We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of asset prices and trading volume when agents face fixed transactions costs. We show that even small fixed costs can give rise to large "no-trade" regions for each agent's optimal trading policy. The inability to trade more frequently reduces the agents' asset demand and in equilibrium gives rise to a significant illiquidity discount in asset prices.
One role of accounting is to discipline softer (more manipulable) sources of information. We use a principal-agent model of hidden actions and hidden information to study this role. In our model, there is both a verifiable signal (a publicly observed output) and an unverifiable signal (a productivity parameter privately observed by the agent). In a one-period setting, the optimal contract does not make use of the agent's report on the private signal. However, when the output is tracked over two periods, the agent's communication can be valuable.
Intertemporal aggregation results in a summarization of information and a natural delay in the release of information. We study a principal-agent model and show that intertemporal aggregation can be an optimal feature of a performance evaluation system. We then highlight subtleties associated with valuing additional information as the level of aggregation of existing information is varied.
The wide range of 401(k) plans offered to employees has raised the question of whether there is such as thing as too much choice. The 401(k) participation rates among clients of the Vanguard Group were studied to verify the assumption that more choice is more desirable and intrinsically motivating. It was found that 401(k) plans that offered more funds had lower probability of employee participation.
Companies are collecting increasing amounts of information about their customers. This effort is based on the assumption that more information is better and that this information can be leveraged to predict customers' behavior in a variety of situations and product categories. For example, information about a customer's purchase behavior in one category can be helpful in predicting his potential behavior in a related category, which in turn could help a firm in its cross-selling efforts.
We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk.
The authors propose that the revenue premium a brand generates compared with that of a private label product is a simple, objective, and managerially useful product-market measure of brand equity. The authors provide the conceptual basis for the measure, compute it for brands in several packaged goods categories, and test its validity. The empirical analysis shows that the measure is reliable and reflects real changes in brand health over time.
This paper considers the problem of sequential parameter and state estimation in stochastic volatility jump diffusion models. We describe the existing methods, the particle and practical filter, and then develop algorithms to apply these methods to the case of stochastic volatility models with jumps. We analyze the performance of both approaches using both simulated and S and P 500 index return data. On simulated data, we find that the algorithms are both effective in estimating jumps, volatility, and parameters.
In this essay, I want to look at certain ethical aspects of the way that globalization has proceeded in recent years. I shall argue that in the way that they have sought to shape globalization, the advanced industrial countries have violated some basic ethical norms.