Investment decisions frequently require coordination across multiple divisions of a firm. This paper explores a class of capital budgeting mechanisms in which the divisions issue reports regarding the anticipated profitability of proposed projects. To hold the divisions accountable for their reports, the central office ties the project acceptance decision to a system of cost allocations comprised of depreciation and capital charges.
In this note we present algorithms that compute, exactly or approximately, time-dependent waiting time tail probabilities and the time-dependent expected waiting time in M(t)/M/s(t) queuing systems.
We review queueing-theory methods for setting staffing requirements in service systems where customer demand varies in a predictable pattern over the day. Analyzing these systems is not straightforward, because standard queueing theory focuses on the long-run steady-state behavior of stationary models. We show how to adapt stationary queueing models for use in nonstationary environments so that time-dependent performance is captured and staffing requirements can be set.
This paper examines model specification issues and estimates diffusive and jump risk premia using S&P futures option prices from 1987 to 2003. We first develop a time series test to detect the presence of jumps in volatility, and find strong evidence in support of their presence. Next, using the cross section of option prices, we find strong evidence for jumps in prices and modest evidence for jumps in volatility based on model fit. The evidence points toward economically and statistically significant jump risk premia, which are important for understanding option returns.
I develop a model of group decision-making, in which a committee generates proposals and holds open discussions, but the ultimate decision is either taken by a leader (decision by authority) or by majority vote. Optimal communication processes are studied that combine both cheap talk statements (proposals) and costly state verification (discussions). I show that by favouring one particular agent—the leader—authoritative decisionmaking reduces rent-seeking discussions and often results in a higher decision-quality relative to majority decision-making.
In a decentralized supply chain, with long-term competition between independent retailers facing random demands and buying from a common supplier, how should wholesale and retail prices be specified in an attempt to maximize supply-chain-wide profits? We show what types of coordination mechanisms allow the decentralized supply chain to generate aggregate expected profits equal to the optimal profits in a centralized system, and how the parameters of these (perfect) coordination schemes can be determined.
We consider a family of N items that are produced in, or obtained from, the same production facility. Demands are deterministic for each item and each period within a given horizon of T periods. If in a given period an order is placed, setup costs are incurred. The aggregate order size is constrained by a capacity limit. The objective is to find a lot-sizing strategy that satisfies the demands for all items over the entire horizon without backlogging, and that minimizes the sum of inventory-carrying costs, fixed-order costs, and variable-order costs.
Although prices in financial markets play an important role in improving allocative efficiency in the real economy, few models of securities markets explicitly incorporate resource allocation decisions. In this paper, we study the equilibrium in a securities market when the market price provides valuable information that can improve allocative efficiency. We show that a decision maker will subsidize liquidity in an illiquid securities market to gather valuable information about her decision payoffs.
Theoretical work on the pricing of information reveals that competition between independent information sellers can result in prices that are negatively related to the quality or reliability of the information. The theory argues that when information products are unreliable (low quality), independent products become complements, and competition can increase prices. The goal of this study is to test empirically the theory's counterintuitive predictions with the help of an experimental market based on a business simulation.