We propose a model of dynamic corporate investment, financing, and risk management for a financially constrained firm. The model highlights the central importance of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity (cash and credit line) for corporate decisions.
Leading up to the recent crisis, government encouraged risky lending, and failed to measure banks' risks credibly or to require sufficient capital. Regulators also failed to losses or enforce intervention protocols for timely resolution. This paper proposes radical policy changes to prevent a recurrence. The need is not for more complex rules and more supervisory discretion, but rather for simpler rules that are meaningful in measuring and limiting risk, hard for market participants to circumvent and credibly enforced by supervisors.
Over the years, the level of analytical rigor has risen in articles published in marketing academic journals. While, ceteris paribus, rigor is desirable, there is a growing sense that rigor has become a, if not the, goal for research in marketing. Consequently, other desirable characteristics, such as relevance, communicability, and simplicity, have been downplayed, to the detriment of the field of marketing.
Customer switching costs are an important factor in account-based services such as telecommunications, financial, insurance and brokerage services. In these businesses, existing customers incur significant costs if they switch to another provider. Such costs include physical configuration and installation costs, contractual costs (e.g. termination fees) and cognitive costs of learning. These switching costs enable a firm to extract more revenue from incumbent customers by charging them higher prices.
The principal performance measures in an inventory system involve key characteristics of the system's inventory position, i.e., the total inventory the firm is economically committed to, as well as the average order size or order frequency. As to the former, the focus among operation managers is on the maximum inventory (position), the average inventory and the minimum inventory, the latter being related to the so-called safety stock concept. Financial analysts and macroeconomists pay particular attention to the sales/inventory ratio, also referred to as the inventory turnover.
Contingent capital, a regulatory debt that must convert into common equity when a bank's equity value falls below a specified threshold (a trigger), does not in general lead to a unique equilibrium in the prices of the bank's equity and contingent capital. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium arises because economic agents are not allowed to choose a conversion policy in their best interests. The lack of unique equilibrium introduces the potential for price manipulation, market uncertainty, inefficient capital allocation, and unreliability of conversion.
Past research recognizes that firms exploit regulatory variations to their advantage but depicts such regulatory arbitrage as a dyadic process between firms and regulators. We extend this account by including a firm’s non-market rivals and suggest that firms view regulatory differences as part of a corporate political opportunity structure and exploit regulatory variations to disadvantage their rivals. Empirically, we focus on variations in right-to-work (RTW) laws that signal the pro-business climate in a state; these laws exist in 22 U.S. states.