This chapter examines the changing nature of interactions between government and private developer and the character of their joint projects. In particular, it examines the objectives of public/private development; the process involved in forming public/private partnerships; and the practical problems and policy issues associated with public/private development.
Frieden and Sagalyn note that, in the 1970s, a city's favorite solution to solving its problems was to build a mall. Although in the complete chapter (Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities, MIT Press) the authors focus on four case studies of varying political and social conditions, this selection contains only the most prominent example of a downtown retail success story, Boston's Faneuil Hall Marketplace.
We consider a production/distribution system represented by a general directed acyclic network. Each node is associated with a specific "product" at a given location and/or production stage. An arc (i, j) indicates that item i is used to "produce" item j. External demands may occur at any of the network's nodes. These demands occur continuously at item-specific constant rates. Components may be assembled in any given proportions. The cost structure consists of inventory carrying, viable, and fixed production/distribution costs.
We consider the problem of simultaneously allocating servers and demands in a service system with independent multiple facilities. We assume a fixed number of facilities and total servers which must service a given Poisson arrival stream. We also assume that service times are identically distributed and independent of the server or facility. The allocation decision is one of simultaneously determining the number of servers and the fraction of the total arrival stream for each facility in order to optimize a givne performance measure.
The question of whether lay attributors are biased in their discounting of 1 cause given an alternative cause has not been resolved by decades of research, largely due to the lack of a clear standard for the rational amount of discounting. The authors propose a normative model in which the attributor's causal schemas and discounting inferences are represented in terms of subjective probability.
This paper addresses a class of single-machine scheduling problems with a common due-date for all jobs, and general earliness and tardiness costs. We show that a class of simple, polynomial, "greedy-type" heuristics can be used to generate close-to-optimal schedules. An extensive numerical study exhibits small optimality gaps. For convex cost structures, we establish that the worst-case optimality gap is bounded by e−i ≈ 0.36, if the due-date is non-restrictive.
This goal of this paper is to establish a research agenda that will lead to a stream of research that closes the gap between actual and normative strategic managerial decision making. We start by distinguishing strategic managerial decision making (choices) from other choices. Next, we propose a conceptual model of how managers make strategic decisions that is consistent with the observed gap between actual and normative decision making.