Leadership in a Liberal Democracy: Johnson's Private Polls and Public Announcements.

Lawrence R. Jacobs
Robert Y. Shapiro

Columbia Institue for Tele-Information
Graduate School of Business
809 Uris Hall
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027
(212) 854-4222

Leadership in a Liberal Democracy: Johnson's Private Polls and Public Announcements.*

Lawrence R. Jacobs
University of Minnesota

Robert Y. Shapiro
Columbia University

Prepared for delivery at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 15-17.

*We would like to acknowledge the able assistance of Scott Adler, Scott Allard, Angela Hernandez, Paul Kramer, Harpreet Mahajan, and Eli Schulman; the staff at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library provided archival assistance. This project has also benefitted from research grants from the University of Minnesota Graduate School, the University of Minnesota McKnight-Land Grant Professorship, the Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation, and the National Science Foundation (SES-9122440). Of course, we remain responsible for the paper's interpretations.

Abstract

We examine the relationship between responsiveness to, and leadership of, public opinion. During three years of the Johnson administration (1964-66), we examine the association of the President's private polling information and his publicly announced positions. Combining quantitative research with archival evidence, we find that the electoral cycle and changing political conditions contribute to variations in the degree of responsiveness and leadership: the former declines over the course of the administration, while the latter rises. While Johnson's positions reliably echoed the reported preferences of respondents during the 1964 election year, responsiveness trails off in 1965 and 1966. Conversely, the impact of Johnson's positions on reported opinion starts relatively low and then dramatically increases during the subsequent years. We conclude that the relationship between public opinion and policy making is dynamic and changing.

Introduction

Until recently, scholars and informed observers commonly assumed that American public opinion had little, if any, direct impact on policy making. At best, the policy preferences of ordinary people set the broad parameters of policy discussions; within these broad limits, elites had free reign to determine government decisions. Clearly, politicians have become preoccupied with tracking public preferences, but it has been assumed that these efforts are geared toward identifying the broad boundaries of what is possible. In terms of detailed policy decisions, public opinion has been accepted to be nearly irrelevant.

Within the last decade, however, researchers have significantly revised the conventional wisdom, arguing that the mass public is quite influential in the making of policy. This account is based on extensive and diverse research on the opinion-policy relationship -- research that encompasses the state and national levels, domestic as well as foreign policy, and different time periods (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Jacobs 1993 and 1992a; Stimson, 1991; Erikson, 1976; Monroe, 1979).

This new research has made important contributions to rethinking policy makers' relationship with the general public, but it remains vulnerable to two serious challenges. First, the causal connection between public opinion and government decisions remains tenuous. High correlations of polling results with policy indicators may well be a spurious relationship, reflecting the impact -- among other factors -- of real-world events on both

opinion and policy. Doubt lingers, then, over whether some other factor accounts for the opinion-policy correlations. Would policy makers opt for the same decision even if public opinion were ignored?

The second challenge is conceptual. Most previous research has treated the opinion-policy relationship as unidirectional: either public opinion effects decisions or policy influences preferences. Indeed, under one model of liberal democracy, strong leaders are expected not to be influenced by public preferences but rather to "educate" the citizenry. Alternatively, responsive officeholders are expected to offer minimal direction, with leaders facilitating the serious consideration of popular policy issues. Clearly, though, this choice is artificial. In a liberal democracy, officeholders cannot -- without significant political risk -- either disregard public opinion or mechanically respond to mass preferences by encoding them into government policy.

We argue that these two challenges can be addressed in a way that enriches (rather than undermines) the current thrust of opinion-policy research. To rethink the relationship between public opinion and decision making, this paper focuses on Lyndon Johnson's presidency between December 1963 and December 1966. In particular, we use primary archival records and quantitative analysis to study whether and how the Johnson White House used private public opinion surveys.

I. Chasing the Old Demons of Causation and Conceptualization

We address the problem of causation by making two modifications in the current study of the opinion-policy relationship: we use a new source of polling data and a different methodology. Research that reports public opinion's effect on government officials raises an obvious question: where is the smoking gun? Past research uses **published** public opinion surveys on the assumption that the preferences reported in these surveys found their way into the policy making process (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Erikson, 1976; Monroe, 1979). Clearly, though, public opinion surveys that a key policy maker actually assembled and used would have a more plausible and direct connection to government decisions.

This paper uses data assembled by a key politician -- namely, the private public opinion surveys that Oliver Quayle conducted for the Johnson White House. The regular use by presidents of private polling has its roots in Kennedy's 1960 presidential race (Jacobs, 1992b). Kennedy's successful race inaugurated private polling as an enduring, institutional commitment of the White House.

Johnson introduced two major innovations: he increased the number of polls and enhanced the organizational attention they received.[1] In addition to receiving published polls (often before they were publicly released), the White House used 119 of Quayle's surveys in the three years after Kennedy's assassination in November 1963.[2] After October 1966, the White House decided to rely on other private pollsters and received only 12 additional Quayle polls.[3] Compared to previous presidents, the Johnson White

House became a veritable warehouse of opinion surveys (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992a).

The Johnson White House's second innovation was to enhance the role of polling in the White House's organization. In general, Lyndon Johnson's organization of the White House eschewed formal structure in favor of a highly personal management style that relied on one-on-one relations and the President's personal coordination of White House activity (Redford and McCulley, 1986). Johnson welcomed this loose organization because it met his insatiable thirst for information. The White House, though, was not unstructured; senior aides were given responsibility as "centers of integration," directing clusters of subordinate staff members and consolidating information before passing it to the President. These centers were differentiated based on policy and on function; for instance, Bill Moyers performed several roles but was assigned primary responsibility for the public relations function.

Opinion surveys and, specifically, Quayle's polls were fully incorporated into the Johnson White House. As part of his functional area of responsibility, Moyers received all of Quayle's polls and supervised their analysis; the Johnson White House introduced new staff positions to assist Moyers' with scheduling, assembling and analyzing polls.[4]

Moyers and later other staff members responded to Johnson's demands for regular polling information by preparing several different kinds of reports.[5] Staffers would at times summarize

findings in a number of polls over time in order to address an overarching White House concern like winning the 1964 election or building public support for the administration's actions in Vietnam.[6] Moreover, the White House's polling specialists prepared detailed analyses of each separate survey in order to identify methodological weaknesses and to "put each individual poll... in the larger scheme of things."[7] During one period between September 1965 and September 1966, the White House received over 70 polls, most of them by Oliver Quayle; over 90% of these polls were analyzed by a staff member and sent along to Bill Moyers, who typically forwarded them to the President. Johnson encouraged the polling specialists to share their results with other staff members and with speechwriters.[8]

The organizational attention devoted to polls reflects their strategic importance. The Johnson White House began avidly consuming Quayle's private polls as it prepared for the 1964 elections; Quayle's thirty nine polls during this period provided information on policy preferences and presidential popularity that helped Johnson evaluate his prospects for winning future primaries and electoral college votes. A significant development during Johnson's presidency was that polls continued to be regularly used <u>after</u> the election in order to monitor the "political climate" in states and cities across the country; by July 1965, seven senior aides used updated notebooks of Quayle's surveys.[9] The White House, then, attached strategic importance to polls during the governing period: they helped pinpoint when the "time was right" to

push an issue and they measured the effectiveness of presidential arguments -- whether, as one White House polling specialist recalled, "your agitation, your propaganda is finally softening up the opposition."[10]

In short, the number and organizational importance attached to Quayle's polls represents a kind of smoking gun for those investigating public opinion's effect on policy making. Johnson's decision to assemble these surveys as sources of political "intelligence" and to integrate them in his decision making provides a direct empirical basis for causally connecting public opinion and policy making. In addition, we have also tailored our statistical analysis of this polling data to explore causal connections: as we discuss later, lags are used to examine the temporal ordering of polling results and presidential decisions.

Our second modification of opinion-policy research to address the problem of causation is methodological. Evidence for the influential public argument generally has been based on analysis of aggregate-level relationships: the most abstract approach compares public "mood" with policy makers' overall ideological positions (Stimson, 1991); a somewhat less abstract approach correlates opinion survey results with large numbers of policy decisions (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Erikson, 1976; Monroe, 1979).

This analysis of aggregate statistical relationships leaves public opinion's causal connection to policy making in an attenuated state. How and why real politicians have focussed on and have been influenced by polling results receives little

empirical attention. A fuller understanding of causality requires that statistical analysis be supplemented with political analysis of the motivations and calculations of individual officeholders.

This paper will shift the analysis of the opinion-policy connection from the broad aggregate-level relationships to the more direct connection between a president's polls and his decisions. This requires methodological pluralism -- the mixing of quantitative methods with more qualitative historical approaches. Specifically, interviews and archival evidence supply more intensive, indepth evidence both to explain a politicians' intentions and calculations, and to explore further -- through a few specific policies -- whether and why private polls have an impact on political decision making. For the case of the Johnson administration, we will use interviews and archival records from the Johnson Library to explore the White House's motivation for conducting polls and its use of survey results. To what extent did Quayle's polls cause Johnson to advocate specific policies? If reported public opinion has a significant effect, why was it considered critical?

We are proposing, then, two modifications in existing research to address criticisms regarding causality; but there is another major limitation associated with the conceptualization of officeholders' relationship with the mass public as unidirectional. What is neglected, though, is the possibility that the opinion-policy relationship is interactive or reciprocal (we use these terms synonymously).

Rather than being mutually exclusive, responsiveness to public opinion and attempts to direct it may coexist. Thus, major politicians (like presidents) may be attracted to strong, persistent public preferences because they calculate that advocating specific, popular issues can modify the public's overall evaluations of themselves and demonstrate their leadership qualities. In this case, attempts to direct the mass public are informed and driven by public preferences (Jacobs, 1993, 1992a, and 1992b; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992a). Alternatively, politicians may decide that outright defiance of public preferences is unnecessarily costly in political terms; a more attractive approach is to use their actions to lead the public to prefer the officeholder's desired policies. Reconceptualizing the opinion-policy relationship as interactive is consistent with electoral pressures on politicians to both track and direct public preferences (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992a).

In short, we explore the opinion-policy relationship by studying the connections between Quayle's private polls for the White House and Johnson's public policy stances. Evidence concerning the opinion-policy relationship will be interpreted in terms of whether it confirms the effect of public opinion, the influence of leadership, or the combination of both responsiveness and direction. We are especially concerned with examining the variation in Johnson's relative attention to responsiveness and direction; we will track the differences that emerge both over the course of his administration, and in a comparison between his

presidency and the activities of John Kennedy.

Measures and Methods

For the statistical analysis, we collected two types of data. We measured Johnson's policy positions by tracking his publicly articulated positions through a systematic content analysis of presidential statements recorded in The Public Papers of the Presidents and The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.[11] (As part of our coding of the full range of presidential statements, we included press conferences -- a particularly common mechanism for Johnson to announce his positions.) We covered the period from January 1964 until December 1966, providing policy statements for 36 separate months.

Johnson's policy stances were coded on a five point scale from explicitly supportive (+2) to explicitly opposed (-2), with the midpoint (0) representing a neutral or unclear position. We then summed these measures for each month, producing a monthly measure for the content of presidential statements on an issue;[12] unless otherwise noted, this measure is used in our reported results discussed below. We also created more detailed indicators of policy content. In addition to measuring the space devoted to an issue, we coded into 39 categories the audience to which the president's announcement was directed and whether it was delivered in oral or written form.[13]

The second type of data used in our quantitative analysis involves public opinion and is based on policy goals that the public cited as important in Quayle's reports to Johnson. We used

67 polls that were archived in the Johnson Presidential Library: 29 polls covered the period before the 1964 election, 11 were conducted in 1965, and 27 were done in 1966.[14] The polls were conducted in separate states, including some states polled on multiple occasions.[15] The policy goals that the public was reported to prefer are generally (though not exclusively) based on responses to an open-ended question regarding the most important problem facing the country.[16] These responses represent an improvement on typical salience measures: they not only identified policy areas (e.g. Social Security), but also generally indicated the preferred policy directions (e.g. increasing Social Security payments). In addition, many of Quayle's polls measured whether respondents evaluated Johnson's handling of a particular issue favorably or unfavorably. Because we focussed on state-wide surveys which studied respondents' national issues of concern, our polling data represents a subset of the public opinion data consumed by the White House.[17]

Using Quayle's opinion data, we created the following three measures: a measure of the salience of a policy objective for the public (i.e. the average percentage of the public citing the policy), a measure of the relative ranking of this public support as compared to other issues that were identified by respondents,[18] and a simple dichotomous measure of whether an issue was cited at all in Harris' report to Johnson. Quayle's surveys spanned 35 separate months from December 1963 through October 1966. We constructed monthly opinion measures by averaging the state poll

results (percentages and ranks) over each time period.

Overall, our data cover 94 policy issues that were raised -- that is, issues that were cited in Quayle's poll reports and in the president's public policy statements.[19] Obviously, our data set permits a fine-grained analysis of specific issues and policy directions and is not limited to studying broad policy categories like "social welfare".

Our final data set, then, consists of monthly measures of reported public opinion and Johnson's policy positions for 94 issues over a 36 month period, yielding effective N's of more than 2400 "issue-month" cases.[20] This extensive data set (a type of pooled time series) enabled us both to compare many issues and time periods, and to use monthly time lags. We used time lags, for example, to analyze the extent to which reported poll results during September 1964 were related to Johnson's policy position during that month as well as during October.

The use of lags is consistent with the way the surveys were conducted and utilized: we dated the polls by the completion of the survey report and it would normally take time for the results to be analyzed and used by the president and his aides. Moreover, comparing variables when each are lagged enables us to explore temporal ordering and thereby study causal priority. In particular, lags are used to study the relative effects of opinion and policy: we compare regression and correlation coefficients for the relationship between the lagged effect of opinion and policy, and the impact of lagged policy on opinion. "Leadership" will be

inferred when the public salience of a policy grows after a president identifies and emphasizes a policy position -- the public modifies its ranking of an issue's importance in the direction chosen by the chief executive. Conversely, strong responsiveness is inferred when the president becomes more likely to identify an issues as important following a change in the salience of the issue to the public.

Analyzing the effects of time sequences across many cases makes it possible to explore initially whether it is reported opinion or the White House's own agenda that is driving presidential leadership. Further, we can compare these statistical results with causal processes revealed through interviews and archival research.

B. Analysis

1. **Responsive Leadership and the 1964 Electoral Process**

In 1964, the Johnson White House pursued two innovative leadership strategies that integrated responsiveness to reported public preferences: one involved short-term planning for the fall contest with Goldwater; the other entailed a longer-term approach for shaping the president's post-election mandate.

Kennedy's 1960 campaign followed a "priming" strategy that focussed on the short-term period of the general election (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992a). It used policy issues, which Louis Harris's polls identified as salient and popular, in order to modify the public's evaluation of the candidates' image and to widen Kennedy's

personal appeal. The campaign's objective in advocating carefully selected (popular) issues was not intended to win over or convert voters based on their self-interest in achieving desired benefits. Rather, the Democratic ticket adopted a limited set of (spatially distinct) issue positions in order to adjust the standards by which their leadership qualities would be perceived, evaluated, and judged by voters.

In 1964, the Johnson campaign pursued a similar strategy in attempting to shape Goldwater's image as a threatening "extremist." To define Goldwater's image, the Johnson forces took advantage of the unusual distance between Goldwater's positions and the midpoint of public opinion on salient and accessible issues (Page, 1978). To emphasize Goldwater's "recklessness," the Democratic ticket used issues that Quayle had identified as enjoying high popularity and salience -- protecting social security and pursuing disarmament and peace. The campaign developed devastating advertisements -- like the daisy girl piece -- and devoted an exceptional amount of presidential attention to highlighting the contrast between Goldwater's positions on these issues and voters' strong preferences

Johnson's second -- and perhaps more innovative -- leadership strategy originated well before the fall: it involved "tak[ing] a positive approach" and was geared to the governing period after November. The Johnson forces plotted the President's strategy not simply to win the contest but to create an unmistakable popular mandate, which would shape the governing process after the

election. The point was to use the race to focus the attention of disparate policy makers on Johnson's popular agenda and to enhance his post-election influence in pressing for enactment of publicly supported programs. Again, the campaign attempted to combine leadership with responsiveness: the objective was to create political momentum behind programs that already enjoyed popular support in order to propel the White House's policy agenda after election day.

This strategy was possible because the outcome was anticipated well in advance of election day by the White House and other political observers. Within the White House, Johnson's closest aides, who had found previous campaigns difficult to predict, concluded "quite early" in the 1964 race that the outcome was "absolutely certain."[21]

With the White House assuming that there "wasn't any doubt... that the incumbent was going to win," a consensus formed among senior White House officials by the early summer of 1964 that Johnson "has an opportunity... to shape the mandate he wants and needs on November 3rd" (our emphasis).[22] The general objective was to create a mandate for a "new, creative period [which]... clear[ed] up long-hanging domestic business."[23] Not satisfied to win a broad endorsement for "vigorous moves," White House officials sought to capitalize on Johnson's historic "opportunity not only to win a decisive mandate... but also to shape that mandate." Thus, nearly half a year before election day small groups of policy specialists prepared for the campaign by "quietly... work[ing] on

specific subjects" for Johnson's 1965 legislative program.[24]

The Johnson camp, then, viewed issues as a campaign instrument. Given the strategic importance attached to presidential position taking, the Johnson campaign carefully selected policy areas and the policy direction of its proposals. The main criteria in selecting a few specific issues for presidential promotion was the White House's interpretation of public preferences. To pursue an "effective" strategy of building the candidates' respective images and shaping Johnson's post-election mandate, aides insisted that the specific issues the President campaigned on must be consistent with the "consensus" or "broad opinions... of the American people."[25] Indeed, in the run-up to the election as well as during the campaign, Douglas Cater and other aides analyzed Quayle's findings concerning the public's policy preferences in order to flag popular positions for Johnson to advocate.[26]

Our quantitative analysis confirms that Johnson's positions responded to public opinion. For the entire period of Johnson's presidency, there was just a modest correspondence between Quayle's surveys and the President's subsequent policy stances during the following one or two months. Policy positions reported as salient in the private polls were about 23 percent ($p<.05$) more likely to be subsequently addressed by the president than issue positions not volunteered by the public. Among 679 issues cited in Quayle's accounts, Johnson took popular positions on 39 percent of them;

among the 1953 issues not cited in the poll reports, the president took positions on only 16% of them.

This moderate finding was echoed in the regression results. The correlation between the average percentage of public support for a policy each month and the position the president took was .27 ($p<.05$).[27] The b coefficient of .25 for the regression of presidential position on public support indicates that for each 4 percent of the public preferring a policy, there was one additional congruent policy statement (coded "1" in our content analysis) during the month after the poll. These overall findings are consistent with our analysis of Kennedy: the 23% difference and modest correlation for Johnson are similar to our findings concerning the relationship between Kennedy's positions in his campaign and administration (as reported in the New York Times) and Louis Harris's poll reports for him.[28]

These summary measures, however, mask critical variations over time (as in the case of the Kennedy years). Disaggregating these overall measures reveals significant variations in the opinion-policy relationship. The impact of public opinion on Johnson's policy positions was stronger for 1964 than for 1966 and, especially 1965. In general, the other variables we created (including our measures of Johnson's audience, the amount of time he devoted to an issue, and different codings of Quayle's reports) are consistent with the thrust of our findings reported here.

Our findings for 1964 are consistent with the White House's political calculations, which are recorded in Johnson's archives.

The difference between the percentage of policy statement cited in the polls and the proportion of issues not cited jumps from 23% for the entire administration to 27% in 1964 (49% versus 22%). More significantly, the b coefficient for lagged opinion's impact on the direction of presidential position jumps from .25 for all three years to .42 (r=.24). (See Tables 1 and 2.)

(Tables 1 and 2 about here.)

The following types of issues, which were salient to respondents in Quayle's surveys, were also publicly advocated by Johnson during the fall of 1964: a secure (or expanding) Social Security program, Medicare legislation, increased aid for schools, reduction of unemployment, as well as increased defense spending and commitment to disarmament and peace. For each of these issues, strong public support in August or September was followed in the subsequent month by decisively stronger presidential statements in favor of these policies. Indeed, for each issue, the change in reported opinion prompted a subsequent jump in the amount of time that Johnson devoted to advocating it -- a two to ten fold increase.[29]

Johnson's strong and repeated positions on issues like Medicare fully echoed top public concerns. Interviews and archival evidence confirm that the Administration decided to create a "specific mandate" for Medicare precisely because officials accurately perceived it to be salient and highly popular among the general public. With the White House's earliest polls in December 1963 reporting Medicare's exceptionally strong public support,

presidential aide Douglas Cater repeatedly informed Johnson and other White House officials that Medicare was one of the few issues that attracted the "largest general interest" and support. Cater based his recommendation on his "analysis of the Quayle State Surveys.... [and, in particular,] the ratings of the voter selection of the 'most important' issues." For evidence of Medicare's popularity, he pointed to Quayle's findings that assisting the elderly was among three issues on which "voter approval is particularly high."[30]

The President and his closest advisers agreed that Medicare was one of the major issues "found to be working for [the President]." As a result, they repeatedly decided during the campaign to rank health reform at the top of Johnson's legislative "must" list.[31] As Wilbur Mills recalled, "Johnson made it a number one, top priority issue of the 1964 election"; a senior HEW administrator explained that Medicare was not only an issue in the presidential race but was also a focus of many congressional contests.[32]

Johnson's position on Civil Rights also reflected public preferences. Quayle's polls throughout 1964 identified the President's handling of the general issue of "integration problems" as one of the public's top concern. By August, the surveys began to pick up support for more specific "pro-integration" measures to create equal rights and fight discrimination. Echoing these reports, Johnson adopted in 1964 and, specifically, during the campaign strong positions advocating civil rights and, specifically

attacked job and voting discrimination.

Although the White House feared that the issue of race would dominate the campaign and could be the "one [issue] that... elect[ed] Goldwater,"[33] Quayle reassured Johnson by reporting that in most states gains among Republican moderates would outweigh backlash losses; he projected Johnson "scor[ing]" with a "frontlash -- Republicans planning to voter for Johnson" because they "recognize the need for Negro equality" and other moderate issues.[34] He concluded in his final set of surveys that "we have not seen the frontlash fading fast enough nor the backlash increasing fast enough to make the election close."[35] Moreover, while many southerners did not support his position, Quayle explained that their opposition was not as overwhelming as initially feared; in some states like Kentucky the backlash was "not enough to cause a dramatic drop in Johnson support."[36]

Significantly, these patterns of responsiveness in 1964 is present for both domestic and foreign policy.[37] For the entire period of Johnson's presidency, there was modest and nearly indistinguishable levels of the correspondence across domestic issues (b=.23, r=27) and foreign policy matters (b=.28, r=.27). (See Table 3.) Yet, once these overall measures are disaggregated for each year, it becomes clear that the level of responsiveness in 1964 is higher than it is for the entire period. Table 4 suggests that for domestic policy, the b coefficient jumps from .23 overall to .50 in 1964 (r=.37); for foreign policy, it rises from .28 to .30.[38] Johnson was clearly preoccupied with responding to voters'

homefront concerns: in 1964, Johnson's sensitivity to the public's domestic concerns is higher than his responsiveness both on all issues (a b coefficient of .50 versus .42) and on foreign policy issues (.50 versus .30).

(Tables 3 and 4 about here.)

Even though it is lower, the President's sensitivity to Americans' foreign policy worries is noteworthy and consistent with his campaign's overall strategy. Private polling results on voters' foreign policy concerns gave the White House valuable information that Goldwater's position on utilizing American military force (including the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam) was inconsistent with public preferences. Goldwater's divergence from public opinion offered Johnson yet another opportunity to portray his Republican opponent as "reckless." During the last phase of the campaign, Johnson strengthened his popular position on the issue of military force and dramatically increased the amount of time he devoted to discussing it: disarmament, avoiding war, and pursuing responsible stewardship over the country's nuclear weapons became among the set of issues he discussed most.

In general, our analysis of 1964 and, especially, the fall campaign reveals cases of clear responsiveness; nonetheless, we also find instances in which Johnson took positions that either lacked support in his polls or, more importantly, directly contradicted public preferences.[39] For instance, a relatively high proportion of Quayle's respondents persistently identified <u>too much</u> foreign aid as a major problem, while Johnson repeatedly staked out

an opposing position. Foreign aid was an area where Johnson, like Kennedy, sought to assure other elites of his worthiness to be president; he resisted public opinion and, instead, sought to educate or lead the public toward a position which advanced the country's national interests (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992a).

Another presidential position at odds with public opinion was the War on Poverty; here Johnson sought to lead Americans in the direction of his policy. Quayle reported no strong public interest in the War on Poverty throughout the early spring of July 1964. But, beginning in earnest in March, when he proposed the Economic Opportunity Act to Congress, the President made strong and extensive comments on it. Because of his considerable travelling and speaking on behalf of this legislation, the amount of time he devoted to the issue leaped over 1000% between February and April. Congress passed the Act in August 1964, giving Johnson the opportunity to renew his crusade for fighting poverty. Johnson's leadership doubled public concern for poverty; subsequent months showed a similar pattern of non-existent or low levels of public interest that rocketed up after a series of presidential statements.

Nevertheless, issues like foreign aid and the war on poverty are clearly exceptions. In general, Johnson was more likely to take stances that Quayle identified as salient and popular than on policies which lacked this level of support. What is significant is not just that Johnson cited issues identified by the public, but that his stance is consistent with the public's preferred direction

for policy.[40]

The opinion-policy relationship in 1964, however, clearly changed in 1965 and 1966 (as will be further discussed below). Compared to 1965 and 1966, the regression and correlation results for 1964 were stronger; the greater responsiveness reflects the impact of the electoral cycle and Johnson's political need to define Goldwater's image and shape (in a more positive vein) his own post-election mandate. Thus, on domestic issues, the b coefficients for responsiveness are highest in 1964, falling off during the subsequent years to .13 in 1965 and .11 in 1966. Johnson's responsiveness on foreign policy, however, produce b coefficients that rise from .30 in 1964 to .41 in 1966; as will become clear below, the increased responsiveness in 1966 on foreign policy may well be an artifact of Johnson's strong leadership efforts.

Compared to the end of the Kennedy campaign and especially Kennedy's position taking during his historic debates with Nixon, the findings for campaign year 1964 seem weaker. The differences between congruent positions cited in the debates and those not cited appears to be stronger than the results for the Johnson campaign (a 36 point difference compared to the 27 point difference). Kennedy's relatively greater responsiveness seems reasonable given his close race with Nixon; Johnson had comparatively less intense electoral motivation for following public preferences because of the near certainty of his victory over Goldwater.

In short, the statistical and archival evidence indicates that Johnson was responsive to public preferences. These findings indicate that Johnson's behavior during the general election campaign contradicts theoretical expectations that public opinion has minimal influence on policy decisions. On specific policy issues like Medicare, strong public preferences guided deliberations within the Johnson White House in 1964.

2. Responsive Leadership

In responding to the issues that the public ranked as important, however, the Johnson campaign did not simply intend to implement the public's preferences. Rather, it viewed popular policy issues as a political resource for directing the public and the Washington policy making establishment. Indeed, Johnson's use of popular issues to define Goldwater's image as an extremist appears to have been quite effective. Despite Goldwater's attempt to move to the center by modifying his views on issues like Social Security, he was perceived by voters as far outside the mainstream (Page, 1978).

Moreover, Johnson was also quite successful in using popular and salient issues to shape his post-election mandate within Washington. Following the leadership strategy crafted six months before the election, Johnson began "whipping his staff into... [a] frenzy" "[a]lmost from the very hour that the polls closed." The President's concern was to convert the impression of a mandate -- that his landslide was based on voter approval of his support for popular policies like Medicare -- into political capital for

passing legislation.[41]

Indeed, Washington elites did conclude that voters' resounding rejection of Goldwater in favor of Democratic congressional and presidential candidates represented strong popular support for the social reforms Johnson had campaigned on.[42] As the White House projected before the election, the "mandate of the election" -- as one administration official recalled -- "gave the [A]dministration tremendous driving strength in the new Congress."[43] Within Congress, even Republicans accepted Johnson's popular mandate for pursuing reform: Party members in the House installed a more pragmatic Minority Leader (Gerald Ford) and acknowledged the necessity -- as the Republican counsel on Ways and Means suggested -- to "face political realities" (Harris, 1966).

Medicare's reception by Washingtonians illustrates Johnson's success in using his campaign to frame his post-election mandate: Johnson's victory was perceived as creating a "specific mandate" for health reform. Thus, members of Congress "read the 1964 election" as "giving a specific mandate for a series of liberal legislative proposals" and, particularly, as "being favorable to the Medicare program."[44] Medicare's passage became a "foregone conclusion"; even earlier opponents of Medicare now "accept[ed] President Johnson's mandate" and the fact that Medicare was "going to pass."[45] Accordingly, the Republican congressional leadership abandoned its previous intransigent opposition to reform and proposed its own health insurance bill.

In short, the Johnson White House deliberately tracked the

public's policy preferences in order to identify its candidate with popular issues. Yet, this responsiveness coexisted with the White House's attempt to shape the perceptions of the general public as well as Washington elites. Interviews as well as archival and statistical evidence suggests that a circularity in Johnson's relationship with the mass public existed; this relationship, though, was apparently driven in 1964 by public opinion.

3. From Responsive Leadership to Directive Leadership: 1965 and 1966

Beginning in 1965, Johnson's relationship with Americans qualitatively changed. Rather than public opinion driving his position taking, Johnson's stances significantly influenced what the public identified as important.

Both quantitative and archival evidence provide striking confirmation of the shift in Johnson's leadership strategy toward directing the public's policy preferences. What most noticeably comes through in our statistical analysis is a clear change in the relationship between presidential positions and Quayle's surveys (see Tables 1 and 2).

As Table 1 indicates, the difference between the percentage of policy statement cited in the polls and the proportion of issues not cited drops from 27 percent in 1964 to 14 percent in 1965. In 1966, the difference rebounds to 22% but fails to reach the 1964 level.

Table 2 most clearly captures the dramatic shift in Johnson's leadership strategy. Consistent with the findings in Table 1, the

regression coefficients for the lagged effect of opinion on policy (responsiveness) noticeably drops off after 1964: the fall of the b coefficient (which is the pertinent "effect" statistic here) from .42 to .11 in 1965 is striking, with a subsequent rise to .29 in 1966. The responsiveness in 1966 is still well below the 1964 level. Some increased White House responsiveness is consistent with its interests in helping Democratic candidates in the mid-term congressional elections; the rise from 1965 is in line with our emphasis on the effect of the electoral cycle on presidential responsiveness. But, the political dynamics of 1966 were much different from 1964, stemming from Johnson's greater motivation during the presidential in contrast to congressional election. Indeed, we think that the findings on responsiveness for 1966 are also probably inflated.[46]

What is most striking is that the temporal decline in presidential responsiveness coincides with an extraordinary rise in presidential direction. To study this reciprocal effect, we used our state-level measures of public preferences on the assumption that they could pick up national processes of opinion leadership.[47] Our use of state opinion to study the impact of national statements produces findings that are consistent with previous research on public opinion processes nationally (Page and Shapiro, 1992, Chapter 7).

As indicated in Table 2, the decline in responsiveness after 1964 is matched by a corresponding and dramatic increase in direction -- the impact of Johnson's positions on public opinion

the following month. Indeed, the overall correlation is stronger than for the reverse effect of lagged opinion on presidential policy. The b coefficient for the overall period of 1964 through 1966 was .24 (r=.23): 2 explicit policy statement (each coded "2") by the president in one month will be associated with a one percent change in the salient public support for that position. This significant effect of presidential direction is consistent with previous research examining its indirect effect through the media (Page and Shapiro, 1985; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey, 1987).

Examining the lagged effect of policy for separate years reveals that Johnson's relationship with Americans was dynamic and changing. Between 1964 and 1966, the b coefficients (and r's) increased from .12 (r=.24) to .83 (.33) and, then, .90 (.48). Consistent with Johnson's political motivation, his impact on opinion in 1964 is distinctly lower than it is 1965 and 1966 (by a factor of six or seven). The strong regression result for policy's impact in 1966 (.90) also suggests that our correlations concerning the effect of opinion (for 1965 and, especially 1966) may be artifacts of presidential leadership: Johnson's position taking directed the public's agenda, creating the impression that his stances were shared by most Americans.

If presidential direction is a dominant concern (especially after 1964), then there should be important variations across policy areas. In the area of foreign policy and defense matters, Americans are exceptionally dependent on the president for information and guidance. Often only the president has information

on sensitive national security matters, with debate limited to a small circle of advisers. We would expect, then, that the president has the greatest potential for directing public preferences when it comes to foreign policy matters (Page and Shapiro, 1992). But, these expectations are not born out by the results reported in Table 3: no significant difference in the correlation and regression results emerge when we compared domestic and foreign policy during the entire period of Johnson's presidency.

Table 4, though, presents a dramatically different and more dynamic picture of powerful presidential leadership. In terms of responsiveness, no real divergence develops between domestic and foreign policy. (As suggested above, we suspect that the rise in responsiveness in foreign policy during 1966 may well reflect the strong impact of Johnson's leadership in 1965 and 1966.)

A stunning divergence develops, though, when considering presidential direction. On domestic matters, the lagged effect of presidential position taking on public opinion produced a b coefficient of .20 in 1964, which rises to .57 in 1965 before falling off the following year. In contrast, the impact of Johnson's foreign policy on public opinion produces regression coefficients that dramatically increase between 1964 and 1966 from .08 to 1.45. The Johnson administration is clearly characterized by "two presidencies" when it came to its relationship with public opinion.

What is especially striking and significant about our findings

for both domestic and foreign policy is the inverse variation between responsiveness and direction that emerges over time. While the effect of opinion was greatest in 1964 and then declines, the impact of policy is lowest in 1964 and then dramatically increases as election pressures ease. The statistical evidence suggests, then, that presidential responsiveness and direction coexist, but that the relative weight given to either varies.

Archival evidence confirms the important shift toward presidential direction that occurs after 1964. Rather than responding to what the public wants, Johnson was intent on pursuing his own policy agenda, using polling information (at best) to monitor public reactions to his appeals.

The White House's concern with public opinion was fuelled by the fairly steady decline in the President's popularity rating beginning in 1965. By the second half of 1965, the White House's concern with the President's popularity rating intensified its interest in public preferences toward policy issues as reported in surveys by Quayle and other pollsters (like Harris and Gallup). Indeed, archival records suggest that Quayle's reports on the public's policy preferences and approval of Johnson became an increasing object of discussion among White House officials and at staff meetings.[48] Johnson himself received a steady flow of reports from Moyers and his assistants. For instance, as White House aides began to discuss the 1966 State of the Union address, the President was sent a report on the public's policy concerns to provide "guidance in determining which goals to set."[49]

The issue that received the greatest attention within the White House was Vietnam -- especially after February 1965 when American involvement escalated. Following Johnson's inauguration, the White House's strategy for defusing its "public affairs problems" was to rely on the administration's "capacity to change the public mood" (our emphasis).[50] The White House's polling specialist agreed that it was critical to make Americans "more knowledgeable about Vietnam": "the more we can educate the people, the more general support we get for our policies."[51] Other administration officials also decided that it was necessary to "make a massive and concerted effort to create a more positive, constructive, affirmative mood."[52] The best tactic, it was agreed, was to "keep the President massively visible through every device possible," especially through media coverage.[53] Johnson himself was fully committed to "maintain[ing] press concentration on the White House as the vital center of news and interpretation."[54] A consensus formed within the administration, then, that on foreign policy and, especially, Vietnam policy Johnson could -- as a Harvard academic (S.M.Lipset) concluded -- "make opinion [and]... not follow it."[55]

The White House's polling were a critical component of its efforts to direct public opinion; as one official explained, they provided useful feedback, making "sure that [the President's] approach is reaching the American public in the way he wants them affected."[56] Indeed, Quayle regularly tracked American's reactions to events in Vietnam as the administration escalated American

involvement in February 1965; the polling results were forwarded to the Johnson via Moyers. By March 1965, Quayle warned Johnson that he "must handle volatile public opinion on Vietnam with kid gloves."[57]

Part of the administration's leadership efforts involved refocusing public attention away from Vietnam and toward other issues. As one aide warned, the White House faced "one-dimensional thinking" in which "the Vietnam War dominates the headlines and the national mind." If it is judged according to this one standard, the administration's public standing would undoubtedly suffer. Rather, he argued, "it is <u>essential</u> for the President to work harder to emphasize, as dramatically as possible, the more hopeful dimensions of America's face today."[58] Thus, the White House mobilized officials and agencies throughout the executive branch to "get across to the country the magnitude of what the Great Society has accomplished so far" and to ensure that it was "properly be[ing] credited to the President in the public mind."[59] As part of its effort to refocus attention on the administration's accomplishments, the White House became immersed with publicizing Johnson's "unprecedented" success in "pushing things through Congress."

The White House realized, though, that attempts to refocus public attention would not be sufficient; they would also need to launch a public relations campaign to shape American perceptions of Vietnam and head off a "national mob psychology." In particular, the administration sought to mobilize Americans behind a middle

ground position: it would achieve a "honorable peace" by both pursuing negotiations and committing military forces.

White House polling analyses repeatedly confirmed into the spring of 1966 that the administration's policy of "negotiat[ing] from strength" enjoyed public support. In December 1965, the White House's poll specialist assured the President that Americans "supported the military increases made during the past year.... [and] in some respects would be willing to go further.... because they think it will bring a peaceful solution nearer."[60] Through the spring and fall of 1966, White House officials continued to report "a great deal of support" for the President's strategy of "keep[ing] military pressure on but seek[ing] a negotiated settlement."[61] Accordingly, they reported strong support for both dimensions of Johnson's policy: Johnson's polling specialists reported majority support both for "stepping up our military effort"[62] and for "achiev[ing] an honorable peace."[63]

In fact, our analysis presents strong evidence that Johnson's strategy had a real effect. On two or three occasions Johnson took positions on Vietnam in the absence of reported opinion to find that the following month or two there was a remarkable jump in public interest (and support) for his position. For instance, Quayle conducted no polls in March and April 1965 and reported in June that 19% cited the administration's position. Meanwhile, in January, February, and even more noticeably during the spring when the escalation began, Johnson expressed strong positions and took a lot of time to enunciate them. By July, the salience of

Johnson's position doubled over the previous month; these reported public expressions increased and stabilized in subsequent months.[64]

The White House's efforts to shape public opinion could and -- according to our results -- did succeed. No doubt, the effectiveness of these efforts partly stemmed from Johnson's decision to exercise his greatest advantage in the area of foreign and military policy -- he deliberately withheld information to the public, deciding to announce the country's escalation as quietly as possible. But, eventually, no amount of White House leadership could reverse the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and public frustration over "how a country of our size and power can seemingly make so little progress in Vietnam."[65] During the second half of 1966, the White House became acutely aware that events were overwhelming its efforts: as Bill Moyers reported, the President's "standing is down and likely to drop further" because of "frustrat[ion]" over Vietnam.[66] The centrist strategy, which once seemed attuned to public opinion, now appeared to satisfy few: the president was "satisfying neither... those who want to get it over with by negotiations, [nor] those who to get it over with by force."[67]

Unfortunately, we are unable to track the collapse of Johnson's leadership strategy because the White House essentially stopped using Quayle's polls by the fall of 1966. Our evidence of Johnson's strong leadership reflected the impact of presidential policy taking both on the salience of the issues like Vietnam and on the direction of the public's policy positions.[68] Our analysis

ends, though, at a critical juncture. Public backing of the President's policy in Vietnam was beginning to erode, but there was still lingering support for that position and the President himself still enjoyed favorable approval ratings through the summer of 1966.[69]

Conclusion

Previous research on the relationship between the mass public and policy makers has divided into two competing perspectives. The older account posits a generally permissive public that -- within broad boundaries -- gives free reign to elites to make policy. Recent research has revised this older account, concluding that the mass public is quite influential in the making of government policy. What has not been fully explored, though, by either research tradition is the dynamic and changing relationship between public opinion and policy.

We have used the Johnson administration and comparisons with our past research on Kennedy to rethink the relationship between leadership of and responsiveness to public preferences. Our statistical and archival research suggests that neither Kennedy nor Johnson treated responsiveness and direction as mutually exclusive strategic concerns.

Our most persuasive finding thus far involve variations: differences both between and within the Kennedy and Johnson periods we have studied. Each politicians' relationship with Americans varied in a predictable manner with changes in the electoral cycle and political conditions. Thus, President Johnson's positions were

significantly more responsive to Quayle's polling reports during 1964 than during off-election year of 1965; this pattern holds for both domestic and foreign policy. Kennedy appears to have been a bit more responsive during certain stages of his election campaign than Johnson in 1964, but this seems reasonable given the different competitive dynamics of each election. For both Democrats, though, responsiveness to popular issues were used as an instrument for leadership. In 1964, Johnson advocated strong, persistent public preferences in order to modify the public's overall evaluations of the candidates and to position himself with a specific mandate to lead Congress in the future.

The opinion-policy relationship varied not only between Johnson and Kennedy, but also over the course of Johnson's administration. After 1964, the president's relationship with Americans became geared toward directing public preferences. The administration's concern with its popularity rating led it to launch and (according to our quantitative analysis) succeed in "chang[ing] the public mood." Our findings are consistent with previous archival research. As Bruce Altschuler reports, "[w]hen his popularity declined later in his term, [Johnson] used polls not to learn of public opinion but to try to manipulate both that opinion and their perception of it" (1990, p.36).

It might naturally be anticipated that the relationship we have reported between Johnson's positions and Quayle' polling results is spurious. It is certainly true that some of Johnson's positions -- such as his support for health insurance for the aged

-- were enduring "party cleavage" issues, over which Democrats had been battling Republicans for decades. Moreover, our findings of presidential leadership after 1964 may stem from the influence of some other factor -- events or the impact of the modern media. In addition, it could reasonably be asserted that congressional sentiment drove Johnson's policies and that public opinion mattered little to this expert on Capitol Hill. In short, it is possible that the relationships we have reported were driven neither by Johnson's positions nor reported opinion, but by congressional pressure, the media, or longstanding divisions between the political parties.

Other factors undoubtedly do play a role, and our future research will attempt to explore these influences. But, we would argue that the archival and statistical evidence strongly suggests an important relationship between Johnson's polls and the positions he took. The statistical findings are robust and change over time in expected ways. After Johnson's election, his positions were less responsive to and more directive of public preferences. On foreign policy issues, where the public is more dependent on the president for information, Johnson seemed to be especially effective in shaping opinion. Charges of spuriousness, then, are undercut by the predicable pattern of variation in responsiveness and leadership between the election and non-election years: Johnson heeded opinion when he needed public backing and led it when electoral pressures subsided.

Equally if not more important, the dynamic and interactive

relationship that emerges in our quantitative analysis is confirmed by interviews and archival evidence. Partisan divisions undoubtedly influenced Johnson and his decisions to include a range of policies in his pool of conceivable election issues. But, the evidence indicates that the White House was quite selective regarding which policies it chose from this pool of party cleavage issues; reported public opinion may well have been the decisive factor in this process of selection.[70] Indeed, interviews with former White House officials and archival records confirm the importance of polling. The sheer number of polls assembled in the White House and the kinds of organizational changes it made to incorporate them further suggests that data on public opinion was seriously considered.

Finally, public opinion's influence on Johnson cannot simply be treated as an epiphenomenon of congressional pressure. The public's effect on the White House may well have followed an indirect route via Congress. Existing research suggests that members of Congress are responsive to opinion in their home districts (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erikson, 1978; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 1984; Weisberg, 1979). Not surprisingly, Johnson's efforts to shape public opinion were aimed at mobilizing public support in order to pressure members of Congress to back the president. A White House polling specialist recalled that Johnson "used the polls an awful lot in his legislative activity to assure Congressmen... that this is what the public was interested in and that their vote... would be politically safe or rewarding in their district."[71]

In short, the evidence in this paper suggests that during the Johnson administration an interactive relationship developed between opinion and policy making. When motivated by electoral concerns, reported public opinion affected Johnson's selection of specific policy areas and particular alternatives. Once the threat of electoral removal faded, the president's public positions became a major influence on public opinion.

TABLE 1 Relationship Between President Johnson's Poll Results and His Subsequent Public Statements

Percent of Issue-Months in which He Took Policy Stances on Issues:

	Not Cited in His Polls		Cited in His Polls		Difference
Year	%	(N)	%	(N)	% points
1964 (N=940)	22	(660)	49	(280)	27*
1965 (N=658)	11	(506)	25	(152)	14*
1966 (N=1034)	15	(787)	37	(247)	22*
Total (N=2632)	16	(1953)	39	(679)	23*

* Statistically significant at the .05 level or better.

Note: On issues cited in the polls, the percentages reported are those of policy stances consistent with public preferences.

Source: Compiled by the authors. See text.

TABLE 2 Relationship Between President Johnson's Poll Results and the Content of His Public Statements

Bivariate Regression (b)* and Correlation Coefficients (r)* for:

	Opinion Lagged One Month and Content of Policy Positions ("responsiveness")			Policy Stances Lagged One Month and Opinion ("leadership")		
Year	b	(r)	N	b	(r)	N
1964	.42	(.24)	940	.12	(.24)	752
1965	.11	(.27)	658	.83	(.33)	752
1966	.29	(.54)	1034	.90	(.48)	940
Total	.25	(.27)	2632	.24	(.23)	2444

* All coefficients reported are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.

Source: Compiled by the authors. See text.

TABLE 3 Domestic versus Foreign and Defense Policy: Relationship Between President Johnson's Poll Results and the Content of His Public Statements

Bivariate Regression (b)* and Correlation Coefficients (r)* for:

	Opinion Lagged One Month and Content of Policy Positions ("responsiveness")			Policy Stances Lagged One Month and Opinion ("leadership")		
Policy	b	(r)	N	b	(r)	N
Domestic	.23	(.27)	1736	.26	(.22)	1612
Foreign	.28	(.27)	896	.23	(.24)	832
Total	.25	(.27)	2632	.24	(.23)	2444

* All coefficients reported are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.

Source: Compiled by the authors. See text.

TABLE 4 Relationship Between President Johnson's Poll Results and the Content of His Public Statements -- Domestic vs. Foreign and Defense Policy

Bivariate Regression (b)* and Correlation Coefficients (r)* for:

Year	Opinion Lagged One Month and Content of Policy Positions ("responsiveness")					Policy Stances Lagged One Month and Opinion ("leadership")				
	b		r		N	b		r		N
	Dom.	For.	Dom.	For		Dom.	For.	Dom.	For.	
1964	.50	.30	.37	.13	940	.20	.08	.30	.20	752
1965	.13	.09	.31	.24	658	.57	1.19	.25	.45	752
1966	.11	.41	.21	.78	1034	.39	1.45	.21	.76	940
Total	.23	.28	.27	.27	2632	.26	.23	.22	.24	2444

* All coefficients reported are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.

Source: Compiled by the authors. See text.

1.There are legitimate questions concerning the precision of Quayle's reports on policy preferences and the White House's effectiveness in using his reports (see Jacobs, 1990; Altschuler, 1990). For instance, he used findings of public support for the general proposition of "help for older people" as evidence that Americans favored Medicare. Despite these problems, though, we assume that Quayle's surveys did not in general depart from a number of other sources of information concerning public opinion that were discussed in the White House (e.g. reports on public concerns from other politicians who may have done their own polling). The important point, we would argue, is that Quayle's polls -- however imperfect the surveys and the White House's analysis-- were seriously considered by the White House.

2.The White House was able to receive private surveys by Quayle and others pollsters at little or no cost because they White House polls were piggy-backed onto ongoing surveys. Moyers reports that Quayle charged $25,000 for his surveys in 1964 and nothing for his polls in 1965 and 1966. LBJ, Watson, Box 27, Letter to Jake Jacobsen from Bill Moyers, 3/28/67.

3.Johnson apparently soured on Quayle because he disapproved of the publicity that the pollster received for his White House connection. LBJ, Watson, Box 27, Letter to Jake Jacobsen from Bill Moyers, 3/28/67; LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 7/27/66. (Johnson's concern with secrecy is reflected by the fact that Quayle's polls were filed in the Confidential File or "CF" series.) After October 1966, the White House relied on a handful of private survey organizations but most consistently received data from John Kraft and Joseph Napolitan.

4.Under the Kennedy Administration, the only major official who seems to have come into regular contact with the polling data was Robert Kennedy. Under the Johnson Administration, five members of the White House were at various times involved in the polling operation: Moyers and four junior staff members -- Fred Panzer, Hayes Redmon, Tad Cantril, and Richard Nelson. LBJ, GEN PR16, File Memo, 6/12/65.

5.Interview with Fred Panzer by LRJ, 11/12/92.

6.For instance, during the last stage of the 1964 campaign, Cater concluded a detailed analysis of Quayle's surveys by recommending that Johnson provide more "public explanation" for a list of issues where "voter interest is high and approval of your record is comparatively low." LBJ, Busby, Box 41, Memo from Douglas Cater to LBJ, 10/8/64. Numerous memoranda integrated polling results to analyze public opinion toward Vietnam (see below for illustrations).

7.Interview with Fred Panzer by LRJ, 11/12/92.

8.Interview with Fred Panzer by LRJ, 11/12/92; LBJ, CF PR16, Box 81, Memo to LBJ from Kinter, 6/27/66.

9.Polling books were kept by Horace Busby, Doug Cater, Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Marvin Watson, and the president's secretary, Juanita Roberts. LBJ, GEN PR 16, Memo from Watson, 7/13/65.

10.Interview with Fred Panzer by LRJ, 11/12/92.

11.We used the president's public statements as a measure of his policy decisions on the grounds that very few presidential decisions can long escape the need for public defense. Obviously, presidential pronouncements are at times intended to avoid or deflect attention from the White House's actual policy; but, this is a strategy that can neither be common nor one that can be maintained for a sustained period.

12.For instance, if the President took 5 positions within one month on the issue of civil rights which were coded +2, -2, and +1, it was summed to a +1.

13.The space measure consists of the number of lines Johnson devoted to a given policy position in the transcripts of his announcement. We also constructed a measure of the frequency with which the president mentioned a position during one of our 35 time periods.

14.By way of comparison, our analysis of Kennedy used the 67 polls that Harris conducted during the primary and general election campaign; in addition, we used the 16 relevant polls that were conducted during the President's abbreviated tenure in office.

15.The number of respondents in Quayle's surveys were sufficiently large to create a representative and reliable sample. For studying the impact of opinion on policy, what matters is that the private polling data were treated by the White House as representative and reliable.

16.This paper generally focuses on responses to the following type of open-ended question: "Now, what do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing people like yourself that you feel the national government should do something about in the next four years? Any others?" Less than 30% of the polling data is based on responses to questions structured by presenting a list of issues.

17.We did not conduct a comprehensive study of all survey data found in the presidential archives. In order to maintain consistency in the polling data, a significant amount of survey data was not used: we excluded published polls (which were often forwarded to the White House before their release), private polls

by organizations other than Quayle's. Moreover, although Quayle sent on average one poll a week to the White House during much of the Johnson presidency (Altschuler, 1990), we excluded Quayle's surveys that were not state wide (i.e. they were for a city or congressional district), or that did not include data on national issues.

18.The measure of the relative ranking of public support was constructed in the following manner: for each state poll, the percentage of respondents identifying the issue as important is used to rank the issues.

19.Since our previous paper (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992b), we condensed the number of specific policies in order to address a serious weaknesses in our earlier data set. Previously, we treated related but distinct stands on similar matters as separate. For instance, we coded Quayle's reports on concern with "old age problems" as separate from Johnson's stances on Medicare and Social Security; similarly, we coded polling results on the relatively ambiguous issue of "dealing with integration" as distinct from Johnson's positions favoring voting rights or other more detailed policies.

20.For the 35-month string of polls, Quayle did not conduct state-wide surveys on issues of national concern during seven of these months.

21.LBJ, Interview with George Reedy by T.H. Baker, Tape #4, 12/20/68; LBJ, Interview with Douglas Cater by David McComb, 4/29/69 (Tape #1); LBJ, Interview with Jack Valenti by J.Frantz, 3/3/71 (Tape #1).

22.LBJ, CF LE, Box 61, Memo to J.Valenti from B.Moyers, just prior to 5/30/64.

23.LBJ, Interview with Jack Valenti by J.Frantz, 3/3/71 (Tape #1); LBJ, Ex LE, Box 1, Memo to B.Moyers from Ernest Goldstein, 5/29/64; LBJ, Ex FG1, Box 10, "Suggested Talking Points. Press Backgrounder Briefing for Sunday 7/5/64," handwritten, "G.E.R[eedy]. Ok to be released. LBJ, 7/4/64."

24.LBJ, Ex FG1, Box 10, Memo to President from D.Cater, 6/3/64; LBJ, CF LE, Box 61, Memo to J.Valenti from B.Moyers, just prior to 5/30/64; LBJ, Interview with Jack Valenti by J.Frantz, 3/3/71 (Tape #1).

25.LBJ, Ex LE, Box 1, Memo to B.Moyers from Ernest Goldstein, 5/29/64.

26.For example, LBJ, Califano Files, Box 7, Memo by D. Cater, 10/7/64; Busby Files, Box 41, Memo to Busby from Cater, 10/12/64.

27.The measure of the president's position is a summary measure, which is described above.

28.Our analysis of Kennedy's administration was hampered by limited polling data. As a result, we limited our analysis to his inaugural speech and his three State of the Union addresses (see Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992c).

29.Johnson's response to public preferences on defense spending was no doubt motivated by Goldwater's pro-defense position; Quayle reported that the Republican's charges could find a receptive audience if left unaddressed. Johnson's positions also changed after public concern developed over China: after taking no position in July or August, Quayle's findings of public concern in those months corresponded with Johnson's change in September and October from avoiding the topic to taking stances opposing China. While public opinion may have been a factor in the President's shift especially in September, China's testing of an atomic bomb in October no doubt encouraged Johnson to speak out at much greater length.

30.LBJ, Moyers Papers, Box 3, Memo to B.Moyers from D.Cater, 7/21/64; LBJ, Califano Papers, Box 7, Memo on the Quayle State Surveys from D.Cater, 10/7/64 (Copies of polls attached); Busby Papers, Box 41, Memo to President from Cater, 10/8/64. Polling results specifically emphasizing Medicare did not begin until August, but Quayle and the White House regularly interpreted respondents' support for "helping the aged" as support for this health reform plan.

31.LBJ, Ex PR16, Box 345, Memo to President from L. O'Brien, 10/4/64; Harris, 1966, p.177; David, 1985, pp.120-21; LBJ, Humphrey Papers, Box 1.

32.Mills Interview, 6/18/87; Interview with Robert Ball by David McComb, 11/5/68, tape 2.

33.LBJ, OPF, Box 10, Memo to LBJ from G.Reedy, 8/10/64 reporting conversation with Samuel Lubell.

34.LBJ, Panzer, Box 175, "A Survey of the Presidential Race in New York," by Oliver Quayle, August 1964; LBJ, Panzer, Box 169, "A Survey of the Presidential Race in Indiana," by Oliver Quayle, October 1964.

35.LBJ, Panzer, Box 169, "A Survey of the Presidential Race in Indiana," by Oliver Quayle, October 1964.

36.LBJ, Panzer, Box 169, "A Survey of the Presidential Race in Kentucky," by Oliver Quayle, October 1964.

37.We defined foreign policy to encompass foreign and defense matters including defense spending, space exploration, and the draft.

38.In our previous analysis of the Johnson presidency (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1992b), we found a significant difference for the entire period. This difference disappeared in this piece because we expanded our data set and condense our policy categories from 172 to 94.

39.There were also instances of non-responsiveness. For instance, on the issue of ethics, Quayle reported public concern but Johnson essentially ignored the issue as it flared up in the Bobby Baker scandal and other cases.

40.In fact, the significant correlation of Quayle's poll report results and Johnson's positions is probably depressed by the selection and coding of cases. First, any issues omitted from the Quayle's polls and presidential statements would have led to underestimates of the correlation between the poll reports and Johnson's visible positions. Moreover, the Quayle surveys that we studied represent only a subset of all opinion information within the White House. As a result, the statistical relationships that we do find are probably conservative; they may very well underestimate the association between opinion and policy. Finally, our selection of cases included Johnson's positions on state issues (like Alaskan development and the TVA), while the polling data we used from Quayle's surveys concerned national issues. (Since Quayle provided separate data on state issues of concern, Johnson may not have lacked polling data, as our study assumes).

41.LBJ, Interview with Jack Valenti by J.Frantz, 3/3/71 (Tape #1); LBJ, Administrative Histories, HEW, Vol.1, Part 1, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Recollections of Michael Parker (HEW official under Wilbur Cohen), 1968, p.14; Ex FG1, Box 10, "Memoranda," unauthored, handwritten "12/21/64," possibly initialed by LBJ; LBJ, Ex FG1, Box 10, Memo from H.A.Knowles to Secretary of Commerce, 11/6/64, forwarded to B.Moyers, 11/10/64; LBJ, Busby Papers, Box 18.

42.Politicians' and specialists' sense of an attitudinal shift appeared to be confirmed by the House's decision to promote reform by modifying its rules and by altering the composition of the powerful Ways and Means Committee (i.e. conservative members were removed). This development is consistent with Kingdon's discussion of political developments creating opportunities for new agendas.

43.LBJ, Administrative Histories, HEW, Vol.1, Part 1, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Recollections of Michael Parker (HEW official under Wilbur Cohen), 1968, p.14.

44.LBJ, Interview with Robert Ball by David McComb, 11/5/68.

45.Harris, 1966, pp.178-79; LBJ, CF PR16, Box 80, Memo to LBJ from J. Valenti, 1/11/65, handwritten "L. Keep in Office"; Testimony by William Beaumont (American Nursing Home Association, President Emeritus), U.S. Congress, House, Ways and Means Committee, 1965, pp.312,330.

46.There are two reason that for considering the 1966 results inflated. First, there was a marked jump in the number of times an issue, which was cited in Quayle's polls, was raised during a press conference. In other words, some of Johnson's responsiveness may be an artifact of the media's involvement: members of the press may be responding to public concerns and prompting the President to take positions on these popular issues. Moreover, there may a process of public interaction at work here. Johnson may be pursuing his <u>own</u> agenda, attempting to lead the public; the result is that he may create public interest in his positions, thereby giving the appearance of responsiveness.

47.We would have preferred to use national data here, but the appropriate monthly national time series data do not exist, as far as we know.

48.LBJ, Memo to LBJ from R. Kinter, 6/27/66; Memo from J.R. Jones to W.M.Watson, 6/24/66.

49.LBJ, Memo to LBJ from Cater, 8/3/65.

50.LBJ, Ex FG165, Memo to LBJ from J.Gardner, 12/19/66.

51.LBJ, Panzer, Box 217, Memo from H. Redmon to B. Moyers, 12/17/65.

52.LBJ, Ex FG165, Memo to LBJ from J.Gardner, 12/19/66.

53.LBJ, Ex PR18, Box 358, Memo to Bill Moyers from Tom Johnson, 8/10/66.

54.LBJ, Ex PR18, Box 356, Memo from Cater to LBJ, 12/26/64.

55.White House aides were sufficiently taken by Lipset's analysis of presidential leadership of public opinion on foreign policy matters that they forwarded it to the President. LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 8/24/66; Ex PR16, Memo to LBJ from Moyers, 9/10/66.

56.LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 8/24/66.

57.LBJ, Panzer File, Box 186, "A Survey of Political Climate in New York City," March 1965, by Oliver Quayle.

58.LBJ, Memo to Cater from E. Duggan, 5/31/66.

59. Evidence of White House pressure on administration officials to improve their publicity and description of programs like Medicare are contained in the following: LBJ, McPherson, Box 11, Memo to LBJ from McPherson, 12/1/65; LBJ, Ex PR Box 1, Memo to LBJ from W.M.Watson, 5/31/67; Ex FG1, Box 13, Memo to LBJ from F.Panzer, 1/21/67; Ex FG1, Box 18, Memo to LBJ from D.Cater, 3/28/68; LBJ, Ex PR18, Box 359, Memo to J.Jones from F.Kelly, 12/30/66; Moyers, Box 12, Memo from Redmon to Moyers, 6/9/66.; Cohen, p.43; LBJ Ex FG100/M, Box 130, Letter from LBJ to John Macy; EX FG1, Box 11, Memo to all personnel handling correspondence, 3/26/65; LBJ Ex FG100, Box 130, Memo from Busby to Johnson, 2/20/65.

60.LBJ, Moyers, Box 11, Memo to LBJ from B. Moyers forwarding H. Redmon memo to Moyers, 12/27/65.

61.LBJ, Panzer, Box 217, Memo to Moyers from H. Redmon, 2/23/66; LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 9/27/66.

62.LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 9/27/66; LBJ, Panzer, Box 217, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 2/21/66.

63.LBJ, Panzer, Box 217, Memo to LBJ from Moyers, 2/11/66, forwarding Redmon's memo to Moyers, 1/12/66; LBJ, Moyers, Box 11, Memo to LBJ from B. Moyers forwarding H. Redmon memo to Moyers, 12/27/65. In addition to finding support for Johnson's pursuit of negotiated peace in Vietnam, the White House's polling specialists also reported majorities favoring Johnson's efforts "working for peace and disarmament." Indeed, the White House's polling specialists carefully followed Quayle's surveys: by mid-1966, they found that 80% of Quayle's surveys reported majorities favoring president's peace and disarmament efforts, with only "pockets" of disapproval." LBJ, Panzer, Box 217, Memo to Redmon from Tad Cantril, 7/27/66; Redmon to Cantril, 7/28/66; Cantril to Redmon, 7/29/66.

64.In late July, the decision was made to more than double the number of American troops in Vietnam to a total of 180,000 by the end of 1965, with possibly another 100,000 to be added in 1966. Quayle's July surveys were completed on the 15th and 29th.

65.LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to LBJ from Moyers, 6/9/66.

66.LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to LBJ from Moyers, 6/9/66 (Moyers' report was based on Redmon's memo to Moyers, 6/9/66). White House reports on public frustration with Johnson's Vietnam policy began in earnest in March 1966. LBJ, Panzer, Box 217, Memo to LBJ from Redmon, 3/21/66.

67.LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to LBJ from Moyers, 6/9/66 (Moyers memo is based on Redmon's memo to Moyers, 6/9/66). This quote is an excerpt from a comment by Louis Harris. The collapse of public support for the White House's Vietnam policy was captured by its

polls that suggested it was "hawks on Vietnam who were quite critical of the President for not going far enough." LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to LBJ from Moyers, 6/9/66 and Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 6/9/66; Panzer, Box 542, Memo to Redmon from Panzer, 6/13/66; Panzer, Box, 216, Memo to LBJ from Redmon, 6/15/66.

68.Some of the White House's data on Vietnam is based on respondents' identification of "handling the problem in Vietnam" as a major problem. Thus, there is some ambiguity in terms of directionality. We are currently analyzing White House data toward a range of policy options in Vietnam, which will provide a better indication of public reactions to the direction of American involvement.

69.The White House's polling specialists reported that "Quayle shows the President with some fairly good, favorable ratings." Indeed, the President's popularity rating stood at 56% by July 1966.LBJ, Moyers, Box 12, Memo to Moyers from Redmon, 6/9/66.

70.For instance, while health insurance is an obvious issue on which the political parties disagreed, Johnson decided to push for a proposal that differed in important respects from the last major Democratic plan -- Truman's universal health insurance proposal. Johnson's decision stemmed in part from wanting to finish Kennedy's agenda, but we would argue that Johnson's decision to select Medicare from a number of Kennedy programs for extraordinary prominence was influenced by his recognition of its popularity.

71.Interview with Fred Panzer by LRJ, 11/12/92.

References

Altschuler, Bruce. 1990. LBJ and the Polls. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

Bond, Jon and Richard Fleisher. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Edwards, George III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Erikson, Robert. 1976. "The Relationship Between Public Opinion and State Policy: A New Look At Some Forgotten Data." American Journal of Political Science. 22:25-36.

_____. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data." American Journal of Political Science. 22: 511-35.

Harris, Richard. 1966. A Sacred Trust. New York: New American Library.

Jacobs, Lawrence. 1993. The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of American and British Health Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

_____. 1992a. "Institutions and Culture: Health Policy and Public Opinion in the U.S. and Britain," World Politics 44 (January): 179-209.

_____. 1992b. "The Recoil Effect: Public Opinion and Policy Making in the U.S. and Britain," Comparative Politics 24 (January): 199-217.

_____. 1990. A Social Interpretation of Institutional Change: Public Opinion and Policy Making in the Enactment of the British National Health Service Act of 1946 and the American Medicare Act of 1965. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.

Jacobs, Lawrence, and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992a. "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign" (unpublished manuscript).

_____. 1992b. "Leadership and Responsiveness: Some New Evidence on the Johnson Presidency." Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6.

_____. 1992c. "Public Decisions, Private Polls: John F. Kennedy's Presidency." Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 9-11.

Kernell, Samuel. 1986. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington: CQ Press.

Kingdon, John. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little Brown.

Light, Paul. 1983. The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Miller, Warren and Donald Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." American Political Science Review. 57: 45-56.

Monroe, Alan. 1979. "Consistency Between Public Preferences and National Policy Decision." American Political Quarterly. 7:3-19.

Neustadt, Richard. 1980. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter. New York: John Wiley.

Page, Benjamin. 1978. Choices and Elections in Presidential Elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Page, Benjamin and Robert Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

_____. 1985. "Presidential Leadership Through Public Opinion," in The Presidency and Public Policy Making ed by G. Edwards III, S. Shull and N. Thomas. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

_____. 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." American Political Science Review. 77:175-90.

Page, Benjamin, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. "What Moves Public Opinion?" American Political Science Review 81:23-43.

Page, Benjamin, Robert Shapiro, P.W. Gronke, and R.M. Rosenberg. 1984. "Constituency, Party, and Representation in Congress." Public Opinion Quarterly. 48: 741-56.

Peterson, Mark. 1991. Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Redford, Emmette, and Richard McCulley. 1986. The White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Stimson, James. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tulis, Jeffery. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weisberg, Robert. 1979. "Assessing Legislator-Constituency Policy Agreements." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 4:605-22.