Corporate Finance

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 can be divided into two distinct phases. The first and more limited phase from August 2007 to August 2008 stemmed from losses in one relatively small segment of the U.S. financial system — namely, subprime residential mortgages. Despite this disruption to financial markets, real GDP in the United States continued to rise into the second quarter of 2008, and forecasters were predicting only a mild recession. In mid-September 2008, however, the financial crisis entered a far more virulent phase.

Building on his expertise in macroeconomic policymaking at the Federal Reserve, Mishkin's Macroeconomics: Policy and Practice text clearly provides a theoretical framework that illustrates the most current and relevant policy debates in the field.

As the subprime mortgage market flourished in the 1990s, innovative lenders turned to a new type of loan: the 2/28 mortgage, designed to allow borrowers with less-than-ideal credit to buy a home and to repair their credit histories. This mortgage offered a fixed two-year "teaser" rate, followed by 28 years of payments that would adjust according to market rates such as LIBOR. As an example shows, the teaser rate was relatively affordable, but when the adjustable rate kicked in, borrowers might see their monthly payments eventually increase by as much as 50 percent.

We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country"s sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt.

Accounting and valuation are so intertwined that valuation is really a matter of accounting; valuation involves accounting for value. Accordingly, a valuation is only as good as the accounting underlying it. How can one ask the question of what the price-earnings should be if the earnings are fuzzy? What is the meaning of price-to-book if book values are suspect? There is a question for both the investor and the accountant to answer: What is good accounting for valuation? Do International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or U.S.

What do economics and history have to tell us about the ways euro zone countries are likely to resolve their problems of fiscal unsustainability and banking system insolvency? In answering that question, I am among the most pessimistic observers of the likely future of the euro and its membership. In my view, the euro zone's likely failure to avoid at least some departures, if not total collapse, reflects its poor initial institutional design.

In the wake of the crisis of 2008 and onwards, it has become fashionable to return to the work of Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger, and cite them as showing the ubiquity of crises, how they are an inevitable result of human nature, and how they have therefore to be carefully and thoroughly regulated against. Charles Calomiris considers this view, first clearly distinguishing between financial crises and banking crises.

In this paper we study the determinants of business groups’ ownership structure using unique panel data on Korean chaebols. In particular, we attempt to understand how groups form over time. We find that chaebols grow vertically (that is, pyramidally) as the family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to set up and acquire firms that have low pledgeable income (e.g., low profitability) and high acquisition premia.