Events 2013-2014

May 23, 2014

• Columbia Business School
   

April 29, 2014

Columbia Business School Room 141

• 6:15 p.m. - 7:45 p.m.

April 10, 2014

Senior Level Dutch Delegation, Law School - Annex Building

• 9:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.

April 2, 2014

• Participant Jonathan Cole, Provost and Dean Emeritus of Columbia University
• 6:45 p.m. - 8:15 p.m.

Is the college of the future online? With the popularity of MOOCs (massive open online courses) and the availability of online degree programs at a fraction of their on-campus price, we are experiencing an exciting experiment in higher education. Does the traditional classroom stand a chance? Will online education be the great equalizer, or is a campus-based college experience still necessary?

March 19, 2014

• 12:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

224, West 57th, New York, NY

Join Open Society Foundations for a provocative dialogue about how work is transforming and what that means for our future.

January 27, 2014

Jerome Greene Hall - Room 602

• Speaker Wolf-Georg Ringe
• 12:00 p.m.

The project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework has been reached with difficulty, and it looks possible that resolution may follow soon. However, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the FDIC has devised in the implementation of the "Orderly Liquidation Authority" under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important institutions need to have in their liability structure sufficient subordinated term debt so that in the event of bank failure, the conversion of debt into equity will be sufficient to absorb asset losses without impairing deposits and other short term credit; second, the organizational structure of the financial institution needs to permit such a debt conversion without putting core financial constituents through a bankruptcy, and third, a federal funding mechanism deployable at the discretion of the resolution authority must be available to supply liquidity to a reorganizing bank. On these conditions, deposit insurance plays a subsidiary role in resolution and could remain at the national (not EU) level.

January 22, 2014

Jerome Greene Hall - Room 646

• Speaker Kevin Haeberle
• 12:00 p.m.

This discussion revisits the association between firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) and whether the firm has a staggered board. As is well known, in the cross-section firms with a staggered board tend to have a lower value. Using a comprehensive sample for 1978 – 2011, we show an opposite result in the time series: firms that adopt a staggered board increase in firm value, while de-staggering is associated with a decrease in firm value. We further show that the decision to adopt a staggered board seems endogenous, and related to an ex ante lower firm value, which helps reconciling the existing cross-sectional results to our novel time series results. To explain our new results, we explore potential incentive problems in the shareholder-manager relationship. Short-term oriented shareholders may generate myopic incentives for the firm to underinvest in risky long-term projects. In this case, a staggered board may helpfully insulate the board from opportunistic shareholder pressure. Consistent with this, we find that the adoption of a staggered board has a stronger positive association with firm value for firms where such incentive problems are likely more severe: firms with more R&D, more intangible assets, more innovative and larger and thus likely more complex firms.

January 16, 2014

Jerome Greene Hall - Room 502

• Speaker Martijn Cremer
• 2:00 p.m.

This discussion revisits the association between firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) and whether the firm has a staggered board. As is well known, in the cross-section firms with a staggered board tend to have a lower value. Using a comprehensive sample for 1978 – 2011, we show an opposite result in the time series: firms that adopt a staggered board increase in firm value, while de-staggering is associated with a decrease in firm value. We further show that the decision to adopt a staggered board seems endogenous, and related to an ex ante lower firm value, which helps reconciling the existing cross-sectional results to our novel time series results. To explain our new results, we explore potential incentive problems in the shareholder-manager relationship. Short-term oriented shareholders may generate myopic incentives for the firm to underinvest in risky long-term projects. In this case, a staggered board may helpfully insulate the board from opportunistic shareholder pressure. Consistent with this, we find that the adoption of a staggered board has a stronger positive association with firm value for firms where such incentive problems are likely more severe: firms with more R&D, more intangible assets, more innovative and larger and thus likely more complex firms.

January 8, 2014

• Richman Center co-director David Schizer speaks at the Beida-Columbia Shale Energy Workshop in Beijing

December 6, 2013

Columbia Business School - Room 307

• Speaker Guest Jennifer Hill
• 12:30-2:00pm

JD/MBA Students - by invitation only

December 2, 2013

17 West 17th St - Eighth Floor

• 6:00-8:00pm

Rich Yeselson called for changes in how unions are run and organized in an article on "Fortress Unionism" - and Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, both former presidents of national unions, responded. Sarita Gupta, Executive Director, Jobs with Justice, now joins the discussion.

To read the relevant articles, see here.

November 21, 2013

• Columbia University, Faculty House, 64 Morningside Drive

For Elected and Appointed Officials only

November 19, 2013

Columbia Business School- Room 301

• 6:15pm-7:30pm
• (Co- sponsored with Silfen Series)

Mr. Fink has led the firm since its founding in 1988, keeping client-centric solutions and innovation at the forefront of his leadership. Mr. Fink leads the Global Executive Committee, which sets the strategic direction of the Company and works across businesses to ensure BlackRock is prepared to solve our client’s most critical investment challenges.

Mr. Fink is frequently sought after by government leaders, policy makers and some of the world’s largest organizations for guidance on how to navigate the increasing complexities of the global financial markets. He is actively involved in discussing major public policy issues and represents the investor perspective in ongoing financial reforms.

Mr. Fink was named "CEO of the Decade" by Financial News in 2011 and has been named one of the "World's Best CEO's" by Barron's for seven consecutive years.

October 31, 2013

Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP

767 5th Avenue, 25th Floor

• 8:00am-9:30am (Breakfast starts at 7:45am)

October 16, 2013

Kaufman Center
129 W. 67th Street, New York, New York 10023

• 5:30pm-6:30pm Private Reception (Kaufman Center; 2nd Floor)
• 6:45pm-8:30pm Program (Kaufman Center)
• 8:45pm-10:00pm Private Reception (A Voce, Time Warner Building)

October 11, 2013

Columbia Law School - Room 106

• 9:00am-5:45pm

Panel of experts will discuss subprime mortgage-backed securities, LIBOR, Workplace Safety and Cyber Crimes.

​October 10, 2013

• The Columbia Club, James Madison Room
• 15 West 43rd Street 6:00-8:00pm