Strategy

This paper studies dynamic competition in markets characterized by the introduction of technologically advanced next-generation products. Firms invest in new product effort in an attempt to attain industry leadership, thus securing high profits and benefiting from advantages relevant for the success of future product generations. The analysis reveals that when the current leader possesses higher research and development (R&D) competence, it tends to invest more in R&D than rivals and to retain its lead position.

This paper studies the delegation as an alternative to communication. We show that a principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment. We further identify cases in which the principal optimally delegates control to an "intermediary," and show that keeping a veto-right typically reduces the expected utility of the principal unless the incentive conflict is extreme.

As more firms adopt a customer asset management approach to their business, it has become increasingly important to understand how customer management efforts relate to the financial performance of the firm. Of specific interest to shareholders is the relationship between traditional financial measures and customer-centric measures. The customer-centric measure that has received the most attention is customer lifetime value (CLV).

We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner's curse driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.

Pricing is one of the most crucial determinants of sales. Besides the actual price, how the price offering is presented to consumers also affects consumer evaluation of the product offering. Many studies focus on "price framing," i.e., how the offer is communicated to the consumer?is the offered price given along with a reference price, is the reference price plausible, is a price deal communicated in dollar or percentage terms. Other studies focus on "situational effects," e.g., is the evaluation for a national brand or a private brand, is it within a discount store or a specialty store.

A planner and agent in a permanent-income economy cannot observe part of the state, regard their model as an approximation, and value decision rules that are robust across a set of models. They use robust decision theory to choose allocations. Equilibrium prices reflect the preference for robustness and so embody a “market price of Knightian uncertainty.” We compute market prices of risk and compare them with a model that assumes that the state is fully observed. We use detection error probabilities to constrain a single parameter that governs the taste for robustness.

We consider the problem of managing inventories and dynamically adjusting retailer prices in distribution systems with geographically dispersed retailers. More specifically, we analyze the following single item, periodic review model. The distribution of demand in each period, at a given retailer, depends on the item's price according to a stochastic demand function. These stochastic demand functions may vary by retailer and by period. The replenishment process consists of two phases: In some or all periods, a distribution center may place an order with an outside supplier.