Labor Markets

Multinational enterprises are at the centre of policy debates in low- and middle-income countries. As some of the most productive and innovative firms in the world, which are at the core of global supply chains, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can accelerate development in the countries hosting them, both directly with their presence, and indirectly through linkages to local economic actors.

Multinational enterprises are at the centre of policy debates in low- and middle-income countries. As some of the most productive and innovative firms in the world, which are at the core of global supply chains, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can accelerate development in the countries hosting them, both directly with their presence, and indirectly through linkages to local economic actors.

Many state and local governments incentivize new business creation. I analyze local growth policy in a setting where firm entry and expansion choices exhibit local complementarities, creating dynamic misallocation at the aggregate level. Optimal entry subsidies would speed the transition of Rust-belt workers to the South and Mountain West by an extra 10 million people by 2035, raising real incomes by 4%. Actual subsidies substantially worsen misallocation, lowering welfare by 3%, 6 times the size of the subsidies themselves.

Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must coordinate members’ views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar’s burgeoning labor movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both ability and personality traits that enable them to influence others, yet they earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers’ views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union’s preferred policy.

Although there have been numerous studies on voluntary departure—i.e., quit behavior—the way race influences voluntary departure is not yet settled. Some studies suggest racial minorities are more apt to voluntarily depart than non-minority employees due to discrimination in the workplace. Other studies suggest racial minorities are more apt to stay due to discrimination in the labor market.

Screening human capital based on signals such as job applications or entrepreneurial pitches is crucial for organizations. Signals are often informative insofar as they require differential knowledge and effort to produce. Generative AI (GAI) complicates screening by lowering the cost of producing impressive signals. We model the informational effects of GAI, showing that applicants' access to GAI can increase—but also decrease—an evaluator's screening mistakes. This result depends on how GAI affects experts' signals compared to non-experts'.

How can we measure the extent to which data-intensive firms are using their market power? Economists typically look to markups as evidence of market power. Using a simple model with firms that price risk in their capital allocation and production decisions, we highlight the competing forces that make markups an unreliable measure of data-derived market power. Instead, we show how markups measured at different levels of aggregation reflect data and distinguish data from other intangible investments.

Gamified training is a novel management control system in which companies use gamification techniques to engage and motivate employees to learn. This study empirically examines the performance consequences of gamified training using data from a natural field experiment in a professional services firm. We find that, on average, the main effect of adopting the gamified training platform on performance is significantly positive. We also study whether outcomes depend on how engaged the office is in the gamified training platform (i.e.