Corporate Finance

Using both a linear regression method and a probability-based method, we find that on average analysts place larger than efficient weights on (i.e., they over-weight) their private information when they forecast corporate earnings. We also find that analysts over-weight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than the consensus, and over-weight less, and may even under-weight, private information when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus.

The collapse of Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM") in Fall 1998 and the Federal Reserve Bank's subsequent efforts to orchestrate a bailout raise important questions about the structure of the Bankruptcy Code. The Code contains numerous provisions affording special treatment to financial derivatives contracts, the most important of which exempts these contracts from the "automatic stay" and permits counterparties to terminate derivatives contracts with a debtor in bankruptcy and seize underlying collateral.

In fall 1998 the Federal Reserve Bank ("Fed") arranged a bailout of the massive hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), which faced the prospect of immediate liquidation if it filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Fed's intervention to aid LTCM calls into question the policy rationale underlying the Bankruptcy COde's special treatment of derivatives. In this paper, we make the following claim: derivatives may deserve special treatment, but not for the reason commonly given.

A liquidity trader wishes to trade a ?xed number of shares within a certain time horizon and to minimize the mean and variance of the costs of trading. Explicit formulas for the optimal trading strategies show that risk-averse liquidity traders reduce their order sizes over time and execute a higher fraction of their total trading volume in early periods when price volatility or liquidity increases. In the presence of transaction fees, numerical simulations suggest that traders want to trade more frequently when price volatility goes up or liquidity declines.

In this chapter, I'll lay out the principal facts and controversies surrounding international flows of capital and their attendant risks. I'll review the perspectives of economic historians and economists on the implications of capital mobility, both during the first wave of globalization (prior to World War I) and during the recent wave (since 1980). I'll emphasize changes over time - especially political changes - that have weakened the case for unfettered capital mobility and have made capital flows more controversial among economists today than in the past.

Contagion is usually defined as correlation between markets in excess of what would be implied by economic fundamentals; however, there is considerable disagreement regarding the definitions of the fundamentals, how the fundamentals might differ across countries, and the mechanisms that link the fundamentals to asset returns. Our research takes, as a starting point, a two-factor model with time-varying betas that accommodates various degrees of market integration between different markets.

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way.

This paper is concerned with the issue of how to balance bailouts (or "lending into arrears") with debt reductions (or "private sector involvement") in the resolution of sovereign debt crises. It provides a review of recent proposals to regulate sovereign debt renegotiations under a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). In addition to defending a sovereign bankruptcy proposal we have put forward in recent work, this article proposes a major reorientation of the IMF's role in sovereign debt crises.

CASE SETTING: $250 million to $499 million in revenues; luxury goods; Netherlands, France At three o'clock in the morning of September 10, 2001, Thierry Hautillac, a risk arbitrageur, learns of the final agreement between Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA (PPR) and LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA (LVMH). After a contest for control of Gucci lasting more than two years, PPR has emerged as the winner.