We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes group decision errors caused by the failure of groups to discuss unshared, uniquely held information. In two experiments, we manipulated the salience of counterfactual thoughts in a pre-task scenario and then had groups of three individuals discuss a murder mystery case. In both experiments, counterfactual mind-sets increased the discussion of unshared information and helped groups to identify the correct murder suspect. These results emerged regardless of whether the direction of the counterfactual thoughts was upward (Experiment 1) or downward (Experiment 2), suggesting that it is the process of thinking counterfactually, and not the content of the counterfactuals, that improves group decision making.


The PDF included here is a preprint version of the article. The final version may be found at < http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2003.11.005 >

Adam Galinsky and L. Kray
Journal Article
Publication Date
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Full Citation

Galinsky, Adam and L. Kray
. “From thinking about what might have been to sharing what we know: The effects of counterfactual mind-sets on information sharing in groups.”
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
, (September 01, 2004):