

# Joaquin Peris

Curriculum Vitae – November 2024

Columbia Business School  
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## EDUCATION

<b>Columbia University</b>	New York, USA
Ph.D. Accounting	2025 (Expected)
<b>CEMFI (Center for Monetary and Financial Studies)</b>	Madrid, Spain
M.S. Economics and Finance	2018
<b>Polytechnic University of Valencia</b>	Valencia, Spain
B.S./M.S. Engineering	2014

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## RESEARCH

### Research Interests

Financial Reporting, Managerial Accounting, Information Economics

### Job Market Paper

#### *“Voluntary Disclosure and the Internal Information Environment of the Firm”*

solo-authored, (2024)

[Paper] [3-min Presentation]

This study explores how a firm’s internal information environment affects a manager’s decision to voluntarily disclose information to investors. It presents a model where the probability of a manager having information depends on whether the information is favorable or unfavorable. In the model, an internal information environment is defined as more conservative (aggressive) if it is more (less) likely to provide information about negative outcomes to a manager. The study shows that conservative internal information environments decrease voluntary disclosure. Additionally, under conservative (aggressive) internal information environments, an increase in information asymmetry between a manager and investors leads to less (more) voluntary disclosure. This finding provides insight into how the firm’s internal and external information environments interact to determine the extent of voluntary disclosure and is thus of empirical relevance. Finally, the study concludes that the most efficient internal information environment is aggressive. Here, efficiency is defined as the difference between the amount of information disclosed to investors and the cost of collecting it internally.

- Dissertation Committee: Tim Baldenius, Matthias Breuer, Jonathan Glover, Ilan Guttman and Sang Wu
- Research Grants: Bernstein Center Doctoral Research Grant
- Presentations: Columbia University, NYU, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 46th EAA Annual Congress, 15th Workshop on Accounting and Economics, IESE Business School, and Junior Accounting Theory Conference
- Coverage: University of Oxford Business Law Blog [\[Link\]](#)

## Working Papers

### *“Disclosure Incentives with Multiple Audiences”*

with Tim Baldenius, (2024)

This paper examines a firm’s voluntary disclosure decisions when dealing with multiple stakeholders, such as its providers of capital and labor. We develop a model where the firm’s value is determined by a production process that depends on the input contributions of both stakeholders. The firm, having private information about the marginal productivity of each input, decides whether to disclose this information. In cases where there are significant synergies between the stakeholders’ inputs, we show that the firm may choose to withhold information. By doing so, the firm can promote balanced input provisions from both stakeholders, thereby maximizing the benefits of synergies. Additionally, we allow the firm to endogenously choose a sharing rule over the outcome between itself and the stakeholders. In this scenario, we find that the firm withholds information at intermediate levels of synergy but not when synergies are either very high or very low. This is because the disclosure decision and the sharing rule act as substitute instruments for eliciting optimal inputs.

- Presentations: Columbia University

### *“Deception for the Good”*

with Sang Wu, (2024)

This paper examines the role of reputational incentives in communication games when the decision maker can acquire additional information besides the advisor’s message. We find that the decision maker is more likely to acquire additional information in the future when the advisor is perceived as misaligned. While both aligned and misaligned advisors value reputation to the extent it increases their trustworthiness in the future, they have opposite preferences regarding the informedness of the decision maker. As a result, conditional information acquisition leads to enhanced communication informativeness. In particular, the aligned advisor is incentivized to “deceive” the decision maker about her type by actually telling the truth in order to induce more information acquisition. The misaligned advisor, on the other hand, tells the truth more often since conditional information acquisition serves as an additional disciplining device.

- Presentations: Columbia University

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## TEACHING

<b>Game Theory</b> , TA to Alex Citanna, Columbia Business School	Spring, 2024
<b>Financial Accounting</b> , TA to Sang Wu, Columbia Business School	Spring, 2023
<b>Game Theory</b> , TA to Alex Citanna, Columbia Business School	Spring, 2023
<b>Financial Accounting</b> , TA to Sehwa Kim, Columbia Business School	Fall, 2020
<b>Financial Statement Analysis</b> , TA to Robert Stoumbos, Columbia Business School	Spring, 2020
<b>Financial Accounting</b> , TA to Sehwa Kim, Columbia Business School	Spring, 2020
<b>Financial Accounting</b> , TA to Matthias Breuer, Columbia Business School	Fall, 2019

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## CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

NYU Big Apple Accounting Conference, Junior Accounting Theory Conference (*Presenter*), 2024  
IESE Business School (*Presenter*), 15<sup>th</sup> Workshop on Accounting and Economics (*Presenter*),  
Wharton Spring Accounting Conference, 46<sup>th</sup> EAA Annual Congress (*Presenter*), Columbia  
Management Accounting Conference, 1st Columbia Accounting Theory Conference, Univer-  
sidad Carlos III de Madrid (*Presenter*), Polytechnic University of Valencia (*Presenter*)

XVII International Accounting Research Symposium, XIII Accounting Research Workshop, NYU Four School Accounting Research Conference, Columbia Junior Faculty Accounting Conference, Columbia Burton Accounting Conference	2023
Columbia Junior Faculty Accounting Conference, Columbia Burton Accounting Conference	2021
LBS Summer Finance Symposium, XIII Workshop on Empirical Research in Financial Ac- counting ( <i>Presenter, Discussant</i> )	2019
XIV International Accounting Research Symposium ( <i>Presenter</i> )	2018

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### FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Bernstein Center Doctoral Research Grant	2024 – 2025
Columbia Business School Doctoral Fellowship	2019 – 2025
Tsinghua University Summer Program Fellowship	2017
CEMFI Tuition Waiver for Academic Merits	2016 – 2018
CMU Moncloa Fellowship for Academic Merits	2016 – 2018
Polytechnic University of Valencia Promoe Program	2014

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### PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

<b>RBB Economics</b>	Madrid, Spain
Associate (consultant in antitrust and competition policy)	2018 – 2019
<b>Compass Lexecon</b>	Madrid, Spain
Intern (consultant in antitrust and competition policy)	2017
<b>IESE Business School</b>	Barcelona, Spain
Research Assistant for Miguel Antón and Gaizka Ormazabal	2014 – 2016

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### SKILLS AND INTERESTS

**Languages:** English (fluent), Spanish (native), Catalan (native). **Service:** Elected as a student class representative at Polytechnic University of Valencia and CEMFI. **Interests:** I like sports, particularly open water swimming (latest official swim: 6km/3.7miles in June 2024).

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### REFERENCES

<b>Tim Baldenius</b> Professor of Accounting Columbia Business School Accounting Division +1 (212) 854-1715 tb171@columbia.edu	<b>Jonathan Glover</b> Professor of Accounting Columbia Business School Accounting Division +1 (212) 854-1911 jg3463@gsb.columbia.edu	<b>Sang Wu</b> Assistant Professor of Accounting Columbia Business School Accounting Division sw3724@columbia.edu
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