Following the financial crisis of 2008–2009, a large literature has emerged that attempts to quantify and measure systemic risk. In this paper we focus on some of the more popular systemic risk indicators from this literature and ask how well they work, in the following sense: At the aggregate level, what information above that which is readily observable in the market do we learn from these systemic risk indicators?
Media concentration has been an issue around the world. To some observers the power of large corporations has never been higher. To others, the Internet has brought openness and diversity. What perspective is correct? The answer has significant implications for politics, business, culture, regulation, and innovation. It addresses a highly contentious subject of public debate in many countries around the world. In this discussion, one side fears the emergence of media empires that can sway public opinion and endanger democracy.
In recent years, online retailers (also called e-tailers) have started allowing manufacturers direct access to their customers while charging a fee for providing this access, a format commonly referred to as agency selling. In this paper, we use a stylized theoretical model to answer a key question that e-tailers are facing: When should they use an agency selling format instead of using the more conventional reselling format?
Hedge fund activism emerged as a major force of corporate governance in the 2000s. By the mid-2000s, there were between 150 and 200 activist hedge funds in action each year, advocating for changes in 200–300 publicly listed companies in the United States. In this article, we review the evolution and major characteristics of hedge fund activism, as well as the short- and long-term impacts of the performance and governance of targeted companies.
We document that contractual disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages contained false information about the borrower's housing equity in 7–14% of loans. The rate of misrepresented loan default was 70% higher than for similar loans. These misrepresentations likely occurred late in the intermediation and exist among securities sold by all reputable intermediaries. Investors — including large institutions — holding securities with misrepresented collateral suffered severe losses due to loan defaults, price declines, and ratings downgrades.
Is the perceived value of things an absolute measurable quantity, as in economists’ notion of “cardinal utility,” or a relative assessment of the various objects being evaluated, as in economists’ notion of “ordinal utility”? We believe that the answer depends in part upon which judgment system underlies the evaluation. Specifically, we advance the proposition that due to its distant evolutionary roots, the affective system of judgment is inherently more ordinal (less cardinal) than the cognitive system.
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within three years after the intervention, and this improvement is pronounced in industries with low concentration. By following plants that were sold post-intervention we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value.
I view the research articles presented here as prototypical examples of what may be called “the new wave” in studying Asian markets and consumers. This emerging “new wave” has a different focus than research done over the last few decades. Research is shifting from an emphasis on traditional Asian culture toward a focus on consumer culture and how this consumer culture manifests itself in various Asian markets. The “new wave” research also focuses less on general concepts and more on uniquely Asian phenomena. Finally, methodologically research is shifting from “East” vs.
We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance — the claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. We subject this claim to a comprehensive empirical investigation, examining a long five-year window following activist interventions, and we find that the claim is not supported by the data.