Decision Making & Negotiations

We develop a competitive pricing model which combines the complexity of time-varying demand and cost functions and that of scale economies arising from dynamic lot sizing costs. Each firm can replenish inventory in each of the T periods into which the planning horizon is partitioned. Fixed as well as variable procurement costs are incurred for each procurement order, along with inventory carrying costs. Each firm adopts, at the beginning of the planning horizon, a (single) price to be employed throughout the horizon.

This research investigates hypotheses about differences between Chinese and American managers in the configuration of trusting relationships within their professional networks. Consistent with hypotheses about Chinese familial collectivism, an egocentric network survey found that affect- and cognition-based trust were more intertwined for Chinese than for American managers. In addition, the effect of economic exchange on affect-based trust was more positive for Chinese than for Americans, whereas the effect of friendship was more positive for Americans than for Chinese.

Financial innovations often respond to regulation by sidestepping regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit activities in which people wish to engage. Securitization of loans (e.g., credit card receivables, or subprime residential mortgages) is often portrayed, correctly, as having arisen in part as a means of "arbitraging" regulatory capital requirements by booking assets off the balance sheets of regulated banks.

We investigate pricing effects of the joint production of loans and security underwritings. We control for firm and borrower characteristics, including differences in sequencing, which are important for pricing. Contrary to previous studies, when banks combine lending and underwriting within the same customer relationship they charge premiums for both loans and underwriting services. Abstracting from effects of joint production within relationships, depository banks engaged in underwriting price lending and underwriting more cheaply than stand alone investment banks.

Anchoring refers to a biased judgment on a stimulus based on the initial assessment of another stimulus and the insufficient adjustment away from that initial assessment. Previous research indicates that anchoring seems to be a general phenomenon, underlying a wide variety of processing strategies (Epley and Gilovich 2001; Johnson and Puto 1987; Tversky and Kahnemann 1974). Every time when individuals form an impression or an image about a stimulus while another stimulus is present, these impressions may be subject to anchoring effects.

We propose a new three-pronged plan to address the recent harmful flood of foreclosures. Our plan would address the major barriers that inhibit the ability of third-party servicers to modify mortgages the way portfolio lenders are now doing with greater success. The plan provides greater compensation for servicers to perform their duties, removes legal constraints that inhibit modification, and addresses critical second liens that often get in the way of effective mortgage modifications.

We investigate determinants of slave family discounts in the New Orleans slave market. We find large price discounts for families unrelated to scale effects, childcare costs, legal restrictions, or transport costs. We posit that because family members voluntarily cared for each other, sellers sometimes found it advantageous to keep families together (when families included needy or dependent members). Evidence from ship manifests carrying slaves for sale in New Orleans provides direct evidence for selectivity bias in explaining slave family discounts.

Media firms compete in two connected markets. They face rivalry for the sale of content to consumers, and at the same time, they compete for advertisers seeking access to the attention of these consumers. We explore the implications of such two-sided competition on the actions and source of profits of media firms. One main conclusion we reach is that media firms may charge higher content prices in a duopoly than in a monopoly.