Frieden and Sagalyn note that, in the 1970s, a city's favorite solution to solving its problems was to build a mall. Although in the complete chapter (Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities, MIT Press) the authors focus on four case studies of varying political and social conditions, this selection contains only the most prominent example of a downtown retail success story, Boston's Faneuil Hall Marketplace.
We consider a production/distribution system represented by a general directed acyclic network. Each node is associated with a specific "product" at a given location and/or production stage. An arc (i, j) indicates that item i is used to "produce" item j. External demands may occur at any of the network's nodes. These demands occur continuously at item-specific constant rates. Components may be assembled in any given proportions. The cost structure consists of inventory carrying, viable, and fixed production/distribution costs.
This paper addresses a class of single-machine scheduling problems with a common due-date for all jobs, and general earliness and tardiness costs. We show that a class of simple, polynomial, "greedy-type" heuristics can be used to generate close-to-optimal schedules. An extensive numerical study exhibits small optimality gaps. For convex cost structures, we establish that the worst-case optimality gap is bounded by e−i ≈ 0.36, if the due-date is non-restrictive.
This goal of this paper is to establish a research agenda that will lead to a stream of research that closes the gap between actual and normative strategic managerial decision making. We start by distinguishing strategic managerial decision making (choices) from other choices. Next, we propose a conceptual model of how managers make strategic decisions that is consistent with the observed gap between actual and normative decision making.
Faced with turbulent national and international environments, entire U.S. industries-most notably steel and automobiles-have revealed a distinct propensity to overlook radically new types of competitors, cling to traditional technologies, and remain mired in similar, yet outdated, strategic postures. In this article, we ascribe the adaptive failures of entire industries not only to the micro-cultures of single organizations, but also to what we term inter-organizational "macro-cultures"-relatively idiosyncratic beliefs that are shared by managers across organizations.
Polling system models are extensively used to model a large variety of computer and communication networks as well as production and service systems in which multiple customer classes or a number of distinct items compete for the capacity of a common server or production facility. In this paper we describe an efficient approximation method for the steady state distributions of the queue sizes and waiting times. This method is highly accurate as demonstrated by an extensive numerical study.
The widespread belief in the intuitive relationship between quality, customer satisfaction and economic returns, as well as the growing frustration with attempts to improve quality, serve to underscore the importance of analytical and empirical work increasing understanding of customer satisfaction and how it relates to economic returns. Firms that actually achieve high customer satisfaction also enjoy superior economic returns.
In this study we investigate several hypotheses relating strategic forecasting to market segment selection and firm performance. In the context of a strategic marketing simulation, subjects in 14 competitive industries made strategic forecasts for market segment size and benchmark prices.
The nature of competitive equilibrium is investigated for brands competing in a multi-attribute product space when consumer preferences for product attributes follow nonuniform distributions. Subgame-perfect equilibria are established in a 2-stage game, where firms choose positions in the first stage and prices in the 2nd stage. Two types of entry scenarios are investigated. In the first, the number of brands is given exogenously, and all of them choose positions simultaneously.