Strategy

Stabilizing the world’s climates means cutting carbon dioxide pollution. There’s no way around it. But what if that’s not enough? What if it’s so late in the game that even cutting carbon emissions to zero, tomorrow, wouldn’t do?

Enter solar geoengineering.

The principle is simple: attempt to cool Earth by reflecting more sunlight back into space. The primary mechanism, shooting particles into the upper atmosphere, implies more pollution, not less. If that doesn’t sound scary, it should. There are lots of risks, unknowns, and unknowables.

We follow a representative panel of millions of consumers in the U.S. from 2007 to 2017 and document several facts on the long-term effects of the Great Recession. There were about six million foreclosures in the ten-year period after Lehman's collapse. Owners of multiple homes accounted for 25% of these foreclosures, while comprising only 13% of the market. Foreclosures displaced homeowners, with most of them moving at least once. Only a quarter of foreclosed households regained homeownership, taking an average four years to do so.

Many think that they understand the secrets to the success of the biggest tech companies: Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google. It's the platform economy, or network effects, or some other magical power that makes their ultimate world domination inevitable. Investment banker and professor Jonathan Knee argues that the truth is much more complicated--but entrepreneurs and investors can understand what makes the giants work, and learn the keys to lasting success in the digital economy.

We study qualitative information disclosure by mutual funds when investors learn from these disclosures in addition to past performance. We show theoretically that fund managers with specialized strategies optimally choose to disclose detailed strategy descriptions, while managers with standardized strategies provide generic descriptions. Generic descriptions lead to errors in benchmarking by investors and thus higher volatility in capital flows.

An historical review of managers' corporate renewal decisions reveals an evolving pattern away from using operating turnarounds in favor of making changes in corporate scope via transactions. One explanation for this progression away from operations is that financial valuation considerations supplant other inputs to managers' strategic logics — a reflection of the rising influence of financial institutions as activist owners.

In late 2007, less than 10 years into the company’s existence, Google came out swinging on the clean energy front. To a fanfare of plaudits up and down Silicon Valley and well beyond, it declared “RE<C” as its goal: make renewable energy cheaper than coal. The company invested tens of millions of dollars into R&D efforts from concentrated solar power to hydrothermal drilling. Four years later, those efforts had been scrapped.

We propose a parsimonious model of leverage and investment dynamics featuring a diffusion-jump cash-flow process, retained earnings, short-term debt, and external equity. Crucially equity issuance is costly. We show that firms' efforts to avoid incurring equity issuance costs generate empirically plausible target leverage and nonlinear leverage dynamics. Paradoxically, it is the high cost of equity issuance that causes the firm to keep leverage low, in contrast to the predictions of Modigliani-Miller and Leland tradeoff and Myers' pecking-order theories.

Product personalization opens the door to price discrimination. A rich product line allows for higher consumer satisfaction, but the mere choice of a product carries valuable information about the consumer that the firm can leverage for price discrimination. Controlling the degree of product personalization provides the firm with an additional tool to curb ratcheting forces arising from consumers' awareness of being price discriminated.

The initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic was characterized by voluminous, highly negative news coverage. Markets overreacted to uninformative news, and reacted more to news during high volatility periods. News coverage responded to lagged market activity, and causally impacted contemporaneous returns. The early part of the pandemic was characterized by pronounced feedback between news and markets. I propose a structural break test to identify the presence and end of such feedback episodes. This one ended in March 2020, which was knowable by the end of April.