Operations & Supply Chain Management

We address the simultaneous determination of pricing, production, and capacity investment decisions by a monopolistic firm in a multi-period setting under demand uncertainty. We analyze the optimal decision with particular emphasis on the relationship between price and capacity. We consider models that allow for either bi-directional price changes or models with markdowns only, and in the latter case we prove that capacity and price are strategic substitutes.

In many service industries, companies compete with each other on the basis of the waiting time their customers experience, along with other strategic instruments such as the price they charge for their service. The objective of this paper is to conduct an empirical study of an important industry to measure to what extent waiting time performance impacts different firms' market shares and price decisions.

We consider the Kiefer-Wolfowitz (KW) stochastic approximation algorithm and derive general upper bounds on its mean-squared error. The bounds are established using an elementary induction argument and phrased directly in the terms of tuning sequences of the algorithm. From this we deduce the non- necessity of one of the main assumptions imposed on the tuning sequences in the Kiefer-Wolfowitz paper and essentially all subsequent literature.

Managing Change: Cases and Concepts, 3e by Todd Jick and Maury Peiperl is comprised of six modules that introduce common threads in the ensuing case studies and readings on organizational change. The materials in this edition — cases and readings — have been chosen and arranged to introduce change as an integrated process. Cases in the text represent a wide variety of change situations. Accompanying many cases are readings, likewise chosen to reflect a broad range of issues.

We consider a pricing problem in an environment where the customers' willingness-to-pay (WtP) distribution may change at some point over the selling horizon. Customers arrive sequentially and make purchase decisions based on a quoted price and their private reservation price. The seller knows the WtP distribution pre- and post-change, but does not know the time at which this change occurs. The performance of a pricing policy is measured in terms of regret: the loss in revenues relative to an oracle that knows the time of change prior to the start of the selling season.

Consider a firm that sells products over repeated seasons, each of which includes a full-price period and a markdown period. The firm may deliberately understock products in the markdown period to induce high-value customers to purchase early at full price. Customers cannot perfectly anticipate availability. Instead, they use observed past capacities to form capacity expectations according to a heuristic smoothing rule. Based on their expectations of capacity, customers decide to buy either in the full-price period or in the markdown period.

In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of a large-scale combinatorial auction (CA); the Chilean auction for school meals in which the government procures half a billion dollars worth of meal services every year. Our empirical study is motivated by two fundamental aspects in the designof CAs: (1) which packages should bidders be allowed to bid on; and (2) diversifying the supplier base to promote competition. We use bidding data to uncover important aspects of the firms’ cost structure and their strategic behavior, both of which are not directly observed by the auctioneer.

We propose a message-passing paradigm for resource allocation problems. This serves to connect ideas from the message-passing literature, which has primarily grown out of the communications, statistical physics, and artificial intelligence communities, with a problem central to operations research. This also provides a new framework for decentralized management that generalizes price-based systems by allowing incentives to vary across activities and consumption levels.