Something is wrong with the global financial system. One might think the system would shift money from rich countries, where capital is in abundance, to those where it is scarce, while transferring risk from poor countries to rich ones, which are most able to bear it. A well-functioning global financial system would provide money to countries in their times of need, thereby contributing to global economic stability.
Much has been said about the failing policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this essay, I attempt to explain why the IMF has pursued policies that in many cases not only failed to promote the stated objectives of enhancing growth and stability, but were probably counterproductive and even flew in the face of a considerable body of theoretical and empirical work that suggested these policies would be counterproductive. I argue that the root of the problem lies in the IMF's system of governance.
This essay concerns the process of globalization, the integration of economies around the world which has put new demands on nation-states at the very same time that, in many ways, it has reduced their capacities to deal with those demands. The nation-state today is squeezed, on the one side, by the forces of global economics and, on the other side, by the political demands for devolution of power.
From the publisher:: Expanding upon the literature of new institutional economics, the first part of this study stresses the significance of imperfections in information, bankruptcy and banks. The second part examines the policy implications of the new paradigm emphasizing loanable fund demand and supply, and demonstrates its relevance to our understanding of two recent historical episodes - the East Asian financial crisis and the 1991 U.S. recession and subsequent recovery and boom.
From the publisher:From the author of Globalization and Its Discontents comes a history of the boom and bust of the 1990s - how and why it happened, how the seeds of destruction were sown in the midst of apparent prosperity, and how America and the world are still failing to learn the lessons from what went wrong. One reason the invisible hand of market economics may be invisible is that it may not exist. So says former World Bank economist Stiglitz in his analysis of what went wrong with the economic boom and bust of the 1990s.
When Russia launched mass privatization, it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law. That didn't happen. We present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may not demand the rule of law even if it is the Pareto efficient "rule of the game." The reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping, and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law.