Decision Making & Negotiations

The present research considered what leads perceivers to evaluate someone as a good or poor judge of people. In general, we found a substantial role for agreement: perceivers evaluated another person as a good judge when he or she agreed with their perception of someone's characteristics. Importantly, the effect of agreement depended on who this " someone" was. We found that perceivers' evaluation of another individual as a good judge was more heavily shaped by agreement about their own characteristics than by agreement about a third-party target's characteristics.

We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capacity is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient in principle, but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up an efficient SPOE resolution regime ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers across jurisdictions are too large, national regulators ring-fence local banking assets instead of cooperating in a planned SPOE resolution.

Despite lab-based evidence supporting the argument that double standards — by which one group is unfairly held to stricter standards than another — explain observed gender differences in evaluations, it remains unclear whether double standards also affect evaluations in organization and market contexts, where competitive pressures create a disincentive to discriminate.

While most studies of the formalization of pay systems suggest that it helps reduce inequality, some recent studies suggest the opposite. The present study draws on social identity theory to shift this debate from whether formalization reduces inequality to when, or under what conditions, less formalized pay systems may also serve to reduce inequality. Specifically, I consider both the gender of the decision maker and the job of the employee being evaluated.

Recent bank regulations have imposed large compliance costs on banks of all sizes, and have increased the costs of borrowing to both consumers and companies. But in this summary of his recent book, the author argues that the problems with banking system regulation go well beyond the excessive costs. Indeed, Dodd-Frank and other post-crisis regulatory reforms have failed to address the major shortcomings that produced the crisis of 2007–2009. Most importantly, excessive housing finance risk was not dealt with adequately, and is already on the rise again.

While it is generally believed that insulating cost allocations help managers focus their attention on their own actions and shield them from the actions of others, non-insulating schemes can have appeal by encouraging teamwork and/or mutual monitoring among divisions. In this paper, we demonstrate that non-insulating allocations can induce fruitful cooperation among parties even when teamwork and mutual monitoring are nonissues.

We find important differences in dollar-based and dollar-neutral G10 carry trades. Dollar-neutral trades have positive average returns, are highly negatively skewed, are correlated with risk factors, and exhibit considerable downside risk. In contrast, a diversified dollar-carry portfolio has a higher average excess return, a higher Sharpe ratio, minimal skewness, is unconditionally uncorrelated with standard risk-factors, and exhibits no downside risk.