Strategy

Performance expectations are revisited pertaining to particular corporate strategies that were highlighted by Rumelt (1974). In particular, suggestions regarding expectations about conglomerate enterprises, vertical integration, and mature- or declining-demand businesses are offered in light of additional information about research findings and observed industry phenomena that are at odds with information available when Rumelt's (1974) study of diversification was performed.

Asymmetric information can distort market outcomes. I study how the online disclosure of information affects consumers’ behavior and firms’ incentives to upgrade product quality in markets where information is traditionally limited. I first build a model of consumer search with firms’ endogenous quality decisions. In this model, lower search costs reallocate demand toward higher-quality producers, raising firms’ incentives to upgrade quality, and more so for firms selling ex-ante lower-quality products.

In modern asset markets, man and machine compete for profits. How does each fare? I build a learning model in which quantitative investors (reliant on computer models) have more learning capacity but less flexibility to adapt to market conditions than discretionary investors (reliant on human judgment). I use machine learning to categorize US active equity mutual funds as quantitative or discretionary. Consistent with the model's predictions, I find that quantitative funds hold more stocks, specialize in stock picking, and engage in more overcrowded trades.

Most private wealth advisors (including trusts and estates lawyers, accountants and investment advisors) assume that a primary goal of their work is to reduce their clients’ taxes as much as possible, including to the point of elimination. The level of sophistication around tax reduction has grown substantially over the past few decades. This is especially true for family-owned businesses but also for all clients with substantial resources.

The SMR was pleased to conduct a set of launch conferences before its first published issue in 2020. One launch conference occurred at Columbia Business School in the summer of 2019 at which James Gorman, Chairman and CEO of Morgan Stanley served as the keynote speaker. An edited excerpt of part of his address appears below, in which he describes essential elements of his conception of strategy, or his principles of strategy. Kathryn Rudie Harrigan, Henry R.

We analyze a model of hierarchies in organizations in which neither decisions nor the delegation of decisions is contractible and in which power-hungry agents derive a private benefit from making decisions. Two distinct agency problems arise and interact: subordinates make more biased decisions (which favors adding more hierarchical layers), but uninformed superiors may fail to delegate (which favors removing layers). A designer may remove intermediate layers of the hierarchy (eliminate middle managers) or flatten an organization by removing top layers (eliminate top managers).

We consider a liquidation problem in which a risk-averse trader tries to liquidate a fixed quantity of an asset in the presence of market impact and random price fluctuations. When deciding the liquidation strategy, the trader encounters a trade-off between the transaction costs incurred due to market impact and the volatility risk of holding the position.

Employee misconduct is costly to organizations and has the potential to be even more common in gig and remote work contexts, in which workers are physically distant from their employers. There is, thus, a need for scholars to better understand what employers can do to mitigate misconduct in these nontraditional work environments, particularly as the prevalence of such work environments is increasing.

We show that dealer market power impedes the pass-through of monetary policy in repo markets, which is an important first stage of monetary policy transmission. In the European repo market, most participants do not have access to trade on centralized exchanges. Rather, they rely on OTC intermediation by a small number of dealers that exhibit significant market power. As a result, the passthrough of the ECB's policy rate to repo markets is inefficient and unequal.