


Price	Rational	% Upside/Up/Down					Avg	Avg	Avg	
		Downside	Ratio	P/E	EV/EBIT	FCF Yield				
Target Price	\$36	SOTP EV/EBIT & FCF								
Bull Price	\$44	Bear Scenario	\$20							
		(\$ millions)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Price	\$22	Revenue	\$2,974	\$3,049	\$2,631	\$2,961	\$3,373	\$3,955	\$4,497	\$5,021
FD Shares Outs.	283	%Y/Y	4.1%	2.5%	-13.7%	12.5%	13.9%	17.2%	13.7%	11.7%
Market Cap.	6,220	P/Sales	2.1x	2.0x	2.4x	2.1x	1.8x	1.6x	1.4x	1.2x
Net Debt + MI	3,081	Adj EBIT	\$510	\$506	\$550	\$590	\$633	\$829	\$1,029	\$1,219
Enterprise Value	9,301	%Y/Y	22.4%	-0.8%	8.8%	7.2%	7.2%	31.0%	24.1%	18.5%
EV / LTM Adj EBIT	14.7x	% Margin	17.1%	16.6%	20.9%	19.9%	18.8%	21.0%	22.9%	24.3%
FCF / TEV	4.0%	EV/EBIT	18.2x	18.4x	16.9x	15.8x	14.7x	11.2x	9.0x	7.6x
Price / Book	9.9x	Adj EBITDA	\$817	\$817	\$855	\$958	\$1,049	\$1,324	\$1,581	\$1,833
ROE	52%	%Y/Y	11.0%	0.0%	4.7%	12.0%	9.5%	26.1%	19.4%	16.0%
ROIC	10.5%	% Margin	27.5%	26.8%	32.5%	32.4%	31.1%	33.5%	35.1%	36.5%
Debt / Capital	84.6%	EV/EBITDA	11.4x	11.4x	10.9x	9.7x	8.9x	7.0x	5.9x	5.1x
ND / EBITDA	2.9x	Adj FD EPS	\$0.96	\$0.82	\$0.79	\$0.94	\$1.15	\$1.56	\$2.04	\$2.53
Interest Coverage	3.8x	%Y/Y	27.9%	-15.2%	-2.8%	18.2%	22.7%	36.1%	30.7%	23.5%
Dividend Yield	2.00%	% Margin	5.7%	4.9%	7.5%	8.8%	9.6%	11.2%	12.8%	14.1%
Beta v S&P	0.85	P/E	22.9x	27.0x	27.8x	23.5x	19.1x	14.1x	10.8x	8.7x
Avg Daily Volume	2.7	FCF	\$119	(\$69)	\$160	\$243	\$372	\$626	\$933	\$1,150
Short Interest	11.0%	% Yield	1.9%	NM	2.6%	3.9%	6.0%	10.1%	15.0%	18.5%
52 Week High	\$29.76	ROIC	8.5%	8.7%	9.5%	9.0%	10.5%	12.9%	14.9%	16.3%
52 Week Low	\$21.42	ND/EBITDA	4.1x	4.2x	3.4x	3.2x	2.9x	2.1x	1.3x	0.7x



RECOMMENDATION

I recommend a LONG on SABR for a potential 65% total return upside. This opportunity exists because of publicized system outages, uncertainty around CEO change, a published short report (appendix) and fears of disintermediation. These fears are overblown since SABR's moat is strengthened through network effects, customer captivity, and high switching costs. SABR is an opportunity to invest in a misunderstood high free cash flow company with strong and sustainable moats.

COMPANY DESCRIPTION

Sabre Corp (SABR) operates in two businesses. First, the global distribution systems (GDS) side of the business is akin to a marketplace for airlines and hotels and is 70% of sales or ~\$2.3bn. A GDS collects real time airline inventory from hundreds of different airlines and transfers the data to thousands of online and offline travel agencies. SABR charges the airline a booking fee (~\$4 / segment) each time a segment is booked and a portion of that fee is transferred to the online travel agent (OTA) or travel management company (TMC) that made the booking. The second part of the business is the IT solutions side which is the reservation and inventory (R&I) and departure control system (DCS) inside of an airline and is ~30% of revenues or ~\$1bn. The IT Solutions business makes money by charging airlines a fee per passenger boarded (~\$0.54/ PB) and is the fastest growing segment in SABR. ROIC has been in the high-single digits due to the company's post-LBO IPO in 2014 and should improve through debt pay-down over time.

THESIS OVERVIEW

- GDS disintermediation risk is overblown – scale and network effects hold customers captive
- The IT Solutions segment provides a long runway for growth and high normalized free cash flow

THESIS 1: GDS DISINTERMEDIATION RISK IS OVERBLOWN; MOAT IS STRONG

The GDS business is a technology that directly connects into each airline to gather fare data and then transferred to OTAs and TMCs for end customers to purchase tickets through. SABR operates in an oligopoly with Amadeus and TravelPort controlling ~58% of air bookings. 42% of bookings is purchased on direct channels such as an airline's website (airline.com). Its important to note that there are two types of customers on the GDS side: (1) retail customers and (2) business customers. Retail customers are price sensitive and are not loyal to any one channel that airline tickets can be purchased through and represent ~20% of an airline's ticket revenue. Business customers must abide to certain company-specific purchase restrictions, are not price-sensitive, and represent 80% of an airline's ticket revenues. I recognize that the retail side of the business has been disintermediated with the Google's and Kayak's of the world. The business traveler and higher-yielding customer, on the other hand, will not be disintermediated and are stickier than most investors think. Below are examples of disintermediation and why it won't work:

- Airlines could display cheaper fares on airline.com, therefore incentivizing travelers to book directly.** Business customers purchase travel through a centralized system known as a Travel Management Company (TMC) such as American Express Travel in order to abide to tailored restrictions set by their employer. While price might be part of the criteria of rules, travel time and convenience is of higher priority for the business traveler. The business traveler is therefore stuck in the TMC technology ecosystem and will rarely leave it to purchase directly on an airline's website because there is no incentive for the employee to risk breaking a rule or incurring additional work in terms of expense reports and seeking permission.
- Airlines could connect directly to TMCs, thereby disintermediating the GDS.** TMCs manage bookings for corporate travelers and are not incentivized to connect to hundreds of airlines. A corporation (imagine GE with tens of thousands of employees) hires a TMC to set controls in adherence to its corporate policy for travel, provide accurate reporting that connects to back end systems such as accounting, and deliver timely itinerary bookings and changes. TMC operators indicated that booking a ticket directly on airline.com takes 5 times as long as booking through a GDS due to the inability to compare prices and different corporate rules. A typical 15 minute purchase can easily turn into an hour's frustration. In order for direct connect to work, the TMC will need to directly connect to hundreds of airlines and have a specialized reporting system developed from each airline – an endeavor that is too costly for a TMC to take on. SABR can spread R&D and maintenance costs over 500 million bookings vs a TMC or airline with only 50 million bookings. In a two-sided market, the disintermediator must benefit the other side in order to be successful, which means airlines must provide TMCs a faster or economically superior alternative to SABR.

Mathematically disproving direct connect to TMCs: Each TMC agent earns ~\$1.50 per booking from SABR and can book 4 tickets / hour, totaling \$6/hour of fees earned from SABR. Through direct connect, the productivity of an agent drops to 1 ticket an hour (15 min x 4) which means the airline will have to pay TMCs \$6/booking. Adding 3 additional agents at an hourly wage of \$10 each to keep up the pace of 4 tickets an hour implies a break-even booking fee of \$64/hour, an amount that is 16x more than ~\$4/booking fee that airlines currently pay to Sabre. This is before taking into consideration the amount of technology costs incurred for direct connections between TMCs and airlines to be possible.

THE GDS MOAT:

2-sided Customer Captivity Through Network Effects. Airlines are captive customers on the GDS because 500 million tickets annually are purchased through Sabre. TMCs / OTAs are sticky because they want a one-stop-shop of all airline fares. The GDS is a classic case of network effects since you can't attract a new airline customer without a high volume of tickets sold, and vice versa.

Scale + High Fixed Costs. As mentioned before, airline direct connections, development of back-end connections, and consistent technology upgrades are costly and require a large amount of ticket volume to spread the cost over. New entry is low due to the scale needed to economically justify investments in developing technology and therefore, Sabre's moat is protected.

GDS PERFORMANCE TO OUTPERFORM IN NEXT 5 YEARS

Not only are customers captive in the GDS system, but Sabre is quickly gaining share in Europe which will result in higher average booking fees. European flights typically crosses country borders which earn higher fees than domestic flights. Sabre's customers, the 4 largest TMCs in the world, have announced international expansion which represents 30% of Sabre's GDS revenues. Mix change will improve average GDS fees and drops directly to the bottom line and is not incorporated into the street's projections.

TMC Customers are Expanding Internationally

Bookings Mix by Geography

Amex GBT

- 10/16: Acquire SMT – #1 share in Finland
- 10/16: Acquire KDS – France
- 9/16: Office open in Columbia
- 11/15: Expands China team
- 9/15: Carlsberg win (45k employees globally)

Carlson Wagonlit Travel

- 6/15: Acquire Ormes – France
- 3/15: Spirt Travel Partner – Albania

BCD Travel

- 10/16: Acquire Ticket Biz – Norway
- 9/16: JV in China

	SABR	AMS
GDS Fee	4.26	5.37
% NA	61%	17%
% Intl	39%	83%
\$ NA	3.28	3.28
\$ Intl	5.80	5.80
2017 Mix	SABR	
% NA	59%	
% Intl	41%	
GDS Fee	4.31	
Implied Growth	1.2%	

Source: Company filings.


Note: SABR acquired Abacus in 3Q15. 3Q15 to 2Q16 growth rates backs out Abacus bookings and revenue for a like-for-like comparison.

THESIS 2: IT SOLUTIONS SEGMENT IS A SOURCE OF GROWTH & CASH FLOW

The IT Solutions segment is the heart of an airline’s operations and connects every aspect of the business (cargo, scheduling, crew management, etc.). 225 airlines are Sabre IT Solutions customers, of which 60 airlines are customers of Sabre’s reservation system. SABR is currently #2 in IT Solutions and has closed the gap with #1 Amadeus in only 5 years.

Investors are concerned that SABR lost Southwest as an IT Solutions customer. Speaking to the LUV executive leading the migration, I learned that the decision to switch was not because of better technology, but because of LUV’s expansion into international markets as a result of the Air Train merger’s impact. Amadeus provided LUV an upfront incentive for being its North America launch customer. While the LUV loss to AMS impacts annual passenger booking volume by 120 million, SABR has offset it with wins in higher growth and higher yielding international customers. North America travel is dominated by AA, United, and Delta which continues to take share from LUV. AMS is moving into the wrong direction (North America) because there is little incentive for US Mega Carriers to switch technology. SABR, on the other hand, is encroaching on AMS’s European and Asian territories and quickly winning customers.

Despite the Southwest loss, Sabre has closed the gap with Amadeus in terms of passengers boarded to double its market share to 21% today from 10% in 2011. The last migration is expected to complete in 2017 with TAM airlines which will result in SABR being head-to-head with Amadeus.



THE IT SOLUTIONS MOAT:

Customer Captivity through High Switching Costs. 7 out of 7 airline executives I spoke to stressed the high risks of operational disruptions associated with switching reservation systems. In fact, an airline will make the switch if (1) it is merging or (2) it is a low cost carrier that started out on a simple system such as HP Shares or SITA and needs a more sophisticated system to support growth. Once an airline is on SABR’s reservation system, it is locked into a 10 year contract and will likely renew since switching is operationally risky (one exec called it “open heart surgery”).


Scale + High Fixed Costs. There are multiple examples of airlines that have attempted to develop its own reservation system and failed. For example, in ‘07, WestJet wrote off \$31m when it scrapped plans to develop a tailor-made reservation system. In ‘09, Air Canada suspended work on its reservation system it was developing with ITA Software, losing C\$67m. These failures are evidence of IT Solutions’ high barriers to entry. SABR has the ability and expertise to develop complicated reservation systems that can be implemented across multiple airlines which therefore spreads R&D and capex costs over a larger base.

NORMALIZED IT SOLUTIONS FCF GENERATION OVER NEXT 5 YEARS:

The IT solutions segment has doubled the amount of passengers boarded since 2011, which means cash flow has been reinvested into the business to support growth. Reported capex as a % of revenue is more than double that of peers and is predominantly comprised of growth capex. Former executives of SABR confirmed that maintenance capex is more than half of reported capex. Implying a normalized 4% capex / sales rate (in-line with peers) SABR is trading at a **18.5% yield on 2018 normalized FCF**.

OPTIONALITY: GROWTH THROUGH LCC AND OLD TECHNOLOGY SWITCHING:

Considering only airlines that have antiquated reservation systems on HP Shares, Navitaire, or SITA implies that there are 650 passengers boarded up for grabs in the next 3 years due to contract expiration. 11 out of 12 of these airlines are low cost carriers which fits the description of an airline that is most likely to switch.



“We were moving from the old system no matter what. We went with Amadeus because we got a good deal to be their launch customer. I don’t see a clear cut difference between Sabre and Amadeus” – EVP LUV

VALUATION

Air passenger traffic has grown at a 8% CAGR during non-recessionary times since 2002 and dropped 0.1% to 1% CAGR during the '90, '92, and '00 recession. In the worst recession of '08, passenger traffic dropped 3% CAGR. During the financial crisis, Amadeus experienced a 2% CAGR decline in GDS revenues while IT solutions remained flat which resulted in a 1.6% CAGR decline in top line and an increase to EPS and operating profits, proving the resiliency of the industry through recessionary times.

Base case: Industry passenger traffic grows 8% per year while SABR maintains market share. At the same time, GDS booking fee increases 1.5% / year due to favorable mix change. IT solutions business normalizes in 2018, resulting in normalized capex / sales rate of 4%. Full credit of passengers boarded from contract wins in IT solutions.

Bull case: Optionality in IT solution wins by assuming 25% of potential 650 passengers migrate to Sabre. Entrance into Europe increases GDS market share by 200bps.

Bear case: Industry passenger traffic declines 3% per year. SABR loses 200bps share to Amadeus. Entrance into Europe is unsuccessful, resulting in a declining GDS booking fee of 1% a year. IT solutions normalized capex / sales at 6%, comparable to SAAS companies with highest rates

Multiples: EBIT multiple of 10x for the GDS business implies a medium quality business that is growing in line with GDP. 9% FCF yield for the IT solutions business implies a medium quality business growing at a rate more than GDP growth.

		Bear Case			Base Case			Bull Case		
	Metric	2019	Multiple	TEV	2019	Multiple	TEV	2019	Multiple	TEV
GDS	EBIT	581	10.0x	5,812	947	10.0x	9,466	1,043	10.0x	10,428
IT Solutions	FCF	259	9.0%	2,881	491	9.0%	5,455	656	9.0%	7,289
	TEV			8,693			14,921			17,717
	Net Debt			1,345			1,345			1,345
	Equity			7,348			13,576			16,372
	PV Equity			5,520			10,200			12,301
	Shares			282			282			282
	\$ / Share			20			36			44
	Return			-11%			65%			98%

RISKS

US Airways vs Sabre Anti-Trust Lawsuit

The lawsuit with US Airways represents the greatest risk to Sabre and the GDS industry. US Airways claims that Sabre acted in anticompetitive behavior to “protect its monopoly pricing power and maintain its technologically obsolete business model.” Specifically, US Airways alleges that Sabre penalizes travel agents for bookings made outside the GDS and has been a barrier for travel agents to book directly with airlines using direct connections. US Airways has been successful in proving the anti-trust nature of full content agreements which could open contract renegotiation that could be financially harmful to all three GDSs. While it is uncertain how contract negotiations will be after the US Airways win, it is clear that airlines need the GDS systems to reach TMCs and therefore, GDS pricing will continue to be a premium.

IT Solutions migration could take longer than expected

Migrations typically take anywhere from 1 to 3 years. Sabre has approximately 7 migrations planned for the next 2 years, of which TAM airlines is the largest one with 40 annual passengers boarded. If the migrations last longer than expected then Sabre could incur unexpected costs or lose future business. History has many examples of botched migrations (United Airlines with HP Shares) that was disastrous to operations by grounding planes for many hours. In the event that Sabre has an event that grounds planes it could mean that the company will become less competitive as compared to Amadeus.

SOURCES

Customers – Airlines

- VP – Canadian Carrier
- EVP – US Carrier #1
- CIO – US Carrier #2
- CIO – US Carrier #3
- COO – US Carrier #3
- SVP – US Carrier #4
- EVP – US Carrier #5

Competitors

- North America CEO – Competitor
- SVP – Competitor
- VP – Competitor
- Founder – Metasearch

Subject Company

- Former Executive – Sabre
- Former Executive – Sabre

OTAs / TMCs

- CEO – Top 10 TMC
- CEO – Top 5 OTA

APPENDIX: DISECTING THE SHORT REPORT

1. Sabre is trying hard to mask underlying business model pressure and an LBO / re-LBO that created questionable value

- Biggest risk is disintermediation risk See Thesis 1
- Private equity sponsors reduced ownership from 80% at IPO to 25% today
- Private equity sales as a negative signpost is overblown since it is the normal course of business for PE to divest shares post-IPO

2. Management quietly starts liquidating ahead of the questionable related-party acquisition of Abacus Int'l

- By adjusting results for Abacus, GDS segment barely grew in 2015 yet management is claiming MSD – HSD organic growth
- Ignoring private equity sales, total insider selling is ~119m, of which, \$45m is from CEO (that is leaving)
- Insiders that sold the most have been with the company for the longest
- Filings show that Abacus revenue was \$187 million since acquisition date of July 1, 2015
- Backing out Abacus's contribution gets to a MSD-HSD organic growth number, just as management announced

3. Accounting Shenanigans

- Abacus acquisition accounting inaccuracies Not all line items of Abacus will match up to Sabre's because Sabre has investments in other JVs
- JV accounting artificially inflates operating cash flow by representing excess dividends as operating cash flows GAAP rules state, "all distributions received by the investor are deemed to be returns on the investment (and classified as operating cash flows) unless the **cumulative distributions exceed the cumulative equity in earnings recognized by the investor**"
 - According to '98 10K, SABR paid \$140 million for a 35% interest in Abacus
 - '99 to '07 filings show no dividends from JV received
 - JV dividends started in 2012 which equates to a cumulative amount of \$63 million
 - Cumulative JV equity distributions is \$85 million
 - Since cumulative dividends of \$63 million is less than cumulative equity distributions of \$85 million, the dividends are considered a return ON cash and **is correctly allocated to operating cash flow**
- Aggressive capitalization of upfront customer incentives
 - Incentives are paid at the start of a contract with terms of 3-5 years
 - Former CFOs of Sabre indicated that the company has been capitalizing incentives for decades, evidenced in the '00 10K
 - In fact, competitor TravelPort also capitalizes customer upfront incentives, which indicates it is industry standard to do so
- Management incentives tied to adjusted EBITDA thus incentivizing them to game it
 - I agree that adjusted EBITDA is a poor measure for incentives and that there are multiple ways to meet the threshold such as acquisitions

2. Valuation disconnect suggesting 40%-60% downside

- LBO fairness opinion suggested terminal Adj. EBITDA multiple range of 6.5x to 8.0x vs valuation today of ~10x Prior to LBO, the business was very different and did not have a focus on the high FCF IT solutions business
- Tax receivable agreement reduces cash flow I agree with this and have appropriately reduced CF by the tax receivable liability

Income Statement	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total Revenue	2,974	3,049	2,631	2,961	3,373	3,955	4,497	5,021	5,676
% Y/Y	4.1%	2.5%	-13.7%	12.5%	13.9%	17.2%	13.7%	11.7%	13.0%
Total Cost of Sales	1,556	1,630	1,484	1,644	1,913	2,178	2,451	2,704	3,018
% Y/Y	2.2%	4.8%	-9.0%	10.8%	16.3%	13.9%	12.5%	10.3%	11.6%
% Revenue	52.3%	53.5%	56.4%	55.5%	56.7%	55.1%	54.5%	53.9%	53.2%
Adj. Gross Profit	1,418	1,419	1,147	1,317	1,461	1,776	2,046	2,317	2,658
% Y/Y	6.3%	0.1%	-19.2%	14.8%	10.9%	21.6%	15.2%	13.2%	14.7%
% Margin	47.7%	46.5%	43.6%	44.5%	43.3%	44.9%	45.5%	46.1%	46.8%
SG&A (excl. D&A)	626	617	307	375	414	455	468	486	517
% Y/Y	0.3%	-1.3%	-50.3%	22.3%	10.3%	9.8%	2.9%	3.9%	6.3%
% Revenue	21.0%	20.2%	11.7%	12.7%	12.3%	11.5%	10.4%	9.7%	9.1%
Adj. EBITDA	793	802	840	942	1,047	1,321	1,579	1,831	2,141
% Y/Y	11.7%	1.1%	4.8%	12.1%	11.2%	26.3%	19.5%	16.0%	16.9%
% Margin	26.6%	26.3%	31.9%	31.8%	31.0%	33.4%	35.1%	36.5%	37.7%
Δ Y/Y bps	180bp	-36bp	564bp	-13bp	-77bp	239bp	168bp	137bp	125bp
D&A	283	296	290	351	414	493	550	612	682
% Y/Y	-3.6%	4.6%	-2.1%	21.4%	17.8%	19.0%	11.6%	11.3%	11.3%
% Sales	9.5%	9.7%	11.0%	11.9%	12.3%	12.5%	12.2%	12.2%	12.0%
Adj. EBIT	509.86	506	550	590	633	829	1,029	1,219	1,460
% Y/Y			8.8%	7.2%	7.2%	31.0%	24.1%	18.5%	19.7%
% Margin	17.1%	16.6%	20.9%	19.9%	18.8%	21.0%	22.9%	24.3%	25.7%
Δ Y/Y bps	256bp	-55bp	433bp	-99bp	-118bp	220bp	192bp	141bp	144bp
Net Interest & Other	(232)	(275)	(219)	(173)	(158)	(169)	(169)	(169)	(169)
EBT	277	231	332	417	474	660	860	1,050	1,291
Income Taxes	131	96	150	172	153	221	288	347	419
% Tax Rate	47.3%	41.4%	45.2%	41.2%	32.3%	33.5%	33.5%	33.0%	32.5%
Joint Venture Equity Income	24	16	15	16	3	2	2	2	2
Net Income	171	151	197	262	324	441	574	706	873
% Y/Y	27.9%	-11.5%	30.4%	32.8%	23.8%	36.3%	30.0%	23.0%	23.7%
% Margin	5.7%	4.9%	7.5%	8.8%	9.6%	11.2%	12.8%	14.1%	15.4%
Δ Y/Y bps	106bp	-79bp	253bp	135bp	77bp	156bp	160bp	130bp	133bp
Adj. FD EPS - Operating	\$0.96	\$0.85	\$0.80	\$0.94	\$1.15	\$1.56	\$2.04	\$2.53	\$3.14
% Y/Y		-11.9%	-5.9%	17.4%	22.3%	36.6%	30.6%	23.5%	24.2%
Diluted Shares	177	186	247	279	283	282	281	279	278

Balance Sheet	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Cash & Equiv	127	308	156	321	364	685	1,317	2,100	3,028
Accounts Receivables, net	417	434	363	376	401	419	430	433	441
Prepaid Expenses & Other	180	99	177	81	89	119	135	151	170
DTA	33	41	182	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Current Assets	757	883	878	778	853	1,222	1,882	2,684	3,639
PP&E, net	408	499	551	628	753	625	350	39	(307)
Goodwill & Intangibles	3,058	2,773	2,633	2,860	2,548	2,460	2,387	2,326	2,258
DTA - LT	0	0	0	44	95	95	95	95	95
Deposits & Other	488	602	655	1,083	1,474	1,553	1,642	1,737	1,844
Total Assets	4,711	4,756	4,718	5,394	5,725	5,956	6,357	6,882	7,530
Accounts Payable	125	111	114	138	169	181	201	220	243
Travel Supplier Liabilities	218	214	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accrued Compensation & Benefits	89	118	84	99	102	108	111	115	122
Accrued Subscriber Incentives	127	143	146	185	216	233	239	249	264
Other Accrued Liabilities	246	268	359	192	223	240	247	257	273
Current Portion of Debt	23	86	22	190	169	169	169	169	169
DTL	219	81	0	30	101	189	300	450	594
Deferred Revenue, Current	138	136	168	165	187	187	187	187	187
Total Current Liabilities	1,185	1,156	897	1,000	1,166	1,307	1,455	1,646	1,853
Long-Term Debt	3,421	3,644	3,061	3,169	3,276	3,276	3,276	3,276	3,276
Deferred Revenue - LT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Liabilities	384	273	675	740	656	545	485	405	325
Total Liabilities	4,990	5,073	4,634	4,909	5,099	5,129	5,216	5,328	5,455
Total Convertible Preferred Stock	598	635	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common Stock	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Additional Paid-in Capital	865	881	1,932	2,016	2,106	1,911	1,671	1,384	1,038
Accumulated Other Comprehensive	(96)	(50)	(74)	(206)	(342)	(342)	(342)	(342)	(342)
Retained Earnings	(1,648)	(1,785)	(1,776)	(1,329)	(1,141)	(745)	(191)	510	1,376
Total Stockholders' Equity	(877)	(953)	84	484	626	827	1,141	1,554	2,075
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity	4,711	4,756	4,718	5,394	5,725	5,956	6,357	6,882	7,530