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Why Pseudonyms? Deception as Identity Preservation Among Jazz Record Companies, 1920–1929

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This paper theoretically and empirically engages the relationship between organizational identity and deception using the market for early jazz recordings as a setting. In this setting, pseudonyms (where a recording is reissued under a fictitious name) were used deceptively as a way to preserve a firm's identity while selling profitable but identity-threatening products to the mass market. Firms founded in the Victorian Era actively sought alignment with the cultural elite and used pseudonyms to deceive observers into believing that their production of cultural products was consistent with their Victorian Era identity. In effect, pseudonyms allowed these firms to decouple their position in identity space from their position in product space by inflating production of identity-preserving products. Using product data from jazz discographies, record company directories, and record advertisements in major U.S. newspapers, we provide strong empirical evidence that Victorian Era firms were active in using pseudonyms to preserve their identities.

Key words: organizational identity; deception; cultural markets
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> There is one and only one social responsibility of business... free and open competition without deception or fraud. (Friedman 1962)

> A deception that elevates us is dearer than a host of low truths. (Tsvetaeva 1980)

Introduction

Even the most casual observers of organizations and markets recognize that some organizations deceive their constituents. Indeed, much scholarship is devoted to better understanding when, why, and how organizations deceive. This interest is broad and longstanding, including but not limited to psychological models of persuasion in marketing research (Gardner 1975), institutional theory emphasis on decoupling and symbolic management (Pfeffer 1981; Perrow 1985; Westphal and Zajac 1994, 2001), impression management of stigmatizing actions (Sutton and Callahan 1987, Elsbach and Sutton 1992, Elsbach et al. 1998), as well as a vast literature on fraud (e.g., Akerlof and Romer 1993, Galbraith 2004).

Often the main targets of deception are those external constituents (or audience members) that affect the financial success of the focal firm (e.g., investors or consumers), where deception is done to financially benefit the firm at the expense of these constituents. For example, in product markets, deception may involve a firm's attempt to mislead consumers by inflating its products' consumption value. Deception would be considered successful if demand increased or consumers purchased the products as a response to the inflated value.

In this paper we examine deception through the lens of organizational role identities (White 1981, Zuckerman 1999, Gioia et al. 2000), where role identities are a function of when an organization was founded (Stinchcombe 1965, Hannan et al. 2006). We complement a broader set of scholars who examine organizational identities and their relationship with the organization's outputs and external constituencies (Albert and Whetten 1985, Elsbach and Kramer 1996, Carroll and Swaminathan 2000, Lounsbury and Rao 2004, Hsu and Hannan 2005). However, our stance is unique. We claim that firms that strongly value their role identity may deceive to preserve that identity—even when the deception does not increase consumer demand or profits of the particular set of products involved.

In our setting, the early jazz recording industry, we observe that certain firms (those founded before the introduction of jazz in 1917) used deception to overcome two types of identity threats: (1) their association with profitable, but illegitimate products and (2) actions of newer entrants that blurred the incumbent firms' identity. For these firms, preserving an incumbent identity required publicly distancing themselves from illegitimate products that were not only less costly to produce, but also exhibited greater market demand. Although these firms produced both "lowbrow" and "highbrow" products, they used deception to present themselves as primarily producers of highbrow products.

Our thesis builds on theories on industry evolution and the conflicting constituencies of firms (e.g., Christensen's 1997 analysis of the disk array industry; Landes' 2000 study of the watch industry; the study by Bielby et al. 2005 of aesthetic and commercial evaluation in television; and the Thornton et al. 2005 of conflicting constituencies in architecture) to build our argument that deception can be a tool for resolving inconsistent demands on an organization's identity. Deception is one mechanism that underlies how firms develop and maintain robust identities (Padgett and Ansell 1993, Stark 1996) and minimize category mismatches (Zuckerman 2000). In examining deception and identity preservation in early jazz, we also draw heavily on insights from historians, management scholars, and sociologists (Peterson and Berger 1975, DiMaggio 1982, Levine 1988, Kenney 1999), as well as organizational research on cultural markets (e.g., Leblebici et al. 1991, the *Organization Science* 2000 special issue on cultural markets, Rao et al. 2003).

Pseudonyms and the Market for Early Jazz

We understand pseudonyms as deceptive acts used by firms to reinforce and heighten their role identities in the early jazz market. During the rise of this "Jazz Age" (Fitzgerald 1922), many of the recordings released by the key firms were actually fictitious reissues of songs by artists the same firms had previously recorded. These types of reissues are referred to as pseudonyms (Sutton 1994). Table 1 provides examples of seven randomly selected groups of musicians who recorded songs that were reissued by their record companies and that existed in that company's catalogues (sometimes under that company's different labels). For each pair, a recording was initially released under the original name and then rereleased under the pseudonym. The name pairs are representative in that the pseudonym typically bore no resemblance to the name of the group that actually recorded the song. The exception is Charlie Davenport, which was reissued as Cowcow Davenport. We note during the discussion and conclusion of this article that although pseudonyms generally appear in song discographies and catalogues (two sources for our data), they were otherwise rarely advertised to the public. This absence of marketing for pseudonyms reinforces our contention that key constituencies were unaware of the prevalence of pseudonyms.[1]

Table 1 Pairs of Original Recording Names with Their Pseudonyms

Original name	Pseudonym
Wisconsin Roof Orchestra	Miami Society Orchestra
Louis Armstrong and His Savoy Ballroom Five	Eddie Gordon's Band
Charlie Straight and His Orchestra	Manhattan Imperial Orchestra
Chuck Nelson and His Boys	Eddie Walker and His Band
Ezra Buzzington (Ezra Buzzington's Rustic Revelers)	Joseph Simpkins and His Rube Band
Charlie Davenport	Cowcow Davenport
King Oliver and His Dixie Syncopators	Aurora Aristocrats

Table 2 Recordings Reissued Using Pseudonyms (of 1,985 Total Recordings)

Type of pseudonym	Percentage of entire sample of recordings (%)	Number of pseudonyms
Any	13	260
Those made by the same record company that originally issued the recording	12	236
Those made by a record company different from the firm that originally issued the recording	1	24

Notes. The remaining 86% of the recordings were not reissued using pseudonyms. Record company information is missing for 1% of the pseudonyms.

Table 2 shows that although 13% (or 260) of the 1,985 recordings used in this study were pseudonyms, only a small fraction (1% of all recordings, or 7.7% of all pseudonyms) were made by a firm's competitors. The majority (92.3% or 236) of the pseudonyms were produced by the same parent company that initially recorded the artists. It is on this set of pseudonyms that we focus our study.

We make two general propositions about the use of pseudonyms for identity preservation. First, we argue that recordings were more likely to be reissued under pseudonyms when the producing firm had an identity associated with the cultural elite and Victorian values. Second, we clarify that the use of pseudonyms by these firms was strategic. In particular, we claim that pseudonyms were more likely to be used on illegitimate products and less likely to be used on the most legitimate products, especially for those products by firms associated with the cultural elite and Victorian values. Once created, the pseudonyms were used to inflate catalogues with fictitious but legitimacy-enhancing products. This use of pseudonyms was driven by the diverging tastes of the mass market (which drove profits) and the cultural elite (which conferred legitimacy). The mass market preferred lowbrow jazz over highbrow jazz; lowbrow jazz was typified by African-American and Creole musicians in smaller improvisational groups and highbrow jazz as music characterized by larger groups of classically trained white (Anglo) musicians who played more symphonic arrangements (Leonard 1962, Levine 1989, Lopes 2002). Music closer to the lowbrow form of jazz had greater market success than music closer to the highbrow jazz (Kenney 1999). But the cultural elite vigorously advocated for the more classically influenced highbrow form of jazz and attempted to confer legitimacy and sanctions through their influence as cultural arbiters (e.g., critics) and policy makers (Leonard 1962, Levine 1989, Ogren 1989, Kenney 1999, Phillips and Owens 2004).

Pseudonyms were used as a way to preserve a firm's identity while selling the profitable but identity-threatening products to the mass market. For example, firms founded in the Victorian Era were more rooted in the values of this period and actively sought alignment with the cultural elite. The advertisements of these firms reflect their interest in a Victorian Era highbrow identity and were placed in magazines and newspapers throughout the United States. This identity was unproblematic until the introduction of jazz in 1917, when the type of highbrow jazz that was more consistent with Victorian Era sentiments became more costly to produce and less successful in the market (Phillips and Owens 2004). Thus, rather than overproducing the less profitable highbrow products, these firms used pseudonyms to deceive observers into believing that their production of cultural products was consistent with their Victorian Era identity. As a result, these firms were successful in decoupling their position in identity space from their position in product space.[2]

The remainder of our paper adds to the context and describes a test of our thesis using data on Midwest jazz recordings from 1920 to 1929. In the course of elaborating our thesis, we distinguish this research from the previous literature in three ways. First, we advance understanding on why some organizations are more sensitive to the legitimation of product categories than others (cf. Zuckerman 1999, Phillips and Zuckerman 2001, Westphal and Zajac 2001). In particular, we demonstrate that organizational identity, partially imprinted when an organization is founded and by the constituents it originally serves (Stinchcombe 1965, Landes 2000), can influence how an organization responds to market and institutional pressures to enter new product categories. Second, our study makes central deception as a decoupling response to market and institutional pressure: rather than just produce more recordings to bolster their legitimate product categories (which these firms did as well), firms founded before the commercialization of jazz (Victorian Era firms) used pseudonyms to artificially inflate their holdings of legitimate products. Finally, we build on White's (1981) model as markets involving differentiating role performances among firms that sought stable identities (see also Fligstein 1996 and Ruef 2000 for treatments at higher levels of analyses). We argue and show that Victorian Era firms used pseudonyms to sharpen their identities when the actions of their less legitimate competitors made the Victorian Era firm identities more difficult to distinguish.

Market for Early Jazz Recordings

The market for early commercialized music had important differences from more modern conceptualizations of cultural markets (Hirsch 1972, Peterson and Berger 1975, Caves 2000, Dowd 2003). First, in our period of interest, commercialized music was an emerging market where firms' identities were less stable than they would be in a more static conceptualization of markets. Many of the firms founded before the commercialization of jazz had constructed identities in the market for phonographs, which were marketed as sophisticated living room furniture designed to compete with pianos (Kenney 1999). Initially, recordings were sold as secondary products to support phonograph sales. Beginning around World War I and continuing with the rise of jazz, the market for recordings overcame the market for phonographs. With this change came a shift in the basis for understanding firm identities. Second, organizations during this period were less organizationally sophisticated, with structures based on owner capitalist models consistent with the dominant organizational logic at that time (Fligstein 1987). We believe that this is key because more modern tools for decoupling illegitimate products from a parent firm were not in the choice set of record company manufactures at the dawn of jazz's commercialization.

For example, whereas contemporary record companies use their multiple labels to segment the market and disassociate the parent from the particular market segment (Negus 1999), firms during the Victorian Era were more likely to explore multiple segments under the same name (Kenney 1999). Thus, today a less legitimate rap music label would have a name distinctly different from the parent firm, but firms in the early music market often kept the name of the parent firm if producing in multiple markets. Any inconsistency between the identity of a firm and the products it produced was more often transparent to constituents.

There were also important characteristics in how records were sold to consumers. First, the strategies of distribution and sales that emerged in this period did not have the structure of large distributors we see in today's industry. Rather, records where sold through mail order, music departments of urban-centered department stores, and small town all-purpose stores. In each of these cases, the role of a company's catalogue of recordings was central. Large shares of records were ordered by directly consulting a record company's catalogue (Kenney 1999, van der Tuuk 2003). In the case of records being sold in both large and small stores, customers bought not only what was in stock, but also consulted the record company catalogue to order songs not in stock. Second, sales during this period tended to emphasize the role of consumer demand over that of the other market intermediaries (such as sales departments in stores). Thus, while some stores may have pushed one type of recording over the other, historians of the era often note that consumer demand for popular music regularly overruled the tastes of these intermediaries (Kenny 1999, van der Tuuk 2003).

Because of our emphasis on individual recordings, two additional features of our setting require elaboration. First, the early market for commercialized music was organized around singles rather than albums. In fact, albums did not exist at this point of the industry's evolution. Second, there was little variance in the price of recordings within the jazz genre. For example, we examined advertised prices from display ads in the *Chicago Defender, Chicago Tribune, New York Times, Wall Street Journal*, and the *Washington Post*. We found no variance in prices by type of jazz. The price for all jazz recordings in our sample was \$0.85 before 1922 and \$0.75 afterward, until the end of our observation period in 1929.

Organizational Identities in Early Jazz

The early phonograph market began with Edison Phonograph Company and Works (founded in 1887), the Columbia Phonograph Company (founded in 1891 as the American Gramophone Company), and the Victor Talking Machine Company (founded in 1901). There was a rise of popular music and market entrants before 1917, but the commercialization of jazz in 1917 brought a distinct set of firms founded to take advantage of this burgeoning market. Among the more well-known Jazz Era record companies were Gennett Records (founded in 1917), Okeh Records (founded in 1918), and the Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company (founded in 1919) (Kenney 1999).

We draw on Stinchcombe's (1965) imprinting hypothesis and Landes' (2000) research on the role of segmented consumers in industry evolution to argue that firms founded before the commercialization of jazz were fundamentally different than the firms founded to take advantage of the growing market in jazz. Firms founded before jazz's emergence, such as Victor Records, had established an identity that emphasized cultural production that sought to morally uplift consumers using strong associations with highbrow (classical) music (Kenney 1999). This emphasis on highbrow music before jazz's emergence in 1917 was both rational and logical, as firms such as Victor and Columbia were selling records to complement their production of phonographs (or gramophones). Moreover, the founders and executives of the Victorian Era record companies were typically members of the elite and nouveau elite (*Who Was Who in America* 1962, Welch and Burt 1994). These companies were organized to make products consistent with culturally elite values and actively sought approval from the elite (DiMaggio 1982).

Key to our paper is the fact that during this period the culturally elite were active in separating highbrow from lowbrow art (Leonard 1962, Schuller 1968, Mooney 1972, Levine 1988, Peretti 1992). The concern over separating high and lowbrow culture emerged in the mid to late 1800s, as the elite reacted to a host of factors—such as industrialization and immigration of non-Anglos—that diminished the hegemony of Victorian values (Levine 1989). The elites' new need for distinguishing culture "made it possible to identify, distinguish, and order this new universe of strangers" (Levine 1988, p. 177). Thus, starting in the late 1800s and progressing into the 1920s, the cultural elite created and enforced a distinction between highbrow and lowbrow culture—often with the goal of morally educating the masses (DiMaggio 1992). It was in this milieu that Victorian Era firms were founded.

For example, the corporate officers of firms such as Victor and Columbia were strongly affiliated with the American elite through educational, matrimonial, and financial ties. Eldridge Johnson, the founder and president of Victor, was the top financial contributor to the Republican Party in 1928, whose list of top contributors also included the Mellons, Rockefellers, and the Guggenheims (Overacker 1933). In addition, Johnson sat on boards alongside members of the financial and industrial elite such as Pierre S. duPont (*Wall Street Journal*, January 9, 1920, p. 9). Victor's own board had members of the elite who were linked to sources of antijazz sentiments (Aldridge 1983). One board member was an executive of the publisher of the *Ladies Home Journal*—well known as an outlet for antijazz criticism (Leonard 1962, Mooney 1972).[3]

Research on other Victorian Era executives reveals similar connections to the elite. Leon Douglass, Victor's vice president, was married into the prominent Adams family that produced Presidents John Adams (the second president) and John Quincy Adams (the sixth president). Thomas Edison, a well-known member of the business elite, was married to Mina Miller, a member of the Daughters of the Revolution (Melosi 1990). The founders and executives of Columbia Phonograph included influential attorneys, graduates of prestigious universities, and financiers associated with the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. House of Representatives (*Who Was Who in America* 1962, Welch and Burt 1994).

To illustrate Victorian Era firms' desire to invoke a highbrow identity, we provide typical examples in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) of advertisements by Victor Records. Advertisements were critical to the marketing and sales of records, as they were the primary means of mass marketing new records, which were released weekly (Titon 1995, p. 218). Figure 1(a) features an advertisement from *Ladies Home Journal*—a publication often cited as advocating against jazz and for more "cultivated" music (e.g., Leonard 1962, Walser 1999). The advertisements such as these were common in linking their records to popular high-status classical stars (Enrico Caruso was perhaps the most well-known opera singer of this period) and demonstrating the companies' commitment to "high-class music" that "appeals to the best class of people" (Kenney 1999). Victorian Era firms' advertisements

Figure 1 (a) *Ladies Home Journal* Ad, February, 1921; (b) *New York Times* Ad, January 17, 1923

(a)



(b)



supported the cultural elite's contention that the type of record purchased signaled one's social standing (Titon 1995; see also Bryson 1996, Peterson and Kern 1996). This ad, like most ads of this kind, appeared prominently on the inside cover of the first page of magazines such as the *Ladies Home Journal*. Moreover, an advertisement such as this typically appeared as a one- or two-full-page ad.

Victor Records was not the only firm to construct highbrow identities through its advertisements. In the same issue of these magazines were advertisements from competing Victorian Era firms (such as Columbia Records) with similar claims of producing the "best music" and providing pictures and names of classical musicians as evidence of their highbrow identity. It is possible to locate advertisements of more popular music by these firms. However, we found the advertisements exhorting a highbrow cultural identity to be invariably larger in size and more prominently placed.

Figure 1(b) shows an Victor Records advertisement that explicitly advertises of some of its jazz offerings (Paul Whiteman and His Orchestra, the Virginians, International Novelty Orchestra, Great White Way Orchestra, The Serenaders).[4] To signal the highbrow nature of Victor Records and its recordings, not only are many of the groups referred to as orchestras, but they are also included in the same advertisement as Victor's in-house symphony, the Victor Symphony Orchestra.

Finally, of note in this advertisement is the prominence of the record catalogue. This magazine advertisement encourages consumers to purchase the special issue of Victor Records offerings, rather than directing them to a retail outlet or other forms of distribution. This is consistent with other evidence that although Victorian Era firms' music was also sold in large, urban-centered, department stores, the catalogue was a prominent means of conveying song offerings (Kenney 1999).

Firms founded after the rise of jazz, or what we classify as Jazz Era firms, typically constructed different identities through advertisements, as they were oriented more to the mass market than to the cultural elite. Figure 2 presents a typical advertisement by Okeh Records, one of the dominant Jazz Era firms. Like the Victor Record advertisements in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), these ads also highlighted the quality of the sound, and like most recordings advertised in the *New York Times*, there is an emphasis on jazz groups as orchestras. Typical of Jazz Era firm advertisements, however, Okeh is signaling an identity using the graphics and language of popular music (e.g., see the wording of the large headings and drawings).

Figure 2 also mirrors the observations of historians that the recordings associated with Jazz Era firms were

Figure 2 ***New York Times* Ad, December 8, 1919**



more often associated with smaller, less prestigious retail outlets ("Nearest Okeh Dealers" in Figure 2) than with the larger department stores (who themselves often had financial ties to Victorian Era firms). At the same time, song catalogues (for mail ordering records) were key elements of Jazz Era company advertising and sales (van der Tuuk 2003). Moreover, the language of these catalogues was consistent with the message conveyed by the ad in Figure 2. For example, in his study of the rise and fall of Paramount records, van der Tuuk (2003, p. 91) quotes an excerpt from Paramount's catalogue: "What does the public want?... What will you have? If your preferences are not listed in our catalog, we will make them for you, as Paramount must please the buying public."

Our argument, which we will support with product-level data, is that the identities of Victorian Era record companies were intimately rooted in the values, agenda, and networks of the American elite during a period when the elite paid close attention to the relationship between social status and the arts. These firms constructed identities associated with more highbrow forms of music in general and highbrow jazz in particular. Jazz Era firms, however, more often linked their identities to popular (lowbrow) music that was stylistically similar to the original form of jazz.

Highbrow and Lowbrow in Early Jazz

> Naturally, *there is both good and bad jazz*... but *in this article I have in mind only the better type of jazz*; that which is composed by understanding musicians, that which is conceived and written according to ordinary esthetical and technical standards... *Many of the orchestral arrangements are very clever indeed.* (Stringham 1926; emphasis added)

Although cultural elites were concerned with separating high and low cultural in general, there was special attention paid to distinguishing between highbrow jazz and the more pure and original lowbrow jazz, as noted in the above quote from a prominent classical music trade magazine. Though profitable as a business proposition, the original form of jazz was deemed illegitimate by the elite, largely because of its association with African-Americans and the illicit activity that was thought to accompany the music (Leonard 1962, Peretti 1992, Kenney 1993). Much of the resistance noted in our research came from the elite music press. These critics would associate jazz with the downfall of civilization or claim that jazz was not worthy of being classified as music. As one prominent classical music conductor and cultural critic (Sir Henry Coward) noted, jazz was a

> ...gigantic black man striding over the world with a banjo in one hand and a saxophone in the other, disintegrating the British Empire. (Laubenstein 1929)

There are several identifiers in the two previous quotes and in other descriptions of illegitimate (or lowbrow) jazz. First is the clear role of race. The above quote was one of many that characterized the jazz music of African-Americans as lowbrow or primitive (Leonard 1962, Peretti 1992). Second is the reference to instrumentation, which was meant to distinguish lowbrow jazz from a more symphonic form of highbrow jazz.

However, with respect to the tastes of the mass market consumer, historical investigation reveals that although the market leaders affiliated themselves with the production of highbrow symphonic forms of jazz, consumers in clubs and dance societies often requested the original (lowbrow) jazz songs, artists, and styles that the elite considered sacrilegious. Even middle class white consumers (who occupied an overlapping position somewhat between the elite and the "masses") seemed to have a wider scope of musical taste than did the cultural elite—often preferring a more lowbrow form of jazz. Kenney's (1993) description of Chicago's jazz market notes that the middle-class breadth of taste required white jazz orchestras to also play the more lowbrow form of "hot" jazz:

> ... "when required" Lombardo's [Guy Lombardo and His Royal Canadians] dance band of the twenties could "play as 'hot' as any of their contemporaries." ... *But Lombardo was more likely to record waltzes* ... and a broad range of mawkish vocal numbers. (Kenney 1993, p. 80; emphasis added)

Kenney (1999) notes that the demand was also expressed in the trade journals, which noted, "If it were not for the flapper, the Victor people might well go out of business. They buy ninety percent of the records—mostly dance records."[5]

Other evidence also points to the fact that although the more illegitimate form of jazz was viewed favorably by the mass market consumer, it was also sanctioned by the elite. For example, jazz was known to be played by 1920s workers while at work. However, business leaders, as members of the elite, banned the playing of jazz music at places of work, attributing the music to a loss of productivity (Leonard 1962). At the same time, the definition of jazz, particularly among the elite, was evolving during the 1920s. Members of the elite began to increasingly distinguish what they considered as "good" (highbrow) and "bad" (lowbrow) jazz, with the "good jazz" having greater acceptance by the cultural elite (Laubenstein 1929, Harap 1941, Lopes 2002). Moreover, elements of jazz were entering into university curricula and the work of composers such as Stravinsky (Lopes 2002). By the end of the 1920s, an increasing number of elites had concluded that jazz, particularly when played in a more symphonic manner and by classically trained (anglo, or white) musicians, was legitimate.

Using this historical background, we distinguish the key dimensions along which early jazz was arrayed using our data on jazz recordings. We are able to take advantage of data on groups' names as listed in the discographies from which are data are drawn. Specifically, we know whether a jazz group was identified as an "orchestra" as well as the race of most of the groups from a series of jazz pictorials (see Phillips and Owens 2004 for the use of "orchestra" in a group's name). From this we construct a typology of four different types of early jazz recording groups: (1) white orchestras, (2) white nonorchestras, (3) black orchestras, and (4) black nonorchestras. White orchestras were the strongest signal of highbrow identity, but recordings from these groups had the poorest performance in the market for jazz. In contrast, the work of black nonorchestras epitomized lowbrow and illegitimate music from the perspective of the cultural elite. However, the recordings from these groups were generally the most successful in the market place (Kenney 1999).

Hypotheses: Pseudonym Use as a Means of Identity Preservation

Our thesis and preliminary investigation suggest a host of predictions that can be tested using multivariate analyses of product-level data. We wish to test three propositions from our central thesis. First, we want to establish that Victorian Era firms were more likely to use pseudonyms. We consider evidence that Victorian Era firms were not only sensitive to preserving their role identities, but that they were more willing to use this particular deceptive strategy as a means of constructing their identity. Accordingly,

Hypothesis 1 (H1). *Recordings were more likely to be reissued using a pseudonym when the producing record company was a Victorian Era firm.*

Second, our analysis and review of historical evidence suggest that the selection of recordings to use pseudonyms was strategic, especially by Victorian Era firms. We test this by examining whether Victorian Era firm recordings of less legitimate groups were reissued using pseudonyms more frequently than more legitimate groups (versus a null of using pseudonyms indiscriminately). Specifically, we examine the likelihood that Victorian Era firms reissued white orchestras and black nonorchestras. If our thesis is correct, these firms should have been less likely to reissue white orchestras using pseudonyms but more likely to reissue black nonorchestras using pseudonyms.

Hypothesis 2A (H2A). *Recordings by white orchestras are less likely to be sources for their pseudonyms when the producing record company was a Victorian Era firm.*

Hypothesis 2B (H2B). *Recordings by black nonorchestras are more likely to be sources for their pseudonyms when the producing record company was a Victorian Era firm.*

Our theory also suggests that pseudonyms were used to heighten Victorian Era firms' identity as highbrow producers when the actions of competitors made the identity of the highbrow producers more difficult to observe by constituents. Here, we emphasize Victorian Era firms, which possessed more concrete and imprinted identities than the emerging identities of the commercially oriented Jazz Era firms. Indeed, van der Tuuk's (2003) historical account of Paramount suggests that Jazz Era firms learned quickly what their customers wanted (in this case through soliciting feedback from customers) and (in contrast to Victorian Era firms) felt no dilemma in responding to customer demand. We reason that we should detect increasing pseudonym activity among Victorian Era firms during periods when their identity as highbrow producers is challenged.

We test this argument using two indicators that proxy the actions of competitors that threatened the identity of Victorian Era firms. First, we test whether recordings were more likely to be reissued as pseudonyms by Victorian Era firms when the market identity space for highbrow music became infiltrated by Jazz Era firms. We reason that to the extent that Jazz Era firms produce lowbrow recordings, Victorian Era firms were more easily distinguished as highbrow producers. In contrast, the more white orchestra recordings that Jazz Era firms released, the less distinct the identity of Victorian Era firms. Under these conditions, Victorian Era firms responded by using pseudonyms to bolster their identity as a means of competition within a niche in the market identity space (cf. Ruef 2000).

Hypothesis 3A (H3A). *During periods when Jazz Era firms produced many highbrow recordings, Victorian Era firms were more likely to reissue recordings using pseudonyms.*

Second, we examine whether Victorian Era firms responded to periods in which a higher proportion of the jazz market was composed of new (Jazz Era) entrants. The more the market is composed of new entrants, the more critics of the overall jazz recording market may have characterized it as producing less legitimate music. Here, again, Victorian Era firms would use pseudonyms to more clearly differentiate themselves when the actions of competitors (in this case, the degree to which the market was represented by Jazz Era firms) blurred their identity.

Hypothesis 3B (H3B). *The more the market was occupied by Jazz Era firms, the more likely that recordings by Victorian Era were reissued using pseudonyms.*

Finally, it is necessary to test whether the fictitious name selected by Victorian Era firms, especially for black nonorchestras, suggested a more legitimate group. In other words, we seek to test whether recordings using pseudonyms of lowbrow groups produced by Victorian Era firms were relabeled as highbrow products more consistent with elite values. We test this by hypothesizing that if a black nonorchestra was selected as a source for a pseudonym, it was renamed as an "orchestra" at a greater rate by Victorian Era firms.

Hypothesis 4 (H4). *Recordings of black nonorchestra groups will be renamed as "orchestras" at a greater rate by Victorian Era firms than Jazz Era firms.*

As a robustness check, we will test whether any nonorchestra groups (independent of race) were more likely to be renamed as orchestras by Victorian Era firms in reissued recordings using pseudonyms.

Data and Methods

We test our hypotheses using data on Midwest jazz recordings from 1920 till 1929. The data on the recording industry come from the *Directory of American Disc Record Brands and Manufacturers, 1891–1943* (Sutton 1994). This resource provides data on 73 record companies over 405 firm-years. The data on recordings are drawn from the two-volume discography, *Jazz Recordings, 1897 to 1943*, by Brian Rust (1969) and confirmed using *The Jazz Discography by Tom Lord* (Lord 2005). Both discographies are regarded by jazz historians and record collectors as comprehensive. The discography lists the recording date, song title, recording label, catalogue number, group name, and city for each recording, along with a listing of musicians and their corresponding instruments. The discography also allows one to track a recording group for any pseudonym it may have appeared under. Given that pseudonyms occur at the level of recordings, our analyses is based on recordings as the unit of analysis.

We bounded our sample in two ways. First, we included only those recordings in the Midwest, the region of the country from which recorded jazz, especially improvisational-oriented jazz, emerged (Kenney 1993). This includes recordings by record companies with headquarters outside of the Midwest, as it was common for larger record companies to own recording studios in multiple cities (Sutton 1994). Our data from the Midwest encompassed Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Richmond (Indiana), Peoria (Illinois), Kansas City, Detroit, St. Paul (Minnesota), Grafton (Wisconsin), and Cleveland.

Second, we right-censor our data at 1929, when the stock market crashed and many musicians left the Midwest for New York. In total, the recording data encompass 2,524 total recordings by 430 groups. Historical accounts as well as our examination of the discographies suggest that musicians who resided in the Midwest typically made recordings in Midwest studios. There were very few occurrences of musicians who actively recorded across different regions in the 1920s. We found no recordings in our sample before 1920, resulting in an observation period from 1920 to 1929. After excluding cases for which there are missing data (271 cases where race or sex is unknown, 251 cases with missing firm-level data, and 17 cases of missing group-level data), our main analysis draws from 1,985 recordings by 344 groups recording for 12 record companies.

Dependent Variable: Pseudonym

The two discographies (Rust 1969, Lord 2005) list which of each group's recordings was reissued under fictitious names (*pseudonyms*). We assigned a dummy variable the value of 1 each time this occurs. We restrict the variable to equal 1 only when the pseudonym is reissued under the same record company (92.3% of all pseudonyms) and not under a competitor.

Independent Variables

We use a dummy variable to code all recordings by firms founded from the birth of the industry in 1887 till 1917 (and that had their first recording before 1920) as recordings by *Victorian Era* firms, where 1917 is the year when jazz was first commercialized. Of the 12 record companies producing the 1,985 recordings in our sample, four are coded as Victorian Era firms and eight as Jazz Era firms. This variable is used to test H1 and H4 as a main effect, and H2A, H2B, H3A, and H3B through interaction effects. We also employ separate dummy variables for whether the group was a highbrow *white orchestra* or a lowbrow *black nonorchestra* (we include *black orchestra* in the models and omit *white nonorchestras* as the reference category). These variables will be used to test H2A and H2B using interactions with whether the firm is *Victorian Era*. H3A is tested using a continuous variable that captures the annual proportion of white orchestra recordings released by Jazz Era firms. H3B is tested using the annual proportion of the firms in the market that are Jazz Era firms.

The classifications of race were drawn from Phillips and Owens (2004), who determined race using multiple jazz pictorials of groups and musicians in that era. These pictorials allowed a visual coding of race for 91% of the groups in the original sample. Of the 344 groups with data on race, 3 were mixed race and coded as black (black refers to both African-American and Creole). Similarly, we draw from Phillips and Owens' (2004) use of group names to determine which groups are orchestras by identifying whether the group was identified as an "orchestra" in its title.

Control Variables

To address alternative explanations, there are a host of controls at the recording, group, firm, and industry or market level. At the recording level, we control for the number of instruments used on the recording as a measure of recording group size. Given that white orchestras have the largest group size and black nonorchestras the smallest size (10.6 versus 5.5, $p < 0.01$), it is necessary to ensure that our hypothesized effects are not confounded by group size. We also control for whether the recording featured vocals, as jazz recordings with vocals often overlapped with blues, a less contentious genre characterized with artists who may have had greater salience to consumers. Because many of the black nonorchestras in our sample had vocals, we want to insure that Victorian Era firms are not avoiding these groups because their artists have less anonymity than white orchestras.

The markets for jazz varied by city, so we included dummy variables for two key locations in early jazz: Chicago and Richmond, Indiana (Kenney 1993). We code whether the recording had a person designated as a director. Recordings with directors are often highly arranged symphonic works, and we wish to separate the actual stylistic features of the recording from the naming of the group. Although most groups called "orchestras" are recording a more symphonic hybrid of jazz, we are claiming that labeling a group an "orchestra" is meaningful, independent of the actual music the group records.

At the group level, we control for whether a group is recording for the first time to capture that group's exposure to consumers, as black nonorchestras were significantly more likely to be recording for the first time. We also capture the group's productivity and popularity using the number of songs recorded per recording date. Productive and popular groups record more songs during each session and help capture the alternative hypothesis that firms were selecting on the success of the group, rather than on the racial and stylistic differences at the core of our paper. Because Louis Armstrong was such a prominent, often-recorded, and nationally recognized band leader (with a distinctive voice as well as trumpet playing style), we include a separate control for whether the group is led by Armstrong.

Finally, we extracted key words from the titles of groups to ensure that our extraction of the term "orchestra" was not picking up other terms that covary in the title of early jazz groups. These terms are "Hot," "Hotel," and songs that make geographical references (e.g., New Orleans) to signal authenticity.[6] The term "hot" referred to "hot jazz" and signaled for many the lowbrow form of jazz. In fact, although 7% of the black nonorchestras also had "hot" in their title, none of the other types of groups did. Thus, we wanted to ensure that Victorian Era firms were centering on jazz "orchestras" and not away from "hot" jazz groups. Some groups were bands based in large hotels and thus were called "hotel orchestras." In our sample, 13% of the jazz orchestras also had "hotel" in their names, compared with 1% of groups that were not orchestras.

We also code for whether the group's name featured the name of the leader or the name of the record label. Groups with the leader's name in the title may be more difficult to reissue using pseudonyms. Recordings by groups with names that reflect the record company are often groups of musicians working under contract with the label; they typically did not constitute a performing group outside of the studio.

At the firm level we also control for common alternative explanatory variables to our Victorian Era measure: firm size (the number of labels produced, whether there are foreign affiliates, whether there were multiple recording studios), firm age, and the market experience of the founder.

The number of labels is an important control variable. If a firm used multiple labels to "place" their pseudonymous recordings, we would expect that the more labels a firm had, the more likely the recordings it produced were reissued using pseudonyms. In contrast, we claim that the use of pseudonyms was independent of a firm's label segmentation strategy. Controlling for founder experience helps separate firm effects from founder effects. We also control for the effort made by a firm to advertise to the mass market by using Lexis-Nexus to code the annual number of advertisements made by a record company in the *New York Times*. These firms may be more active in presenting a favorable identity to constituents, although the direction is unclear. Although the *New York Times* was the most widely circulated daily newspaper in this period (giving access to a wide audience), it was also where many antijazz sentiments by elite cultural arbiters were published. At the market level we control for the number of firms in the market (annually), a linear time trend as well as a separate variable for 1929, when the market for recordings dissolved because of the stock market crash.

Descriptive Analyses

To confirm our analysis of the historical record that Victorian Era firms were distinct from Jazz Era firms, we examined our product-level data on Midwest jazz recordings. Table 3 compares several characteristics of Victorian and Jazz Era firms: firm age, firm size (number of labels, whether there were multiple studios, whether the firm had foreign affiliates), and founder's industry experience. We also examine the simple proportion of songs by each type of firm that were reissued using pseudonyms.

Table 3 shows that Victorian Era firms, by construction, are older firms with founders who had a greater amount of industry experience. However, by many indicators of firm size, Victorian Era firms were not distinguishable. The only significant difference with respect to firm characteristics reveals that Victorian Era firms had a greater number of labels—an indicator of a record company's size and scope. Finally, Table 3 suggests that Victorian Era firms reissued a greater proportion of pseudonyms than Jazz Era firms (13% versus 9%, $p < 0.01$).

An examination of the frequency with which Victorian Era and Jazz Era firms record each type of jazz supports the typology we derive from the historical record.

Table 3 Differences Between Victorian Era Firms ($N = 1{,}114$ Recordings from Four Firms) and Jazz Era Firms ($N = 881$ Recordings by Eight Firms)

	Victorian Era firms	Jazz Era firms
Firm age (years)	14.83**	8.48
Multiple studios	1.00	0.95
Multiple pressing plants	0.00	0.04
Foreign affiliates (0,1)	0.59	0.60
Number of labels	4.28**	3.20
Founder industry experience (years)	15.58**	10.87
Proportion using pseudonyms	0.13**	0.09
Cases	1,114	881

Note. Means are subjected to t-tests across rows (** $= p < 0.01$).

Table 4 Victorian and Jazz Era Firms' Allocation of Recordings Across Subtypes of Jazz Group

	Victorian Era firms	Jazz Era firms
White orchestras	0.18**	0.08
White nonorchestras	0.16**	0.11
Black orchestras	0.17	0.16
Black nonorchestras	0.50	0.65**
Cases	1,114	881

Note. Means are subjected to t-tests across rows (** $= p < 0.01$).

Table 4 uses t-tests to compare the proportion of each of the four types of groups recorded by Victorian Era firms to the proportion recorded by Jazz Era firms. Rowwise, 18% of Victorian Era firms' recordings are of white orchestras, compared to 8% of Jazz Era firms ($p < 0.01$). Of the more popular black nonorchestra jazz groups, the proportion recorded by Victorian Era firms was lower than Jazz Era firms (50% versus 65%). Of the two remaining types of groups, black orchestras make up the same proportion of Victorian and Jazz Era firm recordings. White nonorchestras make up a larger proportion of Victorian Era firm offerings than Jazz Era firm offerings ($p < 0.01$).

We glean two insights from Table 4. First, the rowwise examination shows that Victorian Era firms devote a greater proportion of their jazz recordings to both white orchestras and white nonorchestras. At the same time, Jazz Era firms devote a greater proportion of their jazz offerings to black nonorchestras. Second, a columnwise examination shows that although Jazz Era firms have a majority of their recordings concentrated in black nonorchestras, Victorian Era firms are comparatively more general in their offerings. Many of the Victorian Era firm releases were of the illegitimate form (which was the center of the mass market after 1917), but not a clear majority of their offerings, as was the case with Jazz Era firms. We expect that these sets of offerings correspond to the conflicting constituencies that Victorian Era firms faced and help to understand why these firms are more likely to employ pseudonyms as identity-preserving and -sharpening tools.

Our thesis partially hinges on the argument that though legitimate, white orchestra recordings perform poorly in the market compared to recordings by less legitimate black nonorchestras. However, one may argue instead that Victorian Era firms were using pseudonyms to strengthen their position with more white orchestra recordings because white orchestra recordings were more successful for the Victorian Era firms than black nonorchestras. Indeed, from a straightforward microeconomic approach, where in equilibrium firms sort into market locations where they are the most successful, we might conclude that Victorian Era firms are better at producing white orchestras and that these highbrow recordings were successful in the market. However, despite the identity of the Victorian Era firms and their values that reflected the cultural elite, orchestras were more difficult to produce (Phillips and Owens 2004). Moreover, the mass market consumer who actually purchased music preferred the form of jazz deemed lowbrow by the elite.

To verify our assertion on the relationship between the type of record company, subgenre of jazz, cost of production, and success of recordings, we extracted two sets of variables from our data on jazz recordings. First, using Phillips and Owens' (2004) coding scheme, we extracted the number of takes for jazz recordings in our sample from catalogue numbers. Multiple takes during the 1920s were very costly, resulting in musician and equipment fatigue. As with any cost, companies sought to minimize the number of takes. Second, drawing from Phillips and Owens' (2006) study of recording success, we count the number of times a song was rerecorded by multiple labels. Rerecording by multiple labels indicates increases in that original song's popularity. The more popular a song, the more companies and labels reissued it. Thus, the number of reissues is a supply-side indicator of recording success. In Tables 5(a) and 5(b) we examine how these two indicators of cost and success vary by type of record company and type of group recorded.[7]

Overall, Victorian Era firms had greater production costs (1.91 versus 1.54, $p < 0.01$) and lower market success (3.04 versus 3.24, $p < 0.05$) in the market for early jazz. However, we are more interested in insights derived from looking by the type of group recorded. Here there are important similarities and differences between the patterns in Tables 5(a) and 5(b). In both, white orchestras were more costly to record than the other type of jazz groups (2.42 for Victorian Era, 1.89 for Jazz Era, $p < 0.01$). At the same time, songs by white orchestras were the least successful of the four types for both Victorian and Jazz Era firms. Black nonorchestras were among the most successful for each type of firm, although for Victorian Era firms black orchestras had the lowest costs per recording. However, these differences should not distract from the main implication of Tables 5(a) and 5(b): recordings of highbrow groups (white orchestras) cost more and were less successful than lowbrow groups (black nonorchestras), independent of the type of firm (Titon 1995, Kenney 1999). By these indicators, there would seem to be little justification in being more closely aligned with white orchestras.[8]

Table 5(a) Victorian Era Firms: Recording Costs and Market Success of Recordings by Type of Group

	Cost of recording: No. of takes	"Success" of recording: No. of reissues
All recordings	1.91	3.04
White orchestras only	2.42	2.63
White nonorchestras only	1.95	2.84
Black orchestras only	1.69	3.09
Black nonorchestras only	1.79	3.26

Table 5(b) Jazz Era Firms: Recording Costs and Market Success of Recordings by Type of Group

	Cost of recording: No. of takes	"Success" of recording: No. of reissues
All recordings	1.54	3.24
White orchestras only	1.89	2.28
White nonorchestras only	1.90	3.36
Black orchestras only	1.48	2.73
Black nonorchestras only	1.43	3.46

This finding is a critical point that drives the mechanism underlying our central thesis: Victorian Era firms used pseudonyms to preserve their identity without bearing the economic costs of producing more costly highbrow records that were also less appealing to the mass consumer. Although the cultural elite may have monitored a firm's announcement of the types of jazz it produced, elites rarely purchased records or attended performances (Leonard 1962, Kenney 1999). Even upper-middle-class consumers, the segment of active consumers most likely to reflect the cultural elite's tastes, enjoyed forms of jazz considered lowbrow. Victorian Era firms, already having physically produced more highbrow forms of jazz, needed a way to continue sending a strong signal of their identity without sacrificing their position in the market for jazz. Pseudonyms helped to serve that purpose.

Model Specification

We test Hypotheses H1–H3 using a logistic regression predicting the likelihood that a recording was reissued more often and more strategically by Victorian Era firms. An examination of regression residuals revealed that our data have correlated error terms from multiple observations for recording groups. Recordings by the same recording group tend to have similar characteristics (such as size, instrument combination, female membership, location of the recording, and other unobservables). We correct the standard errors with robust standard error estimators used in STATA 9.2. The resulting models test hypotheses on the likelihood of a recordings to be reissued as a pseudonym by Victorian Era firms (H1), the effect of group subtypes and Victorian Era firms (H2A and H2B), as well as whether the recording is made during periods when the highbrow identity of Victorian Era firms was blurred by the actions of Jazz Era firms (H3A and H3B).

We test Hypothesis 4 using a Heckman probit regression in STATA 9.2 (Heckman 1979; see Winship and Mare 1992 for a review). Our selection equation estimates the likelihood that a song by a black nonorchestra group was first reissued using a pseudonym. Our probit model (testing H4) captures whether the fictitious new name of the group contains the word "orchestra" (the dependent variable). We expect that Victorian Era firms are more likely to alter the names of black nonorchestra groups to names that include the term "orchestra"—enhancing their highbrow identity. These models correct the standard errors as well, as the same data structure applies.

Results of Hypothesis Tests

Before estimating our models, it is important to recall that, consistent with our theory, Table 4 showed results of a t-test suggesting that the proportion reissues by Victorian Era firms using pseudonyms was greater than for Jazz Era firms (13% versus 9%, $p < 0.01$). Close inspection of the data revealed that every firm in our sample used pseudonyms at least once. The key difference was that the rate of use was significantly greater among Victorian Era firms. Further examination revealed that the difference is greatest for black nonorchestras: 19% of black nonorchestra recordings produced by Victorian Era firms were reissued as pseudonyms (versus only 12% for Jazz Era firms). Thus, before engaging in a more sophisticated econometric approach, simple mean comparisons suggest that recordings by Victorian Era firms were more likely to be reissued using pseudonyms and more likely to be reissued strategically.

In terms of a more formal test of the hypotheses, we use the six models in Table 6 to test H1–H3.[9] We use Models 1 and 2 to test H1, that recordings are more likely to be reissued using pseudonyms when the producer is a Victorian Era firm. H2—that Victorian Era firms were less likely to use white orchestras (H2A) and more likely to use black nonorchestras (H2B) as sources for pseudonyms—is tested in Models 3 and 4. Models 5 and 6 test H3A and H3B, that Victorian Era firm recordings were more likely to use pseudonyms when their market identity was blurred by the actions of Jazz Era firms.

Models 1 and 2 confirm the t-test in Table 4. On average, Victorian Era firms were more likely to act deceptively through the use of pseudonyms. Model 1 includes the key independent variables without controls; Model 2 introduces the controls. H1 is supported even after controlling for a host of alternatives, although now its statistical significance is attenuated ($p = 0.046$). Thus, there is solid evidence that Victorian Era firms were more likely to use pseudonyms. The models also show that before controls, black nonorchestras were more likely to be targets for pseudonyms. However, once the control variables are included this effect is no longer statistically significant. Among the control variables, recordings made in 1929 and those having Louis Armstrong as a leader increase the likelihood of the recording being reissued using a pseudonym. The effect for 1929 suggests that all firms responded to the market collapse in 1929 by increasing the rate of pseudonym use. We expect that many of the acts of deception in 1929 were not done because of identity preservation as much as because firms were seeking to inflate their catalogues during a period when the production of actual recordings diminished dramatically. In other words, firms were likely using a different logic during a market collapse and inflating their catalogues independent of concerns over the legitimacy of their identity.

The strong effect for Louis Armstrong suggests that his salience as the key person associated with lowbrow jazz made him an unusually attractive target for any record company. Although it may have been frowned on for many white consumers to purchase lowbrow music, his sound was considered to be recognizable as definitive lowbrow jazz (Peretti 1998). This is not to say that firms had a strategy of using pseudonyms to reissue his songs because his songs were more successful. Indeed, there is no evidence that more successful recordings become pseudonymous reissues. Songs that become pseudonyms have average market success of 3.01, but songs that do not become pseudonyms have an average success of 3.15 (the difference is not statistically significant). Even among the subset of recordings by Louis Armstrong, firms were not selecting his more popular recordings to reissue using pseudonyms. Rather, we expect that the Louis Armstrong indicator speaks to his salience and exemplary status as the definitive lowbrow musician—whose recordings were in the forefront of the minds of firm decision makers.

In this sense, Louis Armstrong singularly transcends the logic of identity preservation that is central to our paper. Instead, we believe another process not explicitly explored in this paper is operating. That is, artists with extraordinarily clear identities may have been more salient to record company decision makers. However, as we note, this salience was independent of the popularity, quality, or market success of the song recorded.[10]

Three of the controls for name identifiers were significant in directions that suggest that lesser-known groups were typically more likely to be reissued using pseudonyms. First, recordings with the name of the record company in the group's title were more likely to be rereleased using pseudonyms. These groups were studio musicians and not typically known as touring groups. In contrast, groups with "Hot" and "Hotel" in their names were less likely to be rereleased using pseudonyms. We suspect that this also reflects the tendency to avoid potentially well-known or easily recognized groups. Groups with "Hot" in their title were substantially more successful in the market. Using our success measure from Table 5, "Hot" groups were reissued an average of 6.06 times, compared to 1.87 for all other recordings. In other words, these groups would have been very well known, making them less likely to be reissued with pseudonyms. Similarly, groups with "Hotel" regularly

Table 6 Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Relisting a Group's Recording Under a Pseudonym (Midwest Jazz Recordings, 1920–1929)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
H1: Victorian Era firm	0.46*	0.76*	0.91*	−0.25	−3.21**	0.43
Group is white orchestra	0.30	0.43	1.46+	0.68	0.41	0.41
Group is black nonorchestra	0.92*	0.63	0.67	−0.15	0.53	0.61
Group is black orchestra	−0.12	−0.49	−0.45	−0.48	−0.58	−0.52
H2A: Victorian Era ∗ group is white orchestra			−1.37*			
H2B: Victorian Era ∗ group is black nonorchestra				1.48**		
Prop. of white orchestras produced by Jazz Era firms		−4.70**	−5.01**	−4.93**	−11.16**	−3.39*
Prop. of market represented by Jazz Era firms		0.86	1.10	1.04	2.42	−5.41
H3A: Victorian Era ∗ prop. white orch. by Jazz Era firm					9.03**	
H3B: Victorian Era ∗ prop. market is Jazz Era firm						7.21*
Founder's years of industry experience		−0.05	−0.05	−0.03	−0.05	−0.05
Firm age (yrs)		0.01	−0.00	−0.02	0.00	0.01
Firm has many studios		−0.62	−0.48	−0.43	−0.47	−0.67
Firm has foreign affiliates		0.20	0.26	0.30	0.36	0.07
Number of labels		0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.05	0.01
Annual number of ads placed in *New York Times*		0.01	0.01+	0.02*	0.01	0.01+
Number of firms in market		−0.10+	−0.11+	−0.10	−0.12	−0.09
Calendar year		−0.09	−0.11	−0.10	−0.11	−0.10
Year = 1929		1.44*	1.57**	1.52*	1.76*	1.19*
Recorded in Chicago		0.60	0.66	0.61	0.74	0.53
Recorded in Richmond, IN		0.35	0.42	0.42	0.39	0.35
Size of recording group		−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.06	−0.05
Recording has vocals		0.12	0.12	0.09	0.16	0.13
Recording has a director		−0.16	−0.00	−0.12	−0.09	−0.10
Group recording for the first time		−0.04	−0.05	−0.07	0.02	−0.00
Recordings per session		−0.08	−0.10	−0.10	−0.07	−0.06
Louis Armstrong group		2.44**	2.50**	2.47**	2.50**	2.29**
Group is named after a person		−0.26	−0.25	−0.31	−0.15	−0.20
Group name has name of record company		1.34+	1.34+	1.35+	1.43+	1.27
Group name has "Hot"		−1.34*	−1.40*	−1.32*	−1.32+	−1.14+
Group name has "Hotel"		−1.59+	−1.73+	−1.83	−1.44	−1.61+
Group name has references to geographical locations		0.30	0.31	0.27	0.32	0.30
Constant	−2.93**	171.54	208.44	196.83	212.32	186.54
Df	4	28	29	33	33	33
Log-likelihood (Df)	−747.85	−658.27	−655.50	−649.76	−646.96	−654.80
N of recordings	2,213	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985
N of groups	356	344	344	344	344	344

Notes. $N = 1{,}985$; 344 groups. $^{+} = p < 0.10$; $^{*} = p < 0.05$; $^{**} = p < 0.01$. Hypotheses are subject to one-sided tests. Standard errors (clustered by recording group) are not reported to facilitate the presentation of results.

performed to local audiences and visitors in well-known hotels (as something akin to a house band). An example would be Jack Chapman and His Drake Hotel Orchestra. The Drake was among the most famous hotels in Chicago (Host and Portmann 2006), and this group's (exclusive) affiliation with that hotel would have substantially increased his visibility.

Finally, we find no evidence that the use of pseudonyms is related to the number of labels a firm has. The lack of an effect (we also tested nonlinear specifications) suggests that the use of pseudonyms was independent of the number of labels where a firm could theoretically place pseudonyms.

We test H2A and H2B in Models 3 and 4 using the interaction between Victorian Era firm and the two key types of recording groups. The models reveal support for both hypotheses. This suggests that, as our thesis states, the use of pseudonyms by Victorian Era firms was strategic. That is, Victorian Era firms avoided using white orchestras as sources for their pseudonymous reissues (Model 3, $p < 0.05$), but were more likely to use black nonorchestras as sources (Model 4, $p < 0.01$). In supplemental analyses, we examined whether songs by black orchestras were more likely to be reissued using pseudonyms by Victorian Era firms (see also Endnote 8). As expected, we found no effect. Black nonorchestras were distinguished in their use by Victorian Era firms.

We test H3A and H3B in Models 5 and 6. For H3A, we hypothesized that recordings by Victorian Era firms were much more likely to be reissued as pseudonyms under during periods in which Jazz Era firms produced greater shares of white orchestras. Insofar as the active production of white orchestras by Jazz Era firms made it less clear that Victorian Era firms occupied the role of highbrow cultural producer, Victorian Era firms would use pseudonyms as an attempt to bolster their identity. Model 5 shows that H3A is supported ($p < 0.01$): Victorian Era firms' use of pseudonyms was higher when there was competition over highbrow products from Jazz Era firms. Model 6 tests H3B, that Victorian Era firms use pseudonyms more during periods in which the market was proportionally dominated by Jazz Era firms. H3B is also supported ($p < 0.05$), leading us to strengthen our expectation that pseudonyms were used by Victorian Era firms to heighten their identities when the actions of competitors blurred these firms' identities.

It is important to note that we also verified the robustness of the Victorian Era dummy variable by conducting additional analysis that included dummy variables for the largest firms: Victor and Columbia (as well as Brunswick). Indeed, our argument is based on the founding period of the firms in our sample, not their size, scope, or other unobserved characteristics that may be associated with these market leaders. If our measure were simply from one of the large firms, then these dummy variables may have explained away the Victorian Era variable. However, in each of these models (not reported here to preserve space), the Victorian Era variable easily retained statistical significance. This was not surprising, given that the models presented in this paper already have a set of firm-level controls that capture size and scope, but it was an important validation.

In Table 7 we test our final hypothesis, that Victorian Era firms were more likely to rename recordings of black nonorchestra groups (conditional on being selected as reissues using pseudonyms) as "orchestras" to inflate their identity as highbrow cultural producers. We use two Heckman selection probit regression models to test this hypothesis, constraining the correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations to be zero. Each model is similar in its specification but differs in the subset of recordings. The first model examines black nonorchestras only. It is here that we test H4 directly. We have hypothesized that recordings by these groups, when selected for reissue using pseudonyms, are more likely to be given fictitious names with the word "Orchestra" in them when the record company was a Victorian Era firm. The results support H4 ($p < 0.05$). Songs by black nonorchestras were more actively renamed as "Orchestras" by Victorian Era firms than by Jazz Era firms.

The second model of Table 7 examines an alternative to our hypothesis: that the first model is actually demonstrating that Victorian Era firms converted any nonorchestra to an orchestra at a greater rate than Jazz Era firms did, independent of the race of the group. However, in this model there is no effect for Victorian Era firms. Thus, we conclude that H4 is strongly supported.[11]

Table 7 **Heckman Probit Regression of the Likelihood of a Black Nonorchestra Group's Recording Being Relisted Using the Term "Orchestra" (Midwest Jazz Recordings, 1920–1929)**

	Black nonorchestras only	All nonorchestras
Probit regression		
H4: Victorian Era firm	2.00^{*}	−0.51
Louis Armstrong group	4.06^{**}	2.52^{*}
Founder's years of industry exp.	-1.59^{**}	−0.06
Annual number of ads placed in *New York Times*	0.01^{*}	−0.00
Calendar year	1.21^{**}	−0.14
Constant	$-2{,}310.48^{**}$	276.25
Selection Eq. (Prob.: Pseudonym)		
Victorian Era firm	−1.11	-1.46^{*}
Prop. of white orchestras produced by Jazz Era firms	-3.11^{*}	-3.14^{*}
Prop. of market represented by Jazz Era firms	-4.60^{**}	-4.50^{**}
Victorian Era ∗ prop. white orch by Jazz Era firm	3.13^{*}	3.84^{**}
Victorian Era ∗ prop. market is Jazz Era	5.48^{**}	4.27^{*}
Louis Armstrong group	0.68^{*}	0.67^{*}
Number of firms in market	−0.11	−0.13
Year: 1929	0.46^{+}	0.54^{*}
Group name has name of record company	1.42^{**}	0.46
Recorded in Chicago	0.12	0.25
Constant	-52.54^{**}	1.26
N	1,126	1,411
Uncensored *N*	172	193
Groups	213	279
df	5	5
Log-likelihood (Df)	−467.53	−560.82

Notes. $^{+} = p < 0.10$; $^{*} = p < 0.05$; $^{**} = p < 0.01$. Hypotheses are subject to one-sided tests. ρ constrained = 0.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our findings suggest that acts of deception can be used to preserve a firm's identity. In our study, Victorian Era firms shunned the direct financial gains of fully participating in the lowbrow product space to preserve their higher-status identities, forged at founding. Instead of employing identity-transforming or identity-enhancing acts (Rao et al. 2003), we uncover deception through the use of pseudonyms as identity-*preserving* acts. Pseudonyms allowed the Victorian Era firms to participate more fully in the center of the jazz market while preserving their identities as highbrow producers. These deceptive acts also allowed Victorian Era firms to more sharply signal their identity when the actions of competing Jazz Era firms made it less clear that Victorian Era firms were distinctly associated with highbrow music.

How Did This Deception Go Undiscovered?

A unique aspect of our study is that we examine deception where there is no evidence that constituencies learned of the deceptive acts. One possibility is that pseudonymous reissues existed in the catalogues of record company offerings but did not physically exist for mass consumption. However, the pseudonyms listed in the discographies from which we drew our data were extracted by jazz collectors and aficionados from records that physically existed. If this is the case, then why didn't the two key constituents—cultural elites and mass market consumers—uncover the deception as jazz collectors did?

We believe the answer for each constituency is different. Both hinge on the fact that the record companies marketed recordings under actual names but did not market the same recording under any pseudonyms. To verify, we conducted a supplementary analysis by searching for actual group names and pseudonyms in the display advertisements of five newspapers: the *Chicago Defender*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Washington Post* (Figures 1 and 2 are examples of display advertisements). We reason that one indicator of whether firms were marketing records with pseudonyms is (1) to see if the fictitious names used as pseudonyms are advertised and (2) to compare their rate of advertising to the rate of advertising of actual group names. We found that although 67 groups (of 344 groups in our data set) recorded by Victorian Era firms were advertised under their actual names, we found no instances of a Victorian Era firm advertisement mentioning the name of a pseudonym. Thus, although Victorian Era firms listed pseudonyms in their catalogues and physical copies existed (or they would not have appeared in our data set), they were not advertised to the public. This is consistent with our earlier Endnote 7, in which we note that we have no evidence that any of the recordings listed under pseudonyms had any market success.

We believe the lack of advertising of the use of pseudonyms is important, as it reveals how these deceptive practices were left unnoticed. The cultural elite, though actively sanctioning lowbrow jazz in general, rarely purchased the music. Their critiques of the music were rarely about specific recordings. To the extent that they were familiar with the music, it would have been more likely to occur through observing live performances, if at all (lowbrow jazz was not played on the radio during our observation period). The fact that Victorian Era firms did not market their pseudonymous reissues in ads would have been sufficient to close the circle on deception with respect to the cultural elite constituency. The only public representation of these reissues would have been the firms' catalogues, which typically listed group names with no information to verify authenticity.

The mass market consumer would not have been likely to uncover the deception either. This constituency would have purchased relatively few groups with highbrow-oriented names, especially those that were unknown to the public and not marketed through advertisements. Thus, once again the deception would have been able to persist given the fact that the firms took steps to disguise evidence of their deception through avoiding placement in advertisements.

Alternative Explanations

Our particularly rich product and firm-level data provided us with an opportunity to control for many alternative explanations. For example, we control for the firm size and scope, a firm's advertising behavior, founder experience, characteristics of the groups and recordings, and time trends. There are, however, other alternative explanations that control variables cannot directly address.

One possibility was that Victorian Era firms were reissuing recordings using pseudonyms to bolster their identity with respect to the market for classical music. Here one might argue that because the primary market for Victorian Era firms was the more prestigious market for classical music, actions in less successful markets, such as jazz, would be used to ultimately serve the classical music market. The lack of data availability makes this alternative difficult to dismiss outright. However, it seems implausible, primarily because after 1917 classical music underperformed compared to more popular (jazz) music, just as highbrow jazz recordings underperformed with respect to lowbrow jazz. According to Walsh (1942), Eldridge Johnson (the president and founder of Victor Records) was thankful for the popular records Victor sold under its label, as these records helped to compensate for losses with classical records. Jazz had become the center of the market for recorded music. It is unlikely that Victorian Era firms were purposely underperforming at the market center to gain advantage in a more peripheral segment.

Indeed, this reality of the market prevented Victorian Era firms from exclusively recording highbrow jazz or even calling all of its groups "Orchestras," even if the underlying music was not legitimate. Less legitimate lowbrow jazz records had to be released under their original names because these records best captured consumer demand (again, see Tables 5(a) and 5(b)). To disguise all of their recordings as highbrow jazz, Victorian Era firms would have lost even greater market share.

Another strong alternative posits that pseudonyms were used so that white consumers could purchase the more lowbrow jazz without bearing any stigma associated with it. However, we know that the pseudonymous reissues were not advertised, making it unlikely that white consumers would be aware of which pseudonyms matched to lowbrow records, or whether pseudonyms existed in the first place. Moreover, one would suspect that such a strategy would have involved Victorian Era firms choosing successful lowbrow recordings as sources of pseudonyms. However, we found the opposite to be true: the black nonorchestras that Victorian Era firms targeted as pseudonyms performed more poorly than the black nonorchestras they did not target (2.65 versus 3.30, $p < 0.01$). This suggests that when choosing black nonorchestras, Victorian Era firms focused on those that were less popular to maximize deception.

We claim that there is strong evidence that Victorian Era firms used pseudonyms as acts of deception to preserve their identities; but we also acknowledge that multiple goals were likely achieved through the use of pseudonyms. Put another way, pursuing identity preservation may have helped achieve additional goals in ways unobservable to us 90 years later. For example, we lack the evidence to examine the effects of identity preservation on the foreign jazz market (European cities varied to the extent that they preferred highbrow and lowbrow jazz from the United States). Also, though descriptions of the 1920s recording market suggest that recordings of classical music were substantially on the decline, we lack the precise data to confidently examine whether the losses in the classical music market were compensated by sales in the market for jazz. Indeed, implicit in our arguments is the notion that Victorian Era firms were acting rationally. Although their actions did not seem to improve the fate of their jazz recordings, we remain open to the possibility that Victorian Era firms were attempting to maximize along multiple dimensions.

Conclusion

In pursuing this thesis in the setting of early jazz, we believe that two additional theoretical implications on the relationship between deception and identity emerge. First, the key models within the sociology of markets (e.g., White 1981) present a parsimonious model of external constituents as monolithic. Not only do constituents value the same products equally, but the same constituents simultaneously determine the firm's position in product and identity space (cf. Zuckerman 1999). Underlying our thesis is the fact that—for Victorian Era firms—the constituents associated with a firm's position in product space are distinct from the constituents associated with a firm's position in identity space. This identity-product space bifurcation lies at the core of the dilemma faced by Victorian Era firms. We find that one response to this bifurcation is deception, where the goal of deception was to construct a more "robust identity" (Padgett and Ansell 1993), appearing to be aligned with constituents who have conflicting expectations and demands. We expect that future research on organizations and markets will find that deception can be an effective means for resolving orthogonally arrayed external constituencies (cf. Glynn and Abzug 2002).

Second, we believe that what underlies our investigation are the building blocks of a theory on organizational identity as a dynamic organizational life-cycle construct. We have presented a context in which the identity at founding loses financial viability as an innovation enters the market. We explore a context in which the market center radically shifts to nonclassical jazz music when the constraint faced by Victorian Era firms was largely identity based.

This brings to bear many questions for which this paper presents more rudimentary answers. For example, do theories of structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977) provide ample templates for a theory of "identity inertia?" Under what conditions can organizations maintain positions consistent with orthogonally oriented external constituencies? Is there a parsimonious model of organizational identity evolution? How common (and successful) is deception as a mean for resolving external identity conflicts generally—and differences in identity and product space positions specifically?

Though we have introduced new questions for theoretical advancement, this paper charts new territory in work that weds market competition with considerations of distinct locations in identity and product space (e.g., White 1981, Zuckerman 1999, Phillips and Zuckerman 2001, Hsu and Hannan 2005) by suggesting that Victorian Era firms deceived to maintain a categorically focused identity (as highbrow firms contrasted with lowbrow firms) while producing products that transcended categorical boundaries. There is too little work on whether and how market competition shapes organizational identities in general and on how firms simultaneously navigate competitive and identity-based landscapes in particular (Ingram and McEvily 2008). We hope this paper joins and fuels scholarship in this vein.

It is likely that our use of cultural markets facilitates our model, but we also believe this context is not idiosyncratic. In addition to the cases of deception enacted by large-scale brewers that was wonderfully documented by Carroll and Swaminathan (2000, pp. 727–728), where incumbent brewers use deception as an attempt to overcome resource partitioning constraints, we draw attention to two additional arenas that we suspect will only become more relevant over time. First, identity and deception in online settings are commonplace and, similar to our context, difficult to monitor. As Donath (1999, p. 29) notes, "One can have, some claim, as many electronic personas as one has time and energy to create.... A man creates a female identity; a high school student claims to be an expert on viruses." Online deception also enters the competitive arena, as exemplified by the recent uncovering of John Mackey, cofounder and CEO of Whole Foods, who used a pseudonym ("Rahodeb") in online discussion groups to tout his firm and disparage his competitor (Wild Oats, which Whole Foods ultimately acquired) (*Wall Street Journal*, July 12, 2007, p. A1). Important to our theory is the fact that Whole Foods (and the CEO as its leader) is a firm publically associated with corporate social responsibility (and in 2007 listed as one of FORTUNE magazine's Most Admired Companies), making the use of deception to preserve that identity even more compelling. We would hypothesize that such acts of deception, although usually undetected, happen often to gain some economic advantage while preserving (as opposed to enhancing) that actor's identity.

Finally, we believe that a second area our theory addresses is the pressure on actors with strong country-specific identities that have to compete globally. In practical terms, this applies to "Made in America" fraud in the United States, when a company deceptively labels its products as being manufactured or made in the United States. We would argue that scholarly attention should be paid to whether firms that have a strong identity linked to the United States are drawn to deception whenever profits would be higher through outsourcing to foreign vendors. And though many readers may be more familiar with US examples, many countries share concerns over a firm's use of deception to preserve its national identity, such as the poultry industry in Canada (Verboven 2007), the watch industry in Switzerland (Swiss Federal Council 1995), and the rice industry in Korea (Chung, February 22, 2007, p. 13). Indeed, though our empirical focus pertains to behavior in markets, acts of identity preservation in political contexts occur as well (e.g., *New York Times* 2003). In general, whenever positive returns to authenticity exist, we would expect pressures to deceive for identity preservation to be higher.

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Endnotes
[1]Although we lack clear data on the date of release for the reissues that pseudonyms, a wealth of anecdotal evidence, bolstered by the work of discographers (Sutton 1993), conversations with jazz curators at university libraries, and jazz collectors lead us to the conclusion that the recording of the original group preceded the release of the recordings under the pseudonym.

[2]The Victorian Era is technically considered to be from 1837 till 1901, when Britain's Queen Victoria reigned. Our classification of Victorian Era firms refers to firms founded between the late 1880s and 1917. Much of this period is more accurately referred to the post-Victorian Era (or the Edwardian Era). However, our use of the term is mean to capture the cultural sentiments of the elite, which in America are argued to dominate until the "Jazz Age," beginning with jazz's commercialization in 1917. Our use of the term is similar to other scholars', who research the cultural evolutions that occurred during the early twentieth century (see Levine 1988, Schlereth 1991, DiMaggio 1992, Kenney 1999).

[3]Our own review of *Ladies Home Journal* magazines from the early 1920s found that Victorian Era firms typically had full-page ads on the first page of the magazine (see Figure 1(a)). This is important, as the *Ladies Home Journal* was a key outlet for antijazz rhetoric in the early 1920s, with articles such as "Unspeakable Jazz Must Go!" (1921), "Back to Prewar Morals" (1921), and "Does Jazz Put the Sin in Syncopation?"

[4]The Virginians were a subset of the musicians in the Paul Whiteman Orchestra. The International Novelty Orchestra and the Great White Way Orchestra were Victor house bands. We were unable to locate additional information on The Serenaders.

[5]As Kenney (1999, p. 103) notes, "The 'flapper,' named for the birdlike arm movements involved in dancing 'The Charleston,' carried a reputation for unconventional behavior. Sometimes known as 'Jazz Babies' or 'Gold Diggers,' younger women defiled the world of Victorian domestic propriety . . . ."

[6]The models included only a subset of name identifiers we extracted to validate our use of "Orchestra" in the group name. Some of the additional identifiers (none of which affected the results): "Jazz," "Jass," "Rhythm," and "Dixie." For other studies that link rhetorical choice to identity in artistic markets, see the Jones and Livne-Tarandach (2008) study on architects.

[7]None of the recordings made under pseudonyms in our sample were rerecorded. This is one of many findings that led us to conclude that there is no evidence that pseudonyms had any success in the market.

[8]One may argue that because Victorian Era firms had greater success with white orchestras than Jazz Era firms (2.63 versus 2.28), Victorian Era firms were driven by a comparative advantage that they had over Jazz Era firms. However, this explanation would also suggest that Victorian Era firms would have focused on recording black orchestras, because their success with these firms was also greater (3.09 versus 2.73). The statistics in Table 4, which shows that Victorian Era firms did not disproportionally pursue black orchestras, casts doubt on this explanation. Moreover, Victorian Era leaders are noted to have claimed that the sales of their popular (lowbrow) recordings helped to offset losses from their highbrow recordings (e.g., Walsh 1942).

[9]The standard errors are omitted from Table 6 to preserve space but are available from the authors by request.

[10]As a point of perspective, we included Louis Armstrong because he is an outlier on almost every dimension available to us (e.g., his songs are about three times as successful and his songs are almost twice as likely to be completed on the first take), and we wanted to make sure that our results were not driven by his inclusion (or exclusion) in the sample.

[11]We also ran logistic regressions (without the Heckman correction) with more fully specified models producing similar results. These results are not surprising, given that in none of our tests of ρ was it statistically different from zero. The advantage of the Heckman models is that they adjust for the

fact that Victorian Era firms produced fewer black nonorchestras in the first place, giving them a different base to draw from than Jazz Era firms. At the same time, one disadvantage of the Heckman models is that they were more sensitive to underlying assumptions and less likely to converge when a theoretically motivated, fully specified model was used.

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