



From belief to deceit: How expectancies about others' ethics shape deception in negotiations



Malia F. Mason*, Elizabeth A. Wiley, Daniel R. Ames

Columbia Business School, Columbia University, United States

ARTICLE INFO

Handling Editor: Shaul Shalvi

Keywords:

Negotiations
Deception
Expectancies
Social exchange
Ethics
Projection

ABSTRACT

Expectancies play an important and understudied role in influencing a negotiator's decision to be deceptive. Studies 1a–1e investigated the sources of negotiators' expectancies, finding evidence of projection and pessimism; negotiators consistently overestimated the prevalence of people who share their views on deception and assumed a sizable share of others embrace deceptive tactics. This phenomenon generalized beyond American samples to Chinese students (Study 1d) and Turkish adults (Study 1e). Study 2 demonstrated that pessimistic expectancies about others' ethics positively predicted the degree to which negotiators were dishonest, above and beyond their own stated ethical views, and that it did so across both distributive and integrative negotiations. Study 3 provided evidence of a causal relationship between expectancies of others' ethical views and dishonest behavior by manipulating expectancies. Study 4 provided additional evidence of this causal relationship in a live, dyadic exchange where performance was incentive compatible. Negotiators' deceptive behavior was shaped by their pessimism about others' ethical standards. We consider the implications of these findings for preventing deception in negotiations.

1. Introduction

Opportunities for deception are common in negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Parties often have incomplete information about one another's preferences and alternatives, leaving ample room to deceive and be deceived. With some frequency, negotiators actively present incorrect information (Lewicki, 1983) and passively welcome their counterparts to draw and act on incorrect inferences (Murnighan, 1991). And yet with some frequency, negotiators are candid and forthright even when doing so is costly. Given considerable variance in these important behaviors, a set of questions has attracted generations of scholars: Who lies in the course of bargaining—and when and why?

One group of answers to these questions revolves around the individual characteristics of negotiators, such as competitive orientation (Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005), greed (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), Machiavellianism (Fry, 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986), and envy (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). Other groups of answers focus on motivational characteristics such as temptation (Tenbrunsel, 1998) and unmet goals (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004), situational characteristics such as mode of communication (Schweitzer, Brodt, &

Crosen, 2002; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998) and consequences of lying (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013), and relational characteristics like trust (Olekals, Kulik, & Chew, 2014) and expected length of the relationship between the parties (Boles, Brashear, Bellenger, & Barksdale Jr, 2000; Lewicki & Spencer, 1991). Although research has considered many factors, an important and understudied determinant may be people's expectancies about others. In the present paper, we argue that a negotiator's expectations about the readiness with which other people embrace deceptive negotiation tactics can play a potentially important role in her choice to deceive a negotiation partner.¹

Expectancies are anticipatory beliefs about how others do and will behave. A long tradition of work in psychology has cast expectancies as playing a central role in shaping behavior (Bandura, 1969, 1977; Mischel, 1968, 1973). The basic tenets of these theories state that people develop mental models of individuals, and people in general, based on learning and experience (Bandura, 1969). The expectancies about others' behavior that flow from these models, even if distorted or mistaken, guide how people behave in social interactions (Mischel, 1973; Bandura, 1977; for a review see Roese & Sherman, 2007). When an individual's expectancies about other people's behavior change, so does their behavior (Mischel, 1968). Expectancies can affect behavior

* Corresponding author at: Columbia Business School, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, 720 Uris Hall, New York, NY 10027, United States.

E-mail address: mfm2139@columbia.edu (M.F. Mason).

¹ In keeping with previous scholars, we define deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead another party by presenting incorrect information (Bok, 1978; Lewicki, 1983) and/or by concealing or misrepresenting information upon which a partner relies when deciding to transact a deal (Shell, 1991).

beyond the impact of values and preferences; based on expectancies, people may act differently than their values alone would prescribe.

Research shows expectancies can play an important role in conflict and negotiation behavior. Expectancies about counterparts being cooperative or competitive shape cooperative versus competitive behavior (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), choice of integrative versus distributive strategies (Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007), the giving and withholding of accurate and inaccurate information (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), and self-reported willingness to engage in unethical tactics (Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013). Negotiators' expectancies about how their counterparts will react to their behavior influences the form and extremity of their proposals (e.g., Ames, 2008; Ames & Mason, 2015). Likewise, recent work shows that expecting a counterpart to be gullible increases the likelihood that a negotiator will use a deceptive move (Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). Here, we build on and go beyond past research by testing whether perceptions of the prevalence of people who endorse deceptive negotiation tactics shape negotiators' behavior. We expected to find that negotiators who believe the endorsement of deceptive negotiation tactics is widespread are more likely to employ these tactics themselves. Before tracing a link between expectancies of others' ethics and deceptive behavior, though, we sought to identify the sources of such expectancies.

1.1. Sources of expectancies

We suspected that one source for expectancies would be projection. That is, negotiators' assumptions about others' attitudes will often reflect their own attitudes. Considerable research reveals that people overestimate the percentage of others who share their beliefs and values (Krueger, 2000; Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This “false consensus” effect bears out in negotiations as well: more prosocial negotiators expect their opponents to cooperate, whereas selfish negotiators expect their opponents to compete (van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). Similar results have been found in the context of social dilemmas (e.g., Krueger & Acevedo, 2007). In the context of deception, we expected to find evidence consistent with projection—namely that people's own views on the appropriateness of using tactics intended to deceive a negotiation counterpart would be predictive of their estimates of others' views. In other words, people who think lying is appropriate in negotiations would estimate a greater share of others endorse lying as compared to estimates by those who see lying as wrong. This association between self-views and estimates of others' views would be consistent with a projective process whereby people's perceptions are anchored on themselves.

Projection could be the dominant or sole source of expectancies about others' views of deception. If so, our argument that these expectations about others play a role beyond one's own view would hold little meaning. If expectancies are simply an echo of one's own views on the appropriateness of deceiving in negotiations, they can hardly provide additional explanatory power in accounting for behavior. In contrast to this *predominant-projection* perspective, we believe there are other sources of expectancies at work, including widespread social beliefs that may depart from self-views. A negotiator's expectancies about what people are generally like—their model of the social world—likely shapes their approach to the interaction.

Here, we focus on expectancies negotiators have about how commonly other people *endorse deceptive negotiation tactics*. Given that self-interest is normative and prescribed in some cultures (Miller, 1999), people may assume there is widespread acceptance of deception as an appropriate means to maximize personal gain (Schwartz, 1986). Although evidence points to the contrary (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1990, 1991), both lay folk (Kohn, 1990; Wrightsman, 1991; Wuthnow, 1991) and social scientists (e.g., economists) presume material profit is the silent mover behind most human behavior (see also Miller & Ratner, 1996, 1998). It follows logically that people may, on balance, have pessimistic beliefs about others' willingness to deceive for personal gain. Central to

our argument, these pessimistic beliefs about others' ethics may predict the likelihood that they themselves deceive.

In sum, one possibility for expectancies about deception in negotiation is that projection predominates: People generally assume others have the same views they themselves do. If so, harnessing expectancies to predict deceptive behavior (beyond the influence of self-views) would be pointless. In contrast, we believe another force is often operating on these expectancies: pessimistic beliefs about others' ethicality. Expectancies may reflect varying degrees of projection as well as varying beliefs about others' endorsement of deceptive tactics that trend toward pessimism. We contend that measuring the variance in people's expectancies about how commonly others endorse deceptive tactics, above and beyond their own self-views of deceptive tactics, will improve our ability to predict and explain deceptive behavior.

1.2. Impact on deceptive behavior

The idea of pessimistic expectancies of others' ethical standards begetting deception is consistent with the idea of moral pragmatism, where people see honesty as less necessary when they doubt others' trustworthiness (Dees & Cramton, 1991). Indeed, honesty, even if it is a preferred strategy, might be seen as foolhardy in the face of inevitable or widespread deception. People often become more aggressive and unethical in competitive contexts because they believe the other party will do the same (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Pierce et al., 2013).

Our prediction that deception increases with the perception of its widespread endorsement stands in contrast to *opportunistic deception*, a dynamic in which deception increases when a counterpart is perceived as benevolent and trustworthy (Olekalns & Smith, 2007). According to the opportunistic model, optimistic expectancies increase deception because benevolent and trustworthy counterparts are seen as less likely to catch an act of deception and less likely to punish deception harshly. Although some past evidence supports this alternative, and this force may often be at play in negotiations, we predict that on balance the view that deception is prevalent will *increase* the use of deception in negotiations.

Whereas the past portrait of a deceptive negotiator is often of a calculative schemer, our portrait highlights another species of deceptive negotiator: the paranoid pessimist. In all likelihood, both species of deceiver exist, and some individuals' deceptive behavior is driven by both of these motives.

1.3. Predictions and plan of study

Our studies test two main predictions, one concerning the sources of expectancies and the other concerning their impact. First, we test the idea that peoples' expectancies about how commonly others endorse the use of deception in negotiations reflect projection as well as pessimism. This prediction stands in contrast to a *predominant-projection* alternative and is a necessary result for our account to have meaning (i.e., if expectancies are simply projections of self-views, these expectancies offer no additional predictive power for behavior). Our second prediction is that variance in expectancies about others' endorsement of deceptive tactics will predict deceptive behavior (i.e., people who expect widespread endorsement will be more likely to deceive). This prediction stands in contrast to an opportunistic deception account whereby believing that others are honest and trustworthy positively predicts deceptive behavior.

We believe these ideas are worth testing because, if borne out, they can expand our understanding of the nature of deceptive behavior in social exchange. If expectations about the prevalence of people who endorse deceptive tactics account for some variance in a decision to deceive, it opens up the possibility for interventions that alter deception by challenging or changing negotiators' (potentially incorrect) beliefs about what is normative rather than by challenging or changing negotiators' values.

We tested our predictions in a series of studies. Studies 1a–1e measured participants' personal views on the appropriateness of negotiation tactics intended to deceive as well as their perceptions of others' endorsement of such tactics, looking for evidence of projection and pessimism across different samples of Americans and in samples of Chinese students and Turkish adults. We expected negotiators' expectancies of others' endorsement of deceptive tactics would reflect both projection (i.e., these expectancies would be predicted by self-views) and pessimism (i.e., people would, on average, assume a sizable share of others endorse deceptive tactics and possibly overestimate the prevalence of people who endorse them). We expected these effects would emerge across social groups with different values, norms, and legal systems. Study 2 investigated how these expectancies shape behavior, testing for a link between negotiators' perceptions of the prevalence of people who endorse deceptive tactics and their use of deception in a series of single- and multi-issue negotiations. Study 3 garnered evidence of a causal connection between expectancies about others and the use of such tactics by *manipulating* expectancies about how commonly people endorse deceptive tactics and measuring their impact on deceptive negotiation behavior. Finally, Study 4 replicated this causal connection between expectancies and deceptive behavior in a live, dyadic exchange where money was at stake.

In our studies, we use three categories for characterizing people's beliefs about the appropriateness of deception in negotiations: *gamers* (who consider negotiations to be like a poker game and believe deception is generally appropriate), *pragmatists* (who weigh the costs and benefits of deception, keeping both material welfare and moral ideals in mind), and *idealists* (who hold themselves to high standards of ethics and integrity in negotiations). These schools of thought correspond to established categories like those used by [Dees and Cramton \(1991\)](#)—opportunists, pragmatists, and idealists—and [Shell \(2006\)](#) in his popular negotiation book.

We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in these studies. Sample sizes were exogenously determined in advance by student enrollment and attendance in negotiations classes (Studies 1a, 1c–1e, and Study 2), and by our intuitions about likely effect sizes and required statistical power (Study 1b). For studies with a binary dependent variable (Studies 3 and 4), we selected a minimum sample size using [Long \(1997\)](#) and [Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, and Feinstein \(1996\)](#) as a guide.

2. Study 1a

Study 1a investigated whether MBA students enrolled at an American university project their own views on deception onto their peers and also overestimate the prevalence of peers who endorse deceptive tactics.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants

Participants were 230 MBA students (55% male; mean age = 28.2 years; 4% African/ African-American, 26% Asian/Pacific Islander, 56% Caucasian/White, 7% Latino/Hispanic, 5% other, and 2% no response) at an American university who completed the survey as part of a course requirement before the initial class session. Four people failed to provide estimates of how their peers felt about each of the three schools of thought, and another 10 failed to indicate the school with which they self-identified, leaving a total of 216 participants for analysis.

2.1.2. Materials and procedure

Participants completed an online survey that explained that many different schools of thought exist about negotiations and what behaviors are expected or acceptable. Participants were instructed to reflect on the extent to which they agreed with three schools of thought:

As a *game*: Negotiation is a game where some amount of deception and tricks are natural and expected. Negotiators must use every play at their disposal to outwit their opponent or else risk being tricked and defeated in return.

As *costs and benefits*: Negotiation is a complex situation where people face tradeoffs and uncertainty. Negotiators should weigh costs and benefits in deciding how to behave (e.g., to lie, to cooperate, and so forth).

As a *matter of principle*: Negotiation is like all other domains in professional life where ethics and integrity should apply. Negotiators should hold themselves and one another to high standards for professional behavior.

We asked participants to rank the three schools for how closely they reflected their own approach to negotiations, giving the view that most closely matched their own a “1” and the view that least closely matched their own a “3.” Participants then indicated what percentage of their classmates they thought would rank each of the views with a “1.”

2.2. Results and discussion

2.2.1. Projection

We found evidence consistent with projection—people's own views about the appropriateness of using tactics intended to deceive was predictive of their estimates of others' views. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed that response was (“as a game”: $\beta = -0.37$, $b = -9.25$, $t(214) = -5.79$, $p < .001$; “as costs and benefits”: $\beta = -0.34$, $b = -8.44$, $t(214) = -5.33$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle”: $\beta = -0.36$, $b = -6.24$, $t(214) = -5.68$, $p < .001$). Moreover, members of each school estimated a significantly higher percentage of people in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $b = 19.13$, $t(214) = 5.26$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.21$; pragmatists: $b = 10.55$, $t(214) = 5.48$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.76$; idealists, $b = 10.69$, $t(214) = 5.40$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.79$; see [Table 1](#)).

Table 1

Actual versus perceived percentages by negotiators' category. Table depicts perceived prevalence of each view (in %) by participants who self-identified with each of the three schools. On the far right is the actual prevalence within each sample. In parentheses are the S.D.'s (in %). “Perceived % prag.” is the share of people presumed to embrace a pragmatist viewpoint, etc.

	Gamers	Pragmatists	Idealists	Actual
Study 1a: MBA students				
perceived % game.	50 (18)	31 (150)	30 (17)	10
perceived % prag.	30 (12)	46 (15)	37 (13)	59
perceived % ideal.	20 (9)	23 (11)	33 (18)	31
Study 1b: Mechanical Turk (American adults)				
perceived % game.	47 (23)	27 (16)	25 (15)	7
perceived % prag.	28 (22)	43 (16)	36 (16)	55
perceived % ideal.	25 (7)	30 (12)	39 (16)	38
Study 1c: Non-profit executives				
perceived % game.	50 (22)	29 (15)	32 (15)	4
perceived % prag.	26 (13)	44 (17)	32 (11)	39
perceived % ideal.	24 (10)	27 (14)	36 (14)	58
Study 1d: Chinese students				
perceived % game.	42 (19)	23 (12)	27 (16)	6
perceived % prag.	30 (12)	53 (17)	29 (11)	76
perceived % ideal.	29 (17)	24 (14)	45 (19)	18
Study 1e: Turkish executives				
perceived % game.	34 (7)	23 (16)	19 (11)	8
perceived % prag.	41 (6)	54 (18)	35 (13)	68
perceived % ideal.	25 (6)	23 (14)	46 (13)	25
Study 2: MBA students				
perceived % game.	37 (15)	33 (16)	27 (15)	16
perceived % prag.	29 (16)	45 (15)	40 (13)	52
perceived % ideal.	34 (17)	21 (12)	33 (17)	32

2.2.2. Pessimism about others

Importantly, projection was not the sole source of expectancies about others' views of deception. Consistent with our prediction that people have pessimistic expectancies about others' ethics in negotiations, on average participants estimated that 32.87% of their peers would endorse a “gamer” view. Moreover, participants' estimates of the share of gamers (32.87%) was significantly larger than what we actually observed (18.10%), $t(215) = 28.69$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.95$; see Table 1. It is worth noting that while participants' perceptions trended toward pessimism, there was notable variance around their estimates of the share of people who endorse a “gamer” view (range: 0 to 90%; $SD = 16.79\%$), variance we will attempt to harness in Studies 2–4 when we test the impact of expectancies on deceptive behavior.

In sum, one source for people's expectancies was projection: Participants' assumptions about others' attitudes tended to reflect their own attitudes. A second source of expectancies appears to be pessimism. Participants estimated a large share of their peers would endorse deceptive tactics, a figure that is significantly larger than what was actually observed. Given that this sample (MBA students) might be particularly pessimistic about the ethical standards to which their peers hold themselves, Study 1b sought to replicate the effect in a more wide-ranging sample of American adults.

3. Study 1b

Study 1b sought to replicate the results of Study 1a in a more general population of participants.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants

We recruited 155 individuals via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in exchange for monetary compensation. We excluded 27 people for failing the attention-check measure and another three for providing an incomplete response, leaving us with a sample of 125 individuals (51.2% male; mean age = 35.1 years; 73% Caucasian, 13% Asian, 6% Black or African-American, 7% Hispanic or Latino, 2% mixed-race).

3.1.2. Materials and procedure

Study 1b stimulus materials and procedures were identical to those of Study 1a with a few exceptions. First, prior to being asked to rank each school of thought according to its self-relevance and to estimate the percentage of other people who would have ranked each of the schools first (i.e., as most closely matching their own), participants were asked to think about a recent negotiation, to describe their experience in a few sentences, and indicate when the negotiation took place. We included this set of items to get participants thinking about the topic before administering our key measures. The only other difference was that Study 1b included an attention-check item (*Please indicate which of the following are NOT part of the three approaches to negotiations mentioned previously*).

3.2. Results and discussion

3.2.1. Projection

We again found evidence that people's own views about the appropriateness of using deceptive tactics was predictive of their estimates of others' views. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $\beta = -0.33$, $b = -9.48$, $t(123) = -3.92$, $p < .001$; “costs and benefits”: $\beta = -0.25$, $b = -6.85$, $t(123) = -2.90$, $p = .004$; “as a matter of principle”: $\beta = -0.37$, $b = -7.43$, $t(123) = -4.45$, $p < .001$). Moreover, members of each school estimated a significantly higher percentage of people were in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $b = 20.88$, $t(123) = 3.74$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.29$;

pragmatists: $b = 8.71$, $t(123) = 2.99$, $p = .003$, $d = 0.54$, idealists: $b = 10.22$, $t(123) = 4.21$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.78$; see Table 1).

3.2.2. Pessimism about others

We again found evidence of widespread pessimism about the ethical standards to which people hold themselves in negotiations: On average, participants estimated that 27.85% of people would endorse a “gamer” view of deception in negotiations. As with Study 1a, this estimate was significantly larger than what we observed (7.20%), $t(124) = 18.32$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.63$ (Table 1). Again, while participants' perceptions trended toward pessimism, there was notable variance around their estimates of the share of people who endorse a “gamer” view (range: 0 to 80%; $SD = 16.95\%$).

Study 1b demonstrated that American adults, like MBA students at an American university (Study 1a), tend to assume other people share their attitudes about deception. One source of their expectancies is their own attitude about deception. A second source of expectancies appears to be pessimism: Our sample of American adults expected a large share of others would endorse the use of deceptive negotiation tactics (i.e., the “gamer” view), a figure that is significantly larger than what was observed.

4. Study 1c

Study 1c tested for projection and pessimism among people who may have less skeptical views of others' ethical standards: managers who work in organizations that are dedicated to furthering a particular social cause (i.e., charities and non-profits).

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants

Participants were 104 senior managers at non-profit organizations with at least five years of non-profit management experience (21% male). These senior managers completed the survey as part of an executive education program. We excluded one participant for failing to follow instructions, leaving responses from 103 people for analysis.

4.1.2. Materials and procedure

Study 1c stimulus materials and procedures were identical to those of Study 1a.

4.2. Results and discussion

4.2.1. Projection

We again found evidence of projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $\beta = -0.29$, $b = -9.01$, $t(101) = -3.03$, $p = .003$; “as costs and benefits”: $\beta = -0.45$, $b = -10.21$, $t(101) = -5.13$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle”: $\beta = -0.31$, $b = -6.83$, $t(101) = -3.27$, $p = .002$). Moreover, members of each school estimated a higher percentage of people were in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $b = 19.42$, $t(101) = 2.46$, $p = .02$, $d = 1.25$; pragmatists: $b = 12.27$, $t(101) = 4.46$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.90$; idealists: $b = 9.48$, $t(101) = 3.46$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.69$; see Table 1).

4.2.2. Pessimism about others

Despite using a sample of people who may have a more optimistic view on human nature, we still observed pessimism about others' views on deception in negotiations. On average, participants estimated a sizable share of peers would endorse a “gamer” view of deception in negotiations (31.04%). As with Studies 1a and 1b, this perceived share was significantly larger than the actual share (3.88%), $t(102) = 20.01$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.97$; see Table 1. Again, while participants' perceptions trended toward pessimism, there was notable variance around their

estimates of the share of people who endorse a “gamer” view (range: 0 to 80%; SD = 16.09%).

Results indicate that, like MBA students at an American university (Study 1a) and a more representative population of American adults (Study 1b), the expectancies of people who work in non-profits appear to have at least two sources: projection and pessimism. They assume other people share their attitudes about deception and that a large share of people will endorse a “gamer” view.

5. Study 1d

To determine whether projection and pessimism about others' ethics are unique to Americans or if they occur in other cultures, Study 1d tested for these effects among a sample of Chinese undergraduates.

5.1. Method

5.1.1. Participants

Participants were 172 Chinese undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 22 who completed the survey as part of a negotiations workshop at an American university.

5.1.2. Materials and procedure

Study 1d stimulus materials and procedures were identical to those of Studies 1a and 1c, with the exception being that they were written in Mandarin. Participants were asked to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of peers who would have ranked each of the schools first (i.e., as most closely matching their own).

5.2. Results and discussion

5.2.1. Projection

We found evidence consistent with projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $\beta = -0.38$, $b = -8.73$, $t(170) = -5.43$, $p < .001$; “as costs and benefits”: $\beta = -0.55$, $b = -18.30$, $t(170) = -8.66$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle”: $\beta = -0.46$, $b = -10.78$, $t(170) = -6.72$, $p < .001$). Moreover, members of each school estimated a higher percentage of people were in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $b = 18.18$, $t(170) = 4.25$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.39$; pragmatists: $b = 24.11$, $t(170) = 8.74$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.56$; idealists: $b = 20.59$, $t(170) = 6.98$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.38$; see Table 1).

5.2.2. Pessimism about others

Again, consistent with our prediction that people have pessimistic expectancies about others' views on deception in negotiation, on average, participants predicted 24.37% of their peers would endorse a “gamer” view. As in Studies 1a–c, this perceived share was larger than the observed share (5.81%), $t(171) = 23.19$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.77$; see Table 1. As was true of the American samples, while participants' perceptions trended toward pessimism, there was notable variance around their estimates of the share of people who endorse a “gamer” view (range: 0 to 80%; SD = 13.76%).

6. Study 1e

As a further test for projection and pessimism across cultures, Study 1e sought to replicate the results among a sample of Turkish adults.

6.1. Method

6.1.1. Participants

Participants were 67 Turkish executives who completed the survey as part of a negotiations workshop. We excluded one participant from the analyses for failing to respond to the survey in full and excluded a

second for providing peer estimates that did not summate to 100%, leaving a total of 65 individuals for analysis (66.2% male; mean age = 35.81, SD = 5.03).

6.1.2. Materials and procedure

Study 1e stimulus materials and procedures were identical to those of Studies 1a, 1c, and 1d. Participants were asked (in English) to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of peers who would rank each of the schools first (i.e., as most closely matching their own).

6.2. Results and discussion

6.2.1. Projection

We found evidence consistent with projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $\beta = -0.38$, $b = -8.52$, $t(63) = -3.24$, $p = .002$; “as costs and benefits”: $\beta = -0.50$, $b = -15.70$, $t(63) = -4.56$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle”: $\beta = -0.65$, $b = -12.79$, $t(63) = -6.74$, $p < .001$). Moreover, members of each school estimated a higher percentage of people were in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $b = 12.17$, $t(63) = 1.86$, $p = .07$, $d = 0.87$; pragmatists: $b = 17.39$, $t(63) = 4.03$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.07$; idealists: $b = 23.20$, $t(63) = 6.41$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.81$; see Table 1).

6.2.2. Pessimism about others

As in Studies 1a–d, on average participants predicted 22.77% of their peers would endorse a “gamer” view. Again, this perceived share was significantly larger than the observed share (7.69%), $t(64) = 12.77$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.58$; see Table 1. Again, while participants' perceptions trended toward pessimism, there was notable variance around their estimates of the share of people who endorse a “gamer” view (range: 0 to 70%; SD = 14.33%).

As a final test that projection and pessimism occur cross-culturally, Study 1e replicated the projection and pessimism effects with Turkish business executives. Taken together, Studies 1a–1e suggest negotiators tend to both assume others share their attitudes about the appropriateness of deceptive negotiation tactics and overestimate the number of people who endorse their use in social exchange.

In sum, across our initial five studies we found consistent evidence of projection, with increases in perceived prevalence of a viewpoint from 7 to 12 percentage points with each increase toward a “1” self-ranking. Importantly, however, these studies also show that expectancies about others' endorsement of deceptive tactics were not redundant with self-views. These expectancies are not simply a mirror of self-views but seemingly reflect other influences. In particular, they seem to reflect varying levels of pessimism about human nature. This result converges with existing evidence that people's model of what others are like includes the extent to which they can be trusted—that their words and promises can be relied upon (Rotter, 1971)—and suggests it is meaningful to consider whether variance in pessimism can be harnessed to predict deceptive behavior, above and beyond the impact of self-views. Our remaining studies focus on this question. We expected negotiators' perceptions of the prevalence of “gamers” would predict their own deceptive behaviors, above and beyond their stated views about the appropriateness of deceptive tactics.

7. Study 2

Study 2 had a primary aim: to test our hypothesis that expectancies of the prevalence of gamers would predict deceptive behavior. Put another way, does believing the social world is full of people who consider it appropriate to rely on deceptive negotiation tactics lead people to deceive? Our secondary aim was to consider whether this effect emerged across both distributive (i.e., single-issue, zero-sum) and integrative (i.e., opportunities to expand the “collective pie”)

bargaining contexts. Expectancies about the prevalence of gamers may be a stronger predictor of deceptive behavior in distributive versus integrative negotiations because negotiators who have (or assume they have) interests that are diametrically opposed to their partners tend to employ a greater number of deceptive tactics (Halevy, Chou, & Murnighan, 2012). In fact, expectancies about the prevalence of gamers might predict deceptive behavior in distributive negotiations but not integrative ones. We suspected that expectancies would be predictive in both contexts but sought to determine whether a boundary exists.

7.1. Method

7.1.1. Participants

Participants were 98 MBA students (61% male; mean age = 28.3 years; 4% African/African-American, 24% Asian/Pacific Islander, 62% Caucasian/White, 6% Latino/Hispanic, and 3% other) who participated in five negotiations—two distributive and three integrative—over the course of six weeks as part of a course requirement in a negotiations class. The data for seven of the 490 negotiations were not reported, leaving a total of 483 data points for analysis.

7.1.2. Materials and procedure

Prior to the first day of class, participants completed an online survey. The survey was identical to that utilized in Studies 1a–1e. Participants were asked to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of the population that would have ranked each of the Schools first.

Approximately three weeks later, participants engaged in their first of a series of five negotiation simulations that were featured in a course on negotiations that met once a week. Two of the negotiations were single-issue, distributive negotiations, and three were multi-issue negotiations featuring mixes of distributive, integrative, and compatible issues.

Upon completion of each negotiation, participants responded to an online survey. Our measure of interest was the statement: “I was misleading or dishonest” rated on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*). We embedded this statement in a larger set of items that were collected to provide students with feedback about their negotiation skillset (e.g., “My partner was an active, effective communicator during the negotiation.”). This item was the only post-negotiation measure relevant to the current project and the only post-negotiation measure included in any analyses we conducted (see Supplementary materials for a complete list.)

7.2. Results and discussion

7.2.1. Projection

We replicated our prior projection findings—people's own views about the appropriateness of using tactics intended to deceive was predictive of their estimates of others' views. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $\beta = -0.19$, $b = -3.93$, $t(96) = -1.90$, $p = .06$; “as costs and benefits”: $\beta = -0.30$, $b = -6.65$, $t(96) = -3.10$, $p = .003$; “as a matter of principle”: $\beta = -0.27$, $b = -5.45$, $t(96) = -2.76$, $p = .007$). Moreover, members of each school estimated a significantly higher percentage of people were in their own school than did non-members (pragmatists: $b = 9.12$, $t(96) = 3.04$, $p = .003$, $d = 0.65$; idealists: $b = 9.05$, $t(96) = 2.73$, $p = .008$, $d = 0.59$), although the effect was marginal in the case of gamers versus non-gamers: $b = 5.71$, $t(96) = 1.34$, $p = .18$, $d = 0.37$; see Table 1.

7.2.2. Pessimism about others

Projection was not the sole source of expectancies about others' views of deception. Replicating the findings from Studies 1a–1e, on average participants predicted a sizable share—31.79% of their

peers—would endorse a “gamer” view. Again, this perceived share was significantly larger than the observed share (16.32%), $t(97) = 20.04$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.01$; Table 1. While participants' perceptions trended toward pessimism, there was notable variance around their estimates of the share of people who endorse a “gamer” view (range: 0 to 70%; SD = 15.62%) raising the possibility that this variance might be tapped into to better predict the choice to deceive a negotiation partner.

7.2.3. Predicting deceptive behavior

We then tested the extent to which participants' personal views about deception and the extent to which their pessimism—their perceptions of the prevalence of “gamers”—predicted their deceptive behavior. Given the nested nature of the data (i.e., approximately 5 negotiations within 98 negotiators), we used a mixed-model design and the statistical tools available in the R-package lme (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). We included negotiator as a random intercept, allowing the model to look at the effects of our independent variables, controlling for subject-by-subject variability.

When participants' ranking of the extent to which they personally view negotiations to be a game were entered as the sole predictor, it significantly predicted reports of being misleading or dishonest across the negotiations, $b = -0.28$, $t(96) = -2.26$, $p = .026$, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.03]. The closer participants ranked “as a game” to first, the more likely they were to report having misled or deceived their counterparts. When participants' estimates of the percentage of classmates who endorsed a gaming view of negotiations was entered as the sole predictor, it also significantly predicted misleading or deceptive behavior, $b = 0.02$, $t(96) = 3.58$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.01, 0.03]. That is, as we predicted, the more prevalent participants thought the gamer view was among their classmates, the more likely they were to be dishonest.

When both predictors were entered simultaneously with an interaction term, estimates' of the percentage of classmates who were gamers remained highly significant, $b = 0.06$, $t(94) = 3.15$, $p = .002$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.10], and self-ranking of “as a game” was reduced to marginal significance, $b = 0.41$, $t(94) = 1.38$, $p = .17$, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.99]. The interaction of the two was also significant, $b = -0.02$, $t(94) = -2.28$, $p = .024$, 95% CI [-0.03, -0.002], indicating people who self-identify with the game view and assume the view is popular were especially likely to be misleading or dishonest.

7.2.4. Testing the robustness of the pessimism effect across negotiation settings

Our dataset permitted testing whether self-ranking of the “gamer” school, perceptions of the prevalence of “gamers,” and the interaction of the two predict deceptive behavior in single-issue, distributive negotiations as well as multi-issue negotiations with integrative potential. When we added estimates' of the percentage of classmates who are gamers, self-ranking of gaming, negotiation type, and the two- and three-way interaction terms to our model, estimates of the percentage of classmates who are gamers remained highly significant, $b = 0.09$, $t(94) = 3.24$, $p = .002$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.14], as did the interaction between self-ranking of “as a game” and estimates of peers who are gamers, $b = -0.03$, $t(94) = -2.32$, $p = .02$, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.003]. Self-ranking of the “as a game” view of deception was a marginally significant predictor of behavior, $b = 0.58$, $t(94) = 1.44$, $p = .15$, 95% CI [-0.22, 1.38]. Critically, we found no significant interaction between negotiation type and estimates of peers being gamers ($p = .19$), suggesting that pessimism predicts deception in both single- and multi-issue negotiations. We also did not observe a main effect of negotiation type ($p = .50$), an interaction between negotiation type and self-ranking of the “as a game” view ($p = .58$), or significant three-way interaction ($p = .39$).

Note that estimates of the percentage of classmates who are gamers positively predicted deceptiveness when we restricted our analyses to data from the distributive negotiations, $b = 0.09$, $t(94) = 3.03$, $p = .003$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.15], as well as when we restricted our

analyses to data from the multi-issue, integrative negotiations, $b = 0.05$, $t(93) = 2.20$, $p = .029$, 95% CI [0.005, 0.093].

In sum, perceptions of classmates' views on deception predicted negotiators' deceptive behavior above and beyond their own stated views on deception. The effect was robust across negotiation settings, emerging in single-issue distributive, negotiations in which parties have diametrically opposed interests as well as in negotiations in which parties have the potential to obtain “win-win” outcomes via the trading of priorities (i.e., multi-issue, integrative negotiations). Note in this particular dataset, perceptions of classmates' views on deception was a more reliable predictor than personal views, suggesting that when trying to assess whether a negotiation counterpart is being honest and forthcoming, knowing how pessimistic the individual is about others' ethics in negotiations might sometimes be more useful than knowing his or her self-reported view of the appropriateness of deceptive tactics.

8. Study 3

Study 3 builds on, and goes beyond, Study 2 in two key ways. First, we test how manipulating expectancies about the prevalence of people who embrace a “gamer” view affected deception in a hypothetical negotiation. Whereas Study 2 sought to establish that expectancies about others' ethical standards predicts deceptive tactics by *measuring* participants' expectancies, Study 3 sought to establish the relationship by *manipulating* expectancies and examining subsequent rates of deception. Second, we examine the relationship between perceptions of the prevalence of gamers and deceptive behavior using an objective, behavioral measure of deception: withholding or misrepresenting information that one was directly asked for by a negotiation partner when revealing it may be costly. Whereas Study 2 relied on self-reports of deceptive behavior, Study 3 sought to establish the relationship with a behavioral measure of deception.

8.1. Method

8.1.1. Participants and design

We recruited 201 individuals from MTurk to participate in exchange for monetary compensation. The study had a single between-participants manipulation (expectancy condition: minority- or majority-gamers). We excluded 11 participants from the analysis—four from the minority-gamers condition and seven from the majority-gamers condition—because they did not write emails as instructed. We therefore had a total of 190 participants (36% male; mean age = 35.2 years; 75% Caucasian, 7% Asian, 10% African-American, 1% Native American, 1% Pacific Islander, 4% Hispanic, 3% other) in our final sample.

8.1.2. Materials and procedure

At the beginning of the study participants were told, “To begin, we want to share some research results with you. We asked several hundred American adults to tell us about their view of interpersonal negotiations. Specifically, we told them about THREE ways for thinking about the appropriateness of deception in negotiations, and we asked them to tell us how these ways matched their own views.” Participants were randomly assigned to either the minority-gamers or majority-gamers condition. Participants in the former were informed that “a majority of people—65%—ranked ‘as a game’ last. In other words, a vast majority saw the use of deception and tricks to outwit their opponent as inappropriate and unacceptable.” Participants in the latter were informed that “a majority of people—65%—ranked ‘as a game’ first or second. In other words, a vast majority saw the use of deception and tricks to outwit their opponent as appropriate and preferable.” To ensure participants processed the manipulation and revised their model of the social world (i.e., of what others are like) in light of this information, they were then asked to write a few sentences explaining why they believed the vast majority of people would see this “as a game” approach as inappropriate (minority-gamers condition) or appropriate

(majority-gamers condition).

Participants were then asked to imagine that they were in a negotiation with an American man named John over a 2010 Honda Civic that they were attempting to sell to him (adapted from Schweitzer & Croson, 1999, p. 230; see Supplementary materials for vignette). Participants were informed that they needed to get *at least* \$8000 for it in order to cover the costs of a relocation. They were also told that “the transmission is in worse shape than most cars with 50,000 miles and that it will very likely need transmission work before 60,000 miles.”

Participants learned John had come by to see the car, and the car performed without a problem. They were then told John said he would send an email to follow up on buying the car. On the next screen, participants are shown an email they had just received from John (see Supplementary materials). In his email, John explains that he is writing about the car's condition and asked if the car has any problems, or if the car could be described as being in good condition.

Critically, participants were then instructed to write a response to John's email. On the subsequent screen, they were asked what they said about the condition of the car in their email response: (a) I was clear the car would need some repairs, (b) I did not address his question about whether the car would need some repairs, or (c) I assured the buyer that the car would not need any repairs. They were then asked to indicate what percentage of people in their situation (selling a used car with transmission issues) would have done the following: (a) been clear the car would need repairs, (b) not addressed his question about whether the car needed repairs, and (c) assured the buyer the car would not need repairs.

We included three items that would permit us to assess whether counterpart-specific expectancies played a role in our negotiators' decisions about whether to mislead the buyer. Participants estimated the percentage likelihood that John was misrepresenting the market value of Civics, his budget, and his alternative (the price at which he could purchase the car from another seller), all on a scale with the following anchors: 0 = *not at all likely*, 50 = *somewhat likely*, and 100 = *extremely likely*.

As a manipulation check, participants indicated what percentage of American adults would rank the “as a game” view of deception as their top choice.² Finally, participants were asked to provide information about their demographics.

8.2. Results and discussion

8.2.1. Behavioral measure of deception

Two coders independently coded participants' email messages ($K = 0.96$, $p < .001$) and then reconciled differences via discussion. Participants who mentioned the transmission problem were categorized as honest; participants who withheld information about the repairs were categorized as deceptive. Consistent with Study 2, a logistic regression revealed that majority-gamer participants were significantly more deceptive (75.8%) than minority-gamer participants (61.6%), $b = 0.67$, $Z = 2.09$, $p = .037$.

8.2.2. Self-reported deception

We conducted parallel analyses using the self-report measure of deceptiveness. Participants who indicated they told John about the transmission problem (i.e., responded “a”) were categorized as honest. Participants who withheld information about the repairs (i.e., responded “b” or “c”) were categorized as deceitful. Comparing participants self-reported deception to the coded transcript we found that only 5% of them falsely claimed to have revealed information about the transmission in their email.

² As expected, minority-game participants estimated a significantly lower percentage of American adults would rank “as a game” as their top choice than did majority-game participants, $t = -7.36$, $p < .001$, $d = -1.09$.

As expected, and mirroring the behavioral results, a logistic regression revealed that rates of self-reported deception were significantly higher among majority-gamer participants (70.3%) than minority-gamer participants (55.5%), $b = 0.64$, $Z = 2.09$, $p = .036$.

Additional exploratory analyses revealed that our manipulation of gamer prevalence did not have a significant effect on ratings of the extent to which the specific counterpart was deceptive, i.e., the composite of responses to the three items that assessed the likelihood that John was misrepresenting his position, $b = 2.96$, $t(188) = 1.06$, $p = .29$.³ This result suggests the effect of gamer prevalence on rates of deception was not channeled thru counterpart-specific expectancies but affected behavior directly, possibly by signaling what is normative.

Building on the results of Study 2 in which we *measured* participants' expectancies about others' views on deception and demonstrated they predict deceptive behavior, Study 3 *manipulated* expectancies about others' ethical standards and demonstrated doing so affected deceptive behavior. Whereas Study 2 results relied on self-reported deceptiveness, here we coded participants' email responses for such behavior and replicated our key finding: Negotiators who believe the endorsement of deceptive negotiation tactics is widespread are more likely to employ these tactics themselves.

Note that the majority- and minority-gamer manipulations were based on the *perceived* and *actual* share of people who endorse a gamer view in a separate sample of American adults (see Supplementary materials). Study 3 found that revealing the *actual* share of people who endorse a gamer view in this US sample (minority manipulation) diminished deceptiveness relative to revealing the *perceived* share in this sample (majority manipulation), suggesting that publicizing the reality of people's ethical standards (or what they are willing to endorse) could be a way to reduce deception in negotiations.

9. Study 4

We interpret Study 3 as providing causal evidence that expecting the endorsement of deceptive tactics to be widespread leads to an increase in deceptive negotiation behavior. However, we captured potentially deceptive behavior in a single message crafted by participants in a seller role responding to a description of a buyer. It could be that deception operates differently when individuals believe they are in a live interaction with another individual. It could also be that monetary incentives for performance shape how deception unfolds. Study 4 addressed these two shortcomings, going beyond our prior findings by manipulating expectancies and then testing for deception (using an objective measure of deception) in the context of a live, dyadic exchange with monetary incentives for performance.

9.1. Method

9.1.1. Participants and design

Participants were 129 individuals who were recruited via Amazon's MTurk for a study that involved negotiating via a chat room. The study had a single, between-participant design (expectancies condition: minority- or majority-gamers). After a review of the chatroom transcripts, we identified 13 cases (9 minority-gamers and 4 majority-gamers) where the seller abandoned the negotiation mid-conversation. We excluded another 12 sellers because they left the chatroom before the confederate could engage them. We excluded another three people because they did not use their seller code as their chatroom alias per our instructions, preventing us from being able to link their transcript data to their survey data (and thus determine which manipulation they received). This process left 101 individuals in the sample.

Of those participants reporting demographic information, 48.5% were women, and 68.3% identified themselves as White/Non-Hispanic,

8.9% as Black/African American, 5.0% as East Asian, 3.0% as South Asian, and 14.9% as Hispanic. Average age was 33.2 years ($SD = 9.2$ years).

9.1.2. Materials and procedure

After an informed-consent procedure, participants were told they would be anonymously paired with another participant and directed to an online chatroom where they would conduct a negotiation simulation regarding the sale of a used car (see Supplementary materials; in truth, they would be negotiating with a confederate pretending to be a research participant, following a pre-determined script). Participants—all in a seller role (buyers were played by trained confederates)—were randomly assigned to receive a manipulation that was identical to the one we used in Study 3. As with Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to either the minority-gamers (“a majority of people—65%—ranked “as a game” last...”) or majority-gamers (“a majority of people—65%—ranked “as a game” first or second...”) condition. As with Study 3, to ensure participants processed the manipulation and revised their model of the social world (i.e., of what others are like) in light of this information, they were then asked to write a few sentences explaining why a reasonable person might be honest in negotiations (minority-gamers) or might lie in a negotiation (majority-gamers condition).

Participants were told they had been randomly assigned to the seller role and were asked to imagine they were planning to move to another state and must sell their car—a 2010 Honda Civic. They were truthfully informed that if their settlement was among the best 25% of deals (i.e., the lowest quartile percent of prices for buyers, the highest for sellers), they would be eligible for a \$50 bonus drawing.

Stimulus materials were nearly identical to those used in Study 3. One notable departure from Study 3 procedures, which involved having participants write an email to a potential buyer, was the inclusion of new materials for the dyadic portion of the study. Specifically, confederates pretending to be buyers followed a protocol involving sending scripted messages to participants (sellers) in an online chatroom (see Supplementary materials). Among other things, the confederate buyer informed participants “My friend who is a car expert tells me a 2010 Civic in good condition would sell for \$7500...” and that he is “...under time pressure because someone else is willing to sell me a car cheaply (below market).” In the fifth message, the confederate buyer asked the seller about the condition of the car. Specifically, the confederate buyer asked, “Would you describe the condition of the car as being good? Are there any issues?” Our key outcome measure was whether the seller revealed the transmission problem to the buyer versus omitted the information or outright lied to the buyer about the car's condition.

Upon reaching a deal or arriving at an impasse, all participants were told to leave the chatroom and return to their individual survey. In their post-negotiation survey, participants were asked to respond to a series of questions that were of no theoretical interest but were included to obscure the true nature of the experiment and to maintain the perception that they had interacted with another participant (vs. a confederate). Specifically, they were asked: (i) whether or not they reached a deal, (ii) if so, the final settlement price (scripted to be \$8100), (iii) to estimate the “maximum your counterpart would have possibly paid you for this car” (i.e., assumed reservation point), (iv) extent satisfaction with the deal (1 = *very dissatisfied*; 5 = *very satisfied*), and (v) how they responded when the seller asked about the least they would accept for the car (the seller never asked this question). After registering their responses to these questions, participants were asked (vi) how they responded when the buyer asked about the condition of the car (1 = *I was clear it would need repairs*, 2 = *I did not address the question*, 3 = *I assured the buyer that the car would not need repairs*, and 4 = *I was not asked this question*). Although our primary concern was establishing a causal connection between general expectancies of others' ethical behavior in negotiation and decisions to deceive, we also collected a measure of counterpart-specific expectancies. Specifically, we asked

³ One observation was excluded due to missing data.

participants the likelihood that the buyer was misrepresenting information about his or her position or the value of the car (0 = *not likely at all*; 100 = *very likely*).⁴

9.2. Results

9.2.1. Behavioral measure of deception

Two trained assistants independently coded the chatroom transcripts for deception ($K = 0.93$, $p < .001$) and then reconciled differences via discussion. Participants who mentioned the transmission problem were categorized as honest; participants who withheld information about the necessary repairs or lied altogether were categorized as deceptive. As predicted, and replicating the findings of Studies 2 and 3, a binary-logistic regression revealed majority-gamer participants were significantly more deceptive (85.5%) than were minority-gamer participants (45.7%), $b = 1.955$, $Z = 4.022$, $p = .00006$.

9.2.2. Self-reported deception

We conducted parallel analyses using self-report measure of deceptiveness. Participants who indicated they told John about the transmission problem (i.e., responded “a”) were categorized as honest. All other participants who withheld information about the repairs were categorized as deceitful. Since only a single participant falsely claimed to have revealed the problem (i.e., 99.0% of participants responded accurately to the self-reported deception item), results converged with our analysis of the coded transcripts. Specifically, a binary-logistic regression revealed the rates of self-reported deception were significantly higher among majority-gamer participants (83.6%) than minority-gamer participants (45.7%), $b = 1.806$, $Z = 3.85$, $p = .0001$.

As was the case in Study 3, the effect of expected gamer prevalence on increased deception did not operate by shaping perceptions of the ethicality of the specific counterpart (i.e., John). While expecting gamers to be prevalent did predict higher ratings of John's deceptiveness, $b = 20.27$, $t(100) = 3.23$, $p = .001$, when we account for the effect of our manipulation on deception ($b = 1.78$, $Z = 3.57$, $p = .0004$), counterpart-specific perceptions had no effect on rates of deception, $b = 0.01$, $Z = 1.32$, $p = .19$. Expecting gamers to be common appears to increase rates of deception because it normalizes the behavior.

10. General discussion

In much of the prior scholarly literature, the portrait of a deceptive negotiator is of someone who is a calculative schemer, executing a gambit that flows from their own internal, profit-maximizing impulses. Here, we put forth evidence of another species of deceptive negotiator: the paranoid pessimist, drawn to deception not so much because of their own appetites but because of their read—or potential misread—of what others are like (i.e., their model of the social world). We found evidence that the tendency to project and exhibit pessimism about others' ethical standards is widespread among negotiators across the globe. Negotiators overestimated the percentage of other people who share their own beliefs about the appropriateness of deceptive behavior and assume a large share of people are willing to embrace deceptive negotiation tactics, much larger than in fact do (Studies 1a–1e & 2). Critically, expecting the endorsement of deceptive negotiation tactics is widespread was highly predictive of decisions to engage in deception oneself, across both distributive (i.e. single-issue) and integrative (i.e., multi-issue) negotiation settings (Study 2). The relationship between pessimism about others' ethics and a choice to deceive appears to be a causal one, as rates of deception increased when we experimentally

⁴ When we included estimates of the likelihood that the specific partner was lying, gamer condition and the interaction of the two as predictors of deception in a logistic regression we found that counterpart-specific pessimism did not predict behavior, $b = 0.02$, $z = 0.73$, $p = .47$, nor did it interact with condition to predict deceptive behavior, $b = -0.005$, $z = -0.31$, $p = .75$.

manipulated perceptions of “gamer” prevalence and then measured its effect on behavior (Studies 3 & 4).

These results raise the possibility of an equilibrium in which a sizable majority behaves deceptively, even though few people personally endorse dishonesty in negotiations. As with the literature on pluralistic ignorance (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1996), a widespread misperception that the “gamer” view is prevalent may be increasing rates of deception. Our findings are certainly consistent with this idea, however we acknowledge that any definitive claims about the relationship between private attitudes and misperceived social norms requires a more reliable estimate of the true “gamer” prevalence than we used here. The discrepancy we observed between the *perceived* and *actual* share of people who endorse a “gamer” view in Studies 1a–e and 2 may reflect cynicism (i.e., people are *overly* pessimistic about others), an unwillingness on the part of gamers to publicly admit they embrace deceptive tactics (i.e., a degree of impression management by participants), or some combination of both. Future research might address this shortcoming.

Notwithstanding this limitation, the results obtained herein imply that people may have a role in creating the duplicitous behavior they are expecting from others. Merely believing a negotiation partner embraces deceptive tactics increases the likelihood that focal negotiator will misrepresent her situation, and we know that people tend to reciprocate the deceptive acts they catch (cf., Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001; Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002) and judge others as less honest when they themselves lie (Sagarin, Rhoads, & Cialdini, 1998). It would seem then that untrusting negotiators might elicit deception via their own deceptive behavior. And, as we have speculated here, widespread cynicism would likely confound these already problematic dynamics.

Our results are inconsistent with the opportunistic model of deception because we find pessimism about others' ethics rather than a belief in others' trustworthiness increases deception. One possible explanation for why the results go against the opportunistic model of deception could be that negotiators in our studies perceived their counterparts as similar to themselves. Past research has shown dishonesty increases when similar others, but not dissimilar others, are dishonest because dishonesty is perceived to be the norm (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009).

This work raises an important set of questions including how these expectancies are formed and why they have their effects on a negotiator's decision to be deceptive. Future research could investigate how peoples' expectancies are (sometimes falsely) created and then confirmed or overturned through experience. Future research also could shed light on precisely why believing there is widespread endorsement of tactics intended to deceive leads people to embrace deception themselves. It is possible that pessimistic expectancies have their effect thru a normalizing process—people perceive deception as more appropriate when they believe others do. It is also possible that the effects we observe here are rooted in fear and paranoia. Indeed, an existing literature reveals that one key reason people deceive in negotiations is to avoid being exploited by their counterpart (De Cremer, van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010; Epley et al., 2006; Tenbrunsel, 1998). A key driver in people's decision to deceive may very well be a fear—often misplaced—that they will be exploited.

Finally, our findings have important implications for practice. Negotiators often want to know how to decrease the likelihood of being exploited by a deceptive counterpart. Our research suggests that, in addition to building rapport (Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002) and developing trust (e.g., by creating opportunities for displaying trust and then demonstrating trustworthiness; Cramton & Dees, 1993), deal-makers may be able to combat deception by signaling the behavior is counter-normative. Our results suggest that people are far less likely to behave deceptively when they think such behavior is uncommon. Indeed, when we provided participants with information regarding the *actual* percentage of people who endorse the “gamer”

view of deception in negotiations (i.e., the information contained in the minority-gamer manipulation; Studies 3 & 4) this dramatically diminished the likelihood they behaved deceptively as compared to when we provided them with an inflated estimate of “gamer” prevalence based on estimates provided by a sample of American adults (i.e., the information contained in the majority-gamer manipulation). This leaves us optimistic that dishonesty can be reduced by addressing the pessimistic beliefs people have about others’ willingness to embrace deceptive tactics.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.02.013>.

References

- Ames, D. R. (2008). Assertiveness expectancies: How hard people push depends on the consequences they predict. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 1541.
- Ames, D. R., & Mason, M. F. (2015). Tandem anchoring: Informational and politeness effects of range offers in social exchange. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 108, 254.
- Bandura, A. (1969). *Principles of behavior modification*. New York: Holt.
- Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. *Psychological Review*, 84, 191.
- Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects models using lme4. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 67, 1–48. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01>.
- Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. (2000). Negotiation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51, 279–314.
- Bok, S. (1978). Lies to the sick and dying. *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*, 232–255.
- Boles, J., Brashear, T., Bellenger, D., & Barksdale, H., Jr. (2000). Relationship selling behaviors: Antecedents and relationship with performance. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 15, 141–153.
- Cramton, P. C., & Dees, J. G. (1993). Promoting honesty in negotiation: An exercise in practical ethics. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 3, 359–394.
- De Cremer, D., van Dijk, E., & Pillutla, M. M. (2010). Explaining unfair offers in ultimatum games and their effects on trust: An experimental approach. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 20, 107–126.
- Dees, J. G., & Cramton, P. C. (1991). Shrewd bargaining on the moral frontier: Toward a theory of morality in practice. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 1, 135–167.
- Epley, N., Caruso, E., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive egoism in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 872.
- Fry, W. R. (1985). The effect of dyad Machiavellianism and visual access on integrative bargaining outcomes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 11, 51–62.
- Gaspar, J. P., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2013). The emotion deception model: A review of deception in negotiation and the role of emotion in deception. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, 6, 160–179.
- Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: The effect of one bad apple on the barrel. *Psychological Science*, 20, 393–398.
- Haley, N., Chou, E. Y., & Murnighan, J. K. (2012). Mind games: The mental representation of conflict. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 102, 132–148.
- Huber, V. L., & Neale, M. A. (1986). Effects of cognitive heuristics and goals on negotiator performance and subsequent goal setting. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 38, 342–365.
- Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 16, 66.
- Kohn, A. (1990). *The brighter side of human nature*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kray, L. J., Kennedy, J. A., & Van Zant, A. B. (2014). Not competent enough to know the difference? Gender stereotypes about women’s ease of being misled predict negotiator deception. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 125, 61–72.
- Krueger, J. (2000). The projective perception of the social world. *Handbook of social comparison* (pp. 323–351). US: Springer.
- Krueger, J. I., & Acevedo, M. (2007). Perceptions of self and other in the prisoner’s dilemma: Outcome bias and evidential reasoning. *The American Journal of Psychology*, 120, 593–618.
- Lewicki, R. J. (1983). Lying and deception: A behavioral model. In M. H. Bazerman, & R. J. Lewicki (Eds.). *Negotiating in organizations* (pp. 68–90). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Lewicki, R. J., & Spencer, G. (1991). *Ethical relativism and negotiating tactics: Factors affecting their perceived ethicality*. Miami: Academy of Management.
- Long, J. S. (1997). *Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. *American Psychologist*, 54, 1053 (Miller, D. T. & MacFarland).
- Miller, D. T., & Ratner, R. K. (1996). The power of the myth of self-interest. *Current Societal Concerns About Justice* (pp. 25–48). US: Springer.
- Miller, D. T., & Ratner, R. K. (1998). The disparity between the actual and assumed power of self-interest. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 53.
- Mischel, W. (1968). *Personality and assessment*. New York: Wiley.
- Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. *Psychological Review*, 80, 252.
- Moran, S., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2008). When better is worse: Envy and the use of deception. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, 1, 3–29.
- Morris, M., Nadler, J., Kurtzberg, T., & Thompson, L. (2002). Schmoose or lose: Social friction and lubrication in e-mail negotiations. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 6, 89.
- Murnighan, J. K. (1991). *The dynamics of bargaining games*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- O’Connor, K. M., & Carnevale, P. J. (1997). A nasty but effective negotiation strategy: Misrepresentation of a common-value issue. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 504–515.
- Olekals, M., Kulik, C. T., & Chew, L. (2014). Sweet little lies: Social context and the use of deception in negotiation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 120, 13–26.
- Olekals, M., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Loose with the truth: Predicting deception in negotiation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 76, 225–238.
- Peduzzi, P., Concato, J., Kemper, E., & Feinstein, R. A. (1996). A simulation study of the number of events per variable in logistic regression analyses. *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology*, 49, 1373–1379.
- Pierce, J. R., Kilduff, G. J., Galinsky, A. D., & Sivanathan, N. (2013). From glue to gasoline: How competition turns perspective takers unethical. *Psychological Science*, 24, 1986–1994.
- Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1996). Pluralistic ignorance and the perpetuation of social norms by unwitting actors. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 28, 161–209.
- Robbins, J. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2005). Social projection to ingroups and outgroups: A review and meta-analysis. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 9, 32–47.
- Roese, N., & Sherman, G. (2007). Expectancy. In A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.). *Handbook of social psychology: Basic principles* (pp. 91–115). New York: Guilford.
- Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 13, 279–301.
- Rotter, J. B. (1971). Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust. *American Psychologist*, 26, 443–445.
- Sagarin, B. J., Rhoads, K. V., & Cialdini, R. B. (1998). Deceiver’s distrust: Denigration as a consequence of undiscovered deception. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24, 1167–1176.
- Schwartz, B. (1986). *The battle for human nature*. New York: Norton.
- Schweitzer, M. E., Brodt, S. E., & Croson, R. T. (2002). Seeing and believing: Visual access and the strategic use of deception. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 13, 258–375.
- Schweitzer, M. E., & Croson, R. (1999). Curtailing deception: The impact of questions on lies and omissions. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 10, 225–248.
- Schweitzer, M. E., & DeChurch, L. A. (2001). Linking frames in negotiations: Gains, losses, and conflict frame adoption. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 2, 236–262.
- Schweitzer, M. E., DeChurch, L. A., & Gibson, D. E. (2005). Conflict frames and the use of deception: Are competitive negotiators less ethical? *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 35, 2123–2149.
- Schweitzer, M. E., Ordóñez, L., & Douma, B. (2004). Goal setting as a motivator of unethical behavior. *Academy of Management Journal*, 47, 422–432.
- Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1990). The limited effect of economic self-interest on the political attitudes of the mass public. *Journal of Behavioral Economics*, 19, 247–271.
- Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1991). The role of self-interest in social and political attitudes. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 24, 1–91.
- Shell, G. R. (1991). When is it legal to lie in negotiations? *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 32, 93.
- Shell, G. R. (2006). *Bargaining for advantage: Negotiation strategies for reasonable people*. New York: Penguin.
- Steinel, W., & De Dreu, C. K. (2004). Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in social decision making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 86, 419–434.
- Tenbrunsel, A. E. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of incentives and temptation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 41, 330–339.
- Tinsley, C. H., O’Connor, K. M., & Sullivan, B. A. (2002). Tough guys finish last: The perils of a distributive reputation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 88, 621–642.
- Valley, K. L., Moag, J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1998). A matter of trust: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 34, 211–238.
- Van Kleef, G. A., & De Dreu, C. K. (2002). Social value orientation and impression formation: A test of two competing hypotheses about information search in negotiation. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 13, 59–77.
- Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., Olekals, M., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93, 994–1010.
- Wrightman, L. S. (1991). *Assumptions about human nature: Implications for researchers and practitioners*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Wuthnow, R. (1991). *Acts of compassion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.