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Vaccine Progress, Stock Prices, and the Value of Ending the Pandemic

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Abstract. One measure of the ex ante cost of disasters is the welfare gain from shortening their expected duration. We introduce a stochastic clock into a standard disaster model that summarizes information about progress (positive or negative) toward disaster resolution. We show that the stock market response to duration news is essentially a sufficient statistic to identify the welfare gain to interventions that alter the state. Using information on clinical trial progress during 2020, we build contemporaneous forecasts of the time to vaccine deployment, which provide a measure of the anticipated length of the COVID-19 pandemic. The model can thus be calibrated from market reactions to vaccine news, which we estimate. The estimates imply that ending the pandemic would have been worth from 5% to 15% of total wealth as the expected duration varied in this period.

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Keywords: COVID-19 • welfare costs • stock prices • vaccine development • regime-switching

1. Introduction

Quantifying the economic consequences of disasters is a crucial step in assessing policy responses along social, medical, fiscal, and monetary dimensions. One measure of the ex ante cost of a disaster is the welfare gain from shortening its expected duration. This paper presents estimates of that quantity for the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020. In the context of a standard disaster model with uncertain duration, we show that the stock market response to duration news effectively identifies the welfare implications of state transitions. We combine this observation with novel data on the progress of vaccine development during 2020, which we use to construct a real-time forecast series for the expected time until successful vaccine deployment. Based on the stock market sensitivity to changes in these expectations, we estimate that ending the pandemic would have been worth 5%–15% of total wealth over the sample period. This finding is robust to a wide range of parameter values and model variations.

Global health planners have recently issued several detailed proposals for preparing for future pandemics (see Craven et al. 2021, Lander and Sullivan 2021, Summers et al. 2021, Gates 2022). Prominent in each of

these have been recommendations for shortening the anticipated time for future vaccine development and deployment, for example, to within six months of an infectious outbreak. Our paper contributes a novel measurement strategy that can speak to the economic benefits of proposed infrastructure investments to achieve such targets. Our exercise can be viewed as complementary to the standard approach in health economics of computing the cost/benefits of interventions such as vaccines via combining their forecasted effects on infections and deaths with some estimates of (or assumptions about) the monetary value of these outcomes. We compare our results to some of these estimates in Section 5.

The welfare calculation we undertake is directly analogous to the seminal work of Lucas (1987) in assessing the ex ante costs associated with business cycle risk. Just as that paper provides a framework for assessing the consequences of policy responses to mitigate consumption volatility, our work speaks to the cost-benefit analysis in alleviating the threat of current and future pandemics.¹ The paper thus contributes to the literature that assesses the welfare costs of disaster risk (see Martin 2008; Barro 2009; Pindyck and Wang 2013;

Martin and Pindyck 2015, 2021; Hong et al. 2022; Jordà et al. 2024). Uniquely to this literature, we exploit novel information within the crisis itself to identify key quantities in the model: a measure of the expected duration of the pandemic and estimates of the stock market sensitivity to changes in that expectation.

The paper's analysis proceeds as follows.

We start with a standard regime-switching model of repeated disasters. In keeping with a common modeling assumption in the rare disaster literature (see Barro 2006, Gabaix 2012, Gourio 2012, Tsai and Wachter 2015), the nature of a disaster is that agents are exposed to a shock that destroys part of the economy's stock of wealth. Within the disaster, we model subregimes corresponding to observable progress toward resolution of the episode. The current state thus provides a stochastic clock within the crisis. The value of a claim to the economy's output responds to the clock transitions because progress out of the disaster regime lowers both the expected wealth losses and uncertainty. Our central analytical result shows that the magnitude of this response imposes bounds on the disaster parameters, which, in turn, bound the possible welfare effects.


The exercise thus benefits from a degree of structural robustness in the sense that variations in the parameters that affect either the welfare cost of a disaster or the effect of the disaster state on the stock market may not strongly alter the implied *relationship* between the two quantities. To illustrate, we numerically compute the theoretical welfare bounds for a collection of parameter values for preferences, output, and disaster timing, drawn from the literature. The results show remarkable consistency across specifications. Hence,

our main results are not driven by the baseline assumptions about the course of the pandemic or about agents' preferences.

Next, we exploit the fact that, during 2020, it was widely believed that deployment of an efficacious vaccine for COVID-19 was both a necessary and sufficient condition for a robust economic recovery.² During this period, there was little progress on alternative mechanisms to resolve the pandemic (e.g., treatments or herd immunity). Moreover, views at the time were optimistic about distribution and uptake of an efficacious vaccine, and the emergence of variants was not yet widely anticipated. Hence, during our sample period, forecasts about vaccine deployment could be viewed as forecasts for the duration of the crisis.³

We therefore construct a time-series of forecasts for the expected time to the widespread deployment of a successful vaccine that we call the vaccine progress indicator (VPI). The forecasts are based on the chronology of stage-by-stage progress of individual vaccine candidates (obtained from the Vaccine Centre at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM)) and related news (obtained from FactSet). Each day, we assign probabilities to each active candidate's future transition across developmental phases, or to failure. We then simulate these future transitions for all of the candidates, and each run of the simulation produces a first-to-succeed candidate.⁴ Averaging across runs of the simulation gives us that day's forecast for the expected time remaining until vaccine deployment. The evolution of our forecast during 2020 is shown in Figure 1. We compare its levels to those of some published contemporaneous survey forecasts in Section 3.2.

Figure 1. (Color online) Expected Time to Vaccine Deployment



Notes. The figure shows our estimate of the expected time to widespread deployment of a COVID-19 vaccine in years. Construction of the forecasts is described in Section 3.

We then relate stock market valuations to the expected time to vaccine deployment by regressing market returns on changes in our forecast series. Controlling for large market moves attributable to release of other macroeconomic and policy-related news, we estimate that a reduction in the expected time to deployment of a vaccine by one year results in an aggregate stock market return of approximately 5%.⁵ The joint relationship exhibits the right cross-sectional properties, with the comovement between returns and changes in the vaccine expectation series being stronger for sectors most affected by the onset of COVID-19. This lends support to the conclusion that our series is indeed measuring changes in beliefs about the duration of the pandemic.

Armed with these estimates, we return to the model's theoretical bounds on welfare effects. We illustrate that, under a range of plausible parameter values, the identification of the benefit of curtailing the pandemic is tight. A 5% stock market response implies a welfare gain of between 4.5% and 5.2% per year of pandemic duration. That is, in late April 2020, when our forecasts imply an expected remaining duration of about one year, the welfare value of ending the pandemic was approximately 5% of total wealth. At the beginning of March, the analogous number is approximately 15%. We discuss interpretation and ramifications of these magnitudes in Section 5.

We further illustrate the structural robustness of our results via several extensions in the Online Appendix. First, we consider endowing the economy with the real option to invest in vaccine research so that the speed of progress is an equilibrium outcome. Naturally, given any fixed parameters, the ability to alleviate the pandemic lowers its welfare cost. Yet, *conditional on the observed market response* to the pandemic state, we show there is no net effect on the conclusions. A second generalization links the pandemic severity to output via endogenizing households' labor choice in the face of exposure risk at work. We show that this linkage further tightens the identification of welfare effects. Finally, we consider the welfare benefit to agents who may be outside the stock market. We show that, with preference parameters for nonparticipants taken from the literature, if these agents face the same level of pandemic risk as participants, their willingness to pay is only slightly less than our baseline estimates.

To summarize, the contribution of the paper is to bring novel data observed during 2020 to bear on the important question of the *ex ante* cost of such pandemics. We show that two key quantities that we estimate—the expected duration of the crisis and the stock market response to vaccine progress—are effectively sufficient to identify the welfare gain to interventions curtailing the pandemic.

1.1. Related Literature

As noted above, our approach to quantifying the cost of the pandemic parallels that of the literature assessing the cost of business cycles. Whereas Lucas (1987) finds small welfare improvements to reducing consumption uncertainty, Barlevy (2004) shows the welfare costs of productivity fluctuations can be substantial in a model with concave capital adjustment costs because consumption becomes endogenously procyclical. Tallarini (2000) shows that the Lucas conclusion is also overturned in models with recursive utility when calibrated to match asset pricing moments. Echoing this finding and foreshadowing our own, Barro (2009) reports that, in a model with rare disasters, moderate risk aversion, and an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) greater than one, society would willingly pay up to 20% of permanent income to eliminate disaster risk. A number of papers, including Pindyck and Wang (2013), explore the welfare costs associated with climate risk. The latter work addresses the issue of how much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe.

A related topic concerns the welfare benefit of resolving disaster uncertainty. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016) show that, measured by the one-period utility loss compared with an adaptive expectations benchmark, uncertainty about the persistence of states is an order of magnitude more important than uncertainty about other parameters, for example, growth rates and volatilities. Acharya et al. (2023) study the welfare and incentive effects of such parameter uncertainty both during and prior to disasters. The literature has also considered the welfare benefit of resolving disaster *risk*, that is, making consumption deterministic while not altering the occurrence of the disasters. Epstein et al. (2014) present a critique based upon introspection of models in which the welfare gain from having consumption become deterministic in the “next period” is large.⁶

A different approach to determining an agent's valuation of alternative consumption paths is presented by Alvarez and Jermann (2004), who define the “marginal cost” of business cycles as the ratio of a market price of a claim to the true consumption process to that of an alternative path with the same mean but lower uncertainty. Although this approach has the advantage of being preference free, it is not obvious how to attain the required market prices. (It may well be applicable in the future if pandemic insurance becomes widely traded.)

Our model is related to Ai (2010) and Gourio (2012). We share many of the features of each, but differ by offering a setting that allows us to connect to our unique empirical data. Both of those papers feature shocks to the stock of productive capital, with endogenous consumption. Like Ai (2010), our model is in continuous

time and allows for frictionless adjustment to capital. That paper also studies the effect of parameter uncertainty, although not in a setting with rare disasters. We differ from Gourio (2012) in modeling *extended* disasters, like pandemics, whose *expected duration* is a crucial and evolving feature of the economy.

Although the literature studying the economic impact of COVID-19 has exploded in a short period of time, there is relatively little focus on the role played by vaccine development and its progress.

Hong et al. (2021b) study the effect of pandemics on firm valuation by embedding an asset pricing framework with disease dynamics and a stochastic transmission rate, equipping firms with pandemic mitigation technologies. Similar to our paper, they model vaccine arrival as a Poisson jump process between pandemic and nonpandemic states. Hong et al. (2021a) combine the model of Hong et al. (2021b) with pre- and post-COVID-19 analyst forecasts to infer market expectations regarding the arrival rate of an effective vaccine and to estimate the direct effect of infections on growth rates of earnings. In particular, they develop a regime-switching model of sector-level earnings with shifts in their first and second moments across regimes.

In both of these papers, the pricing kernel is exogenously specified for the pandemic and the nonpandemic states. In contrast, our model is general equilibrium in nature with the representative agent optimally choosing labor and consumption (and, in turn, investment in capital) to mitigate health risk.

Elenev et al. (2022) incorporate a pandemic state with low, disperse firm productivity that recurs with low probability for studying government intervention in corporate credit markets. Hong et al. (2021b) fix expected pandemic duration around one year but show in comparative statics that asset prices can have considerable sensitivity to the arrival rate of the vaccine. Hong et al. (2021a) use their model to infer the arrival rate of the vaccine. In contrast, we construct an estimated time to vaccine deployment using news on the progress of clinical trials of vaccines for COVID-19. We infer the loss in economic wealth in the pandemic from stock market reactions to changes in these forecasts

On the empirical side, Baker et al. (2020a) deploy transaction-level data to study consumption responses to COVID-19, finding an increase in the beginning in an attempt to stockpile home goods, followed by a sharp decrease as the virus spread and stay-at-home orders were enforced. Using customized survey data, Coibion et al. (2020) find lockdowns decreased consumer spending by 30%, with the largest drops in travel and clothing. Bachas et al. (2020) find a rebound in spending, especially for low-income households, since mid-April. Chetty et al. (2020) further find high-income households significantly reduced spending,

especially on services that require in-person interactions, leading to business losses and layoffs in the most affluent neighborhoods. Outside the United States, Sheridan et al. (2020) and Andersen et al. (2020) find aggregate spending decreased 27% in the first seven weeks following Denmark's shutdown, with the majority of the decline caused by the virus itself regardless of social distancing laws. Chen et al. (2020) use daily transaction data in China and find severe declines in spending, especially in dining, entertainment, and travel sectors. In Section 5 we relate our estimates and methodology to the broader literature attempting to measure the costs associated with COVID-19. Like us, Del Angel et al. (2021) measure stock market sensitivity to pandemic-related news. They find a strong negative correlation between reported fatalities and market returns during the 1918 flu outbreak.

2. Disasters with News About Duration

To begin, we modify a standard rare-disaster framework to incorporate news about the expected duration of disaster episodes. We show how to compute welfare in terms of the economy's state. Then we price a claim to output, which is a function of the expected duration. The key finding is that that functional relationship effectively restricts the magnitude of welfare effects. This lowers the effective dimensionality of the model, enabling a feasible calibration whose conclusions are largely insensitive to the particular parameters governing the disaster dynamics and household preferences.

2.1. Disaster Dynamics

Our underlying building block is a general equilibrium regime-switching model of disasters (following Nakamura et al. 2013 and Collin-Dufresne et al. 2016) where the economy is alternately in "normal times" and in a "disaster" regime. The regimes differ in their state-specific stochastic process for the accumulation of wealth. Fundamentally, the model depicts disasters as destroying or degrading that stock of wealth, as in Gourio (2012), with consumption and other policies potentially responding endogenously. For this reason, we work with a production-based framework rather than an endowment economy.

Specifically, let q denote the quantity of productive capital of an individual household (which could be viewed as both physical and human capital). We assume that the stock of q is freely convertible into a flow of consumption goods at rate C per unit time. Then, our specification is that, in state s , q evolves according to the process

$$dq = \mu(s)qdt - C(s)dt + \sigma(s)qdB_t - \chi(s)qdJ_t \quad (1)$$

where B_t is a standard Brownian motion and J_t is a Poisson process with intensity $\zeta(s)$. We set $\chi(s) = 0$ in

normal times and $\chi(s) > 0$ within the disaster. Hence, we interpret the Poisson shock as capturing the risk of an economic loss due to being in a disaster regime.

Next, we augment the disaster regime to include sub-regimes that correspond to observable progress to returning to normal life. Now let the state s take values in $\{0, 1, \dots, S - 1, S\}$, where both $s = 0$ and $s = S$ are the same normal time regime, and the others are the disaster substates. We assume that the economy switches between these states based on a Markov-switching or transition matrix. The transition probabilities are as follows:

$$Pr(s_{t+dt} = 1 | s_t = 0 \text{ or } S) = \eta dt \quad (2)$$

$$Pr(s_{t+dt} = s_t | s_t = 0 \text{ or } S) = 1 - \eta dt \quad (3)$$

$$Pr(s_{t+dt} = s - 1 | s_t = s \in [1, S - 1]) = \lambda_d(s) dt \quad (4)$$

$$Pr(s_{t+dt} = s + 1 | s_t = s \in [1, S - 1]) = \lambda_u(s) dt \quad (5)$$

$$Pr(s_{t+dt} = s_t | s_t = s \in [1, S - 1]) = 1 - \lambda_d(s) dt - \lambda_u(s) dt. \quad (6)$$

That is, η is the intensity of disaster arrivals, and λ_d and λ_u are the respective intensities within a disaster for transitions “down” or “up” to the adjacent states. Given this specification, a straightforward Markov chain calculation yields $\mathbb{E}_t[T^* | s]$, where T^* is the time at which the state S is attained and the current disaster is terminated.

Although the specification allows for arbitrary parameter differences across the substates, our intention is rather to interpret them as differing *only* insofar as advances in the state reduce the expected time to exit the disaster. Hence, for $0 < s < S$, we will take $\mu(s) = \mu(1)$, $\sigma(s) = \sigma(1)$, and $\chi(s) = \chi$, $\zeta(s) = \zeta$, and $\lambda_u(s) = \lambda_u$, $\lambda_d(s) = \lambda_d$ to all be constants. We can thus interpret the state index s as a probabilistic clock. As such, within a disaster, agents are subject to an additional source of risk: stochastic duration.⁷

It is worth highlighting the implicit assumptions in the model about long-run effects. Our specification is pessimistic in the sense that loss of wealth due to the disaster shocks is permanent. Productive capital q does not get restored when the disaster ends. On the other hand, the model is optimistic in the sense that the productive process, dq , does fully revert to predisaster dynamics. After the disaster, the world looks stochastically the same as it did before. Agents know that the disaster will eventually end, and there will be no scarring effects, for example, on the economy’s normal growth rate, $\mu(0)$.

2.2. Agents

We assume the economy has a unit mass of identical agents (households). Each agent has stochastic differential

utility or Epstein-Zin preferences (Duffie and Epstein 1992, Duffie and Skiadas 1994) based on consumption flow rate C , given as

$$\mathbb{J}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty f(C_{t'}, \mathbb{J}_{t'}) dt' \right] \quad (7)$$

and aggregator

$$f(C, \mathbb{J}) = \frac{\rho}{1 - \psi^{-1}} \left[\frac{C^{1-\psi^{-1}} - [(1-\gamma)\mathbb{J}]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}}{[(1-\gamma)\mathbb{J}]^{\frac{1}{\theta}-1}} \right] \quad (8)$$

where $0 < \rho < 1$ is the temporal discount factor, $\gamma \geq 0$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), $\psi \geq 0$ is the EIS, and

$$\theta^{-1} \equiv \frac{1 - \psi^{-1}}{1 - \gamma}. \quad (9)$$

The use of recursive preferences is standard in macro-finance models because of their ability to match financial moments. We recognize the limitations of using a utility specification driven by consumption goods, particularly within a crisis when other considerations (e.g., health, social interaction, the safety of others) so strongly affect well-being. However, using a familiar formulation ensures that our findings are not driven by nonstandard assumptions about utility. The representative agent’s problem is, in each state s , to choose optimal consumption $C(s)$ that maximizes the objective function $\mathbb{J}(s)$.

2.3. Solution

We now characterize the solution to the optimization problem.

Proposition 1. Assume all state parameters are constant for $0 < s < S$. Denote

$$g(s) \equiv \frac{(1-\gamma)\rho}{(1-\psi^{-1})} - (1-\gamma) \left(\mu(s) - \frac{1}{2}\gamma\sigma(s)^2 \right) - ([1-\chi(s)]^{1-\gamma} - 1) \quad (10)$$

Let $H(s)$ ’s denote the solution to the following system of S recursive equations:

$$g_0 \equiv g(0) = \frac{(1-\gamma)}{(\psi-1)} \rho^\psi (H(0))^{-\psi\theta^{-1}} + \eta \left[\frac{H(1)}{H(0)} - 1 \right] \quad (11)$$

$$g_1 \equiv g(1) = \frac{(1-\gamma)}{(\psi-1)} \rho^\psi (H(s))^{-\psi\theta^{-1}} + \lambda_d \left[\frac{H(s-1)}{H(s)} - 1 \right] + \lambda_u \left[\frac{H(s+1)}{H(s)} - 1 \right], \quad (12)$$

for $s \in \{1, \dots, S - 1\}$.

Assuming the solutions are positive, optimal consumption in state s is

$$C(s, q) = \frac{(H(s))^{-\psi\theta-1} q}{\rho^{-\psi}}, \quad (13)$$

and the value function of the representative agent is

$$\mathbb{J}(s, q) \equiv \frac{H(s)q^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \quad (14)$$

Note: All proofs appear in the Online Appendix.

The recursive system is straightforward to solve numerically. Henceforth, we implicitly assume the parameters are such that a unique solution vector $H(s)$ exists and is strictly positive.

2.4. Welfare Across States

The certainty equivalent change in the representative agent's lifetime value function upon a transition from state s to state 0 (or to state S) is given by

$$V(s) \equiv 1 - \left(\frac{H(s)}{H(0)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}. \quad (15)$$

This is the percentage of the agent's stock of wealth q that, if surrendered, would be fully compensated by the utility gain of reverting to the nondisaster state. This willingness-to-pay definition is standard in the literature. Using the optimal consumption characterized above, we also obtain Proposition 2.

Proposition 2. *The value of ending the disaster in state s is determined by the ratio of marginal propensity to consume ($c \equiv dC/dq$) in the disaster state s relative to that in the nondisaster state, adjusted by the agent's EIS:*

$$V(s) = 1 - \left(\frac{c(s)}{c(0)} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\psi-1}} = 1 - \left(\frac{C(s)}{C(0)} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\psi-1}}. \quad (16)$$

The definition above naturally generalizes to the willingness-to-pay to alter the clock from any given s to another s' , as

$$V(s, s') \equiv 1 - \left(\frac{H(s)}{H(s')} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}. \quad (17)$$

This is the relevant quantity when assessing mitigations that, although not ending the disaster, shorten its remaining expected duration.

2.5. Asset Pricing

We interpret "the market portfolio" within the model as a claim to the economy's output.⁸ Output is the net new resources per unit time, which is implicitly defined by two endogenous quantities: the change in the cumulative wealth plus consumption, or $dq + Cdt$. Denote the price of the output claim as $P = P(s, q)$. By the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, the instantaneous expected

excess return to holding this claim is equal to minus the covariance of its returns with the pricing kernel. Under stochastic differential utility, and with the value function solution above, the pricing kernel in our economy is given by

$$\Lambda_t = \exp \left\{ \int_0^t [\rho^\psi (\theta/\psi) H(s_u)^{-\psi/\theta}] du \right\} q_t^{-\gamma} H(s_t).$$

From this, we derive the value of the market portfolio in the following proposition.

Proposition 3. *The price of the output claim is $P = p(s)q$ where the constants $p(s)$ solve a matrix system $Y = Xp$ where X is an $S+1$ -by- $S+1$ matrix and Y is an $S+1$ vector, both of whose elements are given in the Online Appendix.*

The behavior of the price-capital ratio, $p(s)$, accords with economic intuition: it declines sharply on a move from state $s=0$ to $s=1$, and then gradually (and approximately linearly) recovers as s advances. Thus, the quantity $\Delta \log P = \log p(s+1) - \log p(s)$ is positive for $s > 0$, as desired.⁹ An alternative way of achieving this response is to assume equity dividends are a procyclical share of consumption (as in Longstaff and Piazzesi 2004, Santos and Veronesi 2006, and Kilic and Wachter 2018), that is, decreasing in a disaster, or an implicit labor share that is partially insured against pandemic losses. (We show the correspondence in the Online Appendix.) Note that impounding less disaster exposure in dividends will decrease the market response to changes in the state. Hence, matching observed market responses will require more severe pandemics, with greater welfare costs. Thus, our assumptions are conservative from the perspective of inferring those costs.

2.6. Welfare and Stock Market Sensitivity to Duration News

Now, define T^* as the time at which the state S is attained and the disaster is terminated. In the next section, we construct an empirical counterpart to its time t expectation, $\mathbb{E}_t[T^*]$, during 2020. It is straightforward to show that this expectation is again given by a linear system, which we omit for brevity. Moreover, for large S , the difference

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}[T^*] = \mathbb{E}[T^* | s+1] - \mathbb{E}[T^* | s] \sim \frac{1}{\lambda_u} \quad (18)$$

is effectively constant as well. Given $P(s)$ and $\mathbb{E}[T^*]$, we can readily compute the sensitivity

$$\frac{\Delta \log P}{\Delta \mathbb{E}[T^*]}. \quad (19)$$

This corresponds to the second quantity we attempt to measure empirically.

Table 1. Parameters

Parameter categories		(a) Baseline	(b) Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004)	(c) Ai (2010)	(d) Gourio (2012)	(e) Nakamura et al. (2013)	(f) Marfè and Pénasse (2024)
Preferences							
Coef. of relative risk aversion	γ	4.0	5.0	2.0	3.8	6.4	6.5
Elast. of intertemporal substitution	ψ	1.5	0.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
Rate of time preference	ρ	0.0125	0.010	0.014	0.004	0.034	0.02
Normal output							
Growth rate	$\mu(0)$	0.03	0.023	0.035	0.01*	0.05*	0.044
Volatility	$\sigma(0)$	0.05	0.029	0.099	0.035*	0.023	0.052
Disaster timing							
Intensity	η	0.02	0.01	0.02*	0.028	0.028	0.041
Duration	$1/\lambda$	4.0	1.0*	4.0*	1.6	4.0	1.9

Notes. The table shows the six parameter configurations used in Figure 2 to compute the welfare bounds of disaster severity as a function of the stock market response to news about disaster duration. In columns (b) to (f) parameters are taken or interpreted from the papers cited on the second line, except where marked by an asterisk (see endnote 11). Coef., coefficient; Elast., elasticity.

The goal of the paper is to estimate the quantities (15) and (17), which clearly depend on how the model is calibrated. An important insight, however, is that the model counterpart to the stock market sensitivity restricts the parameters governing the severity of the disaster: $\mu(1), \sigma(1), \chi$, and ζ . More precisely, sets of parameters consistent with an observed value of (19) all have welfare costs, V , within an admissible range. We formalize this result as follows.

Proposition 4. *Given a set of nondisaster parameters (e.g., those given in Table 1) and subject to regularity conditions given in the proof, a particular fixed value of $A \equiv \frac{\Delta \log P}{\Delta E[T^*]}$ restricts the disaster parameters such that the quantity $B \equiv \frac{V}{E[T^*]}$ must lie in a finite range $[\underline{B}, \underline{B}]$. For large, S , the limits of the range are determined by the solution to a three-equation system given in the proof.*


The economic logic underpinning the proposition is straightforward. Although the household’s value function and the stock price are different constructs, the effect of a disaster on each is largely driven by the same two things: the decrease in expected rate of wealth accumulation (or, the severity of the disaster), and the expected time until a return to normal conditions (the expected duration of the disaster).

The bounds identified in the proposition are not directly expressible in terms of the primitive parameters of the model. Hence, it remains to verify numerically that they are reasonably tight and reasonably robust to the choice of nondisaster parameters. To this end, we present the computed bounds for a number of cases whose parameters are collected in Table 1. The first case, labeled (a), is the paper’s baseline parameter set.¹⁰ The remaining cases, (b) to (f), are the parameters used in prominent and influential papers in the literature. These provide significant variation along all dimensions.

Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004) assume constant relative risk aversion—and therefore an EIS below one—and also much rarer disasters than the baseline. Ai (2010), although not a disaster model, includes direct shocks to the capital stock and uses a much higher volatility to match evidence on the volatility of wealth. Gourio (2012), also a production-based model, uses a lower risk aversion than our baseline and also a lower rate of time preference. Nakamura et al. (2013) and Marfè and Pénasse (2024) provide direct estimation of disaster processes, and their estimates imply shorter and more frequent disasters. Both also use higher risk aversion. The former uses a higher rate of time preference, whereas the latter uses a lower EIS than our baseline.

All of these models differ from ours. So, there is not a perfect mapping (except in the case of the preference parameters) between their parameters and ours. In a few cases, we have augmented or modified the papers’ parameters to approximate our paper’s depiction of output and disasters, or to satisfy the model’s assumptions.¹¹

For each of these configurations, we compute the admissible range for the welfare value of ending the disaster conditional on an observed stock market response. Figure 2 plots the results. The first important result is that the bounds are indeed reasonably tight—around $\pm 2\%$ of wealth when the stock market response is 4%–6% return per year of reduced duration. Even more important, the bounds are seen to be quite robust across the range of parameter configurations. As a market response of 4%, the bounds for all cases are within about 1% of wealth relative to each other. This establishes that our paper’s primary conclusions are not driven by its baseline assumptions about preferences, output, or disaster frequency and duration.¹²

Figure 2. Welfare Gain Implied by Market Response to Duration News

Notes. The figure shows the minimum and maximum allowable welfare gain to ending a disaster given an observed stock market response to disaster timing news. The welfare gain must lie in the plotted range for any choice of the disaster severity parameters. Cases (a) to (f) correspond to the parameter configurations listed in Table 1.

3. Vaccine Progress in 2020

We now turn to the application of our model to the COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed in the introduction, our maintained hypothesis is that expectations about the time remaining to successful deployment of a vaccine during 2020 map into our model's expectation for the termination of the pandemic and the return to normal economic conditions. We therefore construct an estimator of that quantity using a statistical model of clinical trial progress.

As described in more detail in Section 3.1 below, each day, the model simulates the future progress of each candidate in order to forecast the time until the first candidate successfully deploys. Each run of the simulation takes the current stage of each candidate, then simulates forward the entire clinical timeline through preclinical trials, clinical trials, application submission, regulatory approval, and vaccine deployment.¹³ Each clinical stage is characterized by an expected duration and a probability

of failing. We update these probabilities as news arrives about individual candidates: preliminary results or more complete information about earlier trials may be published, released to the press, or leaked. At each simulated stage, each candidate can either fail (and that candidate's run ends) or advance onto the next stage (and the simulation continues). The model then records the time to deployment among candidates successfully reaching deployment, and the average time across a large number of runs is that day's estimate of the expected time until a successful deployment.

Note that vaccine deployment is a final stage with a nonzero probability of failure. That is, an approved vaccine possibly still could not attain widespread deployment, for example, because of manufacturing and distribution difficulty, emergence of serious safety concerns, mutation of the virus, or adoption hesitancy. In other words, observers at the time were aware that the approval of a vaccine would not necessarily correspond

to a “magic bullet” that instantly terminates the spread of COVID-19 and ends the pandemic.

The forecast incorporates the expectation that the success and failure of candidates are positively correlated. This positive dependence arises most obviously because all vaccines were targeting the same pathogen, and would succeed or fail largely because of its inherent biological strengths and weaknesses. Candidates also shared one of a handful of strategies (or platforms) for stimulating immunological response¹⁴ and relied on common technological components, resources, or abilities, and some research teams concurrently developed several candidate vaccines. The model incorporates correlation among candidates by assuming the stochastic durations of each stage are generated by a Gaussian copula with positive correlation matrix.

The next subsection provides details on the data and each step in the construction of the forecast time-series and discusses some of the underlying assumptions. Further details on specific assumptions are provided in the Online Appendix.

3.1. Forecast Construction

Each day, we start with N positively correlated vaccine candidates, with correlation matrix \mathcal{R} . Each candidate n is in a state $s \in S$, where

$$S = \{\text{failure, preclinical, phase 1, phase 2, phase 3, application, approval, deployment}\}$$

and each state has expected duration τ_s and baseline probability of success Π_s^{base} .¹⁵

Next, we augment the state-level, baseline probability of successes with candidate-specific news. Let $\omega_{n,t} \in \Omega$ denote news published at time t about candidate n . For example, Ω could span positive data releases, negative data releases, next-state announcements, etc. Then let $\Delta\pi : \Omega \rightarrow [-1, 1]$ be a mapping from news to changes in probabilities. For each candidate, we cumulate the changes in probabilities from all news from the beginning of our sample t_0 up to time t ,

$$\Delta\pi_{n,t}^{\text{news}} = \sum_{t'=t_0}^t \Delta\pi(\omega_{n,t'}).$$

Finally, we combine it with the baseline probability of success, resulting in a candidate-specific probability of success that potentially varies over time, even within the same state,

$$\pi_{n,s,t}^{\text{total}} = \frac{\exp\Upsilon_{n,s,t}}{1 + \exp\Upsilon_{n,s,t}}$$

where $\Upsilon_{n,s,t} = \log \frac{\pi_{n,s,t}^{\text{base}}}{1 - \pi_{n,s,t}^{\text{base}}} + 2\Delta\pi_{n,t}^{\text{news}}$.

We simulate stage-by-stage progress of each candidate and generate the expected time to first vaccine deployment, similar to a first-to-default credit model.

Specifically, on each day, one run of the simulation repeats steps one and two until candidates have all failed or deployed.¹⁶

1. We model each state transition as a two-state Markov chain with exponentially distributed times. Draw an N -dimensional multivariate normal random variable

$$z_t = [z_{1,t}, \dots, z_{N,t}]' \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \mathcal{R})$$

and for each candidate, transform to exponential time with intensity $\lambda_{n,s,t} = \frac{\pi_{n,s,t}}{\tau_s}$

$$t_{n,s,t} = -\frac{\log \Phi(z_{n,t})}{\lambda_{n,s,t}}.$$

2. Then draw a success or failure Bernoulli random variable with parameter π_s . If failure, then that candidate’s run is over. Else if success, then that candidate advances states and the run continues.

3. Calculate each candidate’s time to vaccine deployment as

$$T_n = \begin{cases} \sum_s t_{n,s,t} & \text{if candidate deploys} \\ \infty, & \text{if candidate fails.} \end{cases}$$

4. Then calculate minimum time to vaccine deployment across candidates, $\min_n T_n$.

That finishes one run of the simulation. We repeat for 50,000 runs and take the cross-run average as T^D , before advancing to the next day. On each day across runs, we calculate the average

$$\mathbb{E}[T^*] = (1 - \mu)T_t^D + \mu T^{ND},$$

where some fraction, μ , of simulations will result in all candidates not reaching deployment, so we incorporate T^{ND} , an estimated expected time to deployment by a project outside of our sample.

We obtain the preclinical dates and trial history of vaccine candidates from publicly available data collated by the LSHTM. We observe the start dates and durations of each preclinical and clinical trial, along with their vaccine strategy. We augment the LSHTM timeline with news pertinent to vaccine progress from FactSet StreetAccount. We classify vaccine-related stories into seven positive types and six negative types. The Online Appendix includes more detail on the number of candidates and breakdown of strategies, the news types and corresponding probability adjustments, and our choices of parameters, also presenting evidence that our assumptions are reasonably consistent with the (small) set of observed trial outcomes. We will validate our choices both by examining robustness to reasonable variations and by comparing them to other actual ex ante forecasts published during the sample period.

Our indicator of vaccine progress aims to capture expectations about deployment principally in the United States because this is likely to be the primary concern of U.S. markets. Because of political considerations, we believe that observers at the time judged it to be very improbable that vaccines being developed in China and Russia would be the first to achieve widespread deployment in the United States. Our base case construction for this reason omits candidates coded in the LSHTM data as originating in Russia or China, retaining candidates coded as multicountry projects including these two countries. We will also verify that including them in our index does not change our primary results.

In focusing on the scientific advancement of the individual candidates, our measure does not attempt to capture general news about the vaccine development environment and policy. News about the acquisition and deployment of delivery infrastructure by governments (or the failure to do so) could certainly affect estimates of the time to availability. We also do not capture the news content of government financial support programs or prepurchase agreements. News about regulatory approval standards could have affected forecasts as well. Although we could alter our index based on some assessment of the impact of news of this type, we feel we have less basis for making such adjustments than we do for modeling clinical trial progress.

Figure 1 shows the model's estimation of the expected time to widespread deployment from January through October of 2020. The starting value of the index, in January, is determined by our choice of the parameter T^{ND} because, with very few candidates and none in clinical trials, there was a high probability that the first success would come from a candidate not yet active. However, this parameter effectively becomes irrelevant by March when there are dozens of projects. The index is almost monotonically declining, because there were no reported trial failures and very few instances of negative news through at least August. The crucial aspects of the index for our purposes are the timing and sizes of the down jumps corresponding to the arrival of good news.

3.2. Validation

We are aware of two data sets that contain actual forecasts of vaccine arrival times, as made in real time during 2020. As a validation check, we compare our index to these.¹⁷

The two data sets are surveys, to which individuals supplied their forecasts of the earliest date of vaccine availability. Comparisons between these pooled forecasts and our index require some intermediate steps and assumptions. In both cases, the outcomes being forecast are given as prespecified date ranges. Thus, on each survey date, we know the percentage of respondents whose point forecast fell in distinct bins. For each

survey we estimate the median response, assuming a uniform distribution of responses within the bin containing the median. Under the same assumption, we can also tabulate the percentage of forecasters above and below our index.

The first survey is conducted by Deutsche Bank and sent to 800 "global market participants" asking them when they think the first "working" vaccine will be "available." The survey was conducted four times between May and September. The second survey is conducted by Good Judgement Inc., a consulting firm that solicits the opinion of "elite superforecasters." Their question asks specifically, "When will enough doses of FDA-approved COVID-19 vaccine(s) to inoculate 25 million people be distributed in the United States?" (Information about the number of responders is not available.) Responses are tabulated daily, starting from April 24. For brevity, we examine month-end dates. Table 2 summarizes the comparison.

Our forecasts align well with those of the Deutsche Bank survey, though ours are more optimistic than the median. The optimism is more pronounced when compared with the superforecasters early in the pandemic. Although we are within the interquartile range of forecasts after May, the earlier dates see us in the left tail of the distribution. A possible reason is the particular survey question, which specifies an exact

Table 2. Forecast Comparison

Panel A. Deutsche Bank			
Date	Survey median	VPI	% respondents below
May	1.158	0.958	35.0
June	1.162	0.893	31.2
July	0.920	0.595	20.8
September	0.625	0.561	44.3
Panel B. Superforecasters			
Date	Survey median	VPI	% respondents below
April	1.902	1.291	16.1
May	1.643	0.958	14.6
June	1.189	0.893	31.0
July	0.808	0.595	32.7
August	0.519	0.606	58.4
September	0.445	0.518	57.2

Notes. The table compares forecasts for the earliest date of vaccine availability in years. Panel A compares the median from a survey conducted by Deutsche Bank, whereas panel B compares the median from a survey conducted by Good Judgement Inc. The column VPI denotes the forecast from our estimated vaccine progress indicator, and the last column reports the percentage of respondents from each survey with forecasts below ours. Survey respondents are reported in calendar intervals. The comparison assumes a uniform distribution of forecasts in time within the median bin. The survey dates are as of the end of the month in the first column, except the Deutsche Bank September survey, which is for the week ending September 11, 2020.

quantity of the vaccine being distributed in the United States. Respondents may have been more skeptical of feasible deployment than we have assumed. We will examine robustness of our results below to increasing the probability of an approved vaccine failing in the deployment stage.

4. Results

This section presents the paper’s main results: measuring the stock market sensitivity to vaccine news and interpreting the estimates through the lens of the model in Section 2.

4.1. Market Reaction to Vaccine News

Our empirical methodology is straightforward: we regress daily market returns in 2020 on changes in the VPI. Because our forecast construction does not utilize any stock market or financial information, its changes are exogenous in the regression context.

An important consideration is controlling for other news, of which there was a great deal during this period, principally because of the extent of the pandemic, policy responses, and the likely economic impact of these, but also including, for example, the U.S. election cycle. Our approach to controlling for nonvaccine news is to exclude days with large stock market moves that were reliably judged to be due to other sources. Specifically, we employ the classification of Baker et al. (2020b), who analyze causes of daily market moves greater than 2.5% in absolute value. Those authors enlist the opinion of three analysts for each such day and ask them to assign

weights to *types* of causes (e.g., corporate news, election results, monetary policy, etc.). Under their classification, pandemic-related economic and policy news is assigned one of these categories. Research on vaccines falls under the category “other.” We view market returns as very unlikely to have been driven by vaccine news if none of the three analysts assigns more than 25% weight to this category, or if the return was more negative than -2.5% . The latter exclusion is based on the fact that there were no significant vaccine setbacks prior to the end of our data window,¹⁸ and on the assumption that positive vaccine progress cannot have been negative news. We then include dummies for all of the nonvaccine large-news days. There are 28 such days, 17 of which were in March. Although the approach is imperfect, it avoids putting (endogenous) financial variables, such as bond yields or credit spreads, on the right-hand side of our regressions. And, at a minimum we are limiting the ability of our estimation to misattribute the largest market moves to vaccine progress.

Table 3 shows the resulting regression estimates of market impact. The dependent variable is the return to the value-weighted Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index from January 1 through October 31, 2020. The regression specifications include contemporaneous changes in the vaccine progress indicator and also examine lagged effects. Given the sheer volume of news being processed during this period, we do not rule out delayed incorporation of information, which would show up in the lag coefficients. Additionally, including lag terms addresses the possibility that the market overreacts to

Table 3. Stock Market Sensitivity to Vaccine Progress

Parameter estimates of Equation (20)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
γ_1	-0.091 (0.068)	-0.068 (0.066)	-0.082 (0.066)	-0.063 (0.064)	-0.098 (0.069)	-0.089 (0.069)
γ_2	0.150* (0.090)	0.180* (0.091)	0.154* (0.092)	0.177* (0.090)	0.138 (0.086)	0.150* (0.083)
β_t	-1.229 (1.353)	-2.084* (1.193)	-1.409 (1.290)	-2.069* (1.243)	-1.000 (1.141)	-1.333 (1.114)
β_{t-1}			-3.836 (3.069)	-4.523 (3.093)	-3.850 (2.892)	-4.269 (2.849)
$\beta_{t-5,t-2}$					-1.959*** (0.689)	-2.281*** (0.631)
α	0.290*** (0.105)		0.225** (0.097)		0.149 (0.099)	
$\sum_h \beta_{t-h}$	-1.229	-2.084	-5.246	-6.592	-6.808	-7.883
F-stat on $\sum_h \beta_{t-h}$	0.83	3.05	4.51	7.20	7.01	10.54
p-value on $\sum_h \beta_{t-h}$	0.36	0.08	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00
N	203	203	203	203	203	203

Notes. The table shows results from Regression (20). The dependent variable is daily excess returns on the market portfolio in percent. The return on the value-weighted CRSP index is used from January 1, 2020, to October 31, 2020. Independent variables include two lags of excess returns on the market portfolio, changes in vaccine progress indicator in years, and dummy variables for each jump date from Baker et al. (2020b) unrelated to news about vaccine progress. All columns employ the baseline construction of the vaccine forecast. Newey-West standard errors with four lags are shown in parentheses.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

vaccine news. The specifications also include two lags of the dependent variable to control for short-term liquidity effects. Specifically, the regression is

$$R_{m,t}^e = \alpha + \sum_{h=-k}^0 \beta_h \Delta \text{VPI}_{t+h} + \gamma_1 R_{m,t-1}^e + \gamma_2 R_{m,t-2}^e + \sum_{j=1}^{28} \delta_j \mathbb{1}_{\text{jump } j} + \epsilon_t \quad (20)$$

where ΔVPI_t is the change in vaccine progress indicator, and $\mathbb{1}_{\text{jump } j}$ is a dummy equal to one on the j th jump date from Baker et al. (2020b). We also present results for specifications without the intercept, α , the argument being that including it treats both the realized market rally (or, positive sample average return) and the realized vaccine progress (negative average change in VPI) as having been *expected*, which is a potential misspecification.¹⁹

The first two columns of the table show results using our baseline vaccine progress indicator, and without lags. The estimated contemporaneous coefficient from the first column implies a stock market increase of 1.29% on a decrease in expected time to vaccine deployment of one year. Although economically meaningful, the response is not statistically significant given the short sample. Also, the estimated intercept in this specification illustrates the point above. A positive value of 0.29 translates into an “expected” annual return of 106% ($1.0029^{250} - 1$) for the stock market, which is not plausible. Column (2) shows the result of dropping the intercept. The response coefficient rises to 2.08%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level.

Columns (3) and (4) add a single lag of the VPI series. We explored a number of lag specifications, and this is the one preferred by the Bayes information criterion. The evidence is consistent with a substantial continued positive market response to vaccine progress as information is processed over a second day. Focusing on the cumulative impact of both days, the sum of the β s is 5.25%, or 6.59% without the intercept, and both are statistically significant at the 1% level. Going forward, we will adopt the more conservative of these two as our primary estimate. The final two columns include a longer lag term, namely, the cumulative change in VPI from day $t - 5$ to $t - 2$. This specification allows us to address the possibility that some of the positive market reaction to vaccine progress in the first two days is an overreaction that subsequently reverses. In fact, we find the reverse: the response continues in the same direction. The cumulative five-day response now rises to 6.81%, or 7.88% without the intercept.

Our baseline estimate of approximately a 5% response to a one-year change in the VPI is strongly supported by the observed reactions to some especially salient announcements. For example, market rallies of 1.1%

and 0.9% followed release of phase I results by Moderna on May 18 and July 14.²⁰ These announcements caused drops in the VPI of 0.02 and 0.11 years, respectively, implying a response coefficient of at least eight. In an out-of-sample observation,²¹ Pfizer’s release of phase III results on November 9 at 6:45 a.m. caused a preopening market surge of 2.8%. Even attributing to the news a reduction in VPI of 0.25 years, the implied response coefficient would be over 10.

Because the construction of the VPI forecasts involves a number of assumptions, Table 4 presents additional regressions using the baseline specification from column (3) for several variants of the methodology, including altering the news adjustments, the correlation assumptions, and the probability of successful vaccine deployment. In all of these variations, the estimated market response to vaccine progress is similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 3.

4.1.1. Industry Responses. As a validity check for our findings, we examine the price impact of vaccine progress in the cross-section of industries. We first gauge each industry’s exposure to COVID-19 by its cumulative return from February 1, 2020, to March 22, 2020. This period captures the rapid onset of COVID-19 in the United States, with a public health emergency being declared on January 31, 2020, and a national emergency declared on March 13, 2020. Importantly, this period precedes the Federal Reserve’s announcement of the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility on March 23, 2020, helping us pin down industry covariances with COVID-19 itself, separate from covariances with policy responses.

We then estimate industry sensitivity to vaccine progress over the nonoverlapping sample from March 23, 2020, to October 31, 2020, by reestimating (20) sector by sector,

$$R_{i,t}^e = \alpha + \sum_{h=-1}^0 \beta_{h,i} \Delta \text{VPI}_{t+h} + \gamma_{1,i} R_{i,t-1}^e + \gamma_{2,i} R_{i,t-2}^e + \sum_{j=1}^{28} \delta_{j,i} \mathbb{1}_{\text{jump } j} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (21)$$

where $R_{i,t}^e$ is value-weight excess returns on the 49 Fama-French industry portfolios.

Figure 3 presents the results. Each industry’s sensitivity to vaccine progress is plotted against its exposure to COVID-19. The relationship is negative and statistically significant—industries that were more exposed to COVID-19 subsequently saw more positive price impact as the vaccine was expected to deploy sooner. Table 5 shows the five top and bottom industries ranked by their sensitivity to vaccine news. In addition to having exhibited greater stock price

Table 4. Stock Market Sensitivity to Vaccine Progress—Robustness

Additional regression results	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
News	All states	None	Current state	All states	All states	All states
Depreciation	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cor(n, n')	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2
$\tau_{\text{approval}}^{\text{base}}$	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.85	0.95
Ex-China and Russia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
γ_1	-0.082 (0.065)	-0.081 (0.065)	-0.083 (0.065)	-0.086 (0.066)	-0.083 (0.066)	-0.091 (0.056)
γ_2	0.154* (0.091)	0.154* (0.092)	0.153* (0.092)	0.153* (0.091)	0.154* (0.091)	0.143 (0.087)
β_t	-1.403 (1.287)	-1.829 (2.047)	-1.605 (1.334)	-1.577 (1.233)	-1.471 (1.228)	1.073 (1.671)
β_{t-1}	-3.829 (3.063)	-4.715 (3.904)	-2.725 (2.606)	-3.308 (3.090)	-3.691 (2.951)	-5.812** (2.925)
α	0.227** (0.095)	0.207* (0.098)	0.243** (0.096)	0.236** (0.095)	0.228** (0.095)	0.228** (0.095)
$\sum_h \beta_{t-h}$	-5.233	-6.544	-4.330	-4.884	-5.161	-4.739
F-stat on $\sum_h \beta_{t-h}$	4.51	5.59	4.93	3.73	4.49	3.71
p-value on $\sum_h \beta_{t-h}$	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.06
N	206	206	206	206	206	206

Notes. The table shows the results from Specification (1) in the paper. The dependent variable is daily percent excess returns on the market portfolio. Independent variables include two lags of excess returns on the market portfolio, a five-day window of changes in vaccine progress indicator in years, and dummy variables for each jump date from Baker et al. (2020b) unrelated to news about vaccine progress. The first column is the baseline specification with news applying to all states, deterministic depreciation, base copula correlation of 0.2, probability of success in the application state equal to 0.95, and exclusion of candidates from China and Russia. Column (2) removes news and depreciation; column (3) restricts news to the current state and increases the $\Delta\pi$ from news on positive data releases, positive enrollment, and dose starts to 15%, 5%, and 5%, respectively; column (4) doubles the base copula correlation to 0.4; column (5) decreases the probability of success to 0.85 in the application state; and column (6) includes candidates from China and Russia. The return on the value-weighted CRSP index is used from January 1, 2020, to October 31, 2020. The table uses Newey-West standard errors with four lags (shown in parentheses).

Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

declines, the top sectors also had earnings that were more pandemic sensitive. Landier and Thesmar (2020) report that real estate, financials, and energy were among the sectors most revised down by analysts in the first quarter of 2020, whereas utilities were the least revised, for example. The association of industry exposure to COVID-19 with its subsequent sensitivity to our index lends confidence to the construction and interpretation of the index as, in fact, measuring vaccine progress.


4.2. Welfare Cost of the Pandemic

In Section 2.6, we derived theoretical bounds on the welfare benefit of ending a disaster conditional on an observed stock market response to the disaster “clock.” We computed and exhibited these bounds for the baseline case (and several alternative parameterizations). These bounds are conservative in the sense that they allow for essentially unlimited variation in the disaster parameters. It turns out that for a wide range of plausible parameters the actual bounds can be tighter. This is shown in Figure 4, where we plot the relationship between the two quantities for several dozen parameter sets in which each disaster variable is allowed to vary over a significant range, as given in the figure caption.²²

So, for example, model solutions for low intensity (ζ) or severity (χ) of the Poisson shocks plot near the lower left. Raising these parameters yields points plotted further to the right and higher. The key point is that the vertical width of the plot is narrow. With this collection of models, the welfare implications of the stock market response are well identified.

In particular, we can see that stock market sensitivities in the range of our empirical estimates (e.g., around 5%) imply welfare costs per remaining expected year of the pandemic of between about 4.5% and 5.2%. This conclusion can be supported by any choice of the disaster parameters that matches the observed sensitivity. For example, the choices ($\mu(1) = 0.015, \sigma(1) = 0.075, \chi = 0.035, \zeta = 1$) and ($\mu(1) = 0.03, \sigma(1) = 0.075, \chi = 0.025, \zeta = 2$) each yield a sensitivity of 0.05, and each implies a welfare cost of 0.048 per year.

We can now combine this estimate with our forecasts for the expected time to successful vaccine deployment constructed in Section 3 (shown in Figure 1). Assuming that this series captures belief at the time for the pandemic’s duration, and assuming investors’ model of the pandemic economy aligned with the model’s dynamics, our results imply that in late April 2020, when deployment was expected in about a year, the

Figure 3. (Color online) Industry Sensitivity to Vaccine Progress

Notes. The figure plots industry sensitivity to vaccine progress against exposure to COVID-19 as measured by cumulative returns. Cumulative returns are from February 1, 2020, to March 22, 2020. Sensitivity to vaccine progress is estimated from March 23, 2020, to October 31, 2020, as in (21).

welfare value of ending the pandemic was approximately 5% of total wealth. At the beginning of March, with very little vaccine progress reported, the analogous numbers are approximately three years forecast duration, and a welfare cost of 15%. By November

2020, with less than six months expected until successful vaccine deployment, ending the pandemic immediately would still have been worth over 2% of total wealth. These are the paper's principal findings.

We defined V as the welfare gain from transitioning immediately to the nonpandemic state. More generally, the quantity (17) defined in Section 2.4 gives the value of any intervention that shortens the expected duration of the crisis. For example, a partially successful vaccine technology which cuts this duration in half can be associated with its analogous welfare gain. Using one of the above choices for the disaster parameters, Table 6 shows the fraction of wealth the representative agent would be willing to pay to lower the expected duration from one value to another. The table entries are close to constant along each diagonal, indicating that the welfare gain scales almost linearly with the expected change in duration. A semieffective vaccine that reduced the duration from four to two years is worth somewhat less but close to one that reduces the duration from two years to zero.

Table 5. Industry COVID Exposure and VPI Sensitivity


Panel A. Top 5 industries		
Industry	$\beta_t + \beta_{t+1}$ estimated from 3/23 to 10/31	Cumulative return from 2/1 to 3/22
Oil	-15.89	-55.37
Textiles	-9.84	-50.79
Banks	-8.02	-42.72
Construction	-7.90	-49.65
Real estate	-7.79	-51.20
Panel B. Bottom 5 industries		
Industry	$\beta_t + \beta_{t+1}$ estimated from 3/23 to 10/31	Cumulative return from 2/1 to 3/22
Utilities	-1.45	-36.45
Precious metals	-1.07	-10.79
Packaging	-1.05	-30.88
Autos	-0.37	-39.99
Coal	1.99	-43.12

Note. The table shows the top five and bottom five betas from Regression (21) of Fama-French 49 industry returns on changes in the expected time to vaccine deployment.

5. Discussion

In assessing our conclusions on the welfare cost of the pandemic, several natural questions arise. First, how robust is our estimate of the welfare cost of a pandemic to model assumptions and parameters? Second, is 5%

Figure 4. Stock Market Sensitivity and Welfare Loss Rate



Notes. The figure shows the welfare cost per unit (expected) time, $V/E[T^*]$, as a function of the stock market sensitivity to changes in the expected time $-\Delta \log P / \Delta E[T^*]$ as the current state s increases by one. Each point corresponds to a different set of disaster parameters. The ranges of these parameters are $\mu(1) \in [-0.01, 0.03]$, $\sigma(1) \in [0.05, 0.10]$, $\chi \in [0.01, 0.05]$, $\zeta \in [1, 2]$. The remaining parameters are those given in Table 1.

of total wealth a reasonable amount to be willing to pay to curtail a pandemic? Third, how should one think about “five percent of total wealth” in terms of real-world values (e.g., dollars)? Fourth, how do these magnitudes compare with other ways of assessing the cost of COVID-19? Finally, what are the ramifications of these numbers?

On the first question, as discussed extensively in Section 2.6 (Figure 2), the estimate of 4%–6% of total wealth being the welfare cost per year of the pandemic

is quite robust to varying model parameters around the baseline assumptions about preferences, output, or disaster frequency and duration. This robustness carries over to many extensions of the model, as described further below.

Turning to the second question, note that within the context of the model, the welfare gain estimate is intimately tied to the rate of loss (or lower growth rate) of wealth due to the disaster shocks. In our calibrations, parameters consistent with the observed stock market

Table 6. Welfare Gain as a Function of Reduction in Expected Duration

	T2: expected duration after intervention (years)							
	3.50	3.00	2.50	2.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0
T1: initial expected duration								
4.00	2.60	5.15	7.65	10.09	12.48	14.82	17.11	19.35
3.50	—	2.62	5.18	7.69	10.14	12.54	14.89	17.19
3.00	—	—	2.63	5.21	7.73	10.19	12.61	14.97
2.50	—	—	—	2.64	5.23	7.77	10.24	12.67
2.00	—	—	—	—	2.66	5.26	7.81	10.29
1.50	—	—	—	—	—	2.67	5.29	7.84
1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.69	5.31
0.50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.70

Notes. The table shows the percentage of wealth that the representative would be willing to trade for an intervention that shortens the pandemic from an initial expected duration of T_1 years to another state with $T_2 < T_1$ years remaining in expectation. The pandemic parameters are $\mu(1) = 0.015$, $\sigma(1) = 0.075$, $\chi = 0.035$, and $\zeta = 1$. The remaining parameters are shown in Table 1.

sensitivity all imply that the expected growth of wealth is 4%–6% less per year while the crisis is unchecked. Hence, sacrificing five percent of wealth per year of expected duration to avoid this outcome makes sense economically.

As another check, one could compare our estimate to the total drop in stock market wealth—around 36%—at the onset of the pandemic. This is not the same quantity that we are estimating. However, the two numbers are not unrelated. Any estimate of the ex ante cost of COVID-19 substantially less than 36% of stock market wealth would be difficult to reconcile with this observation. Conversely, as discussed in Section 4.1, modest good news about clinical trials at vaccine developers Moderna (May 18 and July 14, 2020) and Pfizer and BioNTech (November 9, 2020) led to sharp, well-identified market reactions in the range of 1%–3% each.²³ Again, an estimate of the cost of the pandemic lower than that implied by this stock market sensitivity to arrival of vaccine news would thus be incompatible with data.

Our estimate is also similar to magnitudes reported in the literature that computes the welfare gain of eliminating other types of disasters.²⁴ Barro (2009) reports that, in a model with rare disasters, moderate risk aversion, and an EIS greater than one, society would be willing to pay up to 20% of permanent income to eliminate disaster risk. Pindyck and Wang (2013) estimate the willingness to pay to reduce the impact of a disaster to 15% of capital stock at 7% of permanent income.

Regarding the third question, as a baseline value, total U.S. household wealth at the end of 2019 was approximately \$96 trillion, so that five percent represents about \$5 trillion. Global estimates typically find household wealth three to four times that of the United States (Shorrocks et al. 2019), implying a global ex ante cost of the pandemic at \$15–\$20 trillion.

Dollar values in this range are plausible, and are not out of line with other estimates of the cost of the pandemic. There is now a substantial literature estimating the cost of COVID-19 based on forgone health and economic activity. As discussed in the introduction, a common approach in health economics is to assign values to lives and productivity lost because of the virus. Writing in mid-2020, Cutler and Summers (2020) forecast health losses (including both morbidity and mental health) caused by the pandemic and estimate the total economic cost of COVID-19 to be \$16 trillion under the assumption that “it will be substantially contained by the fall of 2021.” Implicitly, then, this is an estimate of a rate of loss for one year. Other such estimates, offered as context for the need to invest in pandemic preparedness, are in similar ballpark range: Craven et al. (2021) estimate economic disruption caused by pandemic wave recurrence relative to speedy recovery to be \$5 trillion for the United States, Summers et al. (2021) estimate it to be \$36 trillion

globally and about \$6 trillion for the United States by implication, Lander and Sullivan (2021) assess the cost to be \$16 trillion for a severe pandemic and \$10 trillion for a milder one, and Gates (2022) takes as starting point the economic loss from the COVID-19 pandemic to be \$14 trillion. Similarly, and focusing just on gross domestic product (GDP), the Congressional Budget Office (2020) estimated over \$7 trillion in lost output through 2030. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (IMF 2021) estimated the collapse could have been three times as large had policymakers not enacted significant intervention (including \$16 trillion in fiscal support). They further estimate the cumulative loss in output relative to the counterfactual without COVID-19 to be \$28 trillion over 2020–2025. The proximity or similarity of this range of estimates to our own—despite the very different inputs and assumptions—lends credence to each.

Finally, there are clear policy implications to our findings. As noted in the introduction, pandemic preparedness strategists have explicitly targeted reducing the time to global deployment of a vaccine for the next pandemic to under six months. Achieving this target involves putting in place global surveillance systems for early detection of future outbreaks; maintaining “hot” manufacturing, supply chains, and distribution networks; and prearranging infrastructure for clinical trials. Cost estimates associated with these steps are typically tens of billions of dollars annually. If six months to worldwide deployment represents a reduction of 12 months from a no-investment baseline (approximately the COVID-19 experience), our work implies a value creation that is many times larger than any plausible capitalized value of such investment.

5.1. Extensions

We extend the model in several directions in the Online Appendix in order to illustrate further the robustness of our conclusions.

A first extension endogenizes the real option to invest in vaccine research so that the speed of progress is an equilibrium outcome. Although we do not attempt to estimate a production function for pharmaceutical research and development (R&D), it is clear a priori that the more powerful the available technology the smaller the welfare cost of a pandemic. Nonetheless, we show that, given the observed market response to vaccine progress, and the observed expected duration of the pandemic, our welfare calculation would not be significantly altered under this version of the model.

The reduced-form model includes no mechanism by which agents themselves affect the severity of the disaster. So, a second generalization endogenizes the choice of labor supply, which determines both the degree of productivity and the exposure to health shocks. Agents optimally withdraw labor in the pandemic states, and the magnitude of the withdrawal then determines the

equilibrium severity of the shocks to wealth. This mechanism also limits the range of possible disaster characteristics, sharpening our identification of welfare effects.

Third, we consider implications for households that do not participate in the stock market. Under the assumption that nonparticipants and participants face the same exposure to the pandemic, we can compute their willingness to pay to end the pandemic based on their likely utility functions. We show that this willingness is quite similar in populations with lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution and higher impatience.

Last, the Online Appendix examines the extent to which the model can offer a plausible depiction of the path of the stock market and consumption that was actually experienced during 2020. Fully accounting for the behavior of the financial markets and the real economy during 2020 is beyond the scope of the paper. Nevertheless, we argue that a consistent interpretation of the actual experience of 2020 is possible, and discuss the extent to which our conclusions may be affected by the model's limitations.

6. Conclusion

This paper provides an estimate of the value of reducing the expected duration of the COVID-19 pandemic using the joint behavior of stock prices and a novel vaccine progress indicator based on the chronology of stage-by-stage advance of individual vaccine candidates and related news during 2020. In the context of a general equilibrium regime-switching model of repeated pandemics, the sensitivity of the stock market to the vaccine progress indicator is essentially determined by the expected rate of loss (or lower growth rate) of wealth during a pandemic. Our empirical estimate can thus be translated into an implied welfare gain attributable to reverting to the nonpandemic state. With standard preference parameters, this gain was approximately 5%–15% of wealth, depending on the expected remaining duration of the pandemic. This number can also be interpreted as a measure of the expected cost of the pandemic.

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giesbusiness.illinois.edu/tcj/data/VPI.xlsx. An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “The Value of a Cure: An Asset-Pricing Perspective.”

Endnotes

¹ A related question concerns the welfare benefit of resolving disaster risk, that is, the uncertainty about them—without altering the occurrence of disasters themselves. See Epstein et al. (2014) for a critique of models in which this benefit is large.

² As Federal Reserve Chairperson Jay Powell remarked to CBS News in May 2020, “For the economy to fully recover, people will have to be fully confident. And that may have to await the arrival of a vaccine.”

³ Note that our maintained hypothesis that investors believed that vaccine deployment would effectively end the pandemic biases downward our estimate of the value of ending the pandemic because a more skeptical market would react less strongly to vaccine news. So, holding the observed response fixed, the less success a vaccine is expected to have, the greater must be the value of complete success.

⁴ An analogy from credit risk literature is that of a first-to-default basket in which several correlated firms are part of a basket and the quantity of interest is the expected time to a first default.

⁵ We assess the hypothesis that the market overreacts to vaccine news and that wealth gains subsequently reverse. At short horizons, at least, the evidence suggests the opposite.

⁶ In an appendix available upon request, we illustrate that our model is subject to this critique. However, unlike the settings Epstein et al. (2014) consider, in our model consumption is determined endogenously. Thus, the “instrumental” value of information is large: agents can and do alter their consumption when risk disappears. Moreover, as in the early stages of the COVID pandemic, in our setting very little uncertainty is resolved in the near term. Hence, the representative agent would not be willing to pay significantly more to resolve all risks today than she would to resolve them in, for example, a year.

⁷ In a business cycle context, Andrei et al. (2019) model an economy in which the mean-reversion speed of current consumption shocks is time-varying. In Gillman et al. (2014) and Ghaderi et al. (2022) regimes of differing growth differ in their expected duration. Thus, in these models, agents similarly face persistence risk.

⁸ Note that this is not the same as a claim to aggregate consumption. As is well known (see Ai 2010), in an economy where the capital stock can be costlessly converted to consumption goods, the consumption claim's price is equal to the capital stock, q . Distinguishing dividends from consumption is standard in the literature, and standard devices to help capture stock market dynamics include making dividends more procyclical (or “levered”) relative to consumption. Likewise, we need equity to be more exposed to disaster losses, which the output claim is. In the Online Appendix, we describe a decentralization of the economy in which this cash flow is the net payout of the corporate sector to households.

⁹ The output claim behaves similarly to a levered claim to consumption in the sense that, upon a shock dq to the stock of wealth, the return to the consumption claim (which has price q) is $[dq + cq dt] / q = (dq/q) + c dt$, whereas the return to our claim is $[d(pq) + (dq + cq dt)] / (pq) = \frac{p+1}{p}(dq/q) + (c/p) dt$. For typical parameterizations where $p \approx 1$ in nondisaster times, the effective leverage is $\frac{p+1}{p} \approx 2$.

¹⁰ Hereafter, we denote λ_u / S as λ without a subscript. We also set the intensity of regress to be $\lambda_d = 0$.

¹¹ To be specific, in Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004), disasters are i.i.d., so we have set the disaster duration to one year. In Ai (2010), there are no disasters, so we have used the baseline assumptions. In Gourio (2012) and Nakamura et al. (2013), we have set the nondisaster output growth and volatility to be as close as possible to their consumption

(or total-factor productivity (TFP)) process while obeying the parameter restrictions in the proposition. In Marfè and Pénasse (2024), the output parameters are those of the dividend process.

¹² Another dimension of robustness concerns the sensitivity of the bounds to the “clock” parameters s and S . There are two potential concerns. First, the proposition above uses the large- S limit of the model for tractability. This could potentially affect the tightness of the bounds. Second, the bounds could depend on *when* during the disaster (measured by s/S) the stock market response to duration news is measured. Numerical analysis in the Online Appendix shows that the results are very robust to the first concern. The bounds change negligibly as S is varied. The analysis also establishes that measuring the market response earlier (e.g., $s = 1$) is conservative in the sense that the implied welfare gains for a given market response increase with s .

¹³ This is a simplification. Candidate vaccines will actually undergo multiple overlapping trial sequences with different patient populations, delivery modalities, or medical objectives (endpoints). One sequence could fail while others succeed. Trials can also combine phases I and II or II and III. In our empirical implementation we focus on the most advanced trial of a candidate. This follows Wong et al. (2018).

¹⁴ For example, if an RNA-based platform proves to be safe and effective, then all candidates in this family would have a higher likelihood of success. In October 2020, two candidate vaccines had their trials paused because of adverse reactions: both were based on adenovirus platforms.

¹⁵ Our baseline success probabilities employ estimates in Pronker et al. (2013) augmented by our own sample of historical outcomes of infectious disease vaccine trials from pharmaceutical research firm BioMedTracker. Our baseline duration estimates are based on projections from the pharmaceutical and financial press during 2020 as detailed in the Online Appendix.

¹⁶ The simulation procedure is presented graphically in a flowchart in the Online Appendix.

¹⁷ We do not employ these in our empirical work because the forecasters may condition their views on contemporaneous stock market reactions, whereas our measure does not employ any financial market information.

¹⁸ As of the time of writing, the website of Baker et al. (2020b) had classified days through June 2020. We append September 3 and September 23 as two dates with negative jumps that were attributable to non-vaccine-related news.

¹⁹ Note that the VPI is, by construction, a conditional expectation, whose ex ante expected change is therefore zero. Slightly more accurately, if T^* is the forecast deployment time, the date- t VPI may be expressed as $E_t[T - t]$, whose expected change over a day is minus one day or approximately -0.004 years.

²⁰ Returns are computed from after-hours S&P 500 futures changes in a 60-minute postannouncement window.

²¹ Our clinical trial data end in October 2020. As of the end of that month, the level of VPI was 0.55.

²² The theoretically wider bounds shown in Figure 2 include models of essentially pure volatility shocks, with high $\sigma(1)$ and disaster severity $\zeta\chi \approx 0$. Although these are valid parameter choices, they seem an inaccurate representation of the risks associated with a pandemic.

²³ These broad rallies also received much attention in the media. See, for instance, Matt Levine, *Money Stuff*, May 19, 2020 (<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-05-19/money-stuff-it-s-a-good-time-to-raise-vaccine-money>), and July 16, 2020 (<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-16/a-vaccine-could-cure-airlines>); John Authers, *Bloomberg Opinion*, November 10, 2020 (<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-10/>

[stocks-rotation-on-vaccine-may-cause-fallout-for-quant-funds](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-10/stocks-rotation-on-vaccine-may-cause-fallout-for-quant-funds)); and Laurence Fletcher and Robin Wigglesworth, *Financial Times*, November 14, 2020 (<https://www.ft.com/content/886c52dd-b822-4152-886e-8dbd72da44a7>).

²⁴ Values are commonly reported as percentage reductions of permanent income. Such numbers are directly comparable to our percentages of (permanent) reductions in q because consumption is proportional to q .

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