Welcome to the Management Division of Columbia Business School! Our website offers a window into the teaching and research activities of the division.
We explore the forces that affect the performance of organizations by studying individual and interpersonal behavior, group interactions, organizational structure and strategic interactions. The insights are relevant for established and large firms to small and growing entrepreneurial ventures. The members of our division are scholars and practitioners that shed light on management questions from different disciplines that include psychology, strategy, sociology, political science, and economics.
The Management Division prepares leaders for the future of business based on our theoretical and empirical research at the scientific frontier. We publish cutting edge research and translate it into insights that are practical and tangible for business leaders of today and tomorrow.
James P. Gorman Professor of Business; Chair of Management Division
In the Media
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Cantaloupe Is Being Recalled over a Salmonella Outbreak. Here's What Business Owners Need to Know
We propose one route to a more inclusive society. Our context is the prevailing one of high wealth inequality where stockholders alone supply the stochastic discount factor governing the allocation of capital. A large and pervasive pecuniary externality is thus imposed on non-stockholder workers, something we view as antithetical to the notion of an inclusive society.
‘Moral hazard’ links geoengineering to mitigation via the fear that either solar geoengineering (solar radiation management, SRM) or carbon dioxide removal (CDR) might crowd out the desire to cut emissions. Fear of this crowding-out effect ranks among the most frequently cited risks of (solar) geoengineering. We here test moral hazard versus its inverse in a large-scale, revealed-preference experiment (n~340,000) on Facebook and find little to no support for either outcome. For the most part, talking about SRM or CDR does not motivate our study population to support a large U.S.
We propose a tractable model of dynamic investment, spinoffs, financing, and risk management for a multi-division firm facing costly external finance. Our analysis formalizes
An investor receives utility bursts from realizing gains and losses at the individual-stock level (Barberis and Xiong, 2009, 2012; Ingersoll and Jin, 2013) and dynamically allocates his mental budget between risky and risk-free assets at the trading-account level. Using savings, he reduces his stockholdings and is more willing to realize losses. Using leverage, he increases his stockholdings beyond his mental budget and is more reluctant to realize losses. While leverage strengthens the disposition effect, introducing leverage constraints mitigates it.
We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks’ inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from non-depository intermediaries.