Leadership & Organizational Behavior

We investigate determinants of slave family discounts in the New Orleans slave market. We find large price discounts for families unrelated to scale effects, childcare costs, legal restrictions, or transport costs. We posit that because family members voluntarily cared for each other, sellers sometimes found it advantageous to keep families together (when families included needy or dependent members). Evidence from ship manifests carrying slaves for sale in New Orleans provides direct evidence for selectivity bias in explaining slave family discounts.

This paper provides an optimal filtering methodology in discretely observed continuous-time jump-diffusion models. Although the filtering problem has received little attention, it is useful for estimating latent states, forecasting volatility and returns, computing model diagnostics such as likelihood ratios, and parameter estimation. Our approach combines time-discretization schemes with Monte Carlo methods. It is quite general, applying in nonlinear and multivariate jump-diffusion models and models with nonanalytic observation equations.

We present a novel role of affect in the expression of culture. Four experiments tested whether individuals' affective states moderate the expression of culturally normative cognitions and behaviors. We consistently found that value expressions, self-construals, and behaviors were less consistent with cultural norms when individuals were experiencing positive rather than negative affect. Positive affect allowed individuals to explore novel thoughts and behaviors that departed from cultural constraints, whereas negative affect bound people to cultural norms.

Three experiments demonstrated that the experience of power leads to an illusion of personal control. Regardless of whether power was experientially primed (Experiments 1 and 3) or manipulated through roles (manager vs. subordinate; Experiment 2), it led to perceived control over outcomes that were beyond the reach of the power holder.

This special issue was conceived as a way to highlight how social cognition researchers are using the paradigm of negotiations to ask and answer a range of important questions central to their core concerns: how do communication media affect social information processing; how do different roles affect preferred processing styles; how do goals and expectancies shape interactions and outcomes?

We document how starting prices differentially impact outcomes in negotiations and auctions. In negotiations (where the number of actors is often predetermined), starting prices drive cognitive processes, leading individuals to selectively focus on information consistent with, and make valuations similar to, the starting value. Thus, starting high will often lead to ending high in negotiations.

Individuals often honor sunk costs by increasing their commitment to failing courses of action. Since this escalation of commitment is fueled by self-justification processes, a widely offered prescription for preventing escalation is to have separate individuals make the initial and subsequent resource allocation decisions. In contrast to this proposed remedy, four experiments explored whether a psychological connection between two decision-makers leads the second decision-maker to invest further in the failing program orchestrated by the initial decision-maker.

We propose that people protect the belief in a controlled, nonrandom world by imbuing their social, physical, and metaphysical environments with order and structure when their sense of personal control is threatened. We demonstrate that when personal control is threatened, people can preserve a sense of order by (a) perceiving patterns in noise or adhering to superstitions and conspiracies, (b) defending the legitimacy of the sociopolitical institutions that offer control, or (c) believing in an interventionist God.