Strategy

Active investors provide entrepreneurs with risk-sharing and value-adding effort, e.g., in form of advising, networking and monitoring. However, holdup problems may create a conflict between two key objectives for high-quality entrepreneurs: to elicit investor effort and to credibly signal their firm type by retaining shares. As a result, pooling of startup firms of different types may arise, in particular when investor effort is essential. More established firms, with access to multiple signals, can always realize both of these objectives.

Jacob Goldenberg, Sangman Han, and Donald Lehmann discuss the critical role of "social hubs" in social systems (i.e., individuals with an exceptionally large number of social ties). They point to the importance of identifying such social hubs for accelerating the diffusion of products.

This paper documents frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open-end discounted closed-end funds, particularly after the 1992 proxy reform which reduced the costs of communication among shareholders. Open-ending attempts have a substantial effect on discounts, reducing them, on average, to half of their original level. The size of the discount is a major determinant of whether a fund gets attacked. Other important factors include the costs of communication among shareholders and the governance structure of the targeted fund.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of a new and increasingly important phenomenon: the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt claims of the same company by non-commercial banking institutions ("dual holders"). The presence of dual holders offers a unique opportunity to assess the existence and magnitude of shareholder-creditor conflicts. We find that syndicated loans with dual holder participation have loan yield spreads that are 18–32 bps lower than those without. The difference remains economically significant after controlling for the selection effect.

As we contemplate the raft of regulatory reforms currently being proposed, it is important not only to consider the content of regulation, but also its structure. In particular, it is important to ask how the role of the Fed as a regulator should change, and how the targets and the tools of monetary and regulatory policy should adapt to new regulatory mandates. For example, some reform proposals envision a dramatic expansion of Fed regulatory authority, while others do not, and some proposals envision the Fed's using monetary policy to prick asset bubbles, while others do not.

The banking legislation of the 1930s took very little time to pass, was unusually comprehensive, and unusually responsive to public opinion. Ironically, the primary motivations for the main bank regulatory reforms in the 1930s (Regulation Q, the separation of investment banking from commercial banking, and the creation of federal deposit insurance) were to preserve and enhance two of the most disastrous policies that contributed to the severity and depth of the Great Depression — unit banking and the real bills doctrine.

This article reviews shareholder activism by hedge funds. We first describe the nature and characteristics of hedge fund activism, including the objectives, tactics, and choices of target companies. We then analyze possible value creation brought about by activist hedge funds, both for shareholders in the target companies and for investors in the hedge funds. The evidence generally supports the view that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating performance of target firms.