Strategy

The incentive contracts of delegated investment managers may have unintended negative consequences for asset prices. I show that managers who are compensated for relative performance optimally shift their portfolio weights towards those of the benchmark when volatility rises, putting downward price pressure on overweight stocks and upward pressure on underweight stocks. In quarters when volatility rises most (top quintile), a portfolio of aggregate-underweight minus aggregate-overweight stocks returns 3% to 8% per quarter depending on the risk adjustment.

Columbia Business School’s position in the heart of New York City places it at the most important nexus of the global financial industry. It’s no coincidence that finance and economics are at the very core of Columbia Business School’s research and scholarship.

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of housing and mortgage markets with aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, costly liquidity and strategic defaults, empirically relevant informational asymmetries, and endogenous mortgage design. We show that adverse selection plays an important role in shaping the form of an equilibrium contract. If borrowers' homeownership values are known, aggregate wages and house prices determine the optimal state-contingent mortgage payments, which efficiently reduces the costs of liquidity default.

We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a continuous-time moral hazard problem and study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the intensity of performance-based incentives, reducing the likelihood of costly termination. We present a novel characterization of optimal dynamic incentive provision when performance-based incentives may decline continuously to zero. Termination happens in equilibrium only if its costs are relatively low.

We would like to share some of our general observations on activism, economics and the macro environment.

People are more generous toward single than toward multiple beneficiaries, and encouraging greater giving to multiple targets is challenging. We identify one factor, perceived efficacy, which enhances generosity toward multiple beneficiaries. We investigate relationships between perceived self-efficacy (believing one can take steps to make an impact), response efficacy (believing those steps will be effective), and charitable giving.

Top 15 Financial Times McKinsey Business Book of 2015

In an "activist risk arbitrage," a shareholder attempts to change the course of an announced M&A deal through public campaigns, and profits from improved terms. Compared to conventional (passive) risk arbitrageurs, activists target deals susceptible to managerial conflicts of interest (e.g., going-private and "friendly" deals) and deals with lower announcement premiums. Their presence increases the sensitivity of deal completion to market signals.

This paper explores the quantitative asset-pricing implications of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, as introduced by Koszegi and Rabin, in an otherwise traditional Lucas-tree m model. I find that the model easily succeeds in matching the historical equity premium and its variability when the preference parameters are calibrated in line with micro evidence. The equity premium is high because expectations-based loss aversion makes uncertain fluctuations in consumption more painful.