Breaking the Cycle: How the News and Markets Created a Negative Feedback Loop in COVID-19
New research from CBS Professor Harry Mamaysky reveals how negativity in the news and markets can escalate a financial crisis.
New research from CBS Professor Harry Mamaysky reveals how negativity in the news and markets can escalate a financial crisis.
Adapted from “Global Value Chains in Developing Countries: A Relational Perspective from Coffee and Garments,” by Laura Boudreau of Columbia Business School, Julia Cajal Grossi of the Geneva Graduate Institute, and Rocco Macchiavello of the London School of Economics.
Adapted from “Online Advertising as Passive Search,” by Raluca M. Ursu of New York University Stern School of Business, Andrey Simonov of Columbia Business School, and Eunkyung An of New York University Stern School of Business.
This paper from Columbia Business School, “Meaning of Manual Labor Impedes Consumer Adoption of Autonomous Products,” explores marketing solutions to some consumers’ resistance towards autonomous products. The study was co-authored by Emanuel de Bellis of the University of St. Gallen, Gita Johar of Columbia Business School, and Nicola Poletti of Cada.
Co-authored by John B. Donaldson of Columbia Business School, “The Macroeconomics of Stakeholder Equilibria,” proposes a model for a purely private, mutually beneficial financial agreement between worker and firm that keeps decision-making in the hands of stockholders while improving the employment contract for employees.
At Columbia Business School, our faculty members are at the forefront of research in their respective fields, offering innovative ideas that directly impact the practice of business today. A quick glance at our publication on faculty research, CBS Insights, will give you a sense of the breadth and immediacy of the insight our professors provide.
As a student at the School, this will greatly enrich your education. In Columbia classrooms, you are at the cutting-edge of industry, studying the practices that others will later adopt and teach. As any business leader will tell you, in a competitive environment, being first puts you at a distinct advantage over your peers. Learn economic development from Ray Fisman, the Lambert Family Professor of Social Enterprise and a rising star in the field, or real estate from Chris Mayer, the Paul Milstein Professor of Real Estate, a renowned expert and frequent commentator on complex housing issues. This way, when you complete your degree, you'll be set up to succeed.
Columbia Business School in conjunction with the Office of the Dean provides its faculty, PhD students, and other research staff with resources and cutting edge tools and technology to help push the boundaries of business research.
Specifically, our goal is to seamlessly help faculty set up and execute their research programs. This includes, but is not limited to:
All these activities help to facilitate and streamline faculty research, and that of the doctoral students working with them.
In this article, the authors focus on impacts of tax rates and, in particular, tax progressivity on the decision to become an 'entrepreneur.' While a proportional tax with a full loss offset will not affect the entry decision for a risk-neutral individual, a progressive schedule with imperfect loss offsets can discourage entry. The authors find substantial evidence for this effect on entrepreneurship using variation in tax schedules faced by households in the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) over the period from 1979 to 1992.
In this paper, we consider American option contracts when the underlying asset has stochastic dividends and stochastic volatility. We provide a full discussion of the theoretical foundations of American option valuation and exercise boundaries. We show how they depend on the various sources of uncertainty which drive dividend rates and volatility, and derive equilibrium asset prices, derivative prices and optimal exercise boundaries in a general equilibrium model.
The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries, and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulations of reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions. We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity-induced defaults from strategic defaults.
This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments.
We analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for its shares. We show that the founder of the firm can optimally choose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. By grouping member cash flows, a coalition internalizes to a larger extent the consequences of its actions and hence takes more efficient actions than would any of its individual members. The model has implications for the optimal bundling of cash flow and voting rights, and for the optimal number and size of shareholders.
One possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets. Examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s, we find the highest bidder returns when financially "unconstrained" buyers acquire "constrained" targets. This result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing.
This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The main change from the single-agent problem is that an agent can now learn from the current experimentation of other agents. Information is therefore a public good, and a free-rider problem in experimentation naturally arises.
This paper develops methods for relating the prices of discrete- and continuous-time versions of path-dependent options sensitive to extremal values of the underlying asset, including lookback, barrier, and hindsight options. The relationships take the form of correction terms that can be interpreted as shifting a barrier, a strike, or an extremal price. These correction terms enable us to use closed-form solutions for continuous option prices to approximate their discrete counterparts.
This paper develops methods for relating the prices of discrete- and continuous-time versions of path-dependent options sensitive to extremal values of the underlying asset, including lookback, barrier, and hindsight options. The relationships take the form of correction terms that can be interpreted as shifting a barrier, a strike, or an extremal price. These correction terms enable us to use closed-form solutions for continuous option prices to approximate their discrete counterparts.
In this paper we develop a residual-income model showing how taxes on dividends affect the relative valuation of retained earnings versus contributed equity, as well as the value of expected future earnings. Tests of predictions from our model for a sample of Compustat firms from 1975-94 suggest that overall firm value, and the relative valuation weights investors assign to retained earnings, contributed equity, and current earnings, all critically depend on dividend taxes.
This paper considers whether stock price elasticity affects corporate financial decisions. Basic economic principles and the existing theoretical literature predict that firms choosing the Dutch auction instead of the fixed price tender offer should be those firms expecting to face greater stock price elasticity.
The following two articles, "Market Transparency: Who Wins and Who Loses?" by Robert Bloomfield and Maureen O'Hara and "Quote Disclosure and Price Discovery in Multipele Dealer FInancial Markets" by Mark D. Flood, Ronald Huisman, Kees G. Koedijk, and Ronald J. Mahieu are the first two experimental microstructure articles that the Review of Financial Studies (RFS) has published. We, the editors of the RFS, hope that they are not the last. Therefore I take the unconventional step of introducing the two articles.
Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), (Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155?1177) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Recent research on business investment decisions suggests that real investment in plant and equipment is quite sensitive to changes in the user cost of capital, pointing to the possibility that long-run changes in tax policy may have a significant impact on an economy's capital stock. Indeed, many countries have at times adopted investment tax incentives to stimulate investment. The prevalence of investment incentives suggests that local policy-makers believe these are effective in increasing investment at a reasonable cost in terms of lost revenue.
Examines the correlation between investments and proxies for changes in net worth or internal funds and the importance of this correlation for firms likely to face information related capital-market imperfections. Developments and challenges in empirical research; Analytical underpinnings of models of capital market imperfections; Model's application to investment activities.
The paper develops a simple model of corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analyzed. The model compares the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the benefits from efficient management control achieved by sonic degree of ownership concentration. The paper reexamines the free-rider problem in corporate control in the presence of liquidity trading, derives predictions for the trade and pricing of blocks, and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure.
It is common to apply multipliers to both earnings and book value to calculate approximate equity values. However, applying a price-earnings multiplier or a price-to-book multiplier typically produces two valuations and the analyst is left with the question of how to combine them into one valuation. This paper calculates weights that combine the valuations and shows that these weights vary over the difference between earnings and book value, doing so systematically over time.
It is common to apply multipliers to both earnings and book value to calculate approximate equity values. However, applying a price-earnings multiplier or a price-to-book multiplier typically produces two valuations and the analyst is left with the question of how to combine them into one valuation. This paper calculates weights that combine the valuations and shows that these weights vary over the difference between earnings and book value, doing so systematically over time.
In this article, we argue that the time has come to begin to integrate the Coasian view of the firm--which is concerned with the interactions between ownermanagers--and the Bede and Means perspective--which emphasizes the separation of ownership and control in most corporations.
The effects of tax reform on corporate financial decisions help determine whether reform will increase capital formation and simplify the tax system. This paper describes the effects of fundamental tax reform on corporate tax planning and summarizes economists' knowledge of the magnitude of these effects. We analyze both income tax reform, consisting of integrating the corporate and personal income taxes, and moving to a broad-based consumption tax. As prototypes of reform, we use the U.S.
We determine the minimum cost of super-replicating a nonnegative contingent claim when there are convex constraints on portfolio weights. We show that the optimal cost with constraints is equal to the price of a related claim without constraints. The related claim is a dominating claim, that is, a claim whose payoffs are increased in an appropriate way relative to the original claim. The results hold for a variety of options, including some path-dependent options.
We present simple adverse selection model in which a firm finds it advantageous to insure against bad outcomes and thereby improve its credit quality and reduce its cost of capital.
This paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets, and it analyses the tickle-down effect of capital accumulation. Moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities. Three main conclusions are obtained from this model. First, when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high, the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution.
The payoff of a barrier option depends on whether or not a specified asset price, index, or rate reaches a specified level during the life of the option. Most models for pricing barrier options assume continuous monitoring of the barrier; under this assumption, the option can often be priced in closed form. Many (if not most) real contracts with barrier provisions specify discrete monitoring instants; there are essentially no formulas for pricing these options, and even numerical pricing is difficult.
The payoff of a barrier option depends on whether or not a specified asset price, index, or rate reaches a specified level during the life of the option. Most models for pricing barrier options assume continuous monitoring of the barrier; under this assumption, the option can often be priced in closed form. Many (if not most) real contracts with barrier provisions specify discrete monitoring instants; there are essentially no formulas for pricing these options, and even numerical pricing is difficult.
We develop bounds and approximations for setting base-stock levels in production-inventory systems with limited production capacity. Our approximations become exact as inventories become critical, meaning either that the target service level is very high or the backorder penalty is very large. Our bounds apply even without this requirement. We consider both single-stage and multi-stage systems.
In this article I begin by discussing the rationale for mandatory convertibles from the point of view of issuers as well as investors. In general, convertibles securities reduce the costs of "information asymmetry" that can make equity offerings especially expensive for some smaller, high-growth companies (or any firm with little additional debt capacity where management is convinced its shares are undervalued).
The paper demonstrates empirically that GAAP earnings have properties to serve as a substitute for dividends in equity valuation analysis. Dividends reduce subsequent GAAP earnings, and "intrinsic" equity prices calculated by forecasting earnings are thus reduced by current dividends. This is in accordance with the Miller and Modigliani principle—the displacement property—which states that the payment of dividends reduces prices, dollar for dollar.
In this paper we provide valuation formulas for several types of American options on two or more assets. Our contribution is twofold. First, we characterize the optimal exercise regions and provide valuation formulas for a number of American option contracts on multiple underlying assets with convex payoff functions. Examples include options on the maximum of two assets, dual strike options, spread options, exchange options, options on the product and powers of the product, and options on the arithmetic average of two assets.
We provide a framework in which we link the valuation and asset allocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetime marginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pension plan formula. In turn, we examine the retirement policies that are implied by the primitives of the model and the value of pension obligations. Our model provides an explicit valuation formula for a stylized defined benefits plan. The optimal asset allocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio of the pension liabilities and the growth optimum portfolio independent of the pension liabilities.
We use firm-level panel data to explore the extent to which fixed investment responds to tax reforms in 14 OECD countries. Previous studies have often found that investment does not respond to changes in the marginal cost of investment. We identify some of the factors responsible for this finding, and employ an estimation procedure that sidesteps the most important of them. In so doing, we find evidence of statistically and economically significant investment responses to tax changes in 12 of the 14 countries.
The financial policy highly leveraged firms (HLFs) commonly follow implies uncertain leverage. Explicit allowance for this characteristic leads to two complementary pricing models. A recursive formula for the value of HLF follows from applying the adjusted present value (APV) approach to uncertain tax shields. This formula is used to evaluate the robustness of the simple APV rule and other valuation approaches used in practice.
We develop lower and upper bounds on the prices of American call and put options written on a dividend-paying asset. We provide two option price approximations one based on the lower bound (termed LBA) and one based on both bounds (termed LUBA). The LUBA approximation has an average accuracy comparable to a l,000-step binomial tree. We introduce a modification of the binomial method (termed BBSR) that is very simple to implement and performs remarkably well. We also conduct a careful large-scale evaluation of many recent methods for computing American option prices.
Simulation has proved to be a valuable tool for estimating security prices for which simple closed form solutions do not exist. In this paper we present two direct methods, a pathwise method and a likelihood ratio method, for estimating derivatives of security prices using simulation. With the direct methods, the information from a single simulation can be used to estimate multiple derivatives along with a security's price. The main advantage of the direct methods over re-simulation is increased computational speed.
Simulation has proved to be a valuable tool for estimating security prices for which simple closed form solutions do not exist. In this paper we present two direct methods, a pathwise method and a likelihood ratio method, for estimating derivatives of security prices using simulation. With the direct methods, the information from a single simulation can be used to estimate multiple derivatives along with a security's price. The main advantage of the direct methods over re-simulation is increased computational speed.
A study was conducted to interpret the price-earnings ratio (P/E) and the market-to-book ratio (P/B) and describe their articulation. It also aimed to explain the role of book rate-of-return on equity in determining the ratios and the relation between them. The P/E ratio signifies future growth in earnings positively related to expected future return on equity and negatively related to current return on equity. On the other hand, the P/B ratio indicates only expected future return on equity.
We examine conditions under which "Veblen effects" arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption. While Veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a "single-crossing property," they may emerge when this property fails. In that case, "budget" brands are priced at marginal cost, while "luxury" brands, though not intrinsically superior, are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth.
Theoretical work on financing costs under asymmetric information has linked shifts in firms' internal funds and investment spending, holding constant investment opportunities. An impediment to convincing tests of these models is the lack of firm-level data on the relative cost of internal and external funds. We use a tax experiment, the surtax on undistributed profits in the 1930s, to identify firms' relative cost of internal and external funds by calculating surtax margins.
Theoretical work on financing costs under asymmetric information has linked shifts in firms' internal funds and investment spending, holding constant investment opportunities. An impediment to convincing tests of these models is the lack of firm-level data on the relative cost of internal and external funds. We use a tax experiment, the surtax on undistributed profits in the 1930s, to identify firms' relative cost of internal and external funds by calculating surtax margins.
This paper examines CEO pay in the banking industry and the effect of deregulating the market for corporate control. Using panel data on 147 banks over the 1980s, we find higher levels of pay in competitive corporate control markets, i.e., those in which interstate banking is permitted. We also find a stronger pay-performance relation in deregulated interstate banking markets. Finally, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation.
The article presents a study using the Euler equation for capital accumulation by individual business firms. First, authors' use an estimation strategy based on the Euler equation representation of firms' investment decisions. This strategy reflects reservations with standard investment models based on the q theory with adjustment costs. In particular, there are well-known problems in measuring marginal q, as well as concerns that observed stock market valuations may not accord with the predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis.
This article addresses the problem of valuing American call options with caps on dividend-paying assets. Since early exercise is allowed, the valuation problem requires the determination of optimal exercise policies. Options with two types of caps are analyzed: constant caps and caps with a constant growth rate. For constant caps, it is optimal to exercise at the first time at which the underlying asset's price equals or exceeds the minimum of the cap and the optimal exercise boundary for the corresponding uncapped option.
Examines how the benefits to managers of corporate control affect the relationship between managerial ownership and the stock returns of acquiring firms. Examination of mergers between 1985 and 1991; Characteristics of agency costs to equity in various levels of managerial ownership.
This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializingin the processing ofparticular types ofinformation. When these returns to specialization outweigh costsofcommunication, it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm.
To explore if, when, and how intentionally corporate officers conceal negative organizational outcomes from shareholders, we used computer-assisted content analysis of over 1,000 president's letters contained in annual reports to shareholders. Results suggest that outside directors, large institutional investors, and accountants limit such concealment, but small institutional investors and outside directors who are shareholders prompt it. Low disclosure is associated with subsequent selling of stock by top officers and outside directors.
Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book.
We show that valuing performance is equivalent to valuing a particular contingent claim on an index portfolio. In general the form of the contingent claim is not known and must be estimated. We suggest approximating the contingent claim by a series of options. We illustrate the use of our method by evaluating the performance of 130 mutual funds during the period 1968-82. We find that the relative performance rank of a fund is rather insensitive to the choice of the index, even though the actual value of the services of the portfolio manager depends on the choice of the index.
The article focuses on investment behavior using tax reforms as natural experiments. Economists and policymakers have long been interested in measuring the effects of changes in the returns to and costs of business fixed investment. That interest reflects both theoretical and practical concerns which have stimulated a large body of empirical research using aggregate and micro-level data. This literature has reached few unambiguous conclusions.
We find support for a negative relation between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance of monthly return, using a GARCH-M model modified by allowing (1) seasonal patterns in volatility, (2) positive and negative innovations to returns having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (3) nominal interest rates to predict conditional variance. Using the modified GARCH-M model, we also show that monthly conditional volatility may not be as persistent as was thought.
This essay reviews the literature on the role of the financial factors in the Depression, and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the Depression and for macroeconomics. I argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial-real links in the Depression followed a paradigm shift in economics.