Breaking the Cycle: How the News and Markets Created a Negative Feedback Loop in COVID-19
New research from CBS Professor Harry Mamaysky reveals how negativity in the news and markets can escalate a financial crisis.
New research from CBS Professor Harry Mamaysky reveals how negativity in the news and markets can escalate a financial crisis.
Adapted from “Global Value Chains in Developing Countries: A Relational Perspective from Coffee and Garments,” by Laura Boudreau of Columbia Business School, Julia Cajal Grossi of the Geneva Graduate Institute, and Rocco Macchiavello of the London School of Economics.
Adapted from “Online Advertising as Passive Search,” by Raluca M. Ursu of New York University Stern School of Business, Andrey Simonov of Columbia Business School, and Eunkyung An of New York University Stern School of Business.
This paper from Columbia Business School, “Meaning of Manual Labor Impedes Consumer Adoption of Autonomous Products,” explores marketing solutions to some consumers’ resistance towards autonomous products. The study was co-authored by Emanuel de Bellis of the University of St. Gallen, Gita Johar of Columbia Business School, and Nicola Poletti of Cada.
Co-authored by John B. Donaldson of Columbia Business School, “The Macroeconomics of Stakeholder Equilibria,” proposes a model for a purely private, mutually beneficial financial agreement between worker and firm that keeps decision-making in the hands of stockholders while improving the employment contract for employees.
At Columbia Business School, our faculty members are at the forefront of research in their respective fields, offering innovative ideas that directly impact the practice of business today. A quick glance at our publication on faculty research, CBS Insights, will give you a sense of the breadth and immediacy of the insight our professors provide.
As a student at the School, this will greatly enrich your education. In Columbia classrooms, you are at the cutting-edge of industry, studying the practices that others will later adopt and teach. As any business leader will tell you, in a competitive environment, being first puts you at a distinct advantage over your peers. Learn economic development from Ray Fisman, the Lambert Family Professor of Social Enterprise and a rising star in the field, or real estate from Chris Mayer, the Paul Milstein Professor of Real Estate, a renowned expert and frequent commentator on complex housing issues. This way, when you complete your degree, you'll be set up to succeed.
Columbia Business School in conjunction with the Office of the Dean provides its faculty, PhD students, and other research staff with resources and cutting edge tools and technology to help push the boundaries of business research.
Specifically, our goal is to seamlessly help faculty set up and execute their research programs. This includes, but is not limited to:
All these activities help to facilitate and streamline faculty research, and that of the doctoral students working with them.
This paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings. Its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply. Integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others. Therefore, to explain the scope of any firm, one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations.
This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making.
Price deviations from basic valuation models based on accounting earnings and book value of owners' equity are used to test the intrinsic value explanation of the price-earnings and price-book value anomalies. Relative price deviations from the implied benchmark prices are used to assign years into high and low deviation groups. Traditional zero investment hedge portfolios are formed in each year, and the returns are compared across high and low deviation years.
This paper assesses policies of mass privatization in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. A central concern stemming from the analysis is that, in view of the fiscal crisis facing economies in transition, it is crucial for governments to try to maximize the proceeds from the sale of state assets. Because of the low initial level of private wealth, it is important, in this respect, to let potential buyers borrow from the government or issue claims on future revenues (obtained with the privatized assets) to the government in order to pay for the privatized firms.
We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.
Research was conducted to investigate the value implications of the changes in annual earnings. It was assumed that a relationship exists between the persistence of earnings and the changes in stock prices associated with reported earnings innovations. The study yielded three major findings. Results showed that other data contained in annual financial statements can be used to evaluate pricing multipliers. Findings also revealed the variability of the persistence of earnings and the pricing multipliers indicated by financial statements.
The paper first characterizes the predictable components in excess rates of returns on major equity and foreign exchange markets using lagged excess returns, dividend yields, and forward premiums as instruments. Vector autoregressions (VARs) demonstrate one-step-ahead predictability and facilitate calculations of implied long-horizon statistics, such as variance ratios. Estimation of latent variable models then subjects the VARs to constraints derived from dynamic asset pricing theories.
The paper first characterizes the predictable components in excess rates of returns on major equity and foreign exchange markets using lagged excess returns, dividend yields, and forward premiums as instruments. Vector autoregressions (VARs) demonstrate one-step-ahead predictability and facilitate calculations of implied long-horizon statistics, such as variance ratios. Estimation of latent variable models then subjects the VARs to constraints derived from dynamic asset pricing theories.
This article explores the differential measurement problems related to the earnings components by invoking the standard errors-in-variables perspective on estimated coefficients. A more traditional way of looking at accounting recognizes the process as one of measurements. That is, the analysis of transactions leads to line items in the financial statements, which in turn aggregate into the bottom line numbers: earnings and book value. The disclosures of the line items clearly suggest that the accountant is aware of the insufficiency of earnings and book values as determinants of values.
Alternative ways of conducting inference and measurement for long-horizon forecasting are explored with an application to dividend yields as predictors of stock returns. Monte Carlo analysis indicates that the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) procedure is biased at long horizons, but the alternatives perform better. These include an estimator derived under the null hypothesis as in Richardson and Smith (1991), a reformulation of the regression as in Jegadeesh (1990), and a vector autoregression (VAR) as in Campbell and Shiller (1988), Kandel and Stambaugh (1988), and Campbell (1991).
This paper documents that firms face upward-sloping supply curves when they repurchase shares in a Dutch auction, and it analyzes the market reaction to these offers. The announcement price increase is highly correlated with the ultimate repurchase premium. Prices decline at expiration only for pro-rated offers. The cumulative return is positive and highly correlated with the repurchase premium, excepting pro-rated offers. Much of this price increase is consistent with movement along an upward-sloping supply curve. Trading volume around the Dutch auction parallels fixed-price repurchasses.
A signalling hypothesis of leveraged buyout (LBO) capital structure is examined, wherein the promoters of an LBO unambiguously convey their commitment to generate and distribute free cash flow to investors by assuming debt service obligations high enough to exhaust free cash flow during the initial phase of the LBO operation. The signalling equilibrium results in an equity value consistent with the promoters' expectations concerning free cash flow and permits them to keep the value released by the LBO.
When futures contracts are settled with respect to underlying asset prices, received theory suggests that the differences between futures prices and implied forward prices (from the term structure) are strictly due to marking to market, ceteris paribus. Empirical evidence appears to indicate that such differences are small for contracts with short maturities. What happens when the futures contract settles to yields implied by future prices of underlying assets?
This paper examines the allocative role of class shares that pay dividends based upon the performance of the individual activities of multi-activity firms. The firms considered operate under economies of scope and technological uncertainty in an incomplete asset market. Investor unanimity about the choice of production plans and a constrained Pareto optimum are attained when all firms in the economy issue a class of shares for each of their activities.
Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors. Demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmonitors.
The traditional pricing methodology in finance values derivative securities as redundant assets that have no impact on equilibrium prices and allocations. This paper demonstrates that when the market is incomplete primary and derivative asset markets, generically, interact: the valuation of derivative and primary securities is a simultaneous pricing problem and primary security prices depend on the contractual characteristics of the derivative assets available.
Japan's capital markets have played a crucial role in the recent increase in the globalization of international capital markets. As a result it has become important to understand the similarities and differences in the way Japanese markets operate in comparison to the more familiar Anglo-American environment. One of the major differences that has attracted a great deal of attention is the relatively high average price/earnings [PE] ratio (Viner [1988]) for the stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The nature of supply curves in corporate equity are examined. Until recently, there has been little direct empirical assessment of their elasticity. At issue is whether or not the supposition of shareholder homogeneity of valuations represents a good approximation to actual markets. In Bagwell (1990), supply curves documented in Dutch auction repurchases have a distinct upward slope. Shleifer (1990) also provides evidence of an upward-sloping supply curve.
We argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low-cost solutions, these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems, which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both. Consequently, decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information, but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important. We also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge.
By committing to terminate funding if a firm's performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage rivals to ensure that a firm's performance is poor; this raises the chance that the financial constraints become binding and induce exit. We analyze the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat. The optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems. (JEL 610)
Knowledge of the one-month interest rate is useful in forecasting the sign as well as the variance of the excess return on stocks. The services of a portfolio manager who makes use of the forecasting model to shift funds between bills and stocks would be worth an annual management fee of 2 percent of the value of the assets managed. During 1954:4 to 1986:12, the variance of monthly returns on the managed portfolio was about 60 percent of the variance of the returns on the value weighted index, whereas the average return was two basis points higher.
This paper performs a financial statement analysis that combines a large set of financial statement items into one summary measure which indicates the direction of one-year-ahead earnings changes. Positions are taken in stocks on the basis of this measure during the period 1973–1983, which involve canceling long and short positions with zero net investment. The two-year holding-period return to the long and short positions is in the order of 12.5%. After adjustment for "size effects" the return is about 7.0%. These returns cannot be explained by nominated firm risk characteristics.
This paper examines the properties of a market solution to the output uncertainty problem faced by unincorporated primary producers. An insurance contract is formulated and shown to provide income insurance to producers without exposing insurers to moral hazard. The equilibrium relative to this contract is shown to be equivalent to that effected by a stock market available to all producers.
Several recent studies have suggested that empirical rejections of the permanent income/life cycle model might be due to the existence of liquidity constraints. This paper tests the permanent income hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that consumers optimize subject to a well-specified sequence of borrowing constraints. Implications for consumption in the presence of borrowing constraints are derived and then tested using time-series/cross-section data on families from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Trading on private information creates inefficiencies because there is less than optimal risk sharing. This occurs because the response of market makers to the existence of traders with private information is to reduce the liquidity of the market. The institution of the monopolist specialist may ease this inefficiency somewhat by increasing the liquidity of the market. While competing market makers will expect a zero profit on every trade, the monopolist will average his profits across trades. This implies a more liquid market when there is extensive trading on private information.
In this paper we show that information in prices that leads (future) earnings is contained in financial statements. While accrual accounting rules produce an earnings number which reflects the information in stock prices with a lag, they also produce a large array of additional numbers presented in the income statement, balance sheet, and statement of changes in financial position. We demonstrate that certain of these numbers can be summarized into one measure that predicts future earnings.
This article looks at the alternative methods that can be employed by firms with regards to rewarding equity holders. Economists have long been puzzled by why firms pay dividends when alternative methods of rewarding shareholders and financiers exist which involve less taxes. Dividend paying equity appears to be the most heavily taxed capital instrument available. It is subject to two levels of taxation: first, the federal corporation income tax (set at a 34 percent marginal rate in the U.S. as of June 1989) and second, the personal income tax if the shares are owned by households.
Most U.S. corporations choose their fiscal years to coincide with the calendar year. We document that the larger the firm, the more likely it is to begin its fiscal year in January. This finding holds across industries.
This paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation. In this theory, suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable actions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past. We develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes, so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve. Unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation, this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motive renegotiation.
An analysis of 1979-1984 panel data for 169 US defense industry firms shows that the federal government promotes research and development (R&D) investment by awarding major contracts through the competitive procurement process. In this process, the government reveals its demand for certain technological innovations and encourages private firms to sponsor the necessary R&D. The firms will recover the R&D expenses by being awarded the government contract.
This paper develops and implements a technique for estimating a model of the bid/ask spread. The spread is decomposed into two components, one due to asymmetric information and one due to inventory costs, specialist monopoly power, and clearing costs. The model is estimated using NYSE common stock transaction prices in the period 1981-1983. Cross-sectional regression analysis is then used to relate time-series estimated spread components to other stock characteristics.
The bid-ask spread can be decomposed into two parts: one part due to asymmetric information and the other part due to other factors such as monopoly power. The part due to asymmetric information attenuates statistical biases in mean return, variance, and serial covariance. Thus, using spread data to adjust for biases in return moments requires knowing not only the spread but the composition of the spread. Furthermore, any spread-estimation procedure using transaction prices must estimate two spread components.
This paper studies the relation between Value Line's successful record in predicting relative stock price movements and the firm size effect. The data suggest little direct relation between the two phenomena. Value Line tends not to rank small firm stocks, and small firm stocks that are ranked are more likely to receive a low rank than large firm stocks. Within each size-sorted quintile of the market, the mean payoffs on costless positions constructed according to Value Line's recommendations are positive.
The authors propose a likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that the minimum-variance frontier of a set of K assets coincides with the frontier of this set and another set of N assets. They study the relation between this hypothesis, exact arbitrage pricing, and mutual fund separation. The exact distribution of the test statistic is available. The authors test the hypothesis that the frontier spanned by three size-sorted stock portfolios is the same as the frontier spanned by thirty-three size-sorted stock portfolios.
It is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long-tern contracts that prevent the entry of some lower-cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely. Moreover, when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry, it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry.
For a collection of agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, a price-independent income distribution, and identical probability beliefs, there exists a von Neumann-Morgenstern approximate aggregator. The risk tolerance of the approximate aggregator is equal to the sum of the individual agent risk tolerances at prices which yield constant, "risk-free," contingent consumption. The application of the approximate aggregator to standard asset pricing models in finance is discussed briefly.
Some companies consistently enjoy share prices that exceed book value. Such value creators range from giants like Coca-Cola Co., IBM, and Procter & Gamble to less-known small and medium-sized companies like Pall and Shoney's. Other enterprises trade below book value year after year, in both bear and bull markets. Many managers believe that these differences in price to book ratio do not stem from real differences in competitive performance but rather from the capriciousness of the stock market.
In this paper, insider trading is viewed as a signal of managements' assessments of firms' future prospects and its information content is compared to that in managements' earnings forecasts. These forecasts are explicit statements of managements' assessments of future prospects. A number of measures of insider trading designed to capture the information aspect of trading are investigated.
The presence of traders with superior information leads to a positive bid-ask spread even when the specialist is risk-neutral and makes zero expected profits. The resulting transaction prices convey information, and the expectation of the average spread squared times volume is bounded by a number that is independent of insider activity. The serial correlation of transaction price differences is a function of the proportion of the spread due to adverse selection. A bid-ask spread implies a divergence between observed returns and realizable returns.
We establish sufficient conditions for the recoverability and uniqueness of utility functions (preferences) generating consumption and asset demands in a two-period setting under uncertainty.
This paper compares the properties of dividend announcements and management earnings forecasts as predictors of earnings and firm value. First, the two predictors are compared on the basis of their ability to predict earnings. Then the information they convey about firm value is assessed by comparison of the performance of investment strategies based on values of the two predictors. Finally, the effects of dividend announcements on stock prices are considered.
Corporate investment in an economy without a complete set of contingent claims markets has the characteristic of a public good in the sense that the stockholders' consumption plans cannot be separated from, but depend on, the specific investment plans of the firms. The purpose of this article is to develop an internal allocation mechanism capable of attaining production plans that are unanimously preferred by stockholders and that satisfy a natural notion of optimality applicable to the stock market economy.
Evidence is given in this paper which indicates that corporate insiders time their trades in their firms' stock relative to the date of the disclosure of their forecasts of annual earnings. Further, insiders earn abnormal returns to their joint trading and information dissemination activities, and the paper provides measures of these returns.
Over the years, there has developed a fairly substantial body of research on the time series of earnings. As a whole, this literature concludes that changes in (annual) accounting earnings are unpredictable, that is, earnings follow a "random walk." Based on this result, some inferences of economic substance (policy) have been claimed. In this paper we reconsider empirical issues which, at least to some extent, have been obscured by this conclusion.
This paper is a theoretical investigation of equilibrium forward and futures prices. We construct a rational expectations model in continuous time of a multigood, identical consumer economy with constant stochastic returns to scale production. Using this model we find three main results. First, we find formulas for equilibrium forward, futures, discount bond, commodity bond and commodity option prices.
The cost of external equity capital is higher than the investor-required rate of return because of flotation costs (underwriting expenses and underpricing). Recognizing this, regulatory agencies have generally included an allowance for flotation costs in the authorized cost of capital. The adjustment for flotation costs can have a significant effect on the firm and its consumers.
Focuses on a theory and test of credit rationing. Lending behavior under a fixed interest rate; leverage terms under risk aversion.