The Future of the Global Trading System

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Globalization: In the Spotlight

Transportation Costs + Policy Barriers + Technological Change


- Optimism of 1990s-2000s: Globalization improves efficiency by allowing firms to perform stages/procure inputs in different locations → Opportunities for growth and development (WB, 2020)
- Concerns of 2010s-20s: Globalization expose s firms and countries to disruption risks → "Favoring the friendshoring of supply chains ... will lower the risks to our economy" (Yellen, 2022):

Comments:

- I. + The Great Reallocation: GVC reconfiguration
 - Clean Energy + Energy Independence
 - Modes of Entry-Trade and FDI
 - FDI: Consistent with the "benefits" narrative (Jobs)... harder to Measure
- II. The Backlash: Public Opinion in Developed Countries
 - Role of China/Jobs + Loss of Anchor (Globalization process: about sovereigns)
- III. **? The Savior:** Trade in Services




• The Great Reallocation: GVC reconfiguration (Alfaro and Chor, 2023; Antràs, 2021; Baldwin, 2022; Freund et al., 2023; Aiyar et al. 2023; Goldberg and Reed 2023; Bown, 2022; Grossman et al., 2023; Fajgelbaum et al., 2023; IMF, 2023; Gopinath et al., 2024)




Update by Chor to Alfaro and Chor, 2023

Green Energy & Energy Independence


- The Great Reallocation: GVC reconfiguration
- "60% of the decline was due to a reduction in the **value** of commodities trade, all of which was due to a decline in prices from the mid-2010s to 2020." (Baldwin, 2020).
 - Green Energy & Energy Independence





Modes of Entry: Trade And FDI

- Distinct aspects of globalization: complements or substitutes:
 - Trade flow and market share changes do not necessarily indicate de-globalization: firms may access a domestic market through a different "mode."
- **FDI**: strategy for **navigating** host-country **restrictions** on trade and mitigating the effects of rising production costs at home.
 - Japanese firms' response to policy restrictions:
 - Boosting production in the US
 - Relocating to lower-cost countries
- FDI will remain a form of engagement
 - "Narrative" Compatible
 - Fiscal and Financial Incentives



FDI: Incentives are "Narrative" Compatible

- Capital/**Jobs**
- Productivity gains
- Employee Training
- Accelerated diffusion of new technologies
- Introduction of new products and processes
- Access to new markets and production networks

- Externalities, Spillovers, Linkages, Agglomeration, Coordination
- Low volatility compared to other Capital Flows


FDI & MNC: Harder to Measure

Economic Activity + Control + Across Borders: Always Difficult to Measure

- Complexity of Modern **Economic Activity**
 - Type of value created (e.g., manufacturing vs. services, IP); Measurement: 20th-century bias
- Complexity of **Control & Ownership** Structures
 - Government, public, private, M&A, SPV, Vanguard (tax structures, regulation)
- + Complexity of **Globalization**:
 - Where is value created? (Auerbach, 2021)
 - + sovereigns (opaqueness), quasi-sovereign; residency/nationality; more tax and regulation (Desai, 2009; Desai, Foley, Hines;
 Alfaro et al. 2014; Horn, Trebesch, Reinhart, 2019; Guvenen, Mataloni Jr., Rassier, Ruhl, 2022; Maggiori, Neiman, Schreger. 2022)
- + New Tech change: e.g. crypto (Graf-von-Luckner, Reinhart, and. Rogoff, 2023)
- ... And then there is the actual measurement: changes to national accounts (software,1999; IP, 2013) + BPM5 (assets/liabilities; macro analysis) to BPM6 in 2009 (directional, inbound/outbound; parent-affiliate: influence)
 - Different adoption times; effect trends? (accounts for reduced labor shares; Koh et al. 2020)
 - Lagged/revised. Real-Time: M&A, Announcements (FT Markets): Not necessarily what will end in BOP
 - MNC activities: firm-level; BOP/Firm-Level (surveys)/ Related party trade (Alfaro, Conconi, Kamal, Kroff, Ramondo, 2024)

FDI: Beyond the Measurement Difficulties

- Geopolitical climate: It is **unlikely China** will be able to emulate the speed, scale, and scope of the Japanese US-based production approach.
- But Chinese firms have been expanding their FDI in third countries (Alfaro and Chor, 2023; IMF, 2023, 2024)
- US could remain **indirectly connected** to China:
- "Foreign" ownership does somewhat **mitigate** the concerns of the "ultimate owner":
 - **Domestic/host country jobs** ("political reason" to provide incentives)



The Negative

Globalization: The Backlash

• Backlash in developed nations (Colantone et al., 2022; Alfaro, Chen and Chor, 2023)

US Nationally Representative Surveys: 2018-2022

(Alfaro, Chen and Chor, 2023)

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-19 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,005)
Do you support placing more limits on imports?	0.57 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.58 [0.49]
Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate?	0.28 [0.45]	0.25 [0.43]	0.25 [0.43]	0.32 [0.47]
Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?	0.44 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Prefer: More progressive taxes?	0.68 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.68 [0.47]
Would you support signing more FTAs?	0.68 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Would you support a minimum wage?	0.78 [0.41]	0.80 [0.40]	0.74 [0.44]	0.78 [0.42]

The Backlash: Can Information Change Public Opinion?

Pessimistic: Trade (+/-) Worsens Perceptions (Alfaro, Chen, Chor, 2023)

- Evidence-based information in shaping individuals' preferences for trade policies through representative annual surveys (2018-2022): randomized facts on how openness to trade has affected labor market outcomes or goods prices.
 - **Positive and negative research-based information** on the link between jobs/price and trade: limits trade

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
More limits on imports	US tariff increase	Support higher	Support more	Most Pref.: More limits	First prin. component	Did info affect	Impact of trade on
•		tariff	FTAs	on imports	•	views?	Americans
Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ord. Logit	Ord. Logit
<u>:</u>							
0.091***	0.071***	0.036**	-0.038**	0.033**	0.242***	0.048***	-0.248***
[0.017] 0.023	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.015] 0.009	[0.043] 0.081*	[0.015] 0.030*	[0.016] -0.025*
0.057***	0.027*	-0.005	-0.001	0.031**	0.109***	0.028*	[0.015] -0.058***
0.040**	0.020	0.017	-0.004	0.023	0.099**	0.046***	[0.015] -0.164*** [0.016]
[0.021]	[0.011]	[0.011]	-0.011*** [0.002]	-0.019*** [0.006]	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.010]
0.003	0.006	-0.042***	0.124***	-0.040***	-0.141***	0.093***	0.089***
[0.014] 0.193*** [0.016]	[0.011] 0.122*** [0.013]	[0.016] 0.143*** [0.015]	[0.014] -0.037** [0.015]	[0.012] 0.141*** [0.015]	[0.035] 0.625*** [0.040]	[0.013] 0.084*** [0.013]	[0.012] -0.002 [0.013]
Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9,275 0.0766	9,275 0.0801	9,275 0.0471	9,275 0.0698	9,275 0.0796	9,275 0.153	9,275 0.0488	9,275 0.0569
	More limits on imports Logit 0.091*** [0.017] 0.023 [0.018] 0.057*** [0.017] 0.040** [0.017] 0.003 [0.014] 0.193*** [0.016] Y 9,275	More limits on imports US tariff increase Logit Logit 0.091*** 0.071*** [0.017] [0.015] 0.023 0.023 [0.018] [0.015] 0.057*** 0.027* [0.017] [0.014] 0.040** 0.020 [0.017] [0.014] 0.003 0.006 [0.014] [0.011] 0.193*** [0.016] [0.013] Y Y 9,275 9,275	More limits on imports	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$


The Backlash: Public Opinion

Mechanism: Jobs and China

(Alfaro, Chen, Chor, 2023)



Why MP limit imports: Other (Trade Hurts Jobs, Trade Hurts Jobs sans China, Trade Helps Jobs, & Trade Helps Jobs sans China)



With "China" in the treatment wording

Which Countries to limit imports from? (Trade Hurts Jobs, Trade Helps Jobs, & Trade Helps Prices)



Treatments about Prices

Why MP limit imports: Other (Trade Helps Prices & Trade Helps Prices sans China)



"Sans China" in the treatment wording

Which Countries to limit imports from? (Trade Hurts Jobs sans China, Trade Helps Jobs sans China, & Trade Helps Prices sans China)



The Backlash: Public Opinion Jobs + China = Tariffs + Industrial Policy


- Randomized **research-based information** on link between trade & manufacturing job losses or **positive information on trades' job price benefits** (or the cost of tariffs): **protectionist** policy choices.
- Mechanism? Direct question (Alfaro, Chen and Chor, 2023)
 - Individuals' trade policy preferences are not a symmetric function of the expected gains and losses from trade but instead shaped by **concerns on US-China relations**, **jobs**, and political priors
- Implications?
 - Government: actions to explicitly reduce this dependence (China) fueled by sentiment (fear of jobs)
 - \rightarrow rise in trade barriers
 - + Industrial Policy (Neutralization Chemical Reaction)
 - Loss of "anchor" of multilateralism
 - At the core, globalization process (trade and capital flows) has always been geopolitical ("Sovereigns")


The Future?

Globalization: Can Services Save (the) US?

• "The future of globalization is not goods but services – in particular, intermediate services ('telemigration').

Trade in services has not peaked in the way goods trade has." Baldwin (2022)





U.S. Trade Balance by Sector, 1980-2023 (US\$ billions) BEA National Data Tables 4.2.5A and 4.2.5B..

Globalization: Can Services Save (the) US?

Transportation Costs + Policy Barriers + Technological Change

- MNCs drive trade in Services: FDI Navigate Policy Restriction ✓
- "The Paradox of a modern metropolis: proximity has become more valuable as the cost of connecting across distance has fallen" (Glaeser, 2011, p.6)
 - Proximity that helps deliver inputs & goods, eases the flow of ideas: FDI "Narrative" ✓
- ➤ New Technological Change (Post Covid): Work From Home, AI
 - Spatial Reallocation: Cities?
 - Will this trigger more location-based /industrial policy (save St. Louise)?
 - AI Tech-Shock: Is it happening too fast (China Shock in steroids)
 - Background: loss of learning (Covid) + outsourcing process of learning
- ☐ Financial Crisis: policymakers tend to fight the last battle
 - Saving 20th-century jobs (instead of fixing schools/learning)

Thanks

