"Cities as Entertainment Centers: Can Transformative Projects Create Place?

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Cities have long been identified as centers for entertainment. By historical evolution or deliberate public policy, across the globe the core of the entertainment industry has lodged itself in the city center. Times Square in New York and the West End of London may be the most iconic centers, but Toronto's Entertainment Center and Cleveland's Playhouse Square derive from a similar centralizing root, as did Potsdamer Platz before the Berlin Wall divided that city. City life itself is often considered theater, a place of real-time performance, street dance, and impromptu staccato of entertainment. Akin to this informal, popular side of city entertainment, amusement parks first found vibrant, if temporary, expression in the 1893 Chicago World's Fair, whereas by the turn of the century the People's Playground of Coney Island had become the uncontested epicenter of America's emerging mass culture. As an idea to shape and promote city identity and draw large numbers of tourists and residents, arts districts fashioned out of whole cloth and invented by public policy began to spring into being in Dallas, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Kansas City and numerous other urban centers in the 1980s. Whether for live-theater performance, mass amusement, or arts entertainment, as a location of centrality, cities have long had a competitive advantage, and this has been no less the case as evolving cultural notions of entertainment increasingly have shifted to sports events and produced new large-format entertainment centers such as London's O2, L.A. Live!, and Amsterdam ArenA.

Some of these new-generation entertainment centers have been developed in the core of cities, yet others on the periphery of a center city. In either urban location, the overriding function of the initiative, typically a public-private venture brought about through public intervention and helped along with public financial assistance, is a sought-after transformation of place. Not infrequently, entertainment projects, particularly sports centers, have evoked high-profile controversy and conflict, and questions of public purpose and public benefit (Fulton 1997, Noll and Zimbalist 1997, Gruen 1998, Goss 1999, Chapin 2004).[1] In this paper, the authors explain how concentrated entertainment centers evolve in the United States, and how the interplay of public policy and market economics shapes development and catalyzes new identities. We are most interested in understanding what kinds of entertainment projects have been successful in effectuating urban transformation, and seek exploratory answers to a number of questions: Why is it that entertainment projects more often than not are sited in dense urban areas, though not necessarily in the core? Is a central location necessary for success? How does the accumulated social capital of a city predispose or predetermine the site of entertainment activity? In areas of the city where such accumulated social capital may not exist, areas where a "place" would have to be created by an invented destination activity, what kind of critical mass is necessary to

[1] Sports stadia have been the focus of numerous studies seeking to evaluate the economic return involved for the owners and cities providing financial support. The results have been consistently negative: baseball parks seldom, if ever pay their own way or create real economic development (Baim 1994, Noll and Zimbalist 1997, Rosentraub 1997), though downtown locations may create more position impacts that other locations (Melaniphy 1996), all cited in Newsome and Comer 2000. In fact, empirical analysis by Newsome and Comer show that the suburbanization trend long associated with the location of U.S. major sporting venue construction is reversing itself, with resurgence in downtown venues. They attribute this to a concomitant trend toward smaller market franchises, increasing corporate sponsorship, deliberate downtown revitalization strategies, and the advantages accruing to owners when different parts of an urban area compete for franchises. Nelson's analysis of the location of major league stadiums in twenty-five U.S. metropolitan areas (2002) showed that in terms of capturing share of economic activity, the best location for professional sports stadiums appears to be downtown (including the central business district and nearby "edge" areas), followed by other locations in the central city, while suburban locations appeared to be associated with the least amount of economic activity.

support the transformative project? In other words, to what extent can a catalytic transformation project create the basis for a future accumulation of social capital? And what types of public policies and incentives are employed—and to what effect—to create the necessary market context for arts and entertainment-based transformative projects? All of which reduces to the question, can today's entertainment-oriented transformative projects create "place"?

In the first section of the paper we discuss the idea of transformation as a planning goal to create place and make the argument that city locations, whether in the center or on the periphery, hold competitive advantages over suburbs when it comes to creating place, especially in the instance of entertainment. We think of place creation as an ambitious mandate beyond the conventional tool kit of planning professionals; consequently, in most cases, embarking on a quest to invent place through large-scale policy intervention typically involves a specialized set of professional skills that have to be tapped through the use of specialized consultants and public-private partnerships. Place can be created through a number of different approaches, which we briefly discuss in this first section. Urban entertainment concentrations have exhibited many different formats over the past several decades of experimentation. In the second section of the paper we present a typology for organizing these many formats and compare across nine identifying attributes, emphasizing for the focus of this volume, primary location in the core of periphery. In the third and fourth sections, we explain the transformation process of two multi-purpose entertainment complexes: one in the core (42nd Street at Times Square), the other in the periphery of the core (L.A. Live!). There two very distinct and different entertainment places are considered by many to be models for adaptation by other cities. On the basis of these cases and our general ideas on the question, we conclude with observations on transformation projects as a way to create place.

Transformation and the Place Mandate

What do we mean by "place?" What motivates cities to want "places?" Today's city planners in the United States grapple with these questions as they are charged with a mandate that goes beyond the traditional goal of providing a rational context for orderly and stable growth of developing urban areas. Whereas traditional planning practice focused on promoting quality-of-life attributes which have come to define the most admired urban neighborhoods and suburban communities (generous open space, park-like amenities, pedestrian-oriented retail activity, street patterns that facilitate neighborly communication), the "place" mandate calls upon city planners to go beyond the design template for good domestic living and develop plans for interactive socially-oriented entertainment and leisure activity. To meet the ambitions of municipal governments they are being asked to develop plans and shape commercial real estate projects in ways that promote economic development, support sustainable development, create the excitement of distinctive venues, and impart prestige and the aura of success to large-scale multi-functional public interventions that aim to become "places." In urban centers, the goal of creating "place" has come to mean long-term sustainable effect: diverse and distinctive mixed-use commercial activity characterized by 24/7 vibrancy and dynamic quality night life, one measure of a city's sophistication. This, of course, represents the antithesis of the suburban planning ideal, which in physical form and normative design was meant to be a retreat from the intensity of city life realized through a primarily residential community that embodied the ideal of a safe, secure domestic life. What then does the literature suggest as necessary and essential for making real the new place-making mandate?

We know "place" when we encounter it, through personal experience. Sometimes, the experience of place comes from feeling history through a landmark of transcendent national memory such as the Gettysburg Battlefield or experiencing civic passion through a local baseball team; Brooklyn fans, for example, still bemoan the loss of the Dodgers, some fifty-four years after the team decamped to Los Angeles. Other times, the experience originates with a local political, cultural, or social event of meaning and fixes in memory on an urban place where people naturally congregate to share events or hear announcements of something important, New Year's Eve in New York's Times Square, for example. Still other times, the experience of place comes from the personal meaning of encounter, where individual social interactions occur on a daily basis, at the local post office, public park, shopping district, or central transportation node such as the main concourse at Grand Central Terminal in New York, where, in words Tony Hiss wrote in *The Experience of Place*, the "experience is one of the unplanned treasures of New York" (1990, 4). In each of these instances, the meaning of place arises out of social interactions—a connectedness—and in that sense, place can be said to be socially constructed (Adams and Tiesdell 2013, 11).

Whether fashioned somewhat spontaneously by unconnected private-market decisions by real estate developers and individuals or intentionally crafted by public interventions, the physical development of place is distinct from a singular building or development project. It is not a function of specific architecture, rather, from the perspective of urban design, a conceptual approach and explicit plan for creating a total experience. Toward that end, Adams and Tiesdall (2013) have defined the characteristics of successful places by the five following attributes: places meant for people, where activity draws people; places that are well-connected and permeable by easy physical access, easy walkability, and easy connectivity; places of mixed uses and varied density which shape its vitality and how well it is used; places of distinction that counter the standardization of place that has become all too familiar as local processes of development have been overtaken by national and corporate development enterprises, especially in retailing, and offer authenticity of location; and sustainable, resilient, and robust places that can be successful over time.

Places of distinction in the field of urban entertainment, however, are becoming more and more difficult given the rise of branded corporate entertainment (David 1999, Hollands and Chatterton 2003, Bruck 2012), and the tensions raised to when access to that entertainment only comes with payment, even though public financial assistance may have been an essential element of a project's feasibility. Beyond the issue of who is doing the actual production, successful urban places engage people in active involvement of experience beyond the experience of being a spectator (15-30). Place making is about creating urban experiences that will be remembered and repeated, experiences that often cannot be created all at once out of whole cloth or that rely on historical legacy or other factors that have little to do with the physical development itself. As such, the urban fabric of a city, with its social capital built up over decades and decades of public and private investment, tends to lend itself more readily to the creation of place than do suburban greenfields.

Urban economic theory also strongly suggests that cities hold a natural competitive advantage over suburban locations when it comes to developing place-defining entertainment venues. The population density of cities confers the potential of critical mass, scale being an especially important consideration for the production of entertainment (Florida et al 2012). Transportation systems, especially mass transit, make possible efficient travel of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of entertainment seekers, delivering them to the doors of these venues without dedicating acres of land to humongous, contiguous areas of parking-lot isolation. Historic associations of place, whether a much-loved iconic baseball stadium or much-remembered World's Fairground or Olympics Park, also factor into the equation of competitive advantage. The agglomeration of economies that define cities provides a diverse mix of commercial activities drawing a broad range of consumers beyond what might be necessary to support the level of consumer activity of any one entertainment activity.

More than simple economic diversity is involved, though. According to Richard Florida and his colleagues, cities, especially the largest cities,[2] hold a competitive advantage because they benefit from "geographic economies of scope." Their concept represents a new cut on the idea of clustering or agglomeration economies familiar to urban economists. They argue, convincingly, that geographic economies of scope are different from simple economic diversity that scholars have long found to adhere to cities. "It is not just the collocation of many diverse inputs and capabilities that characterize geographic economics of scope, rather the geographic collocation of *related* capabilities at a sufficient scale to produce high-quality and efficient production at a reduced cost" (Florida et al 2012, 184). The idea of related capabilities does not correlate precisely to agglomeration; rather, it refers to shared pools of skills and material inputs made possible by clustering. This idea, especially its scale attribute has particular applicability to entertainment, where skills and knowledge on an as-needed basis can be crucial. Entertainment production is high risk. It calls for constant reinvention and creativity, and its finished products—shows, concerts, sporting events—are market-driven, dependent upon popular consumption; they must be presented to intended consumers before the producer learns their true economic demand. There is, in other words, an element of 'nobody knows" (Caves 2000 cited in Florida, 188). Entertainment production is costly, and it requires more combinations of specialized knowledge and skills across many technical and creative areas than the production of more standardized products, which is why urban areas are the most efficient locations for entertainment. Urban concentrations bring together large pools of related skills and knowledge, and the choice of a core location becomes a way of reducing the risk of not finding what is needed at the same time it avoids the economic risk (and higher cost) of hiring permanent employees.

[2] Based on empirical analysis of the entertainment industry across U.S. metropolitan areas from 1970 to 2000, Florida and his colleagues suggest that geographic economies of scope are triggered only in large cities and regions where a certain minimum scale can be reached. In the U.S. they found that entertainment sector as a whole and its key subsectors are significantly concentrated in two superstar cities—New York and Los Angeles—more so than their scale effects, measured by population, would suggest.

The geographic clustering of the consumption activity mix—some combination of sports venues, restaurants, nightclubs, music and dance clubs, multiplex cinemas, theaters, and retail stores—is the logic that underlies of the most successful urban entertainment districts. It is what attracts people to the area, keeps them there for extended periods, encourages repeat visits, and attracts a diverse group of consumers. It is the compelling aspect of cities that by the mid-1990s had convinced U.S. developers that cities are the natural habitat for entertainment districts, so much so that urban entertainment has become a specialized sector of the real estate industry complete with its own set of development principles (Beyard 1998), conferences, case studies (ULI DCS), industry reports (Entertain Real Estate Report 1995, Rubin 1995, ULI 1996, Fox 1996), webinars (ULI 2012), specialized consultants (UEC Directory 1996, Robinett and Camp 1997), and academic research (Berkeley 1999, Haynes and Talpade 1996, Hunter and Bleinberger 1996, Davis 1999). That entertainment venues should not be developed in isolation of other urban activities has become the conventional wisdom of both the academy and the business sector.

The geography of an urban location, whether downtown or on the periphery of a city, may be a necessary precondition for success but scope and scale are necessary for commercial success; location alone cannot automatically generate the desired catalyst of redevelopment. In the past twenty five years, scores of entertainment complexes of an extensive variety have been built in the United States and Europe, many of which located downtown or near it, as we note in the typology section of the papers. There have been notable failures, including Kansas City Power and Light (WSJ 4/23/12) and Metreon (King 10/10/12). The question of whether one almost ubiquitous entertainment attraction, sports stadia are, in fact, catalysts of revitalization and return public benefits to justify their heavy public subsidy has been extensively studied, and the conclusions have been uniformly negative. At the regional level, facilities and teams have been shown to have only marginal effects, at best, on economic development. By themselves, a sports team or facility cannot turnaround the economic fortunes of a city or region (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Facilities developed for large-scale events that attract large numbers of tourists, the Olympic Games or World Cup events, for example, can have very positive short-term effects, but there is scant evidence of any longer-term positive effects. On the other hand, if a set of amenities continues on an annual basis to attract a large number of events that bring tourists to an area, or if legacy effects are made an integral part of master plans for Olympics venues, positive outcomes may be sustained. These studies, however, typically do not take into account the intangible benefits of public investments that drive so much political support for these types of projects: "The return of a franchise to the central city or the location of a stadium in an aged but beloved district provides symbolic and political benefits that cannot be captured when measuring jobs or tax revenues," wrote one scholar of the topic (Chapin 1999).

Recasting the image of a place, though difficult to capture in broad-based urban statistics, is exactly that type of transformation local boosters and politicians seek when they promote most types of urban entertainment projects. As these venues have continued to evolve over the decades, the combination of sports, entertainment, and cultural facilities appears to have changed the equation for success, at least when it comes to creating a new image for a city and its center. Where a facility is located within a region does matter. Because downtown locations are able to concentrate other amenities into a package that enhances local spending in the area of a sports and entertainment facility, Rosentraub (2010) found that it was indeed possible under the right conditions for these facilities to impact *where* people spend money on entertainment. They can and do change the patterns of spending when that development is concentrated in downtown with other amenities and when these types of entertainment centers are developed with commitments of private and nonprofit investment dollars alongside public investment (41-43). Downtowns are more likely to provide the agglomeration amenities and classic economic spinoff effects—more opportunities for linking a sports event or concert to eating out, shopping, and socializing with others than suburban and most other city locations (Nelson 2002)—

especially when the venues cluster many activities, and therein lies the potential for transformative impact.

Transformative is a descriptor of aspiration, an outcome of intervention planners and public officials aim for in promoting and financing high-profile projects. But what is meant by transformation? Criteria on the list might include a positive change in perception *and* consequences of an area or district transformed in multiple dimensions: in public recognition and change of habit, in economic and investment activity, in residential desirability, on a trajectory of growth versus stagnation and decline. The processes by which transformation takes hold in an urban area often seem elusive, incapable of being defined by formula. Yet the preconditions fostering transformations appear to arise from a confluence of social and economic forces, shifting consumer tastes, and emergent cultural values. In considering the ways in which transformation appears to happen, we offer four approaches, including identification of projects successful in effectuating urban transformation:

First: <u>Revitalization by refurbishing a symbolic legacy, icon/brand</u>. Historical entertainment venues typically reflect this approach—42nd Street and Times Square (New York); Hollywood and Highlands project, location of the landmark theater that has been home to the annual Academy Awards ceremony (Hollywood, California); Coney Island amusement park (Brooklyn, NY); and the retro baseball stadia, including the oft-cited Camden Yards (Baltimore), Coors Field (Denver), and Jacobs Field and Gund Arena comprising Gateway Project (Cleveland).

Second: <u>Planned interventions manifesting themselves in two approaches</u>: Ground-up new development or redevelopment that seeks to redirect city growth where market is unlikely to take it, fostered and supported by public sector investment of new social, physical, and/or institutional infrastructure. Typically, these are large-scale interventions; some like Canary Wharf (London), LaDefense (Paris), and Battery Park City (New York) pioneer new locations, while others literally create new development ground as in the decking over of the rail tracks in Manhattan to create Park Avenue in the early part of the twentieth century or the land filling operation that created the Back Bay neighborhood of Boston in the mid-nineteenth century. Another intervention approach is focused on the conversion of in-place industrial facilities into new uses, often some combination of entertainment, or tourism. Location is a given, in these cases of entertainment development, not a choice, where the public strategy focuses on allocating substantial resources to build necessary infrastructure for market change. Examples of this type include SteelStacks (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania), Battersea Power Station (London), Kansas City Power & Light District (Kansas City, Missouri).

Third: Market harvest of social change,. This type of transformation, often labeled organic change or referred to as Natural Cultural Districts when talking about the arts (Stern and Seifert 2007), may be spontaneous and the result of incremental activity, such as the emergence of SoHo in New York, where the regulatory response followed the market (Zukin 1982). It may also result from systematic and pioneering private investment as was the case with the emergence of South Beach in Miami following early investments made by the-late Tony Goldman, a visionary long-term investor who understood how arts and preservation could transform the grittiest neighborhoods (Pristin 2010, Kaufman 2012), or the gentrification of older off-the-trend track areas of cities following the creation of boutique hotels by Ian Schrager (Bagli 1998).

Fourth: Creation of de novo place destinations responsive to changing social norms and culture where location is a choice. This is the build-it-and-they-will-come approach (Disneyland; large-scale integrated sports and entertainment venues—L.A. Live! Amsterdam ArenA), an approach that can favor suburban or urban periphery areas where large tracks of vacant or underutilized land may be readily available and dislocation of existing residents and businesses may be minimal (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003).

A Typology for Entertainment Concentrations

Entertainment is a key component, if not central strategy, in establishing urban identities, reinvigorating undesirable places, protecting historical legacies, rescuing failing high-profile projects, and attracting private-sector investment. Modern planning movements from City Beautiful and Municipal Art to Urban Renewal and "Back-to-the-City" campaigns have all sought to leverage, capture, and promote individual or collective preferences for entertainment by including a mix of art, natural history and science, gambling, gaming, shopping, sports, eating, drinking, and commercial entertainment. Municipal and civic leaders have done so as a way to build economies, replace lost industries, remake place, attract residents and workers, and provide public-health benefits. Private developers have done so to create profitable projects, capitalize on nearby synergies and spillover effects, and increase the likelihood of public financing and support. The aspirations for both economic and place benefits have resulted in a number of approaches for imagining, designing, and implementing concentrations of entertainment activities. The projects themselves reflect specific sets of identities that match development interests, economic development objectives, and market realities, which we capture in a typology to showcase these differentiations.

Rationale and Approach for Typology. Planning and development scholars have analyzed specific types of entertainment projects sphere, including baseball stadiums, performing arts centers, museums, and festival markets (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Zimbalist 1997; Strom 2002; Garcia 2004; Rosentraub 2010). Others have created comprehensive lists of urban entertainment uses ranging from gaming arcades and IMAX movie theatres to water parks and resorts, or have broadly considered the role of Urban Entertainment Centers in downtown revitalization (ULI 1995, 1996, 1998; Bender 2003). To better understand how entertainment concentrations can potentially achieve place transformation, we find a typology to be most useful for unpacking different approaches and isolating key features that distinguish one approach from another, most saliently for the focus of this volume, the choice of location. We approached the task by identifying entertainment concentrations in the top 20 most populated central cities in the United States and looking for commonalities and differences across such key variables as location, economic development rationale, business motivation, and project type. When we examined these projects and reviewed their attributes we noticed a marked differentiation in how policymakers, boosters, and developers pursued an entertainment-centered agenda. The typology identifies seven entertainment-center composites: single-purpose concentration, mixed-purpose concentration, individual anchor project, enhanced retail center, neighborhood cluster, private amusement park, pop-up cluster, and public entertainment node (Exhibit 1). Although some overlap exists, the classification unveils important points we underscored earlier in the paper: market dynamics matter, public intervention can lower risk, and location choice capitalizes on competitive advantage within the center city or the broader metropolitan region.

Single-Purpose Entertainment Concentrations. Many cities choose to focus their interests and resources on one type of entertainment activity: arts, sports, casino gaming, museums. Whether part of a large redevelopment or place-transformative initiative, these types of project typically demand major capital investments and follow planning strategies that cluster activity in a spatially defined district. Spurring tourism-centered economic-base activities is the primary economic motivation; however, these concentrations often achieve a secondary goal of city center revitalization by stimulating local consumption of goods and services. The complexities of phasing, financing, and implementing such large projects often requires public-led intervention at the front-end of development but also heavy investment by private and nonprofit players. These urban projects usually take place in under-performing areas along waterfronts or light industrial and commercial areas of the urban periphery where land is relatively inexpensive, access is easy, and conditions are favorable for site assembly. Examples of both sports and arts districts can be found in many of the largest cities across the United States. One of the more pronounced illustrations is the South Philadelphia Sports Complex where professional football (Eagles), baseball (Phillies), baseball (76ers), and hockey (Flyers) teams play in three separate sports facilities (Lincoln Financial Field, Citizens Bank Park, and Wells Fargo Center) isolated by parking lots and access to public transit. Lincoln Center on the Upper West Side in New York, home to several performing arts venues, small theatres, and arts schools amid residential neighborhoods, universities, and major parks is often viewed as the first attempt to explicitly cluster the arts as part of a revitalization effort (Sagalyn 2008). The States of Maryland, Louisiana, and Rhode Island, among others, have also passed cultural economic development policy to initiate municipal revitalization via tax breaks and incentives for arts districts (Maryland State Arts Council 2012; Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism 2012; Rhode Island State Council on the Arts 2012).

Mixed-Purpose Entertainment Concentrations. Increasingly, cities are moving from focusing on a single entertainment activity to a mix of entertainment uses. These mixed-purpose entertainment concentrations combine arts, sports, museums, commercial theatres, casinos, and amusements as part of a cluster, district, or complex as a way to draw a wider audience. These large format projects are often adjacent to hotels, convention centers, and nightlife venues, offering opportunities for entertainment activity to capitalize on nearby synergies and create spillover effects. They also can serve dual roles: supporting a tourism, export-driven agenda but also prioritizing urban place-making and sustainable development as a way to draw residents and commercial activity by providing amenities, 24-7 informal and planned programming, and access to urban infrastructure and resources. Caution, however, is an important by-word for this strategy: Creating a critical mass for concentrated commercial entertainment activity is not always easy, especially in smaller cities. Mixed-purpose projects tend to be located in similar areas as single-purpose entertainment concentrations for many of the same reasons, though these public-led interventions often turn into complex public-private partnerships because public financing is often necessary to enhance feasibility, execution is complex, and unknown market dynamics increase project risk. In many cases, mixed-purpose projects are central to revitalization strategies and have become fields of specialized planning and activity centers in their own right.

This paper addresses two of the more high-profile mixed-purpose entertainment projects namely LA Live! in downtown Los Angeles and Times Square in New York. Another example, although in a looser formation and developed in phases over a long period, is Inner Harbor and Camden Yards in Baltimore, which clusters a cross-section of uses, including sports stadia, museums and aquariums, major retail activity, and supportive development. These projects have also been a major stimulant for adjacent neighborhood waterfront redevelopment, including the transformation of Fells Point. They have also taken decades to execute. Several other cities are experimenting with these mixed-entertainment strategies that go beyond downtown-focused revitalization strategies from the postwar era. These newer and highly visible large format centers target mass audiences and are part of a multi-phase, multi-decade effort that require significant private sector investment to take off.

Individual Anchor Projects. Many cities do not pursue a single or mixed-purpose strategy of clustering similar entertainment activities; rather, they focus on an individual project that may or may not be part of a larger redevelopment effort. These single-site anchors or complexes include casinos, museums, performing art centers, or sports stadia (Birch 2010). The spatial and financing patterns vary depending upon entertainment type; art anchors tend to be more tied to the urban core and periphery, while sports tend to be footloose, freer to pursue greenfield or suburban locations (New York Giants in East Rutherford, New Jersey or Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas) due to attractive incentive packages, cheap and available land, intra and inter-regional competition to attract franchises and expansion teams, new stadium demands, freeway access, and limited need for center city agglomeration benefits. Individual anchor projects are primarily public-led but the type and scale of intervention changes with entertainment use. Moreover, the politics of developing a nonprofit arts anchor differs materially from what tends to characterize sports, gambling, and commercial arts entertainment. Here caution is also called for: Many of the projects on their own may not have a net benefit but function as a loss leader, which is one reason there is a momentum to tie these anchors into large redevelopment strategies (Nunn and Rosentraub 1997; Zimbalist 1997; Sanders 2002; Markusen and Johnson 2006).

Anchor projects are increasingly shuffling locations within the urban core as a way to support large-scale redevelopment efforts, to expand or build new facilities, or to increase audience and consumer bases (Birch 2010). Baseball's San Diego Padres moved from the city fringe to Petco Field in downtown to help catalyze redevelopment. Coors Field in Denver was part of an effort to revive the historic LoDo and warehouse neighborhoods, while National Stadium in Washington, D.C. was championed as an initiative to anchor a new residential and commercial neighborhood as part of the Anacostia riverfront development endeavor (Cooper 2013). The Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis, Arena Stage in Washington D.C., and Sugar Casino along the Delaware River in Philadelphia are central to master plans for redeveloping underperforming urban peripheral areas. The Woodruff Arts Center in Midtown Atlanta and the Brooklyn Art Museum in Prospect Park, although not in the urban commercial core, have recently engaged in strategies to expand their impact from tourism hubs to centers of place-making and revitalization.

Enhanced Retail Centers. Decades of mass decentralization of people and industry from the center cities to suburban areas have pushed municipal officials and a handful of maverick developers to experiment with ways to bring retail back to the core (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). In turn, facing stiffer competition, suburban retail developers in the U.S. have sought to reinvigorate their business models to reflect changing consumer preferences for shopping and shopping locations. Enhanced retail centers emerged from these trends; they are marketed places that, in addition to shopping services, also provide consumers entertainment experiences, including live performances, commercial cinemas, IMAX theatres, arcades, and themed restaurants as a way to prolong visits and increase retail sales. Common names for these places include regional malls, festival markets, mega malls, and lifestyle centers. Unlike the previously types, these are primarily market-initiated, but include instances where developers partner with public entities for favorable financing, planning, and governing terms.

Typically, these projects are internally focused, although there is some experimentation with residential and commercial development as is the case with Belmar in Lakewood, Colorado where Denver-based Continuum Partners developed a new suburban town center on the former site of failed shopping area. The New Urbanist neighborhood used the arts as the centralizing feature to enhance retail branding and the live/work identity of the project. Their largest arts tenant, The Laboratory of Arts and Ideas, curated by Adam Lerner eventually merged with the Museum of Contemporary Art in downtown Denver but several smaller gallery and work spaces remain in the suburban town center (Gougeon 2010). For enhanced retail centers, the scale of project often determines site location: regional malls (e.g. Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota or King of Prussia Mall outside of Philadelphia) are in suburban green/grayfields or edge cities; compact or targeted urban malls and lifestyle centers are often in commercial core (The Plaza in Towner Centre in Jacksonville, Florida or Denver Pavilions along 16th Street Mall), and festival malls are often in historic sites or public or quasi-public spaces (Pike Place Market in Seattle or Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston).

Neighborhood Clusters. Some of the most famous or high-profile entertainment concentrations are in urban neighborhoods, and unlike the super-sized centers and developments previously mentioned, these projects embody a fine-grained mix of small-scale primarily commercial entertainment uses with restaurants, bars, music venues, art exhibition space, small theatres, and neighborhood retail. Distinct from the isolated project, neighborhood clusters typically are part of a historic or older urban fabric where there is a meshing of neighborhood residents, local visitors, and national and international tourists. The principle economic motivation varies between export-based tourism, local consumption, and neighborhood economic development. More often than not, these are market interventions with state and local economic development bodies supporting these existing organic hubs through tax incentives, district designation, and marketing support.

High-profile clusters include Beale Street in Memphis and Bourbon Street in New Orleans, but also support lower profile districts and neighborhoods that are more of a regional draw such as Williamsburg in Brooklyn, Capitol Hill in Seattle, Gordon Square Arts District in Cleveland, Station North Arts and Entertainment District in Baltimore. In many cases, policymakers and scholars point to these these neighborhoods as central to attracting knowledge workers who may be drawn to these types of distinctive places although criticism exists about the negative and equitable ramifications of such sub-area growth strategies (Mele 2001; Florida 2002; Lloyd 2005).

Private Amusement Parks. Many regions are home to private amusement parks where visitors pay to access a gated or secured cluster of themed attractions, live performances, themed entertainment, and themed restaurants and rides. They are located in a wide range of areas from larger metropolitan cities (e.g. Six Flags in Denver, Colorado) to isolated suburban and rural development (e.g. Valley Fair in Shakopee, Minnesota) due to evolving market trends and consumer preferences, different programmatic profiles and site requirements, varying needs for transportation access and infrastructure, and inter regional competition for economic development. In the United States, these tourist sites are market-initiated developments that range from isolated, entertainment-only amusements to mini-private, gated cities with hotels, convention centers, and retail shops.

Disneyland, Walt Disney World, Euro Disney, Tivoli Gardens, Dollywood, Six Flags, Universal Studios, Sea World, Europa Park, and Beijing Shijingshan Amusement Park are all illustrations of this particular type. Beyond the classic cases, developers have also marketed their entertainment product as a way to sell other real estate investments in master-planned neighborhoods, such as the case with the well-documented 1993 development of Celebration, Florida by the Disney Development Company. Built on wetlands, the New Urbanist-influenced master planned community marketed the suburban experience as ''a place that takes you back to that time of innocence" (Goodnough 2004). The 5,000-acre mixed-use product has been heavily criticized for its negative environmental impacts but mostly for its elite, homogenous, and inauthentic nature, giving fuel to critics of "Disneyfication" of place (Stutzman 1991; Zukin 1996; Blair 2001; James 2012). In other cases, commercial and residential development has grown around once-isolated parks due to regional growth patterns, which raises the question: How can these private, gated arrangements become integrated into the broader urban or suburban fabric?

Public Entertainment Nodes. Unlike private amusement parks, public entertainment nodes offer open or free access to clusters of live entertainment, themed entertainment, amusements, exhibition space, or restorative design. While there may be fees for using particular elements (e.g. rides, observation decks), visitors are free to choose to observe, engage, or partake in entertainment activities or in the theatre city life discussed earlier in the paper. These nodes usually evolve on publicly owned, managed, operated, financed, or administered land, although the public sector may have private or nonprofit partnerships or franchise arrangements with vendors, land owners, unions, exhibitors, or others.

Public amusement parks, fairgrounds, open space, and parkland are the common sites in urban core, urban periphery, suburban, and rural areas. While they have usually been part of tourism-centered strategies, they are increasingly used to catalyze private-sector investment and as a strategy to create place. Examples include Coney Island in Brooklyn, South Street SeaPort in Lower Manhattan, Fair Park on the outskirts of Dallas, San Antonio Riverwalk, Millennium Park and the Navy Pier in downtown Chicago. These illustrations demonstrate the ways that these public entertainment nodes operate across a range of places within city life, from more isolated projects to integrated activities creating different ways of place-making and place identity for tourists, residents, and passerbys.

Pop-Up Clusters. Outside of entertainment-oriented projects or facilities that become a permanent or semi-permanent part of the built environment, there are also temporary nodes of increased activity. These pop-up clusters are part of a larger flux movement happening in urban, suburban, rural, and wildland communities, which transcends the physical or built environment through planned or impromptu programming and activity (Hack 2011). As impermanent concentrations, they take over a single site or an accumulation of scattered or connected sites for a temporary period time ranging from a few hours to a few years. Pop-up events can accommodate diverse forms of entertainment—music, film, and art festivals, for example—as well as being concentrated in a single site or dispersed throughout the city. Social media is making pop-up events an increasingly common entertainment format. Typically market-initiated spurts, they can attract large numbers of tourists; however, the economic impact varies depending upon whether spillover occurs, if the promoters and vendors are locally-based, and if the municipality has negotiated good terms for their services and land.

Some of the more common pop-up clusters include South by Southwest in Austin, Bonnaroo Music Festival in Tennessee, Jazzfest and Mardi Gras in New Orleans, Treefort Music Festival in Boise, Fringe Festival in Philadelphia, and Burning Man in the Utah desert. These pop-up clusters occur on single sites, within district and corridors, on multi-acre green space, or in deserted natural areas as places for performance art, large-scale public art, temporary cities, and, entertainment clusters. The ability to access or participate varies depending upon event, location, and promoter. Other examples include large-scale public art installations, such as Christo's project, "The Gates", in Central Park or the Chicago Loop Alliance's 2012 commission of Jessica Stockholder's "Color Jam," which creates a three dimensional color splash on building and streets along State Street in downtown Chicago. These types of projects become transitory entertainment centers by bringing new audiences or engaging everyday users to targeted locations as a way to transform place and ideas. The same idea can also underscore the authors' previous comments about the spontaneity and diversity of city or urban life making the urban experience itself, a transitory entertainment center. Possibilities exist for this to also happen in suburban or peripheral areas as they become more diverse or provide a different set of transitory entertainment activities, especially in the case of enhance retail centers.

Guiding Themes

Our typology of entertainment concentrations underscores the importance of taking a long view since these projects are often part of a multi-year discussion among municipal officials and planners about place and economic development. Classifying entertainment centers allows for greater insight on how cities are pursuing an entertainment-driven agenda not only to stimulate economic growth but to transform place. Overall, the typology underscores three large themes related to historical legacy, location segmentation, and development effort.

First, many of the entertainment concentrations are located in areas with a strong historical tie to an embedded community memory. As former ports, rail hubs, commercial centers, community gathering spaces, or fair sites, these places were once part of the city's economic, social, or civic dynamism. They are key markers of how places evolve and the challenges and opportunities that come with shifts in time. Capital disinvestment, failed urban renewal projects, shifting public priorities, new residential preferences, and demographic changes turned these areas into underperforming, outdated, or vacant areas of placeless and inactivity. In other cases, some clusters have retained their entertainment function but their vibrancy or use has diminished due to changing consumer preferences for entertainment. The legacy of place, however, is not exclusive to the urban or urban periphery; it is also represented in suburban or lower density areas, particularly when considering failed or underperforming retail areas.

Second, location choice is highly segmented, although further analysis would provide greater insight. By and large, urban entertainment centers are located in the central city, although this is changing somewhat depending upon project scale, entertainment mix, and increasing across-the-board interest in urbanizing and retrofitting suburban areas. Project sites are chosen and allocated based on public policy objectives, market forces, and fit with project design. There is also significant shuffling and shifting within the central core as planning priorities and private markets change. This movement transcends the common dynamic or conversation that pits the center city against the undeveloped fringe or that pits the core against neighborhoods.

Finally, despite the differences among the composites, the typology underscores the complexity and time it takes to create urban entertainment centers. This does not change whether it is a publicly-planned project or a organic formation driven by market interest. The memory of place, the pace of development, and the capacity of private entities, institutions, and community members all influence the extent that place and or physical transformation can occur.

Multi-Purpose Concentrations in the Core and Urban Periphery: What Makes for Success?

Lessons from Times Square

Entertainment was a second-attempt strategy in the playbook for cleaning up the Deuce, as West 42nd in Street in Times Square was commonly called. The transformation succeeded only after years of controversy and conflict killed the first plan that sought to eradicate the sleaze and porn of the district. The city's policy goal was complex on several levels. As a physical transformation, the twenty-year saga began in the early 1980s. To transform the Deuce, the city entered into a coalition with the state and formed a single-purpose entity, the 42nd Street Development Project (42DP), which was charged with the mandate of engaging developers in a series of public-private partnerships. As a social transformation, the project promised to clear away the depraved social pathology of the place—the "bad" uses—and put in place "good" uses: new commercial activity at either end of the block and renovated historic theaters for Broadway fare in the midblock (Figure 1). As a cultural transformation, commercial activities attractive to the middle class would replace the sex-and-drug bazaar that had earned the street a worldwide reputation for decades. By the end of the 1980s, the effort was at a stalemate, bogged down by litigation and entrapped in a real estate downturn. By the mid-1990s, economic and social forces had recast the long-running pessimistic prognosis for the project. As activity on the street shifted from drug dealing, prostitution, and pornography to legitimate theater, family entertainment, tourism, and office employment, ironies of change defined the transformation. As seen from afar, the transformation signaled not merely a new 42nd Street, but redemption of New York's image as a "big, bad city."

Nothing really went according to plan, for either public officials or private developers. Rather, a complex dynamic between planning and politics recast the initial intentions of the 42DP and as market forces changed altered the course of revitalization in Times Square. Symbolism too became a mediating force among contending, fractious interests in shaping the future fabric of a public place that had become an icon, its associations—garish commercialism, spectacular signage, cultural diversity, and social tolerance—firmly embedded deep into the city's psyche. More than the city's center for entertainment, more than a commercial marketplace capable of satisfying diverse consumer needs, Times Square a repository of a special type of accumulated social capital (Sagalyn 2001).

At First, Rhetoric

The "revitalization of 42nd Street as a theater and entertainment center" featured front and center in all of the earliest planning documents for the redevelopment project, but the rhetoric of the initial plans put in place did not match the reality of resources dedicated to the task. The task of recreating the street's historic entertainment focus presented a daunting programmatic and economic challenge. The 1980s would turn out to be one of the worst for the theater industry. "Urban entertainment," the concept that clusters of activity devoted to middle-class recreation could flourish in cities, had yet to see its moniker in lights. And movie uses—widely associated with what had made the street a mess—were not allowed under the terms of the deals approved by the city's then ruling legislative body; the RFP did not prohibit "film" uses per se, but the big fear, pushed mainly by private developers, was that movie theaters would turn West 42nd Street back to pornography. These factors conspired against the success of a market-driven commercial strategy for theater preservation, and relying upon private developers to fill out this portion of the plan could not possibly alter the reality. City and state officials were making decisions for the theaters but the detailed economics of how theater revitalization would actually work were missing.

Though the city's goal was genuinely conceived, its initial execution was seriously flawed and crippled by the narrowness of what theater preservation meant at the time—"live" Broadway-like productions—abetted by a policy decision that commercial use of the theaters should prevail over other ways to preserve the structures. Entertainment in the most general sense was not encouraged. The programmatic guidelines did not encourage movie theaters or nightclubs, rehearsal space, or stages for dance and music (except Broadway musicals), yet these were indispensable elements of what has made New York a center for the arts. The plan, according to one critic, did not add up to a coherent theater or entertainment district" (Russell 1984, 131). A more politically forthright assessment would have concluded that the theater "plan" amounted only to compensatory symbolism.

After nearly a decade of plans, protests and controversies over the city's vision to transform 42nd Street, the effort reached a stalemate, bogged down by litigation and entrapped in a downturn of the real estate cycle. The question of whether it was possible to execute a large-scale transformation of Times Square seemed to have been answered in the negative. Not that many years later, however, opportunity born out of overbuilding, coincident with a shift in tastes favorable to cities, fused with a new entertainment-oriented vision for the street. It represented a rare second chance for planning a transformation of naughty, bawdy, 42nd Street.

Entertainment Takes Center Stage, Finally

A good-time place that belongs to everybody: democratic, freewheeling, hedonistic. A mix of high and low culture, theater, popular entertainment. An experience for consumers, tourists, families. An aesthetic cacophony of contradictory styles, scales and materials, honky-tonk diversity. Brash bold signage and glitz, unabashedly commercial. These were the set pieces for rescripting the project. The task began in earnest in mid-1991, went public in concept in the fall of 1992, and then formally debuted a year later. Defined first as “interim,” *42nd Street Now!* put forth a dramatically different plan of uses calibrated to restore “New York’s quintessential entertainment district”—without conceding an inch of ground over the office towers that remained a major part of the long-term redevelopment scheme. In concept, visual imagery, and language, the plan revealed a shift in values so clear and so starling that a certain level of disbelief and skepticism accompanied the general enthusiasm with which it was greeted. After The Walt Disney Company committed to restoring The New Amsterdam Theater as its New York venue for legitimate theater, a cartoon in the *New Yorker* “Fantasy: The New Forty-Second Street?” captured the inescapable irony of such an improbable transformation of planning values [See Figure 2].

To succeed with this second chance at transformation, the 42DP’s president, Rebecca Robertson, would have to aggressively market the vision—not something planners are typically called upon to do—and shepherd the plan through various approvals to ensure that would assure its implementation. The goal of the design-driven conceptual plan was to recreate the street’s legendary luster, with razzle-dazzle honky-tonk details.[3] If as an entertainment venue West 42nd Street today

[3] It would take more than two years to line up all the pieces before Robertson could orchestrate the formal presentation of *42nd Street Now!* For earlier changes to the program requiring amendments to the *General Project Plan*, an Environment Assessment had been sufficient, procedurally. But the scope and direction of change embedded in the new plan finally put it over the top; the Environmental Impact Statement would have to be completely redone, which would be time-intensive and costly. Not unexpectedly, the new entertainment and tourist-oriented agenda of the plan garnered strong support from the performing-arts community, once their greatest fear—competition from additional legitimate-theater entertainment—had been assuaged. Though many New Yorkers continued to voice dislike of the idea of inventing a new Times Square, preferring the gritty and sinful place of the past, a spectacle characterized by unusual street life, the intense clash of values that generated so

seems too conventional—a nostalgia-oriented place packed with thirty-eight movie screens, a wax museum, four Broadway theaters, and lots of restaurants and retail activity centers, the problem stems from the political exigencies of the rescripted plan, *42nd Street Now!* Driven by an immediate need to bring forth a new vision for the street after the project had collapsed along with the market for commercial development, the plan relied almost exclusively on visual aesthetics, in contrast to outlining a provocative program for innovative content. It was part of a process geared to rebuilding political support for the controversial project through new but comfortably safe images evocative of Times Square's symbolic legacy, carefully and professionally supported by intensely detailed design guidelines. As a political document, the new vision aimed to heal controversy, rebuild anew a coalition of support, and market a set of hopes that, at the time, seemed almost improbable. The plan was not a content-driven call for innovative programming that aimed to cultivate way-out, cutting-edge entertainments; rather, the visual razzle dazzle of the images sought to assure key decision makers in government and business and, most importantly, the civics, that the 42DP was now firmly aligned with the historic symbolism of Times Square.

Lessons Learned

The new Times Square is a "made dynamic." It is not an accident. It is an invention, yet an invention that remains synonymous with the city itself, its commercialism, intense energy, urban insouciance, and cultural and economic diversity. It came into reality as a product of public-private collaboration and mutual risk-taking. Through its special institutional arrangements, the public sector was able to assemble land, manage redevelopment of the thirteen acres through a discretionary zoning framework, negotiate a financial deal that incentivized private developers with generous tax abatements and density bonuses, and manage the politics of development and its inevitable opposition from various

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much conflict over the first plan was gone because the new plan no longer fought with the street's historic identity.

special interests. For its part, private developers financed the costs of acquiring the majority of land needed to redevelop the site and protect the historic midblock theaters, a most unusual and unprecedented (and controversial) arrangement, invested the hundreds of millions to develop the transformative commercial uses of the project area, and contributed relatively small dollars to the provision of public benefits for the area.

The 42DP story offers compelling lessons about the possibilities and limits of executing an ambitious transformation of place. As a baseline condition, it takes patience and perseverance to make things happen. Second, with skill and sensitivity to the legacy of place, it is possible for cities to reshape what the market is likely to deliver, but plans for transformation of well-known districts that build on history and iconic memories must be consistent with the symbolic, if not literal, legacy of place. Third, opposition is not always a negative force; it sometimes makes for a better project. That is, planners do not always get it right on the first plan. Large ambitious transformative projects like the 42DP often succeed only as opposition and alternative visions get factored into the political calculus of change and the evolution of market acceptability. Last, but certainly not least and often underestimated and sometimes forgotten in the storyline of success, leaders—the people and their personal drive—make things happen apart from market and political forces and institutional context.

Lessons from L.A. Live!

Decentralized, sprawling and auto-centric, Los Angeles is often portrayed as something less than a city. In writings about the spread-out metropolis, urbanists of many stripes have widely critiqued, scorned, and satirized the place as not really being a place, in no small part because of its decentralized pattern of settlement and lack of a strong central business district. Its physical form, laced with endless ribbons of freeways, has inspired grounded and abstract works on urban theory, form and design (Scott and Soja 1998). In popular media and peer-reviewed scholarly articles, information abounds about the diminishing regional role of this West Coast central city and the impact of sprawl (Giuliano and Small 1991, Davis 1990, Scott and Soja 1998, Ewing 1997, Kotkin 2011). Notwithstanding these mainstream and scholarly sentiments, which may be too simplistic and overlook sub-local patterns of urban development, policymakers and planners have for decades continued to put forth ideas about how to strengthen the urban core and reinvent the image of downtown. Two of the city's largest and most recent initiatives, LA Live! and the Grand Avenue Project are vivid examples of reinvention ideas put into practice through complex public-private arrangements (Slatin 2010). Undertaken in the face of opposing urban forces, each is an attempt to fulfill the ambitions of LA's center city redevelopment strategy: "to create a modern, efficient and balanced urban environment; to create a symbol of pride and identity which gives the center city a strong image as the major center of the LA region; and to further the development of downtown as the major center of the metro region" (Redevelopment Plan for the City Center Redevelopment Project 2002, 2).

As the center of Hollywood and historic movie-making in the United States, LA has an obvious competitive economic advantage in arts and entertainment industries. The region houses vast entertainment assets in commercial film and music, commercial fashion design, and nonprofit performing and visual arts (Markusen and Johnson 2006, Currid and Williams 2010) built up over many decades. In short, it and has accumulated the type of economic, social, and cultural infrastructure essential for continuous creation of entertainment. For this reason alone, the city's efforts to back entertainment clusters as a means of sparking place-based transformation seem organic, true to its cultural DNA. Public, private, and civic groups have aggressively leveraged this industrial advantage through cultural, urban planning, and economic development policies despite concerns over the problems with tourism as a central strategy for growth (Eisinger 2000). Timothy Leiweke, President of Anschutz Entertainment Groups (AEG), underscored this competitive advantage when making the case for public subsidy for LA Live!: "Award shows, tourism and content are going to be the most important industries we have. We're not going to be the steel city, we're not going to be the chip city, we're not going to be the new technology city" (Barrett 2005, a).

LA Live! is one of two signature projects in downtown that seek to capitalize on this competitive advantage. The Grand Avenue Project, also a mega mixed-use retail, residential, and commercial development, is another priority, and it is in close physical proximity to the case at hand. Located at the northern edge of downtown, the Grand Avenue Project reinforces connections between historic Bunker Hill and the government-based Civic Center through arts and entertainment. It aims to capitalize on the concentration of highbrow traditional arts institutions designed by star architects arrayed along the corridor, including the Walt Disney Concert Hall, the County of Los Angeles Performing Arts Complex, the Museum of Contemporary, and the new Broad Museum. Dubbed the "corner of art and commerce," the Grand Avenue project is regaining momentum with the 2012 opening of the Grand Park element of the project following the halt in activity brought about by the 2008 economic crisis.

LA Live! differs from the Grand Avenue Project in several important ways. First, rather than focusing purely on performing and visual arts, it builds off the success of other entertainment offerings, including, professional sports and the legendary Los Angeles Lakers. Committed to the theme of commercial entertainment with mass appeal, LA Live! programs mainstream concerts, movies, and major events. Second, while the region historically has a marked competitive advantage in arts and entertainment, this district *has not historically housed or programmed* these activities. LA Live! is a wholly invented development endeavor built from scratch on a hodgepodge of parcels that formerly housed automobile dealerships, industrial uses, parking lots, and some affordable residential housing. The underused and isolated site was attractive to developers not because it had a strong entertainment presence, but because it embodied the basic components for a mega-project of this kind: freeway access, cheap and abundant land, and extensive municipal support. In both of these cases, the planning goal has been to create or strengthen place.

The story of LA Live!, a large-format entertainment center at the southern end of downtown, illustrates how one city expanded a tourist-based strategy of economic development to transform the physical identity of downtown making it one of "the biggest private developments in Los Angeles history" (Hawthorne 2010). The case offers insight into the challenges of re-fashioning a sizable chunk of underutilized urban land through high-risk public investment. These ventures are risky in no small part because multi-purpose entertainment strategies built from scratch are experimental in nature and may need to amend past planning mistakes to stand a chance of reinventing place.

The Basics

LA Live! is a $2.5-billion complex situated between the Financial and South Park Districts in downtown Los Angeles, cushioned near the interchange between Harbor (I-110) and Santa Monica (I-10) freeways. The eye-catching development on the edge of the core periphery consists of a 7,000-seat concert theatre (Nokia Theatre), 4,000-seat multiplex theater (Regal Cinemas), 3,000-person ballroom, and a 40,000-square-foot open plaza with retail and smaller venues. City officials and boosters champion the "miniature Times Square" or "Times Square West" as one of several reinvention projects in downtown (Daunt 2001; Williams 2010). The complex sits adjacent to the city-owned Convention Center and the AEG-owned STAPLES Center, where the legendary Los Angeles Lakers and Kings play. Tightly clustered within a 6-block area, these different entertainment venues concentrate mainstream attractions—professional sports, commercial music, and live theatre entertainment—to strengthen the city's base as a tourism capital and enliven a seemingly poorly used and poorly designed space in the process.

Arena Land Company (now AEG), owner of the STAPLES Center, proposed the concept for LA Live!, and approached the City for assistance in establishing a formalized plan that would help enliven a "desolate" part of downtown (Daunt 2001). To execute the joint public-private vision for LA Live!, the city in 2001 created the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District (LASED), a special-purpose planning district, as a way to enhance synergies between existing and proposed facilities. The plan laid out the boundaries, specified land use, detailed desired entertainment mix, and provided design and signage guidelines (City of Los Angeles 2001). Bounded by Olympia Boulevard to the north, Flower Street to the east, Pico Boulevard to the south, and 110 freeway with scattered sites on Olympic Boulevard between Georgia Street and Francisco Street, the 27-acre LASED is part of the South Park and Convention Center districts, two of the nine officially recognized planning districts in the central city along with Bunker Hill, Little Tokyo, Civic Center, Central City East, South Markets, Historic Core, and the Financial Core (Figure 3). The original concept plan for the district called for 5.5 million square feet of development, including 1.65 million square feet of hotel and ballroom facilities; 790,000 square feet of retail/ entertainment/and restaurants, 250,000 square feet of new convention center space, 250,000 square feet for office space, 2.5 million square feet of residential, and 120,000 square feet of cinema (LASED 2001; Central City Community Plan, date unknown, I-7).

In less than a decade, the multi-phase development district has slowly filled in despite the economic recession; in addition to the city-owned Convention Center and AEG-owned STAPLES Center, it now houses AEG-owned hotel and condominium projects (Marriott and Ritz Carlton), broadcasting studios for ESPN, Grammy Museum, and several shops and restaurants. Several other new and expansion projects are also underway, including a proposed AEG-owned football stadium on public land and a newly renovated convention center. AEG, in 2010, also expressed interest in developing the last empty parcel in the district, referred to as the 2.2. acre Olympic North sub-area, which they tapped for two separate projects: "a 600,000-square foot office, studio, and production facility; and the other for a 300,000-square foot, 275-key hotel, with up to 65 luxury residences" (Planning Record 2010). AEG also sold several of their properties in the adjacent South Park district for residential development (Planning Record 2010).

The "Big White Elephant"

The public sector's zeal for L.A. Live! stemmed from past failure. As did many cities in the urban renewal era, Los Angeles, in 1971, publicly financed the construction of a 900,000-square-foot downtown Convention Center on South Figueroa Street and Pico Boulevard near the interchange of the Harbor and Santa Monica Freeways. Policymakers and civic boosters bet that a single anchor institution would draw additional private investment in the form of hotels, entertainment venues, retail outlets, and other tourism services. However, private markets did not follow and the convention center sat isolated and under-programmed and left the city holding a hefty obligation for $30 million in annual debt service with no obvious way to pay off its $460-million loan (Barrett 2005b). Democratic Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa referred to the burdensome public facility as an "albatross that is choking the lifeblood out of the financial condition of the city" (Barrett 2005b).

Politically, policymakers were hard pressed to make a case to the public for pumping more money into the area. They had to justify using limited public resources to subsidize an underperforming public facility. They had to contend with citizens who argued that "saving" the project would hurt nearby Hispanic, low-income neighborhoods by displacing low income or working class neighborhood inhabitants. They had to confront concern over negative environmental impacts associated with traffic congestion, public safety, and light pollution. They had to make the case that investing in downtown did not mean the city was ignoring community priorities or other parts of the city. They had to avert legal challenges contesting the city's intervention in private market activity. To jump all these hurdles, their strategies were complex and controversial, ranging from approving a community-benefits agreement to advocating for changes in State law that would shorten the process for the California Environmental Quality Act-mandated Environment Impact Review. The city justified its actions as necessary steps to develop an undevelopable area.

High-Risk Market Intervention

To recover from previous bad or ill-planned public investments in the "white elephant," the city entered into several, independent public-private partnerships for specific projects within the LASED District. Public officials and policymakers believed that they had to provide extraordinary public resources in order to change sub-area market dynamics and to relieve the city of its fiscal obligations. In 2005, Lew Wolff, an early hotel development partner who eventually backed out of the project, said, "[This hotel project would] force success downtown...The city, Anschutz, Hilton, ourselves are trying to make something that wouldn't happen in the nature course of economic events" (Barrett 2005c). Private investors argued that the district could not undergo conversion without extensive and ongoing public investment.

AEG and the city, previous partners on the STAPLES Center, were the primary players in the development of L.A. Live! and the surrounding district. AEG brought extensive management and development experience in commercial arts and sports entertainment, and it also had significant investment in the district—owning land, facilities, and sport teams. The city brought to the table public financing, land use condemnation power and regulatory control, and it directed significant public resources to the district in the form of publicly backed bonds, tax abatements, land gifts, generous leasing fees, and permitting and inspection waivers for various projects (Rosentrabu 2010).

Two of the city's biggest and most powerful contributions came in the way of establishing the previously discussed Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District, and in helping finance hotel development where the latter had been one primary reason cited for the failed convention center. In 2005, the City Council and Community Redevelopment Authority agreed to provide a $16-million below-market rate loan for hotel construction, $10 million in street and infrastructure improvements, $270 million in tax breaks on bed-tax revenues over 25 years, and $4 million in fee and inspection waivers (Barrett 2005b, Barrett 20005c). The deal was highly controversial because of the cost, the favoritism towards certain developers, and the way that the government was intervening in private markets (Orlov

2005). In addition, hotel development was slow to start over several years due to the difficulty in finding equity partners, in securing financing, and dealing with the rising costs of construction (Barrett 2005d, 2005e). In one example of the development hardships, AEG lost several potential equity partners, including Wolff's Apollo Real Estate Advisors and billionaire philanthropist Eli Broad's KB Homes, due to the economic crisis and rising cost of construction. Eventually, AED and the city financed the project independently, and they secured Marriott International and Ritz Carlton to operate the 54-story hotel and condominium development (Laidman and Orlov 2006; Orlov 2006; Orlov 2007). In the midst of the problems with the hotel, L.A. Live! broke ground in 2005 with its first project, the Nokia Theatre.

Despite the hard times brought on by the brewing economic crisis and the difficulties of financing the hotel, L.A. Live! survived and its three phases are complete. For the first phase, Nokia Theatre and Nokia Plaza opened in 2007. In the second phase beginning in 2009, several small shops, restaurants, and entertainment venues opened along with the Grammy Museum and the ESPAN West Coast Broadcasting Center. The third phase ending in 2010 culminated with the opening of a commercial movie theatre, two hotels, and high-end residence, including The Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Los Angeles, the JW Marriott Los Angeles L.A. LIVE and The Ritz-Carlton Residences at L.A. LIVE (L.A. Live 2013).

Over the past few years, the City has continued to support L.A. Live! through a series of controversial decisions, including authorizing permits for new advertising signage in 2009, by agreeing to help build a new professional football stadium in 2012, and by backing Governor's Brown decision to cut the environmental impact review process for the football stadium (Wilson and Reston 2009; Hoag 2011; Markazi 2012 a, 2012b).

The proposed stadium project, across the street from L.A. Live! is simultaneously a complementary entertainment venue, an infill project in terms of the micro-urban fabric of the district, and a controversial public investment. To advance the "downtown's new showpiece," AEG and the City Council entered into a nonbinding agreement whereby AEG would demolish the West Wing of the

Convention Center along with two parking garages to make way for a new sports facility (Modestil 2011). In exchange, AEG would lease the city-owned land under the stadium and pay fair market value in rent, which would provide a revenue stream for the city to pay off the $275-million loan for the expansion of convention center. The City Council again stepped in to help finance the project yet claimed that no public money was on the line because they would use off-budgeting financing mechanisms. They approved $195 million and $80 million in Series A revenue and Series B Mello-Roos bonds; the former, officials argued, would be paid off from AED's 55-year land lease, facility activity taxes, parking revenues, and construction sales tax, while the latter would be paid off directly by AEG, and would be secured by the L.A. Live! and Staples Centre properties (The Daily News of Los Angeles 2012). AEG also brought in Farmers Insurance as a $700-million naming partner (Modestil 2011). The city also supported a controversial measure by Governor Brown to help speed the development process as a way to combat an unemployment rate of 12.1 percent (The Daily News of Los Angeles 2011). Currently, the future of the field is unclear because of AEG's status and because of the difficulty in buying a football team.

AEG and the city have been full partners in the development of L.A. Live! However, the value of centralizing the risk between two key players is open for debate. The city and AEG's stakes in district success have made it possible to reinvent a large part of downtown. Critics, however, have questioned the social and environmental costs of such a strong relationship between public and private entities. The city's reliance on AEG is of particular concern because there is no assurance long-term that the goals of these two partners will always be in alignment. In fall 2012, when the entertainment giant announced plans to sell the conglomerate, including an estimated $8.5 million of its assets located in LASED, the potential issue became real. The loss of AEG as a champion for the district and the possibility of several new owners raise questions about whether the reinvention of place has grown deep enough roots to hold and if new ownership will enhance or reduce what is already in place. A key part of the answer will have to due with the strength of the contracts outlining the public-private partnership.

Reinvention and for Whom

The LASED transformation should be examined from both district and citywide goals. Without a doubt, the project invented a new place on the urban core periphery through large-scale commercial entertainment as a centralizing force. We know this by looking at images of the district and by public testimony comparing what was there before and what is there after. Yet, it unclear if whether place transformation has impacted the community beyond tourism, or even if that is a realistic expectation. To do so would require looking at the sum of downtown planning initiatives and assess whether they have moved the needle in the quest to create a more urban environment that would strengthen the core.

Part of this historic analysis is a frank discussion about the social costs of such public investment and ways to ensure equitable development as demonstrated by the gentrification controversy and resulting community benefits agreement from the Staples Center (cite articles on Figueora Corridor Collection for Economic Justice). Part of this conversation is also about authenticity and design. This highly visible project has its proponents and critics. In 2010, the real estate development group, the Urban Land Institute honored L.A. Live! with the prestigious “Global Award for Excellence” for creating a vibrant 24-hour destination, kick-starting private investment, and programming high profile events (Los Angeles Times 2010). Jury Chair, Joseph E. Brown, Group Chief Executive of AECOM in San Francisco commented, “L.A. LIVE! is a large-scale project that breaks the myth of being too big to succeed" (cite LA Live! press release). Others, including the California Development and Planning Report, referred to it as “a private enclave…a mousetrap to capture tourists [who haven’t ventured into the city proper]…a co-option of decades of planning by big money” (Stephens 2010). These are two sides of popular debate in many cities about place invention and the relationship between authenticity, city life, and good urbanism, where the goal is to make downtown “matter to [more than] civic boosters and curiosity seekers” (Ouroussof). Regardless, the entertainment-centered concentration did reinvent place but the “kind” and “quality” of place is open for debate. It is an issue that in unlikely to be settled until more time has passed and additional decisions are made about the area as a whole and how it connects to the other parts of downtown and the region. Yet, what can be discussed is what it *takes* to invent or transform a place.

Concluding Remarks

With the right conditions and with the necessary resources, the two very different cases discussed in this paper illustrate how places of entertainment were invented through transformative projects, places of attraction to residents and visitors alike not just once, but on a continuous and repeat basis. The ingredients were not alike, but the results are delivering the concentration of activity that both New York and Los Angeles wanted in the respective districts of transformation. What the cases demonstrate is the scope and intensity of effort it takes to move from purely changing the physicality of space to creating a place that is part of the social and cultural fabric of a city. In large part, invention depends on planning culture and the market conditions for development. The conclusions here highlight and reinforce the complexity of such endeavors.

First, development of large-scale entertainment venues takes an extraordinary effort and a supportive planning culture. It calls for a range of essential public *and* private elements working together: private market players willing to invest a material amount of capital; public intervention and financial investment that can change conditions on the margin through transportation infrastructure, urban amenities, and landscape architecture and urban design; and political leadership and capacity to negotiate the inevitable controversies that arise when executing on the complexities of ambitious development agendas.

Second, the newest entertainment complexes aiming to transform an area are, in essence, development experiments. There is no sure formula for assuring success. The triumph of 42nd Street Times Square builds on a world-wide iconic brand, a historic association with urban excitement and more than a century of accumulated social capital; at least nine out of ten visitors to New York visit Times Square, and the concentration of movie theaters and *ad hoc* street theater in combination with live Broadway theater continues to attract local residents. In the case L.A. Live!, the long-term results are as yet uncertain, but the prospects are encouraging. The plan has been realized with the addition of hotels, residences, music venues, museums, offices, and supportive services. Visitors have flooded the district to consume the various entertainment options, although net new economic growth in entertainment spending has not yet been analyzed and so remains unclear. The project has stimulated new private investment in the district and surrounding communities. The district's vibrancy has been elevated due to the mix of programmed activities and high-profile draws. Planners and economic developers have also realized that L.A. Live! illustrates another way to encourage a livability culture, which in turns, enhances the city's identity. This unlikely reinvention of a marginal area of Los Angeles occurred but it required significant public investment, which suggests that it may not work in places lacking deep financial resources or strong political will.

Third, the success of the projects may rely to some extent on the competitive or comparative advantage that these cities have in arts and entertainment. Both of these cases represent two of the largest metropolitan population concentrations in the United States with a regional audience draw for commercial and mass produced entertainment. LA and New York are widely hailed as "Arts Super Cities" as well as industrial and occupational magnets for film, design, music, and related activities. Their demographic and economic features likely help increase their chances for success. Their profiles suggest that other cities should identify their central and regional advantages for pursuing differently scaled entertainment strategies.

Fourth, the L.A. Live! case also suggests that districts at the edge of a city are particularly well-suited to accommodate these large-format entertainment venues better than a more centralized high-density location. Urban districts where vacant or underutilized land is more readily available and land condemnation actions can be more easily avoided, in other words, have distinct advantages, and cities everywhere seem to have such candidates for transformation. What matters, though, is whether they can function as a hybrid social space, a place where the critical mass of consumers coming from various and different locations in a region can and will want to access social venues that provide a distinct type of social interaction. Critical mass is necessary for the economic viability of transformative projects. In both of the cases discussed in this paper, the projects have tapped into nascent market demand for urban entertainment in these big cities. The ability to do so marks the difference between fundamental physical transformation and coveted place transformation.

Often the focus on the urban periphery speaks to recurring lessons from the postwar era of urban renewal. Rarely are today's cities involved in mass demolition and clearance efforts as a way to prep land for private investment. Both of the cases illustrate the political, financial, and social necessity of "working with what you have" via an array of long-range and incremental planning and development efforts. While these initiatives did face public controversy, the specific issues of each were of a different flavor even though both dealt with central questions that historically frame the quest for urban revitalization. The urban periphery areas themselves are part of the urban renewal legacy, and the large-format projects underscore an attempt to change the fates of these forgotten or disinvested places. Failed entertainment centers were also part renewal legacy, and in the case of the L.A. Live!, policymakers attempted to improve on the past mistakes by integrating rather isolating the planned entertainment centers.

Fifth, creating new places is an achievable goal, but the risks are high, and it takes time for the roots of transformation to take hold. The accumulated social capital of a place like Times Square predisposed the rejuvenation of the district. The same could not be said of the specific district where AEG has built L.A. Live!, yet the social culture of this entertainment-oriented city and its critical mass of consumers unwittingly provided a different form of local social capital upon which the district is continuing to build. The cases suggest that planned entertainment centers work given sufficient time and market interest and a tailoring to local customs.

Sixth, while the risks will always be high, it is possible to take some of the uncertainty out of these developments through robust ex-ante evaluation of outcomes that define the nature and scope of risk taking for both public and private parties. On the ex-post side, more information would certainly help unmask the advantages and limitations of such efforts, but that is a harder task because, typically, policymakers and civic boosters dread the potential for negative publicity and public condemnation that might result from serious critique and analysis. Public resources are at a low, making it difficult to find the necessary funds to pay for such rigorous assessments. Moreover, a methodological challenge exists, as conventional measurement tools do not necessarily capture the full social as well as economic value of such initiatives. Often, the studies themselves cannot keep pace with the speed of development or the decision-making processes that accompany such complex endeavors. In the end, cities are choosing to work on faith alone. These barriers to assessment make it difficult to move beyond the experimental nature of the projects.

A starting point of policy evaluation would be look at these entertainment strategies not as isolated centers or projects but in relation to the rest of the core or city at-large. A broader view could then begin to answer whether these projects are remaking urban space as a way to strengthen the role of the commercial core. For example, L.A.! Live is one of several strategies for urban revitalization and part of an effort to anchor a key transportation corridor. The answers to the fundamental question of transformative place-making are bound to differ when dealing with places that have a built-up core and are relying on the periphery to expand in a sustainable manner. The ultimate long-term test of success is economic validation by the market and social acceptance of the new place, which can only be understood through a historical and planning framework.

List of Exhibits and Figures [separate files]

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