Corporate Finance

An impressive set of scholars and practitioners bring together in this volume recent practical innovations and policy questions in the field of microfinance. The authors address integration of capital markets with microfinance, technological innovations such as the use of mobile phone technology, the consequences of gender empowerment (particularly on micro-loan borrowings), and the regulatory challenges and opportunities emerging as the landscape of microfinance dramatically evolves.

In this paper, we discuss earnings quality and the related concept of earnings management, focusing on the primary financial accounts. For each key line-item from the financial statements, we summarize accounting and economic considerations applicable to that item, discuss implications for earnings quality, evaluate the susceptibility of the item to manipulation, and identify potential red flags. The red flags and specific issues discussed for the individual line-items provide a framework for fundamental and contextual analysis by academic researchers and practitioners.

Walgreen Company completed new five-year financial projections in preparation for the succession of Daniel Jorndt, senior vice president of finance and company treasurer, to the presidency of the company. Joanna Doode, Jorndt's assistant, had been requested by Jorndt to consider specifically whether the company's projected dividend path was appropriate in light of Walgreens' changing circumstances. Did Walgreens' expected surge in cash flow necessitate that its cash distribution policy be more dramatically overhauled?

Volatility is the key variable in option pricing models and for risk management in general. Not surprisingly, this has led to the recognition that volatility uncertainty is an important risk factor. This realization, in turn, has given rise to derivative instruments tied to volatility, such as variance swaps, volatility swaps, and options on both variance and volatility, which are specifically designed to help manage this risk. To price these contracts, a model is needed for the volatility process.

This paper empirically investigates directors' ownership in the mutual fund industry. Our results show that, contrary to anecdotal evidence, a significant portion of directors hold shares in the funds they oversee. Ownership patterns are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. That is, ownership is positively and significantly correlated with most variables that are predicted to indicate greater value from directors' monitoring. For example, directors' ownership is more prevalent in actively managed funds and in funds with lower institutional ownership.

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism.

Hedge fund activism is a new form of investment strategy. Using a large handcollected data set from 2001 to 2006 we find that activist hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. The abnormal stock return upon announcement of activism is approximately seven percent, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism.

This paper develops rare-event simulation methods for the estimation of portfolio credit risk—the risk of losses to a portfolio resulting from defaults of assets in the portfolio. Portfolio credit risk is measured through probabilities of large losses, which are typically due to defaults of many obligors (sources of credit risk) to which a portfolio is exposed.

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk.