Leadership & Organizational Behavior

We present six experiments that tested whether lacking control increases illusory pattern perception, which we define as the identification of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli. Participants who lacked control were more likely to perceive a variety of illusory patterns, including seeing images in noise, forming illusory correlations in stock market information, perceiving conspiracies, and developing superstitions.

Research has yielded weak empirical support for the idea that creative solutions may be discovered through unconscious thought, despite anecdotes to this effect. To understand this gap, we examined the effect of unconscious thought on two outcomes of a remote-association test (RAT): implicit accessibility and conscious reporting of answers.

This chapter examines the relationship between the related yet distinct constructs of power and leadership. Although power (asymmetric control over valued resources) is often a foundation of leadership (influencing and motivating a group of individuals towards a common goal), we consider power to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of leadership. We distinguish power from leadership along a number of dimensions and highlight that the relationship of power to leadership lies in power's psychological effects.

We examine the association between CEO reputation (proxied by the extent of press coverage) and the quality of the firm's earnings (proxied by two accruals-based measures). We test three explanations for an association between these constructs: the efficient contracting hypothesis suggests that reputed CEOs are associated with good earnings quality, while the rent extraction and matching explanations argue that reputed CEOs are associated with poor earnings quality.

Consider an economy in which the underlying security returns follow a linear factor model with constant coeffcients. While portfolios that invest in these securities will, in general, have a linear factor structure, it will be one with time-varying coeffcients. However, under certain assumptions regarding the portfolio's investment strategy, it is possible to estimate these time-varying alphas and betas.

This paper examines coworker networks in the American, Chinese, German, and Spanish divisions of a global retail bank. Because the bank has standardized structure and policies across countries, it is possible to examine how norms rooted in national culture impact on various features of informal ties. We propose that cultures vary in the models on which coworker interaction norms are based, with market, family, law, and friendship relations serving as alternative templates.

A common feature of managerial and financial reporting is an iterative process wherein various parties selectively correct particular measurements by challenging them and subjecting them to increased scrutiny. We model this feature by adding an agent appeal stage to the standard moral hazard model and show that it can be optimal to allow the agent to decide which performance measures to appeal, despite the agent's incentive to cherry-pick. In the presence of measurement errors, the agent is incentivized by increased opportunities for cherry-picking that arise if he chooses the "right" vs.

Competing organizations are often defined by their niche overlap or structural equivalence in resource dependence, but the very structure that defines competitors can also identify cooperators. There is a fine line between competition and cooperation, but current theories give insufficient guidance as to which will take place and also contribute to the belief that cooperation between competitors is illegitimate. We show that the legitimacy of these practices, as well the evaluation of their welfare implications, are context bound.