Abstract
People often rationalize their choices, reassessing selected options as more positive after choosing them. This paper proposes that this type of rationalization does not arise from the act or self-perception of choosing (as previously thought), but rather from accepting the outcome, characterized by the degree to which it feels resolved and settled. It builds on a dissonance-reduction account of rationalization, in which unfavorable features of a chosen alternative become inconsistent with the choice, and the resulting cognitive dissonance motivates the chooser to rationalize them (e.g., by downplaying the importance of those features) and form a more favorable view of the chosen alternative. We extend this idea by suggesting that a similar process can motivate this form of rationalization for outcomes that were not personally selected, provided there is acceptance of the outcome. This paper introduces acceptance as a critical moderator of this type of rationalization for both choices and assignments, with higher acceptance leading to more rationalization. This conceptualization allows for the exploration of factors that influence acceptance of outcomes. Potential antecedents such as freedom to choose or reject the outcome, finality of the outcome, and consent to the outcome-determining process are discussed. Finally, this perspective broadens the scope of dissonance theory. While choice has been considered a necessary condition for dissonance effects, the results from seven experiments (N = 2,557) challenge this view, bridging dissonance and other theories of rationalization.