received on a job is included as a control. It is adjusted for inflation and measured in 2020 U.S. dollars.

Union. Since being in a union might influence turnover and vary by race (Ferguson, 2015), I code a *union* variable as dichotomous, equal to 1 if the respondent was a member of a union for a job or else 0.

Occupational categories. In order to account for differences in turnover propensities across occupations, the following categories were included as controls per the labeling of the NLSY data: (1) Management and Professional Service, (2) Sales and Office Occupations, (3) Natural Resources, Construction, and Maintenance, (4) Production, Transportation, Material Moving, (5) Armed Forces, and (6) Special.⁶

Employer Size. A variable that indicates the *size of the employer*, measured by the number of thousands of employees in the respondent's workplace, is included as a control.⁷

Finally, several variables are included as to control for region, year, and industry heterogeneity. *Regional* dummy variables are included for four regional dummies based on the U.S. Census region (Northeast, North Central, South, and West). *Industry* controls are included as dummy variables based on the listing of industries in the NLSY (see the appendix Table A3). A *year* variable in the survey is also included to adjust for time varying factors affecting employment.

⁶ Given the unique nature of "armed forces" jobs, in robustness checks, I restricted the analyses to only civilian jobs by dropping all jobs with industry or occupational codes listed in the armed forces. The results remain substantively the same as shown below.

⁷ This variable was not collected for jobs which lasted less than 13 weeks. To deal with the high level of missing data, I impute missing observations in two ways: (i) using the average employer size and (ii) using multiple imputation techniques.

Analytic Strategy

The method used to test the hypotheses is survival analysis. Survival analysis models the duration it takes for an event of interest to occur, rather than modeling an event occurring as a dichotomous outcome. I run Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972), a semiparametric model of the expected time it takes for an event of interest to occur (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May, 2008). Cox models are commonly employed models for studying turnover (Fine and Gray, 1999; Lee et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2015; Austin and Fine, 2017). The Cox proportional hazard models are run with individual fixed effects, which addresses the likelihood that an unobserved, person-specific characteristic that is constant over time is affecting the results (Allison, 2009).

In this analysis, the week is the unit of time. This means that if a person voluntarily turned over from a job in week 40 in that Cox model, then I also model in weeks 1-39 that the person did not turn over. One assumption underlying all proportional hazard models is that the underlying hazard rate is a function of independent variables and covariates, and that hazard functions are proportional over time across the groups of interest (Cox, 1972). To assess these assumptions, I performed a number of tests (e.g., the plotting of proportionality hazard plots, Schoenfeld residual plots, and the comparison of predicted hazards of Cox and the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates). Across these various modeling assumption checks, there was no evidence that justified rejecting the proportional hazards assumption.

In the models, observations of voluntary turnover are included in the models up until the point they become censored or there is a failure (i.e., exit from the sample). For example, let's say a respondent worked for 32 weeks at a job, and then "quit because didn't like the job" according to their response on the NLSY survey. This is not an outcome of interest in H1–H4. In this case, the worker-job level observation would be included in the model for weeks 1–31 (equal to zero for those weeks) in order to account for the fact that they did not voluntarily depart during this time period. Then after

31 weeks for tests of H1-H4, this observation would be treated as censored.⁸

Another assumption underlying Cox models concerns censoring is that censoring refers to not being able to observe an event of interest because another event has occurred (e.g., a different event occurs or the actual event of interest occurs outside of the study period.) In Cox models, there is an assumption of independent censoring, or that the occurrence of one event does not affect failure times for other events. In a robustness check, I also run competing risk models, which allows me to relax the independence assumption. For H1 and H3, it seems reasonable to assume that leaving due to resource enabled opportunities or resource disadvantages do not "compete" with one another (i.e., they are independent). Yet, this might be less the case for H2 and H4. Specifically, if a working individual has decided to look for a job elsewhere, leaving to look and leaving to take a job as an event is unlikely to be independent. To address this, in the competing risks model, instead of modeling the hazard and survivor functions, I model the cause-specific hazard function and the cumulative incidence function (Fine and Gray, 1999; Cleves et al., 2002; Donoghoe and Gebski, 2017). I provide further discussion about competing risk models after presenting the main models.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics, including the mean of the primary variables and a comparison of their values for Blacks and Whites, are shown in Table 1 at the worker-level. The total number of involuntary departures for Whites was lower than for Blacks, consistent with prior research (p< 0.001). Voluntary departures are more common in this sample than involuntary departures. The total number of voluntary departures is more for Whites than Blacks on average in this sample (p < 0.001). In terms of other demographic variables (i.e., age and gender) the sample is balanced across the racial groups.

⁸ In sum, when an event occurs (i.e., quitting because one did not like their job) outside of any of the failures of interest (in H1–H4), the Cox models incorporate this information.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

Before turning to survival models, I first investigate how often leaving for various reasons occurs among these respondents. In this sample, individuals quit nearly 45K times (i.e., 44,696 occurrences) over the 22-year period. Of these, leaving for alternate job opportunities was the most common reason individuals quit, accounting for nearly half of all quits. Individuals voluntarily left to take a new job 32% of the time they left. Quitting to look for a new job was the second most frequent occurrence, at 12% of the time. The next reasons for quitting had to do with disliking the job and having poor work conditions, both of which accounted for approximately 8% of elective quits. In investigating leaving for resource disadvantaged reasons and resource enabled reasons, these occurred at 10% and 9.5% of the time, respectively.

In Table 2, I model voluntary turnover. Model 1 regresses the hazard of voluntarily departing onto *Black*. In calculating the hazard ratio for *Black* (i.e., the exponentiation of the coefficient) I find that the risk of Blacks experiencing voluntary departure is 12% higher than it is compared to all other groups in the model without any controls. In Model 2, other demographic variables are added (White is the omitted race category). The coefficients on the demographic variables suggest that those belonging to the *Black* and *Other Minority* category are more apt to voluntarily depart than Whites. Women are more likely to voluntarily depart than men. In Model 3, the worker, employer, and job-related variables are added. By and large, the signs on the coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations. Working for more years, having higher pay, working for a larger employer, and working in a union job are all negatively related to quitting. Having been previously laid off is positively associated with quitting, as is working in a part-time job, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Davis et. al., 2015).

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

In Model 4, all the regional, year, and industry controls are added. The coefficient on *Black* remains positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). The hazard ratio for *Black* in the full model indicates the risk of Blacks experiencing voluntary departure is 3% higher than it is for Whites. These results highlight the importance of running survival analyses, in that even though Whites had more voluntary turnover overall, their likelihood of turning over voluntarily for a given job is less than it is for Blacks. The hazard ratio (HR) is less than 1 for *Hispanic*, indicating that this group is less likely to voluntarily quit than Whites once controls are included in models and survival analysis is performed. Consistent with the earlier models, the coefficients on *Other Minority* (HR: 1.1:1.0) and *Female* (HR: 1.08:1.0) indicate members of these groups are more apt to quit.⁹

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Turning to H1, in Table 3 I run another series of Cox models where the event of interest is departure due to resource disadvantages. The hazard ratio for *Black* for this form of departure, relative to the other racial and ethnic groups combined is 1.44:1.0 in models without controls. The other demographic variables are added in Model 2, and the same worker, job, and employer characteristics are added in Model 3, and regional and other controls in Model 4. The coefficient on *Black* in the full model indicates that Blacks are 18% more likely to electively leave than Whites due to resource disadvantages. None of the other racial or ethnic groups has a positive correlation with departing due to resource disadvantages.¹⁰ Overall, these results provide evidence that Blacks are more apt to leave

⁹ The findings that there are differences in the voluntary departure across demographic groups here is consistent with some existing research that has found higher levels of voluntary departure for minorities (e.g., Hom et al., 2008; McGinn and Milkman 2013).

¹⁰ The coefficient on *Female* indicates that they are much more likely to depart for resource disadvantage reasons than men (HR: 2.92:1.0). I interact the *Black x Female* variables to assess if there are gendered effects across race, and there coefficient on the interaction variable indicates that this is not the case.

voluntarily than are Whites due to resource disadvantages. The results are not only statistically meaningful, but consequential in magnitude. H1 is supported.

Next I turn to H2 on departing to look for a new job. Prior to running hazard models, I assess descriptively the frequency with which respondents leave to look for jobs for the racial and ethnic groups in the sample. I find the average number of times that members of all groups who left to look for work is <1 over the period. There are statistical differences. Namely, Black respondents leave more frequently than White respondents to look for work(p < 0.01).¹¹

In Table 4 Model 1, I run the Cox hazard model for *leaving to look for a job*. The hazard ratio for *Black* for this form of departure, with the other racial and ethnic groups combined in the denominator of the ratio is 1.4:1.0. Additional demographic variables are added in Model 2, and the same worker, job, and employer characteristics are added in Model 3, and regional and other controls in Model 4. The coefficient on *Black* in the full model indicates that Blacks are 28% more likely to leave to look for a job rather than stay compared to Whites. Hispanics are 15% more likely to leave to look for jobs compared to staying than are Whites. There are no differences in the likelihood of leaving to look for a job for across Asians and Whites. Overall, these results indicate that H2 is supported, or that Black workers are more apt to leave to look for a job than stay compared to White workers.

[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]

Next, I turn to H3, which concerns leaving for reasons enabled by resources. In Table 5, I model the hazard for leaving due to resource enabled reasons. Here, I find that the coefficient on the variable *White* in Model 1 indicates that compared to all other racial and ethnic groups, and that Whites are more likely to depart for resource enabled reasons (HR: 1.17:1.0). The other demographic

¹¹ The set of observations for the qualitative comparisons of the frequency of leaving (to look for jobs or take jobs) are comprised of all those with race/ethnicity variables and reasons for departure (N=64,300 observations).

variables are added in Model 2. The coefficient on *Female* indicates that they are about 9% less likely to leave than men for resource-enabled reasons. Model 3 adds the worker, job, and employer characteristics, and Model 4 adds the regional and other controls. The coefficient on *White* in the full model indicates that they are 13% more likely to electively leave than Blacks (the omitted group). The full model indicates that *Hispanic* (HR: 0.77:1) and *Other Minority* (1.29:1) remain less likely to leave than Blacks (HR: 1:44:1) with all control variables included. Overall, H3 is supported.

[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]

Last, I turn to H4, which argues White workers are more likely to voluntarily leaving to take jobs than they are to stay compare to Black workers. Table 6 models the hazard for leaving due to take jobs. Here again, I assess qualitatively the frequency of leaving to take jobs. White respondents left to take jobs 2.2 times on average over the 22-year period, and Blacks did so 1.8 times, a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01). Although the coefficient on White is positive and statistically significant in Model 1 as Table 6 indicates, the effect does not remain statistically significant. None of the demographic variables indicates statistical results, with the exception of *Female*. Women are less likely to leave to take jobs than men (HR women/men: 0.85:1.0 in full model). There is no support using these models that H4 is supported.¹²

[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Modeling Assumptions. Thus far we have run Cox proportional hazard models for all

¹² Interaction effects were also assessed after each of the full models for H2–H4 (with models including the main effects). There was a positive and statistically significant interaction effect between *Black* x *Female* for H2, but no effects found for interactions tested in H3 and H4.

observations where voluntary departure occurred, with the assumption that when there has been censoring it is independent. Finding support for H1-H3 (but not H4), I now relax that assumption and rerun tests of models H2 and H4 with competing risk models. I do so because leaving to take a job reasonably competes with leaving to look for a job (Fine and Gray, 1999; Cleves et al., 2002; Donoghoe and Gebski, 2017). Competing risks account for the nature of the bivariate distribution of (t_1, t_2) or both potential outcomes.¹³

For the purposes of ease of interpretation, I run competing risk models with only Black and White respondents.¹⁴ I find that across the competing risk models of the cause-specific hazard rate accounting for both types of departure, it is less likely for Black respondents to depart to look for jobs than White respondents, consistent with H2 (see models in the appendix) wherein the hazard ratio for Blacks/Whites is 1.27:1. Turning to H4, in competing risk models of Whites leaving to take jobs and the likelihood compared to Blacks, I find the coefficient on *White* is positive and statistically significant with a hazard ratio of Whites/Blacks of 1.09:1.0, consistent with H4.

In Figures 2A and 2B, I show the cumulative incidence for these voluntary departure events for White and Black respondents. What these figures indicate is that there is a slight divergence in Whites and Blacks leaving to take jobs, but it is not as substantial as it is for leaving to look for jobs. Looking across all the models and the Figure 2B, I take this be weakly suggestive (but not substantial) evidence for H4.

[INSERT FIGURE 2A AND 2B HERE]

¹³ As an example, let's say person A and person B are both working, and both desire to depart and undertake a new job search. Person A looks for a while and finds a new job while working a current one. Meanwhile, person B also looks while working a current job but does not find one and decides to voluntarily depart to look for one. Persons A and B sustain outcomes that are correlated with the other possible outcome when one decides to look for work.

¹⁴ The competing hazard models are run with the storreg command in Stata 14.

Resource-Based Reasons. Beyond further assessing H2 and H4, I also explore the more nuanced reasons for voluntary quitting that may be lending support for the hypotheses. I assess the subhazards for each of the reasons for resource disadvantaged/enabled departure. I find that quitting due to (1) transportation and (2) family reasons when modeled as separate events of interest indicates that Black respondents are more likely than White respondents to voluntarily depart (p < 0.05). There are no differences in leaving due to illness and injury. Additionally, I find White respondents to be more apt than Black respondents to quit to return to school (p < 0.01), but there is no statistical difference by race in quitting to start businesses.¹⁵

Alternative Explanations. In addition to relaxing the modeling assumption for Cox models, I also consider an alternative explanation for these results. Specifically, that they are being driven by social class and not race. I include these in models and rerun them. The social class variables in the NLSY are the *level of education of the father and mother*. These were measured at Round 1 and completed by an adult in the household. A second measure of social class is also included, *household income*, and it is the "gross household income in the previous year." A plot of family income as a percentile by race is shown in Figure 3. As shown in the figure, Blacks in the sample are concentrated at the bottom of the family income distribution (in 1996 when the survey began), while Whites are concentrated at the top.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

For father's and mother's education, I include the following categories: *1st–8th grade, 9th– 11th grade, 12th grade, some college, college degree, some grad school, grad/professional degree* (no education is the omitted variable)¹⁶ in Cox proportional hazard models. I run models inclusive of

¹⁵ One reason this may be is that approximately only 1% of the voluntary quits were due to starting a business, or it was a relatively uncommon reason for quitting among this cohort. This is likely due to the age of individuals, who are in the teens, 20s, and 30s in this study, and may not be starting businesses to a large extent. A recent study by Azoulay et al., 2018 finds that the mean age for those that start high growth businesses is 40.5 in the United States.

¹⁶ For one-third of the observations, there is missing data on background information on parents' education or income.

parental education and family income separately. In models inclusive of these variables, the results for race for H1 and H2 are robust, wherein the coefficient on *Black* is positive and statistically significant (p< 0.05). For H3, the coefficient on *White* remains positively and statistically significant (p=0.06) in models with parental education (HR: 1.09:1.0), but this coefficient does not remain statistically significant in models inclusive of family income. For H4, in models with family income, the coefficient on *White* is positive and statistically significant for departing to leave to take a job (p< 0.05), as well as in models inclusive of parental education (HR: 1.05:1.0). These results suggest that the positive relationship between *White* and departure for resource enabled reasons is supported, by and large, once the social class controls are included.

Beyond these steps, additional analyses were conducted for robustness. I verified the directionality of differences in gaps between employment spells for those who left to look versus left to take jobs. I found that in the NLSY about 80% of respondents who quit jobs to take a job spend a month or less with an employment gap, whereas 80% of respondents who quit a job to find another job have about a five-month employment gap or less (see Figure 4).

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

To check the possibility that the results are being driven by outliers, I restrict the sample to jobs that had been worked for not more or less than +/- 3 standard deviations of the mean weeks worked. The results remain. Additionally, in 7% of the jobs, respondents worked the same job more than once. To account for the concern that departure may be correlated within a job, I cluster standard errors at the job level and use departure at the stint level (instead of the job level) in the analyses. The results remain robust. Further, included in the NLSY is the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score for some respondents, which is a test that was designed to measure "the applicant's knowledge and skills in a number of topical areas." This test was missing for a large portion of the sample and it is an opt-in test (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). Caution should be used in

assessing models with the ASVAB score, as there was no evidence the scores were missing at random with respect to race. However, in the models inclusive of scores for ability, the results are substantively the same except in models for H3.¹⁷

DISCUSSION

In this paper, my goal has been a study of the conditions—i.e., resources and subsequent employment outcomes—that transpire concomitant with voluntary departure. I developed a theoretical model on the relationship between resources and departure that expects there to be greater turnover at either end of the resource spectrum than there is in the middle. With this theory, I argued that because resources are related to race voluntary departure can be better understood by breaking it into two parts: resource disadvantaged departure and resource enabled departure. Then using a cohort sample of individuals born in the United States in the early 1980s, I tested my predictions. I find the risk of workers quitting due to resource disadvantages is higher for Blacks than Whites. Blacks are more apt to voluntary depart for reasons such as a lack of transportation and health. Further, the risk of workers quitting to take jobs for resource enabled reasons is higher for Whites than it is Blacks, whereby there is some (weak) evidence that they are more apt to voluntarily quit to take other jobs. Whereas prior work has largely focused on questions of which racial group turnovers over more, this study offers a more nuanced understanding of how race relates to voluntary departure.

Contributions to the Racial Inequality Literature

There are four contributions this study makes to the literature on racial inequality. First in this study, I interrogate resource conditions outside local instances of discrimination, to advance a new

¹⁷ There is no support for H3 when *ASVAB* scores included. There were large changes in many coefficients for the model for H3 once this variable was included unlike all other analyses run, likely owing to the relationship between *ASVAB* returning to school.

way to conceive organizational behavior with respect to quitting. It brings to light how race is affected and reconstituted to influence organizational behavior in light of broader racial structures in society. The theory developed suggests that apart from any racial animus (i.e., prejudice), there might be outcomes that differ across racial groups. Organizational inequality and career scholars are wellpoised to investigate these further in future research. Theoretical attention examining why liminalities between society and the workplace are consequential has been long a part of the purview of organizational theory (Stinchcombe, 1965; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Scott and Davis, 2007).

Second, this study contributes to the literature on race and labor market mobility. Scholars know a great deal about how employment outcomes are patterned by race. Studies find it takes unemployed Black job seekers longer to find new employment than unemployed White job seekers (Pager and Pedulla, 2015; Weller, 2019). Further, research finds Black workers have approximately 2x the unemployment rate of White workers in the United States, a difference that has been documented with regularity since the 1970s (Western and Pettit, 2005; Pager, 2007).

Given this, the findings of this study suggest a new way that job precarity creeps into labor markets. Racial minorities are at higher risk of leaving jobs without new ones in place. This may be an important mechanism for inequality given that "loading up" on longer-term experience with a single employer appears to be one of the only ways Black employees sustain upward mobility (Baldi and McBrier, 1997; Elliott and Smith, 2004; see Wilson, 2020 for a recent summary), this may be a difficult quest for some employees. I offer a new understanding of how disadvantages in labor markets arise (Kalleberg, 2001). It is unclear to date, but it may be that voluntary quitting may have similar economic consequences to involuntary turnover (e.g., Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003; Seninger, 1997), given that at least sometimes, it appears to occur under tenuous circumstances.

Third, this research helps further open up a rapidly growing literature on racialized organizations (Ray, 2019). Specifically, this research suggests ways racialized organizations may be

created and maintained. Studies of racialized organizations argue that organizational rules, processes, and routines link Whiteness to material and socially-infused resources (Byron and Roscigno, 2019; Ray, 2019). According to this perspective, it is uncommon for organizations to be openly racist or discriminatory. Instead, normative meanings about ideal workers pattern workplace behaviors. In line with this, my findings suggest particular vulnerabilities for those with some racial identities.

Fourth, by offering a structural perspective on voluntary departure, the theory presented here enters into existing conversations about structural theories, including those related to involuntary departure (Wilson and McBrier, 2005; Couch and Fairlie, 2010; Kalev, 2014). Scholars have accumulated a number of structural explanations for why involuntary departure varies by race. For example, studies find Black employees are more likely to work in marginal jobs with less security than White employees (Cornfield, 1983; Edin, Lein, and Nelson, 2002; Haveman, Broschak, and Cohen, 2009; Storer, Schneider, and Harknett, 2020) as well as in unions with disappearing labor protections and higher levels of firing (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp, 2012; Ferguson, 2016). For the theory developed herein, there is the promise that more predictable patterns for voluntary turnover can be understood through empirical study, of the type that exist in studies of involuntary departure (Zwerling and Silver, 1992; Wilson and McBrier, 2005; Couch and Fairlie, 2010).

Contributions to the Voluntary Departure Literature

There are important contributions this study makes to the literature on voluntary turnover. There has been an active body of literature on organizational theory that has been investigating voluntary turnover ever since March and Simon's (1958) treatise on organizations. A main question is, when are employees more weakly tethered to an organization and when are they apt to stay? One of the important conceptualizations over the last twenty years regarding this question has been about how pathways influence turnover. Researchers argue there is not a single event that influences turnover, but an unfolding of interlocking events that lead employees to depart (Lee and Mitchell, 1994; Maertz and Campion, 1998; Hom et al., 2008; Rubenstein et al., 2018). This study helps shed light on why pathway logics may differ by race, as well as the post-quit effects of those pathways. The resources that Black and White individuals have at their disposal may differ in ways that make them more or less vulnerable to remain in organizations, and may lead them onto different pathways after quitting.

Additionally, elective departure has long been attended to within organizational theory because voluntary departure imposes costs on organizations, full stop (McFeely and Wigert, 2019). But this study raises new questions about how these costs are conceptualized. For evidentiary reasons, inequality scholars are interested in whether employees are departing to take jobs or if, instead, they leave a job without an accompanying job in place. While inequality scholars might be interested in this outcome because it influences the economic positioning of prior employees and demographic groups, organizational scholars might additionally be interested in the employment conditions under which people depart due to the longer-term consequences this may have on organizations.

If employees depart without already having jobs lined up, then this may have important impacts (Klotz and Bolino, 2016). In this study, leaving to look for a job occurred at approximately 25% of the rate that it did for leaving to take jobs. An important question for future research is what are the longer-term consequences on incumbents when they leave, even *without jobs lined up*? Does this have spillover consequences on incumbent employees? Scholars have found employees' elective departure is attended to as a sensemaking event for employees about own relationship and commitment to the organization (Sørensen, 2004; Bartunek, Huang, and Walsh 2008). This study suggests new, undiagnosed costs in departure for organizational scholars to investigate, given that the employment conditions under which individuals depart vary.

Limitations, Future Research, and Policy Implications

This study is not without its limitations. In terms of data analyses, this is a study of a single cohort of individuals. The data is rich in the insights it allows us to glean into why people quit jobs. However, it does not study conditions where workers are subject to the same sets of conditions within workplaces. Future research should be undertaken that studies workers within the same workplace or divisions within organizations and examines why turnover occurs across groups (e.g., Elvira and Town, 2001; Zatzick, Elvira, and Cohen, 2003; Sørensen, 2004; Castilla, 2008; McGinn and Milkman, 2013). In so doing, it would also be useful to glean performance records and other in-depth data to understand further how resource-related factors influence quitting (Tomaskovic-Devey, 2005; Castilla, 2008). It would also be important to study managers (Elliott and Smith, 2001; Abraham, 2017).

Qualitative research might be especially needed to shed light on the more multifaceted conditions that prompt workers to quit, and may allow the theoretical frame developed here to expand further. Although this study is novel with respect to the literature on turnover, supervisors who observe employee turnover behavior might discover the findings here are in line with their daily work experience. For example, an anecdote that arose during this project from a former manager in a small, blue-collar setting indicated that the former manager saw these dynamics related to resources among their employees (i.e., a lack of transportation, health challenges) and that there were differences across race. Qualitative research might further examine how employer behavior intercedes to influence voluntary quitting, and if there are differences by race that are not made clear here. For instance, even if there are differences in Black and Whites workers health conditions, the work support they may receive regarding their health might also differ (Pfeffer, 2018). Researchers interested in how these dynamics unfold might be well-advised to spend time doing in-depth studies of managers, supervisors, and other workplace employees.

This study also provides a roadmap for new research on additional racial and ethnic groups, including Hispanics and Asian Americans. In full regression models, Hispanics were found to be less likely to voluntarily depart than White employees and more likely to leave to look for jobs, similar to Black employees. Asian Americans were found to be not different in the likelihood of voluntarily leaving compared to White employees and also were not different in their likelihood of leaving to look for jobs. Overall, I believe the structural frame developed here accommodates these groups, and studies have focused explicitly on these other groups in the past, and how they may fit within the "racial order" in society (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). In future research, I encourage scholars to build on this structural perspective to generate deeper insights into these groups, including in more nuanced ways. For instance, the experiences of South Asian employees may differ from East Asian employees, not only in the workplace but also outside the workplace (Lu, Nisbett, and Morris, 2020). Further, there are likely differences across gender within these groups that need further examination (Abraham, 2017; Kelly, Moen, and Tranby, 2011).

In closing, this study does raise questions about what can be done from a practitioner and policymaker standpoint to affect the type of voluntary departure that appears to not lead to better mobility, and is instead related to resource disadvantages (Karageorge, 2017). The structural framework that has been developed evidences that going "beyond discrimination" as local and situated (e.g., racial prejudice) in order to uncover complexities that exist between race and turnover is important. Many interventions to date locate the problem of racial inequality in racial animus or at the level of individual actors, workplaces or firms (see EEOC policies). The research here gives organizations a viable way to link attention to external conditions in society to what occurs within organizational boundaries. If it were possible to structural disparities that recreate race in society, this might have important consequences on employee turnover and mobility.

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Figure 1. Resources and Voluntary Departure



Resources



Figure 2. Competing Risk Models of Leaving to Look or Leaving to Take a Job

Note: Competing risk models of blacks and whites (cumulative incidence is shown of risk models without control variables). Full models and regression coefficients are provided in the appendix

Figure 3. Family Income Distribution by Race



Figure 4. Time Gaps in Jobs



Table 1: Summary statistics of demographic characteristics for all workers, worker level

	Al	1	Bla	ck	Wh	ite	Diff
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	b
Number of voluntary departures	4.852	(3.291)	4.762	(3.330)	5.033	(3.307)	-0.271^{**}
Number of involuntary departures	1.778	(1.869)	1.997	(1.945)	1.718	(1.870)	0.280^{***}
Number of jobs	9.178	(5.049)	9.249	(5.078)	9.386	(5.125)	-0.137
Female	0.488	(0.500)	0.500	(0.500)	0.483	(0.500)	0.017
Birth year	1982.009	(1.397)	1981.964	(1.401)	1982.033	(1.395)	-0.069^{*}
Ever married	0.568	(0.495)	0.398	(0.490)	0.650	(0.477)	-0.251^{***}
White	0.585	(0.493)					
Black	0.264	(0.441)					
Hispanic	0.212	(0.409)					
Asian	0.017	(0.131)					
Other minority	0.020	(0.140)					
Observations	8699		2294		5090		7384

Black	$ \begin{array}{r} (1) \\ 0.114^{***} \\ (0.0113) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} (2) \\ 0.217^{***} \\ (0.0115) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} (3) \\ 0.0924^{***} \\ (0.0121) \\ \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} $
Asian		-0.0326 (0.0372)	-0.0192 (0.0387)	-0.0625 (0.0390)
Hispanic		0.0291^{*} (0.0124)	-0.0150 (0.0127)	-0.0676^{***} (0.0134)
Other minority		0.144^{***} (0.0340)	0.127^{***} (0.0345)	0.0980^{**} (0.0332)
Female		$\begin{array}{c} 0.0472^{***} \\ (0.00953) \end{array}$	0.0601^{***} (0.0101)	0.0791^{***} (0.0107)
Age at interview		-0.115^{***} (0.000953)	-0.0548^{***} (0.00187)	-0.0148^{***} (0.00391)
Married		-0.0781^{***} (0.0126)	0.0194 (0.0133)	-0.0266^{*} (0.0135)
GED			0.200^{***} (0.0208)	0.0252 (0.0213)
High school			-0.0212 (0.0142)	-0.132^{***} (0.0148)
Associates			0.0557^{*} (0.0261)	-0.0875^{**} (0.0269)
Bachelors			0.0369 (0.0200)	-0.106^{***} (0.0218)
Masters			0.0199 (0.0363)	0.00428 (0.0379)
PhD			-0.0863 (0.123)	-0.0298 (0.138)
Professional degree			0.228^{**} (0.0785)	0.0347 (0.0775)
Number of years worked			-0.132^{***} (0.00292)	-0.158^{***} (0.00294)
Previously laid off			$\begin{array}{c} 0.329^{***} \\ (0.00868) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.273^{***} \\ (0.00874) \end{array}$
Part time			-0.0634^{***} (0.0108)	0.00693 (0.0109)
Hourly pay (2020 dollars)			$\begin{array}{c} -0.0172^{***} \\ (0.00143) \end{array}$	-0.0120^{***} (0.00147)
Unionized job			-0.0709^{***} (0.0167)	-0.0286 (0.0176)
No. of employees in '000's			-0.0119^{*} (0.00467)	-0.00357 (0.00423)
Region controls	No	No	No	Yes
Year controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controls	No	No	No	Yes
Occupational controls	No	No	No	Yes
Degrees of freedom Log likelihood	50282 1 -421486.3	50282 7 -411324.3	50282 20 -408394.7	50282 63 -406047.4

51.1	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	0.365^{***} (0.0337)	0.542^{***} (0.0361)	0.270^{***} (0.0385)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.162^{***} \\ (0.0402) \end{array}$
Asian		-0.426^{*} (0.173)	-0.269 (0.175)	-0.251 (0.177)
Hispanic		0.265^{***} (0.0396)	$0.0616 \\ (0.0410)$	-0.000822 (0.0434)
Other minority		$\begin{array}{c} 0.0756 \\ (0.118) \end{array}$	-0.0143 (0.119)	-0.0297 (0.120)
Female		0.882^{***} (0.0348)	0.995^{***} (0.0378)	$\frac{1.069^{***}}{(0.0412)}$
Age at interview		-0.0849^{***} (0.00274)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.00341 \\ (0.00424) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0655^{***} \\ (0.0119) \end{array}$
Married		0.498^{***} (0.0385)	0.639^{***} (0.0384)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.525^{***} \\ (0.0372) \end{array}$
GED			$0.0942 \\ (0.0583)$	-0.166^{**} (0.0567)
High school			-0.390^{***} (0.0427)	-0.555^{***} (0.0444)
Associates			-0.593^{***} (0.0853)	-0.770^{***} (0.0842)
Bachelors			-0.956^{***} (0.0737)	-1.128^{***} (0.0713)
Masters			-1.104^{***} (0.143)	-1.020^{***} (0.137)
PhD			-1.372^{**} (0.501)	-1.136^{*} (0.481)
Professional degree			-1.296^{***} (0.361)	-1.453^{***} (0.347)
Number of years worked			-0.187^{***} (0.00709)	-0.225^{***} (0.00750)
Previously laid off			$\begin{array}{c} 0.381^{***} \\ (0.0249) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.277^{***} \\ (0.0254) \end{array}$
Part time			-0.195^{***} (0.0364)	-0.0463 (0.0357)
Hourly pay (2020 dollars)			-0.0119^{*} (0.00533)	-0.00461 (0.00406)
Unionized job			0.0992 (0.0550)	0.163^{**} (0.0558)
No. of employees in '000's			-0.0310^{**} (0.0108)	-0.0211^{*} (0.0105)
Region controls	No	No	No	Yes
Year controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controls	No	No	No	Yes
Occupational controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	50282	50282	50282	50282
Degrees of freedom Log likelihood	1 -41271.8	7 -40386.7	20 -39489.6	$61 \\ -38756.5$

Black	(1) 0.337***	(2) 0.506^{***}	(3) 0.332^{***}	(4) 0.254^{***}
	(0.0302)	(0.0323)	(0.0342)	(0.0350)
Asian		-0.0101 (0.123)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0274 \\ (0.124) \end{array}$	-0.00939 (0.125)
Hispanic		$\begin{array}{c} 0.272^{***} \\ (0.0355) \end{array}$	0.196^{***} (0.0362)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.137^{***} \\ (0.0382) \end{array}$
Other minority		$\begin{array}{c} 0.156 \\ (0.104) \end{array}$	$0.133 \\ (0.105)$	$0.112 \\ (0.104)$
Female		-0.193^{***} (0.0278)	-0.150^{***} (0.0297)	-0.133^{***} (0.0316)
Age at interview		-0.143^{***} (0.00292)	-0.0581^{***} (0.00457)	-0.0110 (0.0112)
Married		-0.355^{***} (0.0464)	-0.217^{***} (0.0471)	-0.237^{***} (0.0469)
GED			0.161^{**} (0.0535)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0189 \\ (0.0536) \end{array}$
High school			-0.212^{***} (0.0357)	-0.316^{***} (0.0374)
Associates			-0.312^{***} (0.0862)	-0.382^{***} (0.0868)
Bachelors			-0.398^{***} (0.0679)	-0.385^{***} (0.0694)
Masters			-0.375^{*} (0.156)	-0.221 (0.153)
PhD			-0.396 (0.489)	-0.148 (0.499)
Professional degree			-0.205 (0.348)	-0.194 (0.347)
Number of years worked			-0.176^{***} (0.00753)	-0.198^{***} (0.00817)
Previously laid off			0.375^{***} (0.0234)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.332^{***} \\ (0.0239) \end{array}$
Part time			-0.0187 (0.0329)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0323 \\ (0.0326) \end{array}$
Hourly pay (2020 dollars)			-0.0215^{**} (0.00789)	-0.0148 (0.00815)
Unionized job			$0.0780 \\ (0.0516)$	$0.0968 \\ (0.0517)$
No. of employees in '000's			-0.00293 (0.0118)	0.00589 (0.0104)
Region controls	No	No	No	Yes
Year controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controls	No	No	No	Yes
Occupational controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations Degrees of freedom	50282 1	$50282 \\ 7$	$50282 \\ 20$	$50282 \\ 61$
Log likelihood	-52356.3	-50376.5	-49805.8	-49509.4

White 0.15^{6+**} 0.0224 0.12^{6+**} 0.122^{***} Asian 0.437^{***} 0.3371^{***} 0.366^{***} 0.03671^{***} 0.366^{***} Hispanic 0.343^{***} 0.312^{***} 0.305^{***} 0.035^{***} Other minority 0.203 0.262^{**} 0.255^{**} 0.1055^{***} Female -0.0786^{**} -0.103^{***} -0.034^{***} 0.0319^{***} Age at interview -0.181^{****} -0.0749^{***} -0.130^{***} 0.0343^{**} GED 0.276^{***} 0.133^{**} -0.032^{***} 0.0133^{**} Married -0.427^{****} -0.130^{****} -0.133^{***} GED 0.276^{***} 0.388^{****} $(0.0503)^{*}$ $(0.0503)^{*}$ Guide 0.992^{****} 0.773^{****} $(0.0718)^{*}$ $(0.044)^{*}$ Bachelors 1.91^{****} 0.992^{****} 0.773^{****} $(0.0718)^{*}$ Masters 1.91^{***} 0.285^{****} $0.0765)^{*}$ $(0.0765)^{*}$		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(0.0330) (0.0397) (0.0377) Asian 0.437*** (0.371*** (0.366*** Hispanic -0.343*** -0.312*** -0.366*** Other minority 0.203 (0.0462) (0.0461) (0.0484) Other minority 0.203 (0.017) (0.105) (0.105) Female -0.0786* -0.103** -0.0934** (0.0331) Age at interview -0.181*** -0.0794*0 (0.0133) Married -0.427*** -0.340*** -0.332*** (0.0536) (0.0548) (0.0548) (0.0548) GED 0.276** 0.343*** (0.0503) (0.0510) Associates 0.927*** 0.880*** (0.0503) (0.0510) Associates 0.928*** 0.773*** (0.0718) (0.0575) Masters 1.191*** 0.992*** (0.0718) (0.0757) PhD -0.216 -0.306 (0.0757) (0.0170) Professional degree 0.643 0.3411 (0.3757) (0.02	White	0.159***	0.0234	0.126***	0.122**
Asian 0.437*** 0.371*** 0.366*** Hispanic 0.343*** 0.312*** 0.305*** Other minority 0.203 0.0467 0.0457 Other minority 0.203 0.0105 0.055** Female -0.0786* 0.103** 0.0934** Age at interview 0.181*** 0.0749*** 0.0133* Married -0.427*** 0.340*** 0.0332** GED 0.427*** 0.340*** 0.038** GED 0.276** 0.138* 0.0900 High school 0.929*** 0.880*** 0.0901 Associates 0.928*** 0.076** 0.103** Matters 1.191*** 0.992*** 0.875*** Masters 1.99*** 1.035*** 0.010** PhD -0.216 0.030 0.010** Number of years worked -0.216 0.0396*** 0.026*** Part time -0.225**** 0.026*** 0.010*** Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.016* 0.00290 0.00290 No. of employeees in '000's -0.010		(0.0330)	(0.0359)	(0.0367)	(0.0379)
(0.104) (0.105) (0.105) Hispanic -0.343*** (0.0462) (0.0461) (0.0484) Other minority 0.03 (0.025*) (0.045) Female -0.0786* -0.103*** (0.031) (0.0348) Age at interview -0.181*** (0.0343) (0.00540) (0.0133) Married -0.427*** (0.0343) (0.00540) (0.0133) Married -0.427*** (0.340***) -0.332*** GED -0.427*** (0.0536) (0.0598) (0.0598) GED -0.216 -0.338 (0.0503) (0.0510) Associates 0.992*** 0.773*** (0.0102) (0.0101) Bachelors 1.191*** 0.992*** 0.773*** Masters 1.191*** 0.927**5) 0.300 Mumber of years worked - -0.216 -0.300 Number of years worked - 0.285*** -0.326**** Hourly pay (2020 dollars) - 0.225**** -0.326*** Number of years worked - 0.225**** -0.326***	Asian		0.437^{***}	0.371***	0.366***
Hispanic -0.343*** -0.312*** (0.0462) Other minority 0.203 0.262* 0.255* Female -0.0786* (0.0105) (0.0348) Age at interview -0.181*** (0.00540) (0.0313) Married -0.427*** -0.340*** -0.332*** GED -0.427*** -0.340*** -0.332*** GED 0.0994** 0.09900 0.09900 High school 0.992*** 0.773*** Associates 0.928*** 0.0130** Masters 1.191*** 0.907** Masters 1.091*** 0.0170 PhD -0.216 -0.300 Number of years worked - -0.216 -0.300 Previously laid off - -0.216 -0.300 Number of years worked - -0.225*** -0.326*** Hourly pay (2020 dollars) - - -0.225*** -0.017*** No No No No No No No. of employees in '000's - - - - - -			(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Impain 10.301 (0.042) 0.012 (0.061) 0.0043 (0.043) Other minority 0.203 (0.107) 0.262* (0.105) 0.255* (0.105) Female -0.0786* (0.0315) -0.00749*** (0.0343) -0.0034** (0.0343) Age at interview -0.181*** (0.0536) -0.0749*** (0.0548) -0.032*** (0.0548) Married -0.427*** (0.0536) -0.340*** (0.0548) -0.332*** (0.0548) GED 0.276** (0.0503) 0.138 (0.0900) High school 0.928*** (0.0563) 0.880*** (0.0563) Associates 0.928*** (0.0765) 0.138 (0.0765) Masters 1.191*** (0.0718) 0.992*** (0.0765) Masters 1.191*** (0.0775) 0.3376) Number of years worked -0.285*** (0.00951) -0.306 (1.002) Previously laid off 0.447*** (0.0344) 0.0355) Part time -0.225**** (0.0355) -0.326*** (0.00285) Part time -0.0164 (0.0355) -0.0101 (0.00263) No No No No No No No No Region controls No	Hienanic		-0 3/3***	-0 319***	-0 305***
Other minority 0.203 (0.107) 0.202 (0.105) 0.255* (0.105) Female -0.0786* (0.0315) -0.103** (0.0343) -0.0934** (0.0343) -0.0934** (0.0343) Age at interview -0.181*** (0.00343) -0.0749*** (0.00548) -0.130*** (0.0133) Married -0.427*** (0.0536) -0.340*** (0.0548) -0.332*** (0.0548) GED -0.427*** (0.0536) -0.380*** (0.0548) -0.332*** (0.0548) GED 0.992*** (0.0503) 0.880*** (0.0510) Associates 0.928*** (0.0102) 0.773*** (0.101) Associates 0.928*** (0.0718) 0.773*** (0.0751) Masters 1.191*** (0.0151) 0.992*** (0.0751) Masters 1.019*** (0.0170) 1.035*** (0.0765) PhD -0.216 (1.002) -0.300 (1.007) Professional degree 0.643 (0.0375) 0.326*** (0.0380) Number of years worked 0.225*** (0.0344) 0.326*** (0.0280) Part time -0.225*** (0.0341) -0.107*** (0.0341) Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.0164 (0.0280) -0.00263 (0.00241) Unionized job No N	mspanie		(0.0462)	(0.0461)	(0.0484)
0203 0.203 0.262 0.255 Female -0.0786* -0.103** -0.0934** Age at interview -0.181*** -0.0749*** -0.130*** Married -0.427*** -0.340*** -0.332*** (0.0548) -0.0556 -0.130*** -0.332*** (0.0548) -0.340*** -0.332*** (0.0548) (0.0548) GED -0.427*** -0.340*** -0.332*** (0.0548) (0.0548) GED 0.992*** 0.0533 (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0503) Associates 0.992*** 0.773*** (0.014) Bachelors 1.191*** 0.992*** Masters 1.199*** 1.035*** (0.161) (0.0765) Masters 1.199*** 0.0326 -0.326*** Number of years worked -0.225*** -0.326*** Number of years worked -0.225*** -0.326*** Nourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 Nourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263			`	0.000*	```´´
Female .00.786* (0.0315) .01.03** (0.0315) .00.0348) Age at interview .0.131** (0.00343) .00.749*** (0.00540) .0.332*** (0.0536) Married .0.427*** (0.0536) .0.340*** (0.0548) .0.332*** (0.0548) GED .0.276** (0.0503) .0.338*** (0.0503) .0.332*** (0.0503) High school 0.992*** (0.0503) 0.880*** (0.0503) 0.880*** (0.0503) Associates 0.928*** (0.0765) 0.773*** (0.0718) 0.929*** (0.0765) Masters 1.191*** (0.0718) 0.929*** (0.0757) 0.302 PhD -0.216 (0.0718) .0.30*** (0.0765) .0.301 (1.002) Number of years worked -0.216 (0.0751) .0.307 Previously laid off 0.443 (0.0765) 0.341 (0.0051) Part time -0.225*** (0.0280) .0.266*** (0.00280) .0.266** (0.00281) No No No No .0.00290 (0.0021) No of employees in '000's .0.0104 (0.0151) .0.00290 (0.0021) .0.00219 (0.0121) No No No No Yes Year controls <	Other minority		(0.203)	(0.262^{*})	0.255° (0.105)
Female -0.0786* (0.0315) -0.103** (0.0319) -0.0934** (0.0313) Age at interview -0.181*** (0.00343) -0.0749*** (0.00540) -0.130*** (0.0540) Married -0.427*** (0.0536) -0.340*** (0.0548) -0.332*** (0.0548) GED 0.276** (0.0503) 0.138 (0.0990) High school 0.992*** (0.0503) 0.880*** (0.0503) Associates 0.992*** (0.0718) 0.0773*** (0.0718) Bachelors 1.191*** (0.0718) 0.992*** (0.0765) Masters 1.199*** (0.0718) 1.035*** (0.0765) PhD -0.216 (0.0091) -0.300 (1.002) Number of years worked -0.285*** (0.0280) -0.326*** (0.00951) Previously laid off -0.285*** (0.0280) -0.326*** (0.0285) Part time -0.225*** (0.0344) -0.326*** (0.00263) Iourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 (0.00351) -0.00263 (0.00151) No No No No No No No Yes Year controls No No No No No No Yes Decreptional controls No No			(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Age at interview (0.0319) (0.0349) (0.0349) Married -0.181^{***} $(0.00536)-0.749^{***}(0.0536)-0.340^{***}(0.0589)-0.332^{***}(0.0599)GED0.276^{**}(0.0599)0.138(0.0899)0.0890High school0.927^{***}(0.0503)0.880^{***}(0.0503)Associates0.992^{***}(0.0718)0.880^{***}(0.0718)Masters1.99^{***}(0.151)0.773^{***}(0.0718)Masters1.99^{***}(0.151)0.0757^{***}(0.157)PhD-0.216(1.002)-0.300(1.002)Number of years worked0.285^{***}(0.0280)-0.326^{***}(0.0765)Number of years worked0.433(0.0376)0.434(0.0376)Previously laid off0.447^{***}(0.0344)0.0996^{***}(0.0280)Part time-0.225^{***}(0.00151)-0.00263(0.00241)Unionized job0.00290(0.0121)-0.00263(0.0031)No. of employees in '000's0.00290(0.0121)-0.00263(0.0121)No. of employees in '000'sNoNoYear controlsNoNoNoNoNoYes200242550282502825028250282Observations5028250282502825028250282502825028250282Observations5028450284-37971.4$	Female		-0.0786*	-0.103**	-0.0934**
Age at interview -0.181^{***} -0.0749^{***} -0.130^{***} Married -0.42^{****} 0.0340^{***} -0.332^{***} GED 0.276^{**} 0.138 High school 0.276^{***} 0.138 Associates 0.992^{****} 0.03090 Masters 0.992^{****} 0.0773^{***} (0.0102) $0(0.0102)$ $0(0.0102)$ Masters 1.99^{****} 0.076^{**} Masters 1.99^{****} 0.032^{***} Number of years worked -0.216 -0.300 Previously laid off 0.447^{****} 0.030^{***} Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.225^{****} -0.326^{****} No No No Yes Year controls No No No No No No Yes Industry controls No No No Year controls No No No Year controls No No No Year controls No No Yes Industry contr			(0.0315)	(0.0319)	(0.0348)
Married (0.00343) (0.00540) (0.0133) Married -0.427^{***} (0.0536) -0.340^{***} (0.0548) -0.332^{***} (0.0548) GED 0.276^{**} (0.0503) 0.138 (0.0900) High school 0.992^{***} (0.0503) 0.880^{***} (0.0503) Associates 0.928^{***} (0.0718) 0.880^{***} $(0.0773)^{***}$ (0.0718) Bachelors 1.191^{***} (0.0718) 0.992^{***} (0.0718) Masters 1.191^{***} (0.151) 0.992^{***} (0.151) PhD -0.216 (1.002) -0.300 (1.002) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} (0.0765) -0.326^{****} (0.00765) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} (0.00761) -0.326^{****} (0.0280) Previously laid off 0.147^{***} (0.0344) 0.0996^{***} (0.0285) Part time -0.225^{***} (0.0344) -0.00263 (0.00241) Unionized job -0.101 (0.0592) -0.101 (0.0592) No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 (0.00241) -0.00219 (0.0121) NoNoNoYes Year controlsNoNoNoNoNoYes $10dustry controls$ NoNoNoNoNoYes $2005^{*}24^{*}004^{*}4^{*}$ $-0.014^{*}4^{*}$ -38953.7^{*} -38264.8^{*} $-37971.4^{*}4^{*}$	Age at interview		-0.181^{***}	-0.0749^{***}	-0.130^{***}
Married -0.427*** -0.340**** -0.332*** GED 0.0538) 0.0548) 0.0548) GED 0.276*** 0.138 High school 0.992*** 0.0900) Associates 0.928*** 0.0101 Associates 0.928*** 0.104 Bachelors 1.191*** 0.992*** Masters 1.191*** 0.992*** PhD -0.216 -0.300 I.0021 (1.017) (0.177) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 Number of years worked -0.285*** -0.326*** Previously laid off 0.147*** 0.0996*** Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.011 -0.0101 Vunionized job -0.011 -0.00263 No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.000219 No. of employees in '000's No No No No No Yes Year controls No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 Observations 50282 50282			(0.00343)	(0.00540)	(0.0133)
GED (0.0536) (0.0548) (0.0548) GED 0.276^{**} 0.138 (0.0900) High school 0.992^{***} (0.0503) (0.0503) Associates 0.928^{***} (0.102) (0.104) Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.922^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) PhD -0.216 -0.300 (1.002) (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 (0.375) (0.0285) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} (0.0285) (0.0285) Part time -0.225^{***} -0.0263 (0.00241) Unionized job -0.101 -0.101 (0.00241) Unionized job No No No Yes Year controls No No No Yes Industry controls No No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 <td>Married</td> <td></td> <td>-0.427***</td> <td>-0.340***</td> <td>-0.332***</td>	Married		-0.427***	-0.340***	-0.332***
GED 0.276** 0.138 High school 0.992*** 0.6800*** Associates 0.928*** 0.773*** (0.102) 0.104) Bachelors 1.91*** 0.992*** Masters 1.91*** 0.992*** Masters 1.91*** 0.992*** Masters 1.91*** 0.992*** PhD -0.216 -0.300 (1.017) -0.216 -0.300 Number of years worked -0.285*** (0.0765) Part time -0.225*** -0.177*** (0.00280) -0.00164 -0.00263 (0.00151) -0.00263 (0.00151) Unionized job -0.011 -0.00164 No No No Year controls No No No No No Observations 50282 50282 Observations 50282 50282 Observations 17 20 62 Log likelihood 1 7 20 62			(0.0536)	(0.0548)	(0.0548)
GLD 0.210 0.0900 High school 0.0992^{***} 0.0990 Associates 0.928^{***} 0.00503 Associates 0.928^{***} 0.0102 Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} 0.0718 0.0765 0.773^{***} (0.0718) 0.0765 0.773^{***} (0.0718) 0.0765 0.992^{***} (0.0718) 0.0765 0.773^{***} (0.0718) 0.0765 0.0765 Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.151) (0.151) (0.157) PhD -0.216 -0.300 Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} (0.00951) (0.0069) (0.0280) Previously laid off 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} (0.0041) 0.00290 -0.0064 (0.00281) Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.011 -0.101 (0.0131)	CED			0.976**	0.138
High school 0.992*** 0.880*** Associates 0.928*** 0.773*** (0.102) 0.104) 0.992*** Bachelors 1.191*** 0.992*** Masters 1.191*** 0.992*** Masters 1.199*** 1.035*** Masters 1.199*** 1.035*** PhD -0.216 -0.300 1.002) (1.017) 0.375) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 Number of years worked -0.285*** -0.326*** Previously laid off 0.147*** 0.00961) (0.0055) Part time -0.225**** -0.0263 (0.0283) Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.0101 -0.00263 (0.00151) Vinionized job -0.101 -0.00263 (0.0021) No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.000219 (0.0131) Region controls No No Yes Year controls No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1	GED			(0.0899)	(0.0900)
High school 0.992^{***} 0.880^{***} Associates 0.928^{***} (0.0503) (0.0510) Associates 0.928^{***} 0.773^{***} (0.102) (0.104) Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} (0.0765) PhD -0.216 -0.300 (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 (0.375) (0.076) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} (0.0280) (0.0285) Part time 0.147^{***} 0.00996^{***} (0.0344) (0.0355) Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 (0.00241) Unionized job -0.101 -0.101 (0.0121) (0.0131) Region controls No No No Yes Yea	*** 1 1 1			0.000++++	,
Associates 0.928^{***} 0.773^{***} Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.199^{***} 1.035^{***} PhD -0.216 -0.300 I.002) (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} Number of years worked -0.285^{***} 0.00996^{***} Number of years worked -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} Number of years worked -0.225^{***} -0.00263 Previously laid off 0.041^{***} 0.00280 (0.0281) Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 No No No No No No No Yes Year controls No No No No No No Yes Industry controls No No	High school			(0.992^{***})	(0.880^{***})
Associates 0.928^{***} 0.773^{***} (0.102) (0.104) Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.928^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.928^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.928^{***} Masters 1.199^{***} 1.035^{***} (0.151) (0.151) (0.157) PhD -0.216 -0.300 (1.002) (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 (0.375) (0.376) (0.036) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} (0.00951) (0.0106) (0.0285) Part time 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} (0.0210) $(0.0225)^{***}$ -0.177^{***} (0.00241) (0.00151) (0.0285) Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 (0.00151) (0.00241) (0.00241) Unionized job -0.101 (0.0131) No No No Yes Year controls No No No <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>(0.0003)</td> <td>(0.0310)</td>				(0.0003)	(0.0310)
Bachelors (0.102) (0.104) Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.191^{***} 0.0765 Masters 1.199^{***} 1.035^{***} (0.102) 1.035^{***} (0.151) (0.157) PhD -0.216 -0.300 (1.002) (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 (0.375) (0.376) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} (0.00951) (0.0106) Previously laid off 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} (0.0280) (0.0285) Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} (0.00241) Unionized job -0.0164 -0.00263 (0.00241) Unionized job -0.101 -0.101 (0.0131) Region controls No No No Yes Year controls No No No Yes Industry controls No No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 50282 <td>Associates</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>0.928***</td> <td>0.773***</td>	Associates			0.928***	0.773***
Bachelors 1.191^{***} 0.992^{***} Masters 1.199^{***} (0.0765) Masters 1.199^{***} 1.035^{***} 0.151 0.0157 0.157 PhD -0.216 -0.300 1.002 (1.002) (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 0.376 0.376 0.376 Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} Previously laid off 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} 0.0280 0.0285 0.0285^{***} Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} 0.0344 (0.0355) 0.00281 Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 0.00290 -0.00164 -0.00219 0.00290 0.00291 (0.0131) Region controls No No No No No No Yes Industry controls No No No No No No Yes Observations 50282 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>(0.102)</td> <td>(0.104)</td>				(0.102)	(0.104)
Masters (0.0718) (0.0765) Masters 1.199^{***} 1.035^{***} (0.151) (0.157) PhD -0.216 -0.300 (1.002) (1.017) Professional degree 0.643 0.341 (0.375) (0.376) (0.1076) Number of years worked -0.285^{***} (0.00951) Previously laid off 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0285) Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} (0.00151) (0.00241) Unionized job -0.00164 -0.00263 No No No Yes Year controls No No Yes Industry controls No No Yes Industry controls No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -411444 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4	Bachelors			1.191^{***}	0.992^{***}
Masters 1.199**** 1.035**** PhD -0.216 -0.300 Professional degree 0.643 0.341 Number of years worked -0.285**** -0.326**** Number of years worked -0.285**** -0.326**** Previously laid off 0.147*** 0.0996**** Part time -0.225**** 0.00285) Part time -0.225**** 0.00263 Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 Vinionized job -0.101 -0.101 No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.00219 Region controls No No No No No No Yes Industry controls No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Leglikelihood 10 -411444 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4				(0.0718)	(0.0765)
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Number of years worked -0.285^{***} -0.326^{***} Previously laid off 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 No. of employees in '000's -0.00290 (0.00290) No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.000219 No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.000219 Region controls No No No Year controls No No Yes Industry controls No No No Ves 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4	Professional degree			(0.643)	(0.341) (0.376)
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Previously laid off 0.147^{***} 0.0996^{***} Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} Part time -0.225^{***} -0.177^{***} Hourly pay (2020 dollars) -0.00164 -0.00263 Unionized job -0.101 -0.101 Unionized job -0.101 -0.101 No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.000219 No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 -0.000219 Region controls No No No Year controls No No No No No No Yes Industry controls No No No Observations 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4				(0.00951)	(0.0106)
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No. of employees in '000's 0.00290 (0.0121) -0.000219 (0.0131) Region controls No No No Yes Year controls No No No Yes Industry controls No No No Yes Occupational controls No No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4				(0.000-)	(0.0000)
Region controlsNoNoNoYesYear controlsNoNoNoYesIndustry controlsNoNoNoYesOccupational controlsNoNoNoYesObservations50282502825028250282Degrees of freedom172062Log likelihood-41144.4-38953.7-38264.8-37971.4	No. of employees in '000's			0.00290	-0.000219
Region controlsNoNoNoYesYear controlsNoNoNoYesIndustry controlsNoNoNoYesOccupational controlsNoNoNoYesObservations50282502825028250282Degrees of freedom172062Log likelihood-41144.4-38953.7-38264.8-37971.4				(0.0121)	(0.0131)
Year controlsNoNoNoYesIndustry controlsNoNoNoYesOccupational controlsNoNoNoYesObservations50282502825028250282Degrees of freedom172062Log likelihood-41144.4-38953.7-38264.8-37971.4	Region controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controlsNoNoNoYesOccupational controlsNoNoNoYesObservations50282502825028250282Degrees of freedom172062Log likelihood-41144.4-38953.7-38264.8-37971.4	Year controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controls No No No Yes Occupational controls No No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4					- 00
Occupational controls No No No Yes Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4	Industry controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations 50282 50282 50282 50282 50282 Degrees of freedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4	Occupational controls	No	No	No	Yes
Degrees of treedom 1 7 20 62 Log likelihood -41144.4 -38953.7 -38264.8 -37971.4	Observations	50282	50282	50282	50282
* = <0.07 ** = <0.01 *** = <0.001	Degrees of freedom	1 -41144-4	7 -38953 7	20 -38264 8	62 -37971 4
	* n<0.05 ** n<0.01 *** n	< 0.001	000001	00101.0	01011.4

Table 5: Cox Regressions of Leaving for Resource Enabled Reasons

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	0.0757***	-0.0449*	-0.0213	0.0226
	(0.0179)	(0.0191)	(0.0195)	(0.0201)
Asian		-0.164*	-0.118	-0.125
		(0.0714)	(0.0730)	(0.0733)
Uicnonia		0.0719**	0.0225	0.0456
Inspanic		(0.0223)	(0.0233)	(0.0237)
Other minority		-0.00476	(0.0437)	0.0770
		(0.0013)	(0.0028)	(0.0025)
Female		-0.160***	-0.188***	-0.159***
		(0.0171)	(0.0176)	(0.0190)
Age at interview		-0.111***	-0.103***	-0.0376***
		(0.00162)	(0.00298)	(0.00685)
Married		0.0211	0.0643**	0.0129
		(0.0226)	(0.0228)	(0.0227)
GED			0 286***	0 111**
0ED			(0.0401)	(0.0408)
High achool			0 176***	0.0649*
nigh school			(0.0276)	(0.0048)
			()	()
Associates			0.430^{***}	0.289^{***}
			(0.0433)	(0.0449)
Bachelors			0.463***	0.341***
			(0.0355)	(0.0382)
Masters			0.512^{***}	0.520^{***}
			(0.0582)	(0.0607)
PhD			0.568^{**}	0.660**
			(0.182)	(0.202)
Professional degree			0.862***	0.662***
			(0.119)	(0.120)
Number of years worked			-0.0401***	-0.0611***
ivulliber of years worked			(0.00430)	(0.00450)
			0.040***	0.000***
Previously laid off			(0.340)	(0.0142)
			(0.0100)	(010222)
Part time			-0.125^{***}	-0.0421^{*}
			(0.0134)	(0.0130)
Hourly pay (2020 dollars)			-0.0193***	-0.0151***
			(0.00180)	(0.00191)
Unionized job			-0.160^{***}	-0.0991**
			(0.0323)	(0.0332)
No. of employees in '000's			-0.0268**	-0.0151
			(0.00942)	(0.00872)
Region controls	No	No	No	Yes
V I I	ЪT	Ът	Ът	3.7
Year controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controls	No	No	No	Yes
Occupational controls	No	No	No	Voc
Observations	50282	50282	50282	50282
Degrees of freedom	1	7	20	63
Log likelihood	-133645.4	-130671.5	-130022.1	-129174.0

Table 6: Cox Regressions of Leaving to Take a Job

Table A1. Overview of the Literature on Resources and Race

	Key Findings	Representative Studies & Data
Intergenerational Mobility	Data analyzed from a half century (from the late 1960s onward), indicates that black American have much lower rates of upward mobility and higher rates of downward mobility than whites, and that there are persistent disparities across generations of blacks.	Chetty, Hendren, Jones and Porter, 2020 Pfeffer and Killewald, 2018
Social Capital & Social Networks	Data from nationally representative surveys, and single-firm case studies indicate that blacks and whites have roughly similarly sized networks for finding employment, and that blacks and whites have a similar number of contacts when searching for jobs. However, the returns from the use of networks to find employment are substantively lower for blacks than they are for whites.	 Elliot 1999 Smith 2005 McDonald 2011 Femandez and Galperin 2014 Pedulla and Pager 2019
Culture	Studies find cultural aspects like hairstyles and modes of dress that are viewed as cultural black are policed and perceived to be anti-professional, which can reduce access to jobs, and that blacks are expected to learn normative behavior in white-predominate culture, but there is not an expectation that whites learn normative behavior in black-predominate culture.	 Kochman 2013 Emirbayer and Desmond 2015 Koval and Rosette 2020
Salary & Income	The median household income for blacks was \$41,692, while a median income for White households was \$70,642 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 2018). Blacks are over twice as likely to live in poverty as Whites.	• U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2018, Table A-2. • Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey • The Economic State of Black America 2020 Penort Joint Economic
	Salary gaps exist among blacks and whites even after controlling for age, gender, education, and region. For instance, among advanced degree holders black workers are paid 14.9% less than white workers.	Committee
Household Wealth	The median wealth of white families is 10 times that of black families in 2019. Blacks have never held more than 5% of the nations wealth, despite being 13% of the U.S. population, while white families held 85% of the nations wealth and are 63% of the U.S. population.	 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finance 2016 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Distribution of household wealth in the U.S. since 1989 report, 2019 Kraus, Onyeador, Daumeyer, Rucker and Richeson 2019
Labor Market Outcomes & Jobs	From 1972 to 2019, the black unemployment rate has averaged 2x the level of whites and are higher for blacks at every education level. Among college educated workers, the black unemployment rate was 50% higher than it was for whites in 2019.	• Quillian, Pager, Hexel, and Midtbøen 2017 • National Bureau of Economic Research, multiple years
	Meta-analyses of 28 audit studies of employers found than since 1989, whites receive on average 36% more callbacks than blacks, and that there has been no change in the level of hiring discrimination against blacks for 25 years.	
Education	The black-white high school graduation gap is now virtually non-existent, and closed in recent decades. More blacks are getting college degrees than any other time period, with black college graduation rates doubling from 1990 to 2018. The college completion rate for blacks remains lower than it is for whites, however.	 McDaniel, DiPrete, Buchmann, and Shwed 2011 U.S. Census Bureau, Historic Time Series Tables, 1940 to 2018
Health	Race has a strong correspondence to health and mortality. Studies suggest health disparities exist by race in part due to but, also independent from, socioeconomic status.Life expectancy for blacks (after live birth) was 3.6 years lower than for non-Hispanic Whites in 2019.	 Whitson, Hastings, Landerman, Fillenbaum, Cohen, and Johnson 2011 Phelan and Link 2015 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2018
	Blacks have a higher rate of sickness and disability compared to whites, and differences in sickness and disability exist net of controlling for income, education and wealth.	
Housing Security	Less than half of Black families own their homes (42%), compared to 73% of White families. No more than 49% of blacks have ever owned their homes. Generally, it is more challenging for black families to cover the cost of rent (58% of black families rent) due to a combination due to lower income and wages compared to whites.	• US Census Bureau Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey 1994 to 2019

Table A2. List of Reasons for Departure

Reasons in NLSY	Involuntary Departure	Voluntary Departure
Layoff	X	
Company, office, work place, or plant closed	X	
End of temporary or seasonal job	X	
Discharged or fired	X	
Program/ project/job ended	X	
Quit for pregnancy or family reasons		X
Quit to look for another job		Х
Quit to take another job		Х
Quit to devote more time to school work		Х
Quit to return to school		X
Quite for other reasons		X
Moved away from job		Х
No transportation/ transportation problems		Х
Incarcerated/ jailed/legal problems		X
Quit to start a business		X
Quit because respondent's ill health, disability or		
medical problems		X
Quit because didn't like job/ assignment, boss,		
coworkers, pay or benefits		X
Retired		X
Job assigned through a temporary help		
agency/contract firm		X

A3. List of Occupations listed in the NLSY Survey

1 "Management and professional"

2 "Service"

3 "Sales and office occupations"

4 "Natural resources, construction and maintenance"

5 "Production, transportation, material moving"

6 "Armed forces"

7 "Special"

Black	$ \begin{array}{r} (1) \\ 0.151^{***} \\ (0.0175) \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} (2) \\ 0.219^{***} \\ (0.0186) \\ \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} (3) \\ \hline 0.0862^{***} \\ (0.0199) \\ \end{array} $	$ \begin{array}{r} $
Asian		-0.162^{*} (0.0686)	-0.141^{*} (0.0692)	-0.172^{*} (0.0686)
Hispanic		$0.0241 \\ (0.0210)$	0.0188 (0.0210)	-0.0644^{**} (0.0223)
Other minority		0.126^{*} (0.0621)	0.118^{*} (0.0594)	0.00918 (0.0599)
Female		$\begin{array}{c} 0.0000842 \\ (0.0161) \end{array}$	$0.0164 \\ (0.0173)$	0.0764^{***} (0.0184)
Age at interview		-0.141^{***} (0.00154)	-0.0779^{***} (0.00254)	-0.00604 (0.00628)
Married		-0.183^{***} (0.0221)	-0.0645^{**} (0.0228)	-0.0804^{***} (0.0229)
GED			0.301^{***} (0.0318)	0.0449 (0.0320)
High school			$\begin{array}{c} 0.183^{***} \\ (0.0231) \end{array}$	0.0278 (0.0234)
Associates			$\begin{array}{c} 0.185^{***} \\ (0.0530) \end{array}$	$0.0190 \\ (0.0516)$
Bachelors			0.233^{***} (0.0340)	$0.0497 \\ (0.0368)$
Masters			$0.125 \\ (0.0709)$	0.190^{*} (0.0743)
PhD			$0.169 \\ (0.171)$	$0.286 \\ (0.189)$
Professional degree			$0.187 \\ (0.119)$	-0.0517 (0.119)
Number of years worked			-0.123^{***} (0.00394)	-0.156^{***} (0.00424)
Previously laid off			0.587^{***} (0.0168)	0.531^{***} (0.0166)
Part time			-0.111^{***} (0.0188)	0.0425^{*} (0.0191)
Hourly pay (2020 dollars)			-0.0137^{***} (0.00198)	-0.00912^{***} (0.00186)
Unionized job			-0.102^{***} (0.0249)	-0.0871^{***} (0.0264)
No. of employees in '000's			-0.00783^{**} (0.00284)	-0.00512 (0.00292)
Region controls	No	No	No	Yes
Year controls	No	No	No	Yes
Industry controls	No	No	No	Yes
Occupational controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	23585	23585	23585	23585
Degrees of freedom	1	7	20	62
Log likelihood	-145077.1	-138852.8	-136930.9	-135169.0

Log Intermood -1400 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

	Quit to Look	Quit to Take
Black	1.271***	
White	(0.044)	1.087***
Female	0.892***	(0.025) 0.868***
Ago	(0.030)	(0.018)
Age	(0.012)	(0.007)
Education Controls	Yes	Yes
Worker Controls	Yes	Yes
Job Controls	Yes	Yes
Employer Controls	Yes	Yes
Region Controls	Yes	Yes
Year Controls	Yes	Yes
Occupation Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	43,401	43,401
Log likelihood	-43756.7	-113820.7

Table A5. Competing Risk Models, Black and White Respondents

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001