Strategy

We use a very accurate panel of all individual spending, income, balances, and credit limits from a financial aggregation app and document significant payday responses of spending to the arrival of both regular and irregular income. These payday responses are clean, robust, and homogeneous for all income and spending categories throughout the income distribution. Spending responses to income are typically explained by households' capital structures: households that hold little or no liquid wealth have to consume hand-to-mouth.

The case is built around video clips from top business leaders in emerging markets who were interviewed for Harvard Business School’s innovative Creating Emerging Markets oral history project. Corruption is a widespread problem in emerging markets, and this case is focused on the agency of business in this issue. It uses the interview material to explore definitions of corruption; how it impacts business in emerging markets; how it can be addressed, by both the private and the public sectors; and the responsibility of both business and policy-makers to address corruption.

We develop a theory of banking that explains why banks started out as commodities warehouses. We show that warehouses become banks because their superior storage technology allows them to enforce the repayment of loans most effectively. Further, interbank markets emerge endogenously to support this enforcement mechanism. Even though warehouses store deposits of real goods, they make loans by writing new "fake" warehouse receipts, rather than by taking deposits out of storage.

Recent evidence suggests that investors are inattentive to their portfolios and hire expensive portfolio managers. This paper develops a life-cycle portfolio-choice model in which the investor experiences loss-averse utility over news and can ignore his portfolio. In such a model, the investor prefers to ignore and not rebalance his portfolio most of the time because he dislikes bad news more than he likes good news such that expected news cause a first-order decrease in utility.

The paper draws on Mohanty and Sundaresan (2018) to explore the effects of bankruptcy laws on the ex ante incentive for firms to hedge FX exposures. We use a simple model in which the bankruptcy code may result in deadweight losses, and may allow equity holders a share of residual value of the firm's assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The paper predicts that, while value-maximising firms promise to hedge a higher fraction of the value of their FX exposure when the debt is issued, they may renege subsequently and take on some FX exposures at the expense of foreign creditors.

The Language of Branding: Theory, Strategies and Tactics shows marketers how to use language successfully to improve brand value and influence consumer behavior.

We propose new metrics for investment performance based on short-run trading profitability. Since investment opportunities are scarce and value-relevant information decays over time, marginal decisions made by fund managers (i.e., trades) should provide more accurate signals about underlying skill than portfolio alphas, which are contaminated by the returns on "stale" positions.

Studies of how quantitative easing (QE) impacts asset prices typically look for effects in one- or two-day windows around QE announcements. This methodology underestimates the impact of QE on asset classes whose responses happen outside of this short time frame. We document that QE announcements by the Fed, ECB, and the Bank of England are associated with: quick price reactions of medium- and long-term government bonds; but with reactions in equity and equity implied volatility that occur over several weeks.

We present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital. We find that they make their contracts depend on public information, e.g., credit ratings or benchmark indices, as a way to attract flows, rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems, as has been emphasized in the literature. Unfortunately, asset managers' competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom: asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is socially inefficient.