Interest Rates and Inflation: What’s Next for the Federal Reserve?
Professor Pierre Yared describes why the U.S. economy is unlikely to see an economic downturn comparable with the 1970s.
Professor Pierre Yared describes why the U.S. economy is unlikely to see an economic downturn comparable with the 1970s.
Tano Santos, the Robert Heilbrunn Professor of Asset Management and Finance and Director of Columbia Business School’s Heilbrunn Center for Graham and Dodd Investing, discusses the school’s approach to value investing and finance.
This paper studies systemic risk in the interbank market. We first establish that in the German interbank lending market, a few large banks intermediate funding flows between many smaller periphery banks. We then develop a network model in which banks trade off the costs and benefits of link formation to explain these patterns. The model is structurally estimated using banks' preferences as revealed by the observed network structure before the 2008 financial crisis.
We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies.
Bank bond portfolios remained deeply underwater in the fourth quarter of 2022, reducing banks' access to liquidity in the first quarter when deposits became far more precious.
Todd Baker is a financial services executive whose career has led him from corporate law to C-suite strategic business leadership roles at several of the largest domestic and international banks and roles as an academic, consultant, writer, speaker and commentator on banking, financial technology, consumer financial access and regulation issues.
Brett House is Professor of Professional Practice in the Economics Division at Columbia Business School. His research and writing are focused on macroeconomics and international finance, with interests in fiscal issues, monetary policy, international trade, financial crises, and debt markets. His work has been published in peer-reviewed journals and international media.
Yiming Ma is an Associate Professor in the Finance Division at Columbia Business School. She received her Ph.D. in Finance from the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2018 and a B.A. in Economics & Mathematical and Global Affairs from Yale University in 2013.
For 29 years Michael has invested directly at the security level and indirectly as an asset allocator in traditional and alternative asset classes. He is a Managing Director, Head of Hedge Funds and Alternative Alpha, and on the Investment Committee at APG, a world leader in Environmental, Social and Governance Investing. Previously he was the Chief Investment Officer at MOV37 and Protege Partners.
Achilles Venetoulias has 30 years’ experience in taking and managing risk, and in creating and running businesses. He has founded and run two hedge funds, taken proprietary risk for large institutions, supervised the investment process for a European fund of hedge funds, and served on the Board of a fund of hedge funds for an international wealth management firm. He has also founded a fintech company that
Pierre Yared is the MUTB Professor of International Business, Senior Vice Dean for Faculty Affairs, and Vice Dean for Executive Education at Columbia Business School. His research, which has been published in leading academic journals, focuses on macroeconomic policy and political economy. He is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and an associate editor of the American Economic Review. Yared teaches Global Economic Environment, a Core MBA course in macroeconomics for which he received the Dean’s Award for Teaching Excellence.
Professor Tetlock's research interests include behavioral finance, asset pricing, and prediction markets. One area of his research examines how firms' stock market prices respond to the content of news stories. His 2007 Journal of Finance study on the impact of negative words, such as "flaw" and "ruin," won the Smith-Breeden Prize for the best article in asset pricing. His research has been featured in popular press outlets such as Business Week, The Economist, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal.
Harry Mamaysky is a Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia Business School, where he serves as the Director of the Program for Financial Studies. He is also on the Steering Committee of the Columbia-IBM Center for Blockchain and Technology. Harry teaches capital markets and asset pricing to MBA, Masters and PhD students, as well as Executive Education courses on the use of text data in finance, and on corporate bonds. He has consulted for a quantitative investment firm and for a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.
Matthew Dell Orfano is a Senior member at Discovery Capital, focusing globally on multiple sectors, thematic trade construction, and special situations, in addition to managing their data efforts. He is responsible for individual positions and the internal thematically driven portfolio, which assimilates bottoms-up analysis and macro thematic from over 55 countries into actionable insights.
Jesse Schreger is an associate professor of macroeconomics in the Economics Division at Columbia Business School. His research is primarily on international finance and macroeconomics, focusing on sovereign debt and exchange rates. His work has been published in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, and the Journal of International Economics.
The US entrepreneurial finance market has changed dramatically over the last two decades. Entrepreneurs who raise their first round of venture capital retain 30% more equity in their firm and are more likely to control their board of directors. Late-stage start-ups are raising larger amounts of capital in the private markets from a growing pool of traditional and new investors. These private market changes have coincided with a sharp decline in the number of firms going public—and when firms do go public, they are older and have raised more private capital.
Researchers and practitioners in marketing, economics, and public policy often use preference elicitation tasks to forecast realworld behaviors. These tasks typically ask a series of similarly structured questions.
Researchers and practitioners in marketing, economics, and public policy often use preference elicitation tasks to forecast realworld behaviors. These tasks typically ask a series of similarly structured questions.
We consider a finite-horizon multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in a Bayesian setting, for which we propose an information relaxation sampling framework. With this framework, we define an intuitive family of control policies that include Thompson sampling (TS) and the Bayesian optimal policy as endpoints. Analogous to TS, which, at each decision epoch pulls an arm that is best with respect to the randomly sampled parameters, our algorithms sample entire future reward realizations and take the corresponding best action.
We consider a finite-horizon multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in a Bayesian setting, for which we propose an information relaxation sampling framework. With this framework, we define an intuitive family of control policies that include Thompson sampling (TS) and the Bayesian optimal policy as endpoints. Analogous to TS, which, at each decision epoch pulls an arm that is best with respect to the randomly sampled parameters, our algorithms sample entire future reward realizations and take the corresponding best action.
This paper studies product ranking mechanisms of a monopolistic online platform in the presence of social learning. The products’ quality is initially unknown, but consumers can sequentially learn it as online reviews accumulate. A salient aspect of our problem is that consumers, who want to purchase a product from a list of items displayed by the platform, incur a search cost while scrolling down the list. In this setting, the social learning dynamics, and hence the demand, is affected by the interplay of two unique features: substitution and ranking effects.
This article analyzes the hedging potential of real estate and especially looks at the impact of lease contracts in various countries around the world on the inflation hedge capability for both expected and unexpected inflation. The dataset consists of direct real estate rent and capital value data for 59 cities/MSAs in 25 countries between 1991 and 2020 to make international comparison over a long time period possible. The results indicate that real estate is a good hedge against inflation, and especially against unexpected inflation.
Moral hazards are ubiquitous. Green ones typically involve technological fixes: Environmentalists often see ‘technofixes’ as morally fraught because they absolve actors from taking more difficult steps toward systemic solutions. Carbon removal and especially solar geoengineering are only the latest example of such technologies. We here explore green moral hazards throughout American history. We argue that dismissing (solar) geoengineering on moral hazard grounds is often unproductive.
We developed a predictive statistical model to identify donor–recipient characteristics related to kidney graft survival in the Chilean population. Given the large number of potential predictors relative to the sample size, we implemented an automated variable selection mechanism that could be revised in future studies as more national data is collected. Materials and Methods: A retrospective multicenter study was conducted to analyze data from 822 adult kidney transplant recipients from adult donors between 1998 and 2018.
We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we examine rules under limited enforcement: the government has full policy discretion and can only be incentivized to comply with a rule via the use of penalties which are joint and bounded. We show that optimal incentives must be bang-bang.