We show for the general dynamic lot sizing model how minimal forecast horizons may be detected by a slight adaptation of an earlier 0(n log n) or 0(n) forward solution method for the model. A detailed numerical study indicates that minimal forecast horizons tend to be small, that is, include a small number of orders.
We address the Joint Replenishment Problem (JRP) where, in the presence of joint setup costs, dynamic lot sizing schedules need to be determined for m items over a planning horizon of N periods, with general time-varying cost and demand parameters. We develop a new, so-called, partitioning heuristic for this problem, which partitions the complete horizon of N periods into several relatively small intervals, specifies an associated joint replenishment problem for each of these, and solves them via a new, efficient branch-and-bound method.
Investigates the explanatory style of religious groups representing fundamentalist, moderate and liberal views. Reason for the optimism of fundamentalist individuals; Causes of the optimism differences among fundamentalists, moderates and liberals; Impact of religious hope on individuals.
This paper examines the attributes that consumers use when making product similarity judgments and their effect on similarity scaling. Previous research suggests that concrete brands are judged using dichotomous features while more abstract product categories are judged using continuous dimensions. This, in turn, suggests that the appropriateness of spatial scaling increases relative to tree scaling as one moves from brands to product categories. The results of two studies support an increase in the fit of spaces relative to trees from brands to categories.
This research proposes that negotiators consider each other's payoffs in their evaluation of potential settlements beyond the level necessary to maintain the bargaining relationship. We further hypothesize that the way in which negotiators weight their opponents' payoffs, relative to their own, is a function of characteristics of the relationship and of the bargainers' personalities. Specifically, we consider liking of the other party, payoff expectations, satisfaction with past settlements, the likelihood of future negotiations, egocentricity, and power orientation.
In this paper we develop a model for a capacitated production/distribution network of general (but acyclic) topology with a general bill of materials, as considered in MRP (Material Requirement Planning) or DRP (Distribution Requirement Planning) systems. This model assumes stationary, deterministic demand rates and a standard stationary cost structure; it is a generalization of the uncapacitated model treated in the seminal papers of Maxwell and Muckstadt (1985) and Roundy (1986).
Money managers select weights of managed portfolios to enhance their reputation in the spot market for their services, inevitably using their actions to signal their quality. We develop a two-asset signalling model of money managers. A unique screening equilibrium and (under certain parameter configurations) a host of pooling equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion. In all the equilibria managers behave more aggressively than they would in the absence of the signalling motive, exaggerating their position in the risky asset.
According to human capital theory, technological change will influence the retirement decisions of older workers in two ways. First, workers in industries with high rates of technological change will retire later if there is a net positive correlation between technological change and on-the-job training. Second, an unexpected change in the rate of technological change will induce older workers to retire sooner because the required amount of retraining will be an unattractive investment.
While under some circumstances information sharing in oligopoly may be beneficial, the literature ignores the possibility of strategic information sharing by assuming verifiability of data. I endogenize the incentives for truthful information sharing and prove that if firms have the ability to send misleading information, they will always do so. To overcome this problem I introduce a (costly) mechanism through which the firm will, in its own best interest, reveal the true value of its private information, even though outside verification is impossible.